Parliamentary Constituencies Bill

Lord Grocott Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 8th September 2020 Grand Committee

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab) [V]]

Amendment 1, which is also in the names of my noble friends Lord Lennie and Lord Grocott, simply re-establishes the existing practice whereby once the Boundary Commissions have done their work, Parliament puts it into legislation. Without this amendment, the Bill provides that the Boundary Commissions’ reviews will be implemented automatically by Order in Council, which, as we know, are not subject to parliamentary approval or any procedure.

There are four reasons to support this amendment. First, there has been no indication of any problem that the Bill seeks to solve with this change. There has been no pre-legislative consultation and no pre-legislative scrutiny of it. We have seen nothing of any debate with the commissions; there has been no suggestion of any demand for such a change and there has been no pre-discussion either with parliamentarians or the political parties, unless within the governing party itself.

Secondly, it is surely clear to the Committee that what happened last time was ample demonstration of the importance of parliamentary oversight to issues that might appear to be merely implementary, but in fact are constitutionally important. The coalition Government decided to reduce the size of the House of Commons to 600, with no reason given for that number. At the same time, they were increasing the size of this House with more unelected politicians. No rationale was given for the number 600 and no account was taken of its implication for Scottish and Welsh seats, or for those in rural or geographically challenged areas. Unsurprisingly, it was, in effect, rejected by the House of Commons. Without that ability of Parliament to have the final say, we would today have only 600 MPs, perhaps with 50 former MPs becoming Peers in compensation. It is proof positive of the need to take the elected House with you when a Government are suddenly seized with an unsustainable notion.

Thirdly, it will be clear from other amendments tabled for today that there is some distrust about the proposed procedure and the ability of the Executive to retain an influence, which under the Bill they will still have, either by the timing of the Order in Council or by the composition of the Boundary Commissions. We might note, therefore, the amendments to be moved by the noble Lords, Lord Cormack and Lord Young of Cookham, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, which we will deal with later.

Furthermore, although our Constitution Committee agrees in principle with the change, it particularly said that the proposed automatic implementation of recommendations of the Boundary Commissions will protect against undue influence only if they are genuinely independent. The committee therefore suggests that the House consider safeguards to ensure the independence and impartiality of the Boundary Commissions and their recommendations. We will come to specific proposals on this later, but the themes underlying this resonate with Amendments 1, 2, 5 to 9, and 12. In other words, both the Constitution Committee and these other amendments are in fact all part of a piece, that the Government—perhaps especially this Government—are capable of a certain flexibility when it comes to decisions that they might seek to influence. Their appointment of their friends—Tony Abbott or others whom I will mention in another group later—or the removal of those whose advice they do not like, and here I cite a swathe of Permanent Secretaries, in addition to the sad loss today of the head of the legal service, indicate a willingness to use subtle pressure to get what they want, or less than subtle pressure, as we witnessed over the attempted Prorogation, the threat to judicial review, and basically the attempt to sideline any whose advice or decisions get in their way. We do, therefore, have a concern that without absolute, very solid safeguards, the ability remains with the Government and not with Parliament.

Fourthly and lastly, there is a vital issue about the role of Parliament vis-à-vis that of a quango. I hear what our Constitution Committee says on that matter, and about the exclusion of Parliament. However, this is about the Executive vis-à-vis Parliament. It is about the Government removing a democratic backstop to an issue where decisions are not black and white but involve judgments, and—vitally—affect communities, devolution and regionalism. These are choices which Parliament cannot shrug off to unaccountable appointees, who may, as the Constitution Committee suggests, be looking to their reappointment.

In brief, we do not need this change. It was not requested; it has not been discussed; and it removes an important backstop role from Parliament. I beg to move.

[Lord Grocott (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, well done to those who have been involved in setting up this hybrid Grand Committee. It is an innovation and my mind boggles at how it is done. But, despite its wondrous characteristics, the sooner we get back to normal the better. As a very early speaker in this Committee, I want to make one constitutional point. There is one very unusual thing about today’s proceedings, which I accept because of the circumstances we are in. To my knowledge, there has never been a major constitutional Bill—which this is—held in Grand Committee. Such Bills are always held on the Floor of the House. One cannot imagine anything more fundamental to our constitution than the way MPs are elected and the areas that they represent. So I hope that this Committee may be the last of its kind and we can get back to the more usual practice of debating these Bills on the Floor of the House.

I have put my name to the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lady Hayter in the full knowledge that she would explain them lucidly and leave me little to do. I am sure she has been comprehensive enough even for Lord Tyler who, I am sure, will be listening and will have heard what she said. I will add, with some strength of feeling, to a couple of the points that my noble friend made. The first relates to the huge importance of Parliament having an ultimate say in the Boundary Commission’s recommendations and their implementation. The Government will deal with this later, but it is also relevant to this clause. The Government will argue that they are taking power from Parliament and the Government and giving it to an Order in Council which is absolutely neutral. I am afraid that that is not very accurate language. When the commission’s report is finally sent to the Order in Council is a matter for a government Minister. So, if the Bill goes through unamended, it will, effectively, transfer the final word from Parliament to Government. We can argue about that, but let us at least argue as if we were on a level playing field and understand what is actually being done.

--- Later in debate ---

Amendment 24 calls for the Government to lay before Parliament a report on accuracy and completeness. That is exactly what we need. This is a serious amendment that should be taken seriously by the Government. That report should pay special regard to electoral problems in the inner cities. It should set aside misplaced concerns over political correctness. There are lessons from the pandemic, in the early days of which a clear effort was made to avoid levels of high media exposure to the incidence of the virus in ethnic minority communities. The lesson is clear: mistaken political correctness undermines confidence in administration and decision-taking. Amendment 24 could help identify and target the real problems that confront us.

[Lord Grocott (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, the Committee has heard three excellent speeches. I thank the noble Lords who tabled these amendments. I am acutely aware of the expertise of these speakers and the efforts they have put in over many years to try to deal with this fundamental weakness of our democratic structure. I cannot claim to have that level of expertise, but it is obvious to me that, however wonderful the Bill comes to be in its final form, it is still, to a worrying degree, a castle built on sand.

The basis of our representative democracy is, of course, the right of people to vote. It is assumed that everyone of an age is able to exercise that right. If, as has been amply demonstrated—there is no need for me to repeat it—it becomes more and more apparent that these figures are seriously inaccurate, and that the numbers on which we determine constituency boundaries do not reflect the number of people living in an area, it is a castle built on sand. It is a bit like an architect saying, “Here is a terrific design for your new house. I like everything about it. The bricks are really dodgy, but you can still go ahead.” The bricks are dodgy; that is the problem.

It is not just a question of numbers; it is also to do with the integrity of our democracy. We hear so many arguments about the size of electorates; for example, pointing out that some inner-city seat has only 50,000 electors, so “My word, it must be a bit of a cakewalk being an MP for that area, with only 50,000 electors.” Of course, it may be true that there are only 50,000 electors, but you can bet your boots, if it is a city-centre constituency, that there will be a lot more people than those 50,000 who live in the constituency and have the right—which they undoubtedly have—to come to you for help. I doubt whether any former MP speaking on this group of amendments, when faced with a long queue of people coming to see them at their surgery, checked before they agreed to help them whether they were on the electoral roll—I certainly never did. There may be MPs who are more effectively bureaucratic than I was who make sure they find that out even if it does not affect their performance, but one’s obligation is clearly to those people. To say that constituency A in an inner city with 50,000 is unfairly overrepresented compared with the rich suburb with 90,000 misses that fundamental point that the bricks out of which the building is constructed are flawed. There is no simple answer, but we have already heard from the previous three speakers that numerous practical things could be done to deal with this fundamental weakness of our democracy—I am not given to hyperbole, but, clearly, if electoral registration is not accurate, people are not able to vote who in our democracy ought to be able to.

I shall say no more and leave it to the experts, but I am so glad that this matter is being debated and with so many really informative contributions.

[Lord Wills (Lab) [V]]

I want to say a few words on Amendment 24, to which I have put my name in support of the noble Lord, Lord Shutt, on whose committee I had the pleasure to serve, but, first, I hope that your Lordships will accept my apologies for my inability to be present at Second Reading.

The Conservative Party manifesto commits the Government to

“making sure that every vote counts the same—a cornerstone of democracy.”

While there are several ways to interpret how exactly every vote counts the same, what I think informs the phrase is a proposition with which I hope everyone can agree, which is that the vote gives every citizen the ability to help choose their Government and to hold those in power to account. That is the cornerstone of democracy and political order. As we have heard, that is true only if every citizen who is eligible to vote is able to vote. They are able to vote only if they are registered to vote. The Government’s aim of equalisation can be achieved only if everyone eligible to vote is registered to vote.

However, as we have heard, there are millions of people who are eligible to vote but who are not on the electoral register and so cannot do so. In this country, as we heard from the noble Lord, Lord Shutt, the register is only 85% complete, which is not a figure with which the Government should be content. In Canada, as the noble Lord pointed out, the register is 96% complete. In normal times, this level of completeness in our electoral register would be a concern, but these are not normal times. Across the Atlantic, in the world’s most powerful country, which has always prided itself on its democracy, there is now unprecedented questioning of the process for electing the next President. Politicians and commentators across the political spectrum are questioning the integrity of that forthcoming election. At the heart of much of that questioning lie well-documented techniques of voter suppression: techniques for stopping voters registering and voting. Such techniques benefit one party, the Republicans, at the expense of the other, the Democrats. Some of those voter suppression techniques are identical to those to which this Government seem attracted, and they use the same justifications as those used by the Republicans in the United States.

I do not want to go into those now. But in these circumstances I hope that the Government would want to take every opportunity to reassure Parliament, and the country, that their motives in pursuing electoral reforms are noble and non-partisan. This simple, straightforward amendment seeks to help them in that endeavour: it gives them an opportunity to share with Parliament their proposals for improving the electoral register until it is as close to being 100% accurate and 100% complete as possible, and it would allow the elected representatives of the people, and your Lordships’ House, to assess the merits of these proposals. It is an amendment that embodies a commitment to democratic transparency and scrutiny, and as such I see no good reason why the Government should not support it. I very much hope that the Minister will now commit the Government to embedding it in the Bill.