The UK’s Relationship with the Pacific Alliance (International Relations Committee Report)

Lord Grocott Excerpts

Monday 1st February 2021 Grand Committee

[Lord Grocott (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, it is 18 months since our committee published its report. That is before the coronavirus pandemic was even thought of and before our country’s departure from the European Union. So much has changed, but the rationale for the report has not. That is best expressed in the words of the noble Lord, Lord Hague, who, when he was Foreign Secretary, said that the UK had

“a track record of underestimating Latin America and neglecting its opportunities”.

Our report focuses on this important challenge, and does so primarily through the prism of the Pacific Alliance. I have time to touch on just two issues: the changes relating to our leaving the European Union and the role of our trade envoys.

First, on our departure from the EU and our capacity to make independent trading arrangements, Ian Perrin, policy forum manager at Canning House, told our committee that leaving the EU

“could act as a spur for the UK to increase engagement with the Pacific Alliance.”

He also said that our trading relations with the region would depend on continuity regarding existing trading arrangements when we exit the EU. Professor Gardini, professor of international relations at Friedrich-Alexander University, told us that if the UK was looking into a

“new trade strategy in a post-Brexit scenario”,

Latin America provided an opportunity

“not only in itself but in terms of UK insertion into regional and global value chains aiming at the Asian market.”

Those are pretty forward-thinking observations in the light of the weekend’s news about the CPTPP.

We now know that Britain has signed continuity trade agreements with all the countries of the Pacific Alliance, which is to be welcomed. Can the Minister update us on any similar arrangements with other countries in the region and tell us what further steps are being taken to maximise the advantages of us being able to make our own independent trading arrangements outside the EU?

I turn to the issue of the Government’s trade envoy programme and the lack of definition about the role of envoys in relation to other parts of the government machinery, which we identified in our report. The International Relations Committee has had a number of unsatisfactory exchanges with the Government about the envoys, including their method of recruitment and appointment, their accountability to the Prime Minister and Parliament, their terms of reference and how their impact is measured and assessed. Those questions were all triggered by the Government’s refusal to allow any of the envoys to appear as witnesses to our committee—an odd refusal since we were inquiring into international trade. The Government clearly attach importance to the trade envoy programme because, on 5 October last year, the Prime Minister announced the appointment of 15 new envoys, doubling the size of the programme, which now covers 69 countries.

Meanwhile, the Secretary of State for Trade wrote to our committee, telling us that this is a “cross-party” programme. There are now 30 envoys, only one of whom is allocated to South America, covering three countries: Chile, Colombia and Peru. As for the cross-party aspect, I make it that, of the 30 envoys, 24 are Conservatives. Can the Minister tell us why some countries in Latin America have envoys but most do not? What is the rationale for selecting Chile, Colombia and Peru ahead of all the others? Does he think that 24 out of 30 envoys being Conservatives can fairly be described as “cross-party”? In addition to the questions that I have asked, will he provide us with an up-to-date list of all the envoys, the countries to which they are attached and their party affiliation?

I conclude by thanking the noble Lord, Lord Howell, for securing this debate. He was an excellent chairman of the committee in the first three years of its operation. I look forward to the Minister’s reply.