Exchange of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information Agreement

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Monday 17th January 2022 Grand Committee

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, I should at the outset make it clear that I welcome the agreement by the US and the UK to make naval nuclear propulsion information available to Australia, one of our oldest and most valuable allies. A step such as this, which will substantially enhance the deterrent capacity of an ally in a sensitive and strategically important region of the world where tensions and challenges are on the rise, makes good sense. When the dust has settled, one hopes that all western allies that have a stake in the security of Indo-Pacific region—including France, however much it was justifiably affronted by the way the announcement of this agreement was handled—will recognise that we all collectively have much to gain from Australia’s increased naval capability.

As to the announcement of the agreement, there, I am afraid, the positive tone changes. That was a travesty of diplomacy. In future years, I suspect this episode will be taught at diplomatic academies across the world as how quite unnecessarily to lose both friends and influence. Why did the Prime Minister think it was sensible to rub salt in French wounds by insulting President Macron with some ill-chosen Franglais, in sharp contrast to President Biden’s willingness to offer an apology and seek to put hard feeling behind us? Are we so pre-eminent in world affairs that we can hope to get away unscathed with that kind of performance? Perhaps the Minister can use the opportunity of replying to this debate to match President Biden’s example. I would greatly welcome it if she did.

Some important questions remain to be answered about the agreement, and I hope the Minister will be able to respond to them. Here are three. First, is this agreement in no sense a defence pact or treaty with objectives and obligations similar to those in the Atlantic alliance? I ask that because a great deal of the press comment has been extraordinarily wide of the mark, as I understand it. The words “pact”, “mutual defence treaty” and so on are thrown around, and it would be a great help if the Minister could correct that—if I am right in thinking that it needs correcting. I hope the answer is no, since I do not think that this is the moment to revive those Cold War relics SEATO and CENTO. To do so would risk opening up rifts in what we must hope will be the widest possible involvement of countries in the Indo-Pacific region, working together to deter any possible Chinese attempt to extend its sphere of influence. I doubt very much whether India, Japan, South Korea or even New Zealand would contemplate joining such a mutual defence organisation, and we surely do not want to slip into new a Cold War mentality when the solution of so many of the world’s problems, such as those relating to climate change, health, trade and nuclear non-proliferation, necessitate working with China.

Secondly, will Australia, a non-nuclear member state under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, be negotiating suitable safeguards with the International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure that there are no proliferation risks from this exchange of information? Will that be a condition of supply?

Thirdly, would it be preferable if any technology transfer to Australia—here I speak about something that, I imagine, might not take place for some time, while design and competition between us and the United States take places—takes the form of propulsion units that will not require replenishment during the life of the submarine in question? That would thus avoid the greatest risk of fissionable material, in the form of high enriched uranium, getting into the wrong hands. It would be very useful if the noble Baroness addressed those three questions. I hope her replies strengthen my welcome for this agreement.