Syria

Lord Hain Excerpts

Monday 20th May 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

My hon. Friend will understand that negotiations with other EU states about the arms embargo are going on now, and there are different forms of amending it. We will meet as Foreign Ministers in Brussels next Monday to look at those discussions in detail. I can say to my hon. Friend that we are prepared to do that if necessary, but of course we are looking for agreement with other EU member states.

[Mr Peter Hain (Neath) (Lab)]

Surely the right hon. Gentleman accepts that his remorseless drive towards British military intervention through supplying arms—because that is what it is—will make the civil war even worse. Having said that, I welcome his commitment to a negotiated solution, although the only way it has a chance of succeeding is by not maintaining the precondition that Assad must go. Of course we all want to see an end to his barbarous rule, but so long as the precondition that he must go is maintained, the conference will never get off the ground.

[Mr Hague]

If is of course our opinion—I suspect it is the opinion of everyone in the House—that Assad should go, but we are not producing any new precondition for the conference or recommending that anybody else should do so. Our starting point for the conference is the outcome of last year’s Geneva conference, which agreed that there should be a transitional Government with full Executive powers formed by mutual consent—that the regime and opposition should each be content with those forming that transitional Government. It would be wrong to retreat from what was agreed last year—that is the only basis for peace and democracy in Syria—and we are not adding any further precondition to that.

Syria

Lord Hain Excerpts

Wednesday 6th March 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

I am grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend for saying that the measures I have announced should be welcomed by the House. I welcome his support and, yes, I absolutely understand that after more than a decade of conflict, in different ways, people are always anxious about new conflict. That does not mean, however, that we can stick our heads in the sand and ignore the new conflicts that have arisen in the world and that can affect us, for all the reasons that I have described. It does mean that our response to them has to be very intelligent and well calculated. Getting to the heart of his question, I think we can say clearly that no western Government are advocating the military intervention of western nations—or of any nations—in the conflict in Syria. The discussion is entirely focused on the degree of assistance that can and should be delivered to the opposition inside Syria. That is what the discussion is centred on, rather than on an external military intervention.

[Mr Peter Hain (Neath) (Lab)]

But will the Foreign Secretary accept that the logical next step in the strategy that he has been pursuing for six months, if not more, is to arm the opposition? That is the logical position that he is now in, but I think that it is profoundly mistaken. Every time he has made a statement on this matter in the past six months, he has carried the whole House with him in eloquently condemning the horror, the deterioration and the barbarity of the evil Assad regime, but his strategy is wrong. Just going for regime change in what is a civil war, with its Shi’a-Sunni conflict and its reincarnation of the cold war, is never going to achieve his objective. What he should be doing, instead of just promoting the opposition’s call for negotiations, is testing the willingness to negotiate that Assad expressed over the weekend. He should test it to destruction, but he is not doing that. He is pursuing a failed strategy involving a monumental failure of diplomacy, and it is making the situation worse.

[Mr Hague]

The right hon. Gentleman does not help his case in describing the Government’s position in that way. It very much follows from what I said in response to the shadow Foreign Secretary that we believe the apparent offer of President Assad to negotiate must absolutely be tested and tested to destruction. We will certainly do that, and the right hon. Gentleman and I will strongly agree on that. If he were in government today, however, he would have to think about what else to do if that did not work, and it has not worked over the last two years—

[Mr Hain]

It hasn’t been tried.

[Mr Hague]

It has been tried countless times: Lakhdar Brahimi has been to Damascus countless times, and Kofi Annan before him went to Damascus countless times. Every possibility has been given to the regime to negotiate, but it has never entered into a sincere or meaningful negotiation. That being the case, it is not adequate to watch slaughter on this scale and say that we will stick our heads in the sand about it. It is important to have a foreign policy that relieves human suffering and upholds human rights. I would have thought that the right hon. Gentleman would always be in favour of that.

Syria: anti-Government Forces

Lord Hain Excerpts

Monday 4th March 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Peter Hain (Neath) (Lab)]

I urge the Foreign Secretary, in his forthcoming statement to the Commons, not to change Government policy. This is a military stalemate that cannot be won by the rebels or by the Government. Handing weapons to jihadists and Salafis who are leading attacks and planting bombs will make the killing worse, not better, and will hinder aid efforts with which the UK Government are helping. I urge him not to get dragged into the quagmire of a catastrophic civil war. President Assad, with all his flaws, announced at the weekend that we need to promote negotiations, and the opposition leader has said that he is ready to do so.

[Mr Swire]

My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary will hear what the right hon. Gentleman says, and he makes a valid point. I stress again, however, that the change to EU sanctions legislation concerns the provision of non-lethal and technical assistance; it is not concerned with the provision of weapons or with arming either side. I repeat what I said earlier: the countries arming President Assad’s Government in particular should stop, because it is they who are directly contributing to the carnage unfolding in Syria.

Europe

Lord Hain Excerpts

Wednesday 30th January 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

I will give way to the right hon. Member for Neath (Mr Hain) and then to one Government Member.

[Mr Peter Hain (Neath) (Lab)]

I am grateful to the Foreign Secretary; he is being very generous. Having represented the Government for two years in Europe, it is clear to me that we can best stand up for Britain’s interests, and sometimes achieve our objectives against all the odds, by building alliances and friendships and being right in there negotiating. How is he getting along with that enterprise?

[Mr Hague]

I have just pointed out many of the things that we have achieved. The reason we have had such strong support from Germany, Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands on the EU budget is that we have built alliances. The reason that the EU patent regime has been brought in is that we have built alliances. I hope that that is well understood by Members from all parts of the House.

Mali

Lord Hain Excerpts

Monday 14th January 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mark Simmonds]

I thank my hon. Friend for his question. The capital of Mali is pronounced “Bam-ack-co”.

Just to clarify the matter, there are currently no plans for NATO to be involved in Mali. The EU has drawn up a mission comprising 400 men, about 250 of whom will be force protection, and they are due to deploy later in the year. My hon. Friend asked a specific question about the number of military personnel who will be there to operate and to defend, if necessary, the aircraft when they are in Bamako. I will have to let him know about that.

[Mr Peter Hain (Neath) (Lab)]

Does the Minister share my scepticism at the French Foreign Minister’s prediction that French soldiers will be out of Mali in a matter of weeks? That seems pretty unlikely to me. On the comparisons with Sierra Leone, does the Minister agree that it would be wrong to make the wrong comparisons? ECOWAS was deployed in Sierra Leone, and I understand that it will quite rightly be deployed in Mali, but the situation in Sierra Leone required British troops to go in and defeat the terrorists there. The second point on Sierra Leone is that there were no jihadi extremists with an international dimension, including al-Qaeda. Sierra Leone was a specific situation, fuelled by blood diamonds. For all those reasons, I believe that the situation in Mali could become an incredibly long-drawn-out morass, and we must be careful to promote a political solution to it.

[Mark Simmonds]

The right hon. Gentleman makes an interesting point. He is right to highlight the complexity of the situation, and the fact that it will take some considerable time to arrive at a complete solution—a political resolution to the problem and providing stability to enable the northern part of the country to be part of the territorial integrity of Mali. The United Nations resolutions are absolutely clear that the political process is a fundamental part of finding a stable, long-term solution to the problem. I very much hope that the French-led military operation, to which we are providing limited logistical support, will be a short time-frame deployment. However, the right hon. Gentleman is right to say that the diplomatic, political and economic processes will take some time.

Syria

Lord Hain Excerpts

Thursday 10th January 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

As I have said, we are not taking any options off the table; we are not excluding any option, given the worsening situation and given that no resolution to it is in sight at the moment. I also stress, as I did to the shadow Foreign Secretary, that we have not changed the British Government’s policy on what we will supply, but we are trying to build in the flexibility for the future. The direct answer to my right hon. and learned Friend’s question is therefore that we have not excluded that possibility; indeed, as I was pointing out in my answer to the shadow Foreign Secretary, there are many different categories of military equipment, many of which fall short of being equipment that has a lethal use. Large categories of equipment can be used to save lives and cannot be used offensively. So we have not excluded that possibility and we must keep all options open as the situation develops.

[Mr Peter Hain (Neath) (Lab)]

Does the Foreign Secretary accept that his use of terms such as “flexibility” and leaving “all options” on the table could be a prelude to western-backed military intervention, and that that would be disastrous? The cross-party support for his condemnation of the barbarity of Assad’s regime and for political transition would disappear, because this is a civil war. This is not a barbarous dictator versus his people; it is an increasingly deepening civil war and it will not be resolved by military action.

[Mr Hague]

Let us be clear that it is a barbarous dictator oppressing his own people. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will not feel it necessary to argue with something that I have not said; there was no mention in my statement of military intervention, nor any advocacy of that. He is setting himself up to argue with a position that the Government have not taken. [Interruption.] Yes, I am not ruling out options, but I do not think we can do so when we are facing a situation where a six-figure number of people might die this year. It would not be responsible to do that as we do not know how the situation will develop. So I am keeping our options open, but the dangers and drawbacks of military intervention are well understood in the House and in the Government.

Middle East

Lord Hain Excerpts

Tuesday 20th November 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

My right hon. and learned Friend has consistently made the case for the active arming of the Syrian opposition by western countries. In response, I have often pointed out some of the disadvantages of that course of action. There is no automatic change in our policy on that as a result of the recognition of the Syrian opposition. I have discussed the issues with the French Foreign Minister. The arms embargo is due to be rolled over and continued from 1 December, as part of the entire package of Syrian sanctions. Whatever one’s views on the arms embargo, we very much want to maintain all those sanctions, so any changes would rely on a subsequent amendment to the overall sanctions package. There has been no request from France to the EU to change that position at this stage. We will keep all the options under review, but we have made no decision to change our policy on arms supplies, as things stand.

[Mr Peter Hain (Neath) (Lab)]

But surely the Foreign Secretary must accept that his specific and chilling refusal to rule out western, British-backed military activity in Syria will make a disastrous policy even more disastrous. Nobody can win this civil war. Assad’s savage regime has the backing of at least a third of the population, including Christians and other minorities. The conflict is also a proxy for Sunni versus Shi’a, for Saudi Arabia versus Iran and for the west versus Russia and China. We have to resolve this by political settlement, not by upping the military stakes.

[Mr Hague]

I think I made the point a few moments ago that there can only be a political and diplomatic solution. It is also important to point out that no one knows exactly how events in Syria will proceed in the coming months and years. Situations such as the one that arose in Libya last year and the present one in Syria are uncharted territory in international affairs. It is foolish to rule out options when we do not know how the situation will proceed. However, it is right to place huge emphasis on diplomatic and political progress and on humanitarian assistance, as I have done in my statement.

Oral Answers to Questions

Lord Hain Excerpts

Tuesday 30th October 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

Yes, absolutely. Again, I want to pay tribute to many people who risk their lives to support the opposition and to many who have worked in the Syrian National Council, for instance, to set out a clear intention to create a better future for their country, but it is now important that they come together in a more effective way. I have often explained to them that in the history of this country when we have faced an existential threat, all parties have come together on a common programme. Syria now faces an existential threat to any peaceful or stable future; it has to do the same.

[Mr Peter Hain (Neath) (Lab)]

If, in the right hon. Gentleman’s answers to questions, I have detected a change of tone from the previous insistence on regime change above all else, may I welcome that? Will he explain his own view that what we are faced with is a civil war—a civil war not just at the present time, with around a third of the people backing the barbarity of Assad out of fear of something worse from Sunni domination, but the continuation of a civil war following a simple collapse of the regime? What we therefore need is his insistence on a transitional Government.

[Mr Hague]

Since I agree with the right hon. Gentleman about the need for a transitional Government, I do not want to disappoint him too much in respect of the start of his question. It is not that the western world has set out on regime change in Syria, but it is certainly our analysis, and it has been for a long time, that peace cannot be brought to Syria without the departure of President Assad. There is no viable peace; there is no peace that the people of Syria would accept without that. I am not changing tone or policy on that. The right hon. Gentleman is quite right about the need for a transitional Government. We agreed in Geneva at the end of June—with Russia, China and all other leading nations—about the need for that. What we do not have is the active participation of Russia in bringing about such a transitional Government.

Oral Answers to Questions

Lord Hain Excerpts

Tuesday 4th September 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

My right hon. Friend always puts these things extremely well, and that question is no exception. One of the dangers of this conflict going on and on is, indeed, that it becomes even more of a focal point for Sunni-Shi’a rivalry. That is not the only origin of this conflict, as I have argued to him before; there are also many people in Syria who want freedom from an oppressive regime, whatever their religious or ethnic affiliations. Kofi Annan resigned because he was not getting the necessary support from the Security Council, because of the Russian position, which my right hon. Friend describes. As I said to the House yesterday, I believe that that position will probably change only when the situation on the ground changes further in Syria. Sadly, that means a great deal more death and suffering along the way.

[Mr Peter Hain (Neath) (Lab)]

Instead of an obsession with regime change, why has the Foreign Secretary not been promoting a negotiated settlement, based on compromise, as all such conflict resolution is? This is not about appeasing Assad’s butchery, Iranian malevolence or Russian self-interest; it is about ending an horrific and deepening civil war, which is reverberating beyond Syria’s borders. Is this not the time to admit that there has been a catastrophic and monumental failure of western policy, and to change course?

[Mr Hague]

The right hon. Gentleman may wish to familiarise himself with the positions that we have been taking, in common with not only western Governments, but the majority of Governments in the world. Our position was the position of the 133 nations in the UN General Assembly that voted for the resolution of 3 August, with only 12 votes against. That position is to have a transitional Government in Syria, including members of the current Government and the current opposition, based on mutual consent. That is the compromise solution. If he wants us to make a further compromise with forces who have killed indiscriminately and oppressed the people of their country with appalling human rights violations, I can tell him that that we are unable to do.

Zimbabwe (Blood Diamonds)

Lord Hain Excerpts

Tuesday 17th July 2012 Westminster Hall

[Mr Peter Hain (Neath) (Lab)]

May I welcome you to the Chair, Mr Havard? It is a delight to speak under your guidance, as a fellow south Wales valleys Member of Parliament. I immediately pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Vauxhall (Kate Hoey); in her chairmanship of the all-party group on Zimbabwe, she has provided inspirational leadership for a long time.

In December 2000, the United Nations General Assembly adopted resolution A/RES/55/56, supporting the creation of an international certification scheme for rough diamonds. That led to the Kimberley process, a mechanism for negotiations, and the international treaty banning blood diamonds, established under UN Security Council resolution 1459 in January 2003. I put a great deal of effort into achieving that when I was British Minister for Africa, because illegally traded blood diamonds were paying for arms, which fuelled conflicts in Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and in Sierra Leone, where those very arms were used against British troops by terrorists. Now we are seeing a different kind of blood diamond from Marange in Zimbabwe, and it is high time that the Kimberley process and the World Diamond Council stopped turning a blind eye to serious abuse with an anti-democratic, violent purpose.

The history of Zimbabwe has been punctuated with violence. Cecil Rhodes’s exercise of colonial power in southern Africa was built on a monopoly of violence. Until it was swept away by the liberation war, which I supported as a British anti-apartheid leader at the time, Ian Smith’s racist Rhodesian regime used violence against opponents demanding democracy. Robert Mugabe’s ZANU, first elected in a landslide victory in 1980, betrayed the freedom struggle that it once led with distinction, by systematically using violence as a political strategy to maintain power and the privileges of an increasingly corrupt mafia surrounding him. Killings, torture and beatings of ZANU-PF opponents and massive human rights abuses accompanied the elections of 2000, 2002 and 2008. Mugabe’s regime specialised in stealing those elections by violence.

My fear is that Zimbabwe’s forthcoming election, due by June next year, might be no different despite the Government of national unity, who have given some relief to their beleaguered, suffering nation. In that Government, the Movement for Democratic Change has been given the Ministries of Finance, Education and Health, among others. ZANU-PF retained the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Mines and the Office of the President, the home of Zimbabwe’s feared secret police—the Central Intelligence Organisation or CIO. Since the MDC took control of the Ministry of Finance and clipped the wings of the Reserve bank, the security mafia loyal to President Mugabe has been on a hunt for sources of off-budget finance. It has now found those sources, thanks to an accident of geology and the failures of the international community.

In 2006, diamonds were found in the Marange fields in eastern Zimbabwe. The area holds one of the world’s richest deposits of alluvial diamonds. The gems lie close to the surface of the ground, making them easy to collect by hand. During 2008, the military deployed soldiers and helicopter gunships during the clearance of thousands of small-scale miners from the Marange diamond fields, killing and wounding many people in the process. Nearly every soldier in Marange is involved in one way or another in illegal mining. Soldiers have formed syndicates of diamond panners, whom they protect and escort.

Many of the diamonds are smuggled to the town of Vila de Manica, in Mozambique, only 12 miles from the Zimbabwe border. It is crawling with illegal dealers from countries such as Lebanon, Sierra Leone, Guinea, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria and Israel, most living in smart houses, bristling with barbed wire and CCTV cameras, and guarded by armed men, admitting they do so with the help of army syndicates and senior ZANU-PF politicians.

Global Witness deserves our thanks for its impressive report, “Financing a Parallel Government?”, which has unearthed devastating evidence on Zimbabwe’s blood diamond trade. In Zimbabwe, mineral rights are vested not in the state, but with the President. Robert Mugabe has granted a series of mining concessions. One was to Canadile, a company that has since collapsed amid allegations of corruption, including against Obert Mpofu, the ZANU-PF Minister of Mines. Mpofu is a man on a £1,200 monthly salary, who is now rich enough to spend over £13 million buying a bank. Another was to Mbada Diamonds. Its chief executive officer, Robert Mhlanga, a Mugabe crony, is developing a £20-million mansion in Ballito, KwaZulu-Natal. Behind Mbada Diamonds and up to its neck in its shady start-up, is a South African scrap metal company, New Reclamation, and its former chief executive officer, South African business man David Kassell.

South African business interests were heavily involved in mining diamonds in Marange or profiting from their irregular sale, in what the South African Broadcasting Company last October reported as a:

“blatant disregard for the rule of law and continued plundering of the diamond fields in Eastern Zimbabwe. New evidence suggests that South African firms have muscled in, and are mining there illegally.”

In 2011, 25% of the shares of Mbada were transferred to a mysterious network of shell companies based in Mauritius, Hong Kong and the British Virgin Islands. Those companies are connected to Robert Mhlanga, a retired air vice-marshal in the Zimbabwean air force. The use of secrecy jurisdictions and tax havens should raise a red flag for any legitimate businesses trading with Mbada. They should be asking the question, who are the real beneficial owners of Mbada? We have seen with Libya’s Colonel Gaddafi how banks, lawyers and businesses colluded in illicit financial outflows of national wealth. I fear that that is being repeated in Zimbabwe.

A third mining concession was to Sino Zimbabwe Development and a fourth to Anjin Investments. Sino Zimbabwe Development purports to be a joint venture between the state-owned Zimbabwe minerals development corporation and an investor, Sam Pa—a businessman from the Queensway syndicate, a network of companies based in Hong Kong, Singapore and Angola. Sam Pa and the Queensway syndicate were the subject of a recent feature in The Economist, which raised two issues in particular. The first was the Queensway syndicate’s amoral deal in Guinea. Just one month after security forces massacred 150 protestors in a stadium, the syndicate signed a multi-billion dollar deal with the Guinea junta—effectively providing a financial lifeline to that pariah regime. Secondly, The Economist alleged that the syndicate was buying Angolan oil ridiculously cheaply and selling it on at market prices to Chinese oil companies—suggesting the Angolan people may have been cheated out of billions of dollars.

In Zimbabwe, several sources suggest that Sam Pa gave the secret police—the CIO—a large sum of money, which one CIO document places at $100 million, and over 200 Nissan pick-up trucks. In return for that apparent assistance, Sino Zimbabwe Development was granted opportunities in Zimbabwe’s diamond and cotton sectors. Sino Zimbabwe Development was set up and registered in Zimbabwe and Singapore. The Singaporean company is in turn part-owned by Strong Achieve Holdings, a company registered in the British Virgin Islands and controlled by someone believed to be a member of the Zimbabwean secret police. That, again, illustrates the highly disreputable role of the British Virgin Islands in facilitating such murky dealings. Sino Zimbabwe Development is ostensibly a legitimate business. Yet its three Zimbabwean directors, Gift Kallisto Machengete, Masimba Ignatius Kamba and Pritchard Zhou, are all believed to be members of the CIO, and the firm is in reality a front company for the Zimbabwean secret police.

Anjin Investments purports to be a joint venture between a previously unknown Zimbabwean firm, Matt Bronze, and a Chinese construction company. In reality, Anjin’s company secretary is Brigadier Charles Tarumbwa, who is also the Judge Advocate General at Zimbabwe’s Ministry of Defence, and is on the EU sanctions list for orchestrating violence. Anjin’s executive board includes Martin Rushwaya, the permanent secretary of the Ministry of Defence, and serving and retired military and police officers. Anjin claims to be the biggest diamond mining company in the world and has been described by informed observers as having the potential to be the next De Beers. In reality, Anjin is a front for the Zimbabwean military; nor does that shadowy activity involve only diamonds.

On 27 June, the Russian business newspaper Kommersant reported that Zimbabwean officials had approached Russian companies with a prospective platinum deal in exchange for attack helicopters. A Russian joint venture, named by Kommersant as involved in the deal, is called Russ Zim and Rushchrome. The deal is ostensibly with the parastatal Zimbabwe Minerals Development Corporation. However, Anjin’s Brigadier Charles Tarumbwa is company secretary of the Russian joint venture, and the chairman of its executive board is Martin Rushwaya, the permanent secretary at the Ministry of Defence, who is on the board of Anjin. Again, the planned deal seems to have been cooked up by the Zimbabwean military-industrial complex.

Why is that important? First, the Zimbabwean military and secret police are known for their uncompromising support for ZANU-PF. It has even been alleged that money from Sam Pa has been allocated to a CIO smear campaign against MDC Prime Minister Tsvangirai, called Operation Spiderweb. If the secret police have access to off-budget sources of funding, they can set and finance their own agenda, in flagrant breach of democratic and civilian control of the security forces budget.

Secondly, Zimbabwe desperately needs tax revenues. Life expectancy at birth in Zimbabwe is 47 for a man and 50 for a woman. The Government are slowly rebuilding the education and health infrastructure after the devastation wrought by years of misrule and the hyper-inflation of 2008. Out of a budget of US $4 billion, the MDC Finance Minister Tendai Biti was promised US $600 million in diamond revenues by the Ministry of Mines and Mining Development. Yet he recently stated that Anjin had not paid one cent to the Zimbabwean Treasury, adding that Anjin’s failure to remit diamond proceeds to the consolidated revenue fund was in breach of the constitution. Anjin claims that it paid some money to the ZANU-PF-controlled Zimbabwe Minerals Development Corporation. Yet none of that has yet reached the Finance Ministry’s consolidated revenue fund. Diamond revenues are being siphoned off when Zimbabwe needs teachers and nurses, not attack helicopters and secret police thugs.

Thirdly, there is a risk that any money given by Sam Pa, Anjin and Sino Zimbabwe Development to the security forces will fund human rights abuses in the run-up to next year’s election. Let us remember that, to cling on to power in the 2008 election, soldiers, ZANU supporters, secret policemen and so-called war veterans—a pseudonym for Mugabe’s thugs—killed 200 people, tortured and assaulted 5,000 and forced 36,000 more to flee their homes.

What can the British Government do? I urge them to engage with the Southern African Development Community facilitators to push security sector reform and democratic and civilian control of budgets up the agenda in forthcoming negotiations. In the long term, much more must be done to regulate the diamond industry properly. I feel strongly that the Kimberley process certification scheme, which is designed to stop the trade in blood diamonds, has failed to deliver on the original objectives that we designed for it during my time as a Foreign Office Minister between 2000 and 2002. It has three weaknesses that have not been addressed. It does not cover polished gems—only rough diamonds. It applies only to crimes committed by rebel groups, not to human rights abuses committed by Governments such as Zimbabwe’s. It does not enforce its own rules properly: the scheme is found wanting when confronted with problems in Venezuela, Côte d’Ivoire and Zimbabwe.

The Kimberley process report on Anjin praises the modern security procedures of the company, makes small recommendations to reduce the risk of theft and smuggling and thanks the Minister of Mines for his co-operation, yet not once does it ask who owns Anjin. That is wilful blindness, and it has led member states, including the UK, acting through the EU, to authorise exports of Anjin diamonds.

Let us be clear: Zimbabwean military-controlled blood diamonds are now sold in the EU and almost certainly in the UK, appearing on wedding rings all over the place. It is time for jewellery companies to stop hiding behind the facade of the Kimberley process and to take responsibility for their own supply chains. Each company must ask, “Where do my diamonds come from, under what conditions are they mined and traded, and who benefits from their sale?” That system, known in the jargon as supply chain due diligence, was first developed for the trade in conflict minerals sourced from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It should be adapted for the trade in diamonds and other gems, so that those resources can play a constructive role in the development of other countries at risk, such as Zimbabwe, Afghanistan and Burma.

I urge the British Government to commission the OECD, which has played an important role in working out the details of such a scheme for the trade in gold, tin, tungsten and tantalum, to examine how it could be applied to precious stones such as diamonds. I hope that the Minister will tell us something about that.

The European Union has placed many individuals and entities on restrictive measures: travel bans and asset freezes. One such entity is the Zimbabwe Minerals Development Corporation and its subsidiaries and joint ventures. Bizarrely, Anjin is not on the sanctions list, despite there being a more compelling case for its inclusion than for the inclusion of other mining firms that are sanctioned by virtue of their association with the Zimbabwe Minerals Development Corporation. Recently, the Zimbabwean Deputy Minister of Mines stated in Parliament that

“Anjin is owned by the Chinese and the Government of Zimbabwe where ZMDC owns 10% and Zimbabwe Defence Industries owns a 40% shareholding”.

Given that both Zimbabwe Defence Industries, which is wholly owned by the Ministry of Defence, and the ZMDC are already on sanctions lists, it seems to me that Anjin should be listed as well, not least on the grounds that it is a subsidiary of listed entities.

Even stranger, in my view, is the news that at its Foreign Ministers Council on Monday the EU proposes to remove or suspend some or all targeted sanctions. To do that less than a year before Zimbabwe’s next election could be very damaging. Are EU and UK officials really suggesting removing an asset freeze on someone like Didymus Mutasa, the former State Security Minister, who is accused by the EU of being

“involved in murders in Manicaland”,

or lifting the EU travel ban on our old friend Brigadier Charles Tarumbwa, who is accused by the EU of being

“directly involved in the terror campaign waged before and during the elections”

and of being in charge of a

“torture base in Makoni West, Mutasa Central in 2007/2008”?

Instead of suspending sanctions at the behest of ZANU-PF, Monday’s EU Foreign Ministers’ meeting and the British Government should argue for Sam Pa, Anjin and Sino Zimbabwe Development to be placed on the EU’s targeted sanctions list and for the Zimbabwe Minerals Development Corporation to remain on the list. That should remain the case at least until the election—probably less than 12 months away—has passed off peacefully.

If the intention is to wave a carrot and not just a stick, by all means suspend sanctions against some of those lower down the ZANU-PF command list, or examine the more calibrated strategy that is recommended by the International Crisis Group and that is being considered by southern African countries, but we must ensure that substantive sanctions, such as asset freezes on Anjin and Sam Pa, are imposed so that the security forces cannot build a war chest before the election.

If off-budget financing of the security forces is not addressed immediately, regardless of what happens to Robert Mugabe, Zimbabwe could soon be ruled by a free-floating securocrat elite: unaccountable, unelectable and unstoppable. More than enough damage has been done already to the wonderful people of Zimbabwe, as a once-prosperous country has been reduced to penury. Let us ensure that we do not perpetuate the terrible damage that has been done by premature suspensions of highly targeted sanctions, especially on those who are responsible for the Marange blood diamonds, when the imperative is to impose more not less.

The World Diamond Council and Governments with a substantial diamond trade must act to block blood diamonds from Marange, or the whole diamond trade could well find itself tarnished and targeted by boycotts and protesters, just as was threatened until it acted in 2000. I hope that hon. Members will consider these matters and that the Government will take forward the policies that I have recommended for targeted sanctions.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Alistair Burt)]

In the absence of my hon. Friend the Member for The Cotswolds (Geoffrey Clifton-Brown), I will begin by thanking you, Mr Havard, for chairing the debate. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship. I also apologise for the obvious absence of the Minister for Africa, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for North West Norfolk (Mr Bellingham). As the hon. Member for Vauxhall (Kate Hoey) said, he is currently travelling on the continent, although I know that he has taken a keen interest in this debate. He has followed this issue closely over recent months, and I suspect that he has been in contact with most of the Members present today. He will be interested to read the text of the debate, and he helped me considerably with compiling a response.

I also thank the right hon. Member for Neath (Mr Hain) for initiating the debate. His background in this issue, his courage over the years in dealing with the issues that lie behind this debate, not only in Zimbabwe but in South Africa, and his knowledge of the area and work as a Minister, have been exemplary. I appreciate his comments and I will reflect on them as the debate progresses. I share the comments made by the hon. Member for Wrexham (Ian Lucas) about other hon. Members who have made significant contributions to the debate and expressed their various points of view and knowledge.

I would like to highlight the work of Global Witness and the contribution that it has made with the publication of its report and the various other issues with which it is involved. I commend it for its unrelenting efforts to keep the spotlight firmly on Marange diamonds, and stress how much the Government share its concerns. The issues raised today are of considerable importance for the future of Zimbabwe and the prospects for free and fair elections in that country, and it is therefore important that we approach the debate in that context.

Since the formation of the inclusive Government, the situation in Zimbabwe has grown increasingly complex. We should no longer view Zimbabwe solely through the lens of Mugabe’s continued grip on power, although we must not be naive in assessing prospects for the future. The hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) and other hon. Members have been keen to press that point, and I assure the Chamber that the Government are in no way being naive when assessing the current situation of the Zimbabwean Government. For each reform made, another appears to be ignored. Instances of human rights abuses continue to decline, but low-level intimidation and harassment continue. The visit of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights was an important step forward, but the day after her departure an MDC activist was brutally killed as a result of political violence.

Therefore, before I address in detail the issue of Zimbabwe’s diamonds and the relevant EU measures, I would be grateful for a few minutes in which to set out the broader picture as viewed by the Government. First, as has been noted in previous debates, we must acknowledge the fundamental progress that has been made in Zimbabwe since the formation of the inclusive Government in 2009, and particularly the impressive and vital turnaround of the Zimbabwean economy. It is fair to say that the pace of political progress has been slower than economic progress, but there have been steps forward, particularly within the last six months. Two key pieces of legislation—the Human Rights Commission Bill and the Electoral Amendment Bill—are about to pass through Parliament. Those important steps demonstrate that the global political agreement is not yet dead.

Even more important is the progress that has been made in the constitutional process, and we understand that negotiators from all parties have agreed a final draft that will soon be submitted to principals for approval. Once agreed, a second all-stakeholders conference should follow before the constitutional referendum takes place, and that is expected before the end of the year. Understandably, there are critics of the process, and particularly of the violence associated with the early stages of outreach. None the less, it represents a significant achievement and an important step towards the elections that we expect to see next year.

It is also important to recognise the ongoing efforts of President Zuma and his partners in the Southern African Development Community—a point made strongly by my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport (Oliver Colvile). At the Luanda summit on 1 June, SADC again confirmed that elections cannot take place until necessary reforms have been completed. We continue to support SADC in its role as guarantor of the global political agreement, and applaud its efforts to work with all parties to keep the reform process moving forward.

The hon. Member for Wrexham raised the issue of freedom and fairness, and of elections and the importance of electoral monitoring including parliamentarians. I strongly support him on that. I was an election observer in South Africa in 1999, for the second elections there. Parliamentarians have an immense contribution to make, and it is increasingly important that they have, and take, the opportunity. We look with some concern at attempts to make it more difficult for parliamentarians to take part, so it is important to keep that process moving forward. More than one hon. Member said that South Africa had to take its responsibilities seriously and ensure that what everyone is talking about—a freer and fairer election process—actually happens on the ground. That will be the acid test of whether those currently in power in Zimbabwe recognise the democratic right of a people to change their Government as and when they wish, and to ensure that the process is there for that to be a possibility.

Such a commitment is vital, despite progress, as there is a long road to travel and a closing window of opportunity. High Commissioner Pillay identified many unresolved issues following her recent visit—in particular, the risk posed by some partisan elements in Zimbabwe’s security sector. We share her concerns that

“unless the parties agree quickly on some key major reforms and there is a distinct shift in attitude, the next election…could turn into a repeat of…2008”.

That continues to be the unfortunate, underlying reality of the situation in Zimbabwe. I hope that that note of caution is recognised by the Chamber. We very much understand that reforms are not irreversible. Everything has to be watched very carefully, despite the progress that has been made.

That leads me back to the central issue that is being debated today: the question of Zimbabwe’s diamonds and the influence they will have on the coming elections. The concerns raised by the right hon. Gentleman are shared by the Government. As he is aware, there have been some positive developments. The most recent reports by civil society confirm that human rights abuses in Marange have decreased significantly since their peak in 2008, and we welcome that. However, I share the right hon. Gentleman’s concerns that revenue from Marange diamonds is being used to build an infrastructure of violence and intimidation in the run-up to elections. It is clear that revenue from diamonds is being siphoned off, as the right hon. Gentleman mentioned. Finance Minister Biti reported a shortfall of $92 million of revenue in the first quarter of 2012.

The question of governance and transparency in diamond revenue flows therefore remains genuinely difficult to answer. It is clear that although there is still an important role for the international community—of course, we have discussed this with partners—solutions will have to be found inside Zimbabwe in light of lack of international unity. We have raised concerns about the handling of diamond finance with the British Virgin Islands. We will continue to work with international partners to support Zimbabwe, but our focus is increasingly on helping to improve conditions for effective regulation of the industry. We are, therefore, supporting initiatives by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in the mining sector. We will also bring the new Global Witness report allegations on Anjin to the attention of the Chinese.

The challenge in achieving international unity was illustrated by the difficulties faced by the Kimberley process in dealing with the situation in Marange. Despite being unable directly to address human rights violations owing to its narrow mandate, the Kimberley process managed to impose a near total ban on Marange diamond exports from 2009 to 2011. The agreement reached at Kinshasa last November, to allow restricted exports, is robust but fair. It allows Zimbabwe only to export diamonds from the Marange region that comply with Kimberley process standards. It established a credible independent monitoring mechanism to ensure those standards are respected, including a role for civil society—something hon. Members from all parts of House have supported the fight to achieve. However, as is well known to hon. Members, the remit of the Kimberley process only allows it to take action to tackle

“rough diamonds used by rebel movements or their allies to finance conflict aimed at undermining legitimate governments”.

It is unable directly to address the issue of revenue flows from the sale of diamonds in Zimbabwe, although it has played a helpful role in increasing transparency over production and export data from Zimbabwe.

In answer to the questions from the right hon. Member for Neath and others, I confirm that the UK would like to see the Kimberley Process’s mandate expanded to enable it to take human rights more explicitly into consideration. We have negotiated a strong EU position— the hon. Member for Strangford was keen to know what we had been doing with EU members, and their responsibility—that reflects our sense that the mandate of the process must be widened, and we are encouraging other Kimberley process participants to support that position.

[Mr Hain]

I welcome the fact that the Minister has indicated that the Government will seek to broaden the remit of the Kimberley process on rough diamonds. However, despite a welcome indication that he will raise the question of Anjin with the Chinese Government, he has not said yet whether Anjin, Sam Pa and the Sino-Zimbabwe development will be put on the EU sanctions list when the British Government go to the Foreign Affairs Council meeting on Monday.

[Alistair Burt]

May I address that point a little later in my remarks? The right hon. Gentleman anticipates where I am going.

While in principle we welcome the development of a supplement on diamonds to the OECD due diligence guidance for responsible supply chains of minerals from conflict-affected and high-risk areas, we do not believe that this is the right time to launch such a process, given the risk of undermining ongoing efforts to reform the Kimberley process. An OECD-led process would also be effective only if the diamond industry and diamond producing states agreed to participate, and therefore significant further consultations would be needed before any such process could begin.

That leads me on to the important and live question of the EU’s targeted measures on Zimbabwe. As all are aware, those measures are under discussion in Brussels. In answer to the questions from hon. Members, let me set out our aim. We want to support the process towards a credible referendum ahead of free and fair elections in 2013. In doing so, we need to encourage progress and incentivise reform, which is why we need to use the measures in the right way to effect a change in behaviour. Therefore, we, and our EU partners, are looking at what options exist to best respond to the clear calls from reformers, including the Movement for Democratic Change, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, and President Zuma and SADC, for the EU to show flexibility to support the reform process.

I was grateful to the hon. Member for Vauxhall, because she put it correctly when she spoke of mixed feelings about how to proceed, and of the uncertainty. I do not think it would be any surprise to indicate that that is exactly where we all are. It is difficult to get the balance right. However, we believe the best way to support progress is through a shift in the EU approach. We have, therefore, proposed to partners that, if there is a peaceful and credible constitutional referendum, the EU should respond accordingly with a suspension of the ban on direct EU development aid and a suspension of the asset freeze and travel ban on all but a small core of individuals around President Mugabe, particularly those who will have most influence on the potential for violence in the next election. For the avoidance of doubt, there is no prospect of any suspension being applied to President Mugabe himself. The process will demonstrate to reformers across the political spectrum that the EU is serious about responding to concrete progress on the ground, and reflects our confidence in the facilitation process being undertaken by President Zuma and the leaders of SADC. It also puts the onus on to the Zimbabwe Government to live up to their commitments. If the situation deteriorates, we can, of course, respond appropriately.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Tiverton and Honiton (Neil Parish) said, all EU partners need to agree a shift in approach, and discussions are ongoing. Alternative approaches have also been suggested, including steps the EU could take in advance of a constitutional referendum.

Within that broad approach, the question of diamonds is particularly acute. We are grateful to Global Witness for its continued effort to shine a light on evidence, and to the right hon. Gentleman for the evidence he set out today. We have listened carefully, and I know that my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State will do so, too. The militarisation of diamond finance is an issue that has a direct impact on the prospects for free and fair elections, and we are acutely aware of that risk. We are looking very carefully at the evidence and we will share it with partners. Although the dynamic we seek is one of responding to progress, where there is strong evidence we will of course take it seriously and encourage the addition of further names, but hon. Members will understand if I do not go into detail. Ultimately, this decision will be taken by all 27 member states in unanimity, based on the legal arguments.

We have had a very important debate, the consequences of which are long lasting. I hope I have done something to indicate the general approach of the Government, to recognise the evidence raised, and to give an assurance that evidence is taken into account in our discussion with all our partners. We know this is a complex area. We want to see progress and we hope that the deliberations of the Chamber and our own considerations will help that progress to move forward without any suspicion of naivety in our approach to the Government of Zimbabwe.