European Union Bill

Lord Goodhart Excerpts

Monday 13th June 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Waddington]

Perhaps we could have a sweepstake and people could put in their bids; we have had 1996, 1994 and 2001, and we could have a few other dates thrown in. The fact remains that in 2000 and 2001 the papers were full of the possibility of a joint platform to take us into the euro. We were going to have the leader of the Liberal Party, Kenneth Clarke and Blair all on the same platform advocating our entry into the euro, so it is a bit rich to tell us now that there was no danger at that time of our going in. We know perfectly well that there was a very real danger of that, and, as I say, we were rather saved from it by Mr Brown. That at least can be said for him.

No one has answered the other point that I have made—I would have raised this on the third amendment if it had been moved—about the issue that has now arisen: what do we think Mr Blair would have done if he had been in office now and the possibility had been dangled before him of the direct election of the European president? He would have said, “Marvellous idea. It certainly doesn’t affect the rights of the British people. In fact, it extends their rights. It gives them the right to vote for the person they want”, without any regard whatever for the appalling constitutional consequences, which, from his press statements of the past few days, he clearly does not recognise. European matters safe in the hands of Parliament? History shows many things but certainly not that. This is not a very creditable performance.

It is no wonder that present-day people think that it is about time that there was more protection for them so that we can be sure that at some stage, if the European train goes tearing along towards the ultimate destination of a united Europe, we will get off before all British sovereignty is lost and we cease to be an independent nation. I am not attracted at all by this piecemeal approach of, “Don’t worry, this will all be done in a spirit of compromise. We can just take away the right to have a referendum here and another right there; it does not really matter”. That is just like the language that we have had for the past 25 years, and I do not find it attractive.

[Lord Goodhart]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Waddington said early in his speech that some Members of your Lordships’ House are opponents of this Bill, and no doubt he includes me among the opponents. I am not an opponent of the Bill and nor are others of any significance in the House. What we want to do is make sure that matters which until now have not had to be decided by Parliament will be decided by Act of Parliament, and we are entirely in favour of giving the right to a referendum in matters of importance, which the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, has already described. We are looking for a different Bill, but we have no wish to destroy this one.

Referendums to be voted on by an entire country involve a lot of work on the part of those arranging them and cost a great deal of money. I understand that the referendum voted on a couple of months ago cost something in the order of £120 million. That is why referendums should be used only for matters of real national importance. Another reason, which is perhaps even more important, is that we must recognise that people will vote in a referendum only on issues of real interest to them. So far, the principle of the way referendums should be used has been recognised and observed. Only one referendum, of course, has been voted on across the whole of the United Kingdom; the 1975 referendum on our continued membership of the European Union. Since then, there have been referendums in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland on the important subject of devolution.

Those of us who support Amendments 14 to 21 accept that three of those issues, as the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, has said, are now covered by Clause 6. In all probability, they would justify a referendum. They are the creation of a single integrated military force in Amendment 15, making the euro the currency of the United Kingdom in Amendment 18, and bringing the United Kingdom into the Schengen protocol in Amendment 19. But extending referendums to other matters now covered by Clause 6 and its subsidiary, Schedule 1, wastes time and money and is completely unjustified.

In Committee, I spent some time demonstrating this, particularly in relation to matters affecting the legal system. I take, for example, the possibility that the United Kingdom Government might wish to participate in the European public prosecutor’s office. This is an organisation that does not now and may well never exist, and it is perhaps unlikely that the United Kingdom would participate in it if it did, although it is a possibility. But the point about this is that the EPPO, to shorten the name, is far from being a potentially serious change to the United Kingdom legal system. If your Lordships look at the terms of the TEU or the TFEU that deal with this issue, it becomes obvious that the EPPO would apply only to offences against the EU’s financial interests or to serious crime that has a cross-border dimension. Those would represent a tiny proportion of prosecutions in the United Kingdom and would affect hardly any of the ordinary citizens of this country. So if an EPPO is created and the British Government want to join it, what will happen? Most citizens will surely say, “This does not affect me so I am not going to waste my time by going out to vote on it”. Of course, the dinosaurs of UKIP will thunder down to the polling station to cast their votes. No doubt they would win in those circumstances, but that does not represent the real view of the people of this country.

There are also several cases in the Bill where the existing provisions of treaties require unanimity, but there is a possibility that member states might get together in the future to agree to QMV. Since the United Kingdom Parliament would have to give its consent to that change, it is likely that it would occur only if moving to QMV was of benefit to the United Kingdom, which it often is. It is more often than not to our benefit because it avoids the blocking of QMV, and therefore of legislation, by small member states that have a limited interest.

Matters made subject to QMV may be important or relatively trivial. It is totally inappropriate to insist on the referendum when we do not know how important or controversial the issue for that referendum will be. It is unlikely that ordinary citizens would take an interest unless it was clear to them that the referendum was a matter of importance, and one that would affect them personally.

We have never seen anything like this piece of draft legislation before. In cases where legislation has called for a referendum, that referendum comes first. It comes before any talk of an Act of Parliament. If the result is negative, there is no Act of Parliament to give effect to it. What we have here is an Act of Parliament first, followed by a referendum that might overrule it. If Parliament makes a decision, surely that decision should be binding. If Parliament wants to leave it to a referendum, so be it. What we have here is a ridiculous system that is contrary to the constitutional practice of this country.

[Lord Flight]

My Lords, the noble Lords proposing these amendments seem not to understand yet, notwithstanding the amount of time we spent in Committee, the whole point of the Bill. Put very simply, the point is that, whether by intent or by being beguiled, over the past 20 years British Governments have continued to give away sovereignty to the EU, notwithstanding that they have frequently pledged not to do so. Agreeing to the Lisbon treaty, clearly in opposition to the majority view of this country, was a huge example of just that.

This rather strange Bill and the arrangements for referenda are, I concede, a constitutional novelty. How it will work, assuming it becomes law, we shall have to see. However, it is clear that the referendum locks are there as a deterrent to prevent Governments repeating the behaviour of the past. It is fine to talk about letting the decision be made by Parliament, but we all know perfectly well that if one party has a substantial majority, Parliament is, alas, in practice an elected tyranny. There is absolutely no guarantee that even the wisest heads of this noble House will vote against the Government of the day if that Government have a substantial majority of Members in both Houses.

The issues that these amendments cover are among those that have been red line issues for Governments of both sides for some time. They are not issues that have been plucked out of the air. As was apparent from debates in Committee, there are several other issues that could have been picked up in both Schedule 1 and Clause 6, where there are clearly some aspects of transferring of power but where, for better or worse, the Government have decided not to make them subject to a referendum. It is not a case of issues being protected by the referendum lock—this is not something new that has been pulled out of the air—but about issues which have been seen as important red lines that should not be crossed by, I repeat, Governments of both persuasions.

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[Lord Faulks]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for his intervention. I listened carefully to what he said and took on board the fact that the suggestion was that some other matters might also be the subject of a referendum if they were joined with those explicitly dealt with by the amendment. I also listened to what he said about the fact that there had been a change since Lisbon because now there was to be parliamentary approval, which was not the case before. I hope that the noble Lord accepts that I had listened to what he said, but, time being as it was, I was trying to truncate my remarks to make them digestible.

I return to the European public prosecutor, which is a matter which I suggest would not be in our national interest for the reasons I gave in Committee. It would involve us adopting the corpus juris, as it has been called; it might well involve us having national prosecutors representing the European public prosecutor; and it might involve an attempt at harmonisation of legal systems, so that we would have to take on board, for example, rules in relation to evidence; hearsay—

[Lord Goodhart]

My noble friend may be right on those particular points, but that would surely be a good reason for Parliament rejecting British participation in the EPPO, not for saying that that is an appropriate matter for members of the public to decide in a referendum.

[Lord Faulks]

I am grateful to the noble Lord and I accept his point. I am not quite sure what is the position of the party opposite in general terms on the European prosecutor. In Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Triesman, said, “Just say no”—as he said in respect of several proposals—from which I understood him to mean that Parliament would not put forward the possibility of a European public prosecutor and that there would therefore be no need for the referendum lock. However, from observations made by the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, I was not at all sure where he stood on the European public prosecutor.

I am, however, in no doubt about the view of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Stamford, because he described the matter as being, to use his words, a no-brainer. Were somebody with his views to be the Minister for Europe in some Government to come, it would no doubt be said that the establishment of a European public prosecutor was generally to be the policy of the Government. The matter would then go through Parliament without the British people having been consulted and we would then have a European public prosecutor, with all the disadvantages which I have attempted to identify.

I am not in any way lacking in enthusiasm for the European project but, as a lawyer, I am aware that whereas sometimes I would like to conclude a negotiation without consulting my client—often I think I do much better without consulting my client—it is sometimes necessary to do so and to seek their instructions. It seems to be accepted on all sides of the House that enthusiasm for the European Union is, sadly, not as great as it might be. It is therefore, I suggest, incumbent on us as parliamentarians to consult and inform the people by means of a referendum, so that we can reconnect with those who are the source of our power.

Although I accept the qualifications made by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, the amendment would take away that reassurance which has been identified by the coalition Government. I suggest that they have identified the zeitgeist. The Bill reflects what the country would like. To remove the referendum lock in the way proposed by the amendment would undermine that.

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It is only right that if we agree to participate in such a measure, which would result in the possibility of British citizens being prosecuted in British courts by prosecutors working for the European public prosecutor and not our legal authorities—that would be quite revolutionary—we should first seek the consent of the British people. That remains our view. That is why I have to say to my noble friend that I fear that I cannot accept his amendment.

[Lord Goodhart]

I accept that other countries in the European Union have been very reluctant, as have our Government, to join up to the EPPO and I think it is unlikely that there will ever be an EPPO, but that is mostly because of the inadequacies of the legal system in a number of those countries. For this country, under Article 86 of TFEU:

“The European Public Prosecutor's Office shall be responsible for investigating, prosecuting and bringing to judgment … the perpetrators of, and accomplices in, offences against the Union's financial interests, as determined by … regulation”.

That makes it perfectly clear that those who would suffer would not be ordinary citizens in this country. If the EPPO was brought into this country, those who would be subject to it would be international criminals and some major commercial companies. It would not affect the ordinary people in this country in the slightest.

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

I respect what my noble friend is saying, but one has only to pause for a moment and think about the phrase, the European Union's financial interests. Who will interpret that? How widely or narrowly will that be interpreted? Will offences be generated by the misuse of structural funds or other arrangements to do with the EU's finances? We do not know. We do not know who will define these things, but we can see clearly that they may well lead to a prosecution authority outside the UK, when we have our own prosecution authorities which are perfectly adequate in most—indeed, in all—cases to deal with those matters. We will have a prosecution authority from outside the United Kingdom for the first time charging and prosecuting British citizens. That is one reason why a huge uncertainty hangs over that.

Furthermore, once set up, although it is confined to EU financial interests now, the range can spread. Who is to say that it may not? We do not know. All those matters are reasons why many European countries—possibly the majority—are reluctant to see a development of that kind and why, if a Government in this country decided to change their mind, flatly against what the previous Labour Government wanted and flatly against what the present Government want, that should certainly be one item that should be put to a referendum.

I turn now to some of the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, which were very reasonably put. I know that he felt that he was in a consensual and concessionary mood and looked for some reciprocity from the Government. In that, I fear that he will be disappointed. The passerelles allowing for a move to QMV, which are listed in Clause 6(5), have been included simply because they are covered by Schedule 1. That is obvious to most of your Lordships. It would be wildly illogical to provide for a referendum on an amending treaty which abolished those vetoes without also providing for a referendum on any decision to use the passerelles attached to the specific articles listed in Clause 6(5), which would achieve exactly the same result. That would be tantamount to locking the front and back doors of the house—not closing them, locking them; and not throwing away the key either, but giving the key to the British people—but leaving the kitchen window open.