(10 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I want to speak briefly on this occasion and to concentrate on Crimea. We need to study the past of Crimea as well as its recent features.
Crimea has been an important Russian district ever since the great Queen Catherine secured it in the latter half of the 18th century. In the 1860s, as we all know, a Russian army was fighting attacks by the British and French armies in Crimea. After that, Crimea remained an important part of Russia. Crimea gathered important places—think of Simferopol, Sevastopol, Balaklava and Yalta, all of them full of Russian people and often Russian buildings. Yalta was, and is, a very special city. For example, it was for several years the home of Chekhov, the greatest Russian author of his day, and was the summer home of the Russian tsars until Tsar Nicholas II and his wife and children were taken away and murdered by the Bolsheviks. In 1944, Stalin secured in Yalta a conference with Roosevelt and Churchill to plan the end of the war against the Germans. None of this was part of Ukraine. Crimea was not treated as part of Ukraine until 1960. At that time, Russia, Ukraine and Crimea were parts of the Soviet Union. It was, I believe, at that time assumed that the Soviet Union would continue to be permanently in charge of Russia and Ukraine.
It was not until some years later, in about 1992, that the Soviet Union ceased to exist. Crimea remained in Ukraine. I believe that this was a mistake and that Crimea should have been made either an independent state or a section of Russia. I do not want the people of Crimea to be forced into abiding by the decisions of the inhabitants of the rest of Ukraine because they are very different. That being so, I believe that we should not do anything to restore Crimea to membership of Ukraine. The Crimean people should not be forced back into Ukraine. Crimea and Ukraine are different and should be recognised as separate places. I agree that there should continue to be Ukraine areas, except in Crimea. The majority of Ukraine and the majority of the citizens of Crimea should be kept separate. If that happens, things will go better, as they should. What we have seen in the past few weeks is very serious and we have to be careful about how we handle it. We need to recognise that what is done now in Ukraine is not necessarily the same as what should be done in Crimea.
(13 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I hope that I will be forgiven if I say that I have a faint feeling of having been here before—and forgiven also for not responding to every strongly held view and argument put forward in this debate that was put forward again and again in the past. The Government and I regard some of these arguments as deeply flawed and consider that they do not understand or come to grips with the realities of political life today, either here or in the rest of the European Union. I will also deal briefly, as is the custom, with the Motion—it is not the custom to make long second speeches on a Motion—and with the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, which goes very much further than anything standing against the Government’s Motion that the amendments be resisted.
On the decisions involved in Clause 6, none is in the grey or insignificant category. They are all there for very strongly established reasons that are largely supported by many other countries. Many vetoes are maintained because the signatories to the Lisbon treaty did not want them to go into the QMV category. They are there because their use could only ever provide for a transfer of competence and power from the UK to the European Union—for reasons that we have explained from this Dispatch Box and that many of my noble friends have explained again and again—and so should be subject to the referendum requirement.
It is difficult to accept that any of the decisions in Clause 6 would not be significant in constitutional or economic terms. Those who say that it stretches their imagination to understand the significance of the measures listed in Clause 6, or Schedule 1, which springs from it, surprise me. Surely a decision on whether to give up our vetoes on, for instance, the multiannual financial framework, border controls or joining the single currency—I refer now to the amendment of the noble Lords, Lord Liddle and Lord Triesman, not to the main one that accepts them—would all fall, under Amendment 13B, into the bracket of something that had to be judged according to whether or not it was significant. This is a completely unnecessary process. Clearly they are of the most profound significance.
I know that the shadow Minister for Europe said on Monday that he considered other items in Clause 6 to be not so important. He exempted the important three—border controls, the European currency and one other—but dismissed the others as paperclips and minutiae. We do not accept that analysis. We firmly believe that the other issues are also of great significance and, when understood in terms of their impact on jobs, work and the processes by which our law system operates, certainly could be subjects of conversation in the pub in Burton-on-Trent, where the noble Lord, Lord Lea, has been listening to conversations.
On the European public prosecutor, I know that it is regarded by some of my noble friends, and by some noble Lords opposite, as not being of constitutional or economic significance. However, it is because it involves affording a supranational body the ability to prosecute citizens of this country within the scope of its own criminal justice system in respect of alleged crimes affecting the EU's financial interests. Someone must decide what that financial interest is and whether the crime has been committed. Is that a paperclip or minutiae issue?
What about the vetoes listed in Schedule 1? Why are they not significant when they all relate—that is why they are there—to the red lines adopted by successive Governments, fought for very hard by the previous Government and sustained by this Government, covering foreign affairs, security and defence policy, economic and tax policy, including issues of the EU's budget, which all of us admit is a red-hot issue, social security, employment policy, justice and home affairs policy, and citizenship and elections? Are these all minutiae, paperclip decisions and things that are never discussed in any pub? I have to ask where some of my noble friends, and some noble Lords, have been if they think that these matters are of no significance, because they include not only domestic issues, where after all Parliament can make and unmake laws, but transfers of power, sovereignty and competence that would almost certainly be irrevocable—in fact, they would be irrevocable.
The amendment before us would, for instance, allow the British Government to relinquish their veto over decisions relating to the multiannual financial framework without first getting the consent of the British people. That is a hugely important decision that Members in the other place were particularly concerned with, and rightly so. The Minister for Europe rightly pointed out that the forthcoming decision on that framework will in effect set budgetary decisions and ceilings for the next five to seven years of the EU's life and development. Are these minutiae, paperclip decisions or matters that people will not understand? I ask my noble friends and noble Lords who think that these matters are insignificant to think again. Their significance is obvious.
It is vital that these matters remain subject to unanimity and that whichever British Government are in office—this matter should be above party—continue to have the right of veto. Similar views are taken in almost every other country in the European Union. We all know what happens when one gets casual about the veto and lets it go. This was the case in the surrender of the veto on Article 122 of the TFEU, which opened the way to fearsome, huge and titanic new financial commitments to the funding of Europe in its present financial difficulties.
The amendment before us would reduce precisely the clarity that we all seek. It would also risk the possibility of judicial review on a decision by the Minister not to consider one of these clear-cut decisions to be significant. The so-called pragmatic flexibility that the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, keeps reminding us about and seeks could well be impeded by his own amendment. He would end up in a quagmire of pragmatic flexibility of his own making. It was too much of this pragmatic flexibility approach in the past that caused antagonism—the turn-off, if you like, of popular support for the European Union and for Ministers’ actions. The ministerial discretion that some of my noble friends and noble Lords call for has become the ministerial indiscretion and undermining of trust and support for the European Union that we are trying to correct.
Would my noble friend accept that it is impossible for a court to make decisions on what is done in the Houses of Parliament? If the Minister declares, therefore, that he believes something to be—or not to be—a matter of importance, it is not a matter that could then go to the courts. It would be settled by the House itself.
Ministerial decisions are open to judicial review. That is not a matter that we discussed much in Committee or one that we would necessarily want to see operate very fully in this or any other area of ministerial decisions on any aspect of policy. However, judicial review is there and ministerial decisions can be challenged.
The House of Commons has twice approved the scope and operation of Clause 6 following a clear exposition from the shadow Europe minister and his views on party policy on Amendments 6 to 13.
I do not want to take further time meeting the marginalisation argument. Frankly, it is a chestnut, as there is absolutely no impact on Ministers’ discretion and flexibility merely because they have sanctions behind them. Most European member states’ Ministers have sanctions of various sorts lying behind them on the decisions that they reach.
The plebiscitary democracy issue, frankly, belongs to the pre-internet age, before the web and the internet system. We see all around the world the wider public’s insistence on having a say where major issues about the transfers of power and competence away from their sovereign control are involved. That is exactly what would happen here. The idea that there would be 56 different referenda coming along is pure fantasy and does not relate to the actual way in which these issues would arise. There would be no great frequency of referenda; this is not the pattern for the future. It will not be the result of this Bill and it certainly would not be the outcome of the way in which the European Union has operated, is operating, or is likely to operate in the future. It is not in the interests of the 27—maybe soon 28—members to proceed in that way.
I think that the noble Lord would be wise to accept the Motion and the view taken in the other place. He would be wise to reject the amendment and therefore I ask him to withdraw it and accept the Motion so ably moved by my noble friend.
As an amendment to Motion D, at end insert "but do propose Amendment 15B in lieu"
My Lords, Amendment 15, which the other place rejected, provided a kind of sunset clause for the whole of Part 1 but gave power for future Parliaments to restore the Bill. Amendment 15B replaces Amendment 15 with more limited powers. In the first place Amendment 15B applies only to Clause 6 and Schedule 1 and not to the rest of Part 1. Secondly, the original Amendment 15 cancels the operation of Part 1 and Schedule 1 at the end of the duration of the present Parliament and leaves incoming Governments to revive those provisions of the Bill. Amendment 15B leaves Clause 6 and Schedule 1 in force unless and until a new Government wish to suspend them, and suspension cannot go beyond the duration of the Parliament which suspended them.
Thirdly, the original Amendment 15 is all or nothing. Part 1 and Schedule 1 either are entirely out of action or are entirely in force. Amendment 15B provides for the suspension of any one or more of provisions contained in Clause 6 or Schedule 1. Amendment 15B is therefore much more flexible than Amendment 15, and that is a very important difference. It is surely plain that some of the decisions that may lead to a referendum under the Bill will not be appropriate for such a referendum because of the limited importance for ordinary citizens of that particular decision or because of the uncontroversial nature of that decision. In such cases Amendment 15B allows the Government to proceed by order, which requires the support of both Houses but without a referendum.
We need flexibility. Without it we may waste money because a decision which is not controversial has nevertheless to go through the process of the referendum. Without flexibility we may lose the benefit of useful decisions because a referendum is of little concern to the majority of citizens who have no objection to it and therefore a small minority are able to defeat the Government. Without flexibility the Government may decide not to go ahead with a decision which is useful and non-controversial but not important enough to justify the cost and effort of a referendum.
Nothing in Amendment 15B would affect the referendum lock in the present Parliament, but future Parliaments should have some control over it. I recognise that the amendment would give the Government and Parliament power in theory to avoid referendums on matters where a referendum would have wide support—especially, for example, in the case of adopting the euro—but there is no likelihood whatever that any Government would refuse a referendum in cases of that kind. In any event, if your Lordships' House accepts the principle of Amendment 15B, I can see no objection to amending it so that it does not apply to those categories where there is likely to be a strong demand for a referendum.
This Government propose to rely on favourable referendums in specified circumstances. So be it, but we should not enforce the same restriction on future Parliaments—that is for each Parliament to decide. Does the Minister recognise that it is impossible for the Government to prevent a future Government exercising their power without a referendum to bring in legislation? If that is so, it makes the situation somewhat different, but it seems nevertheless desirable for Amendment 15B to be included, because it makes simpler provision for varying the Bill now being enacted.
It is desirable to take Amendment 15B on board. I hope that the Government will consider doing just that.
My Lords, this is again a wrecking amendment, which is how the noble Lord, Lord Blackwell, described the previous amendment. It goes to the very heart of the Bill and would neuter it completely if it produced a sort of son of a sunset clause. People outside this Chamber and outside Parliament will simply not understand what the House of Lords is doing if it votes for it. The Bill is intended to give British people a voice and protect them from further laws and further integration produced by Europe. They will not understand if the House of Lords supports this amendment, which goes against the whole tenor of the Bill.
On the earlier amendment, the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, made some great play about the lack of trust in politicians and Parliament in general. Although he would not interpret his remarks that way, I take them to support the use of referendums, precisely because of the lack of trust in Parliament and government in general in this country. The noble Lord, Lord Grenfell, prayed in aid the people of Slovenia, who apparently trust their Parliament and say that they do not want referendums. But that simply is not the case in this country. The voters in this country do not have the same faith in their Government and Parliament as the people of Slovenia apparently do. If the amendment is carried, it will drag Parliament even further into the contempt that British people already have for it. It is extremely dangerous, and I hope that it will be voted down by this House.
My Lords, I point out to the noble Lord that Amendment 15B was not put to the Members of the House of Commons. It is a newly introduced amendment and what he is saying has very little bearing on this issue.
I was referring to the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, and commenting that of course very few people participated in the debate, so that point is valid. The noble and learned Lord is right to say that this particular amendment was not before the other place, but at the end of the day the purpose is the same. The noble Lord, Lord Radice, described it as a “soft sunset”. Well, whether you have a hard sunset or a soft sunset, it is still a sunset, and at the end of the day I just wonder, in view of our discussions in this House about our own future, whether it is wise for Members of this House to send anything back to the other place that contains the word “sunset”. It is probably not the best thing for us to do. There is no constitutional imperative to send this back to the other place. If we believed that there was, it would be the duty of this House to do so. I just do not see that in front of us.
On the continuous use of the word “flexibility”, we all like flexibility in government, but it is a euphemism for something else. It means that Ministers can go on to take decisions, and it is precisely that flexibility that has existed for the past 35 years that leads to the Bill being in front of your Lordships’ House tonight. It is unfortunate that we have to go through these procedures, but I see no alternative but to go ahead with the Bill, and I believe that the amendment as currently drafted, or in its original form, casts a dagger at the very heart of what the Bill stands for. I hope that noble Lords will reject this proposal.
My Lords, let me start by making a small and not very serious comment. From time to time my noble friend Lord Lamont and others have referred to me as being learned. Unfortunately, I am not. If I was in the House of Commons, I would be, but in your Lordships' House I am not.
On more serious matters, I start by thanking my noble friends Lord Howell and Lord Wallace of Saltaire for their balanced and serious response to the debates that have taken place on this matter. So far as an incoming Government are concerned after the next general election, they will, whether or not Amendment 15B is present, have the power to repeal all or part of the EU Act, as it will then be, without a referendum. If Amendment 15B is adopted, the incoming Government can use that amendment as an alternative to repeal and replacement of the complete Act. Members of Parliament will be involved either way, either in supporting a new Bill or in approving the making of the order that will need to be passed under this Bill. This is not a big step.
The noble Lord, Lord Armstrong of Ilminster, made a very good point on this and explained very clearly the distinction. Amendment 15B just gives a simple way of dealing with an action that could be done without it. I see no reason why Amendment 15B should not be included in the Bill. While I seriously considered the question of whether we would pass this amendment without going to a vote, I think this falls short of that. It is therefore my intention to ask for the decision of your Lordships’ House.
(13 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberPerhaps we could have a sweepstake and people could put in their bids; we have had 1996, 1994 and 2001, and we could have a few other dates thrown in. The fact remains that in 2000 and 2001 the papers were full of the possibility of a joint platform to take us into the euro. We were going to have the leader of the Liberal Party, Kenneth Clarke and Blair all on the same platform advocating our entry into the euro, so it is a bit rich to tell us now that there was no danger at that time of our going in. We know perfectly well that there was a very real danger of that, and, as I say, we were rather saved from it by Mr Brown. That at least can be said for him.
No one has answered the other point that I have made—I would have raised this on the third amendment if it had been moved—about the issue that has now arisen: what do we think Mr Blair would have done if he had been in office now and the possibility had been dangled before him of the direct election of the European president? He would have said, “Marvellous idea. It certainly doesn’t affect the rights of the British people. In fact, it extends their rights. It gives them the right to vote for the person they want”, without any regard whatever for the appalling constitutional consequences, which, from his press statements of the past few days, he clearly does not recognise. European matters safe in the hands of Parliament? History shows many things but certainly not that. This is not a very creditable performance.
It is no wonder that present-day people think that it is about time that there was more protection for them so that we can be sure that at some stage, if the European train goes tearing along towards the ultimate destination of a united Europe, we will get off before all British sovereignty is lost and we cease to be an independent nation. I am not attracted at all by this piecemeal approach of, “Don’t worry, this will all be done in a spirit of compromise. We can just take away the right to have a referendum here and another right there; it does not really matter”. That is just like the language that we have had for the past 25 years, and I do not find it attractive.
My Lords, my noble friend Lord Waddington said early in his speech that some Members of your Lordships’ House are opponents of this Bill, and no doubt he includes me among the opponents. I am not an opponent of the Bill and nor are others of any significance in the House. What we want to do is make sure that matters which until now have not had to be decided by Parliament will be decided by Act of Parliament, and we are entirely in favour of giving the right to a referendum in matters of importance, which the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, has already described. We are looking for a different Bill, but we have no wish to destroy this one.
Referendums to be voted on by an entire country involve a lot of work on the part of those arranging them and cost a great deal of money. I understand that the referendum voted on a couple of months ago cost something in the order of £120 million. That is why referendums should be used only for matters of real national importance. Another reason, which is perhaps even more important, is that we must recognise that people will vote in a referendum only on issues of real interest to them. So far, the principle of the way referendums should be used has been recognised and observed. Only one referendum, of course, has been voted on across the whole of the United Kingdom; the 1975 referendum on our continued membership of the European Union. Since then, there have been referendums in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland on the important subject of devolution.
Those of us who support Amendments 14 to 21 accept that three of those issues, as the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, has said, are now covered by Clause 6. In all probability, they would justify a referendum. They are the creation of a single integrated military force in Amendment 15, making the euro the currency of the United Kingdom in Amendment 18, and bringing the United Kingdom into the Schengen protocol in Amendment 19. But extending referendums to other matters now covered by Clause 6 and its subsidiary, Schedule 1, wastes time and money and is completely unjustified.
In Committee, I spent some time demonstrating this, particularly in relation to matters affecting the legal system. I take, for example, the possibility that the United Kingdom Government might wish to participate in the European public prosecutor’s office. This is an organisation that does not now and may well never exist, and it is perhaps unlikely that the United Kingdom would participate in it if it did, although it is a possibility. But the point about this is that the EPPO, to shorten the name, is far from being a potentially serious change to the United Kingdom legal system. If your Lordships look at the terms of the TEU or the TFEU that deal with this issue, it becomes obvious that the EPPO would apply only to offences against the EU’s financial interests or to serious crime that has a cross-border dimension. Those would represent a tiny proportion of prosecutions in the United Kingdom and would affect hardly any of the ordinary citizens of this country. So if an EPPO is created and the British Government want to join it, what will happen? Most citizens will surely say, “This does not affect me so I am not going to waste my time by going out to vote on it”. Of course, the dinosaurs of UKIP will thunder down to the polling station to cast their votes. No doubt they would win in those circumstances, but that does not represent the real view of the people of this country.
There are also several cases in the Bill where the existing provisions of treaties require unanimity, but there is a possibility that member states might get together in the future to agree to QMV. Since the United Kingdom Parliament would have to give its consent to that change, it is likely that it would occur only if moving to QMV was of benefit to the United Kingdom, which it often is. It is more often than not to our benefit because it avoids the blocking of QMV, and therefore of legislation, by small member states that have a limited interest.
Matters made subject to QMV may be important or relatively trivial. It is totally inappropriate to insist on the referendum when we do not know how important or controversial the issue for that referendum will be. It is unlikely that ordinary citizens would take an interest unless it was clear to them that the referendum was a matter of importance, and one that would affect them personally.
We have never seen anything like this piece of draft legislation before. In cases where legislation has called for a referendum, that referendum comes first. It comes before any talk of an Act of Parliament. If the result is negative, there is no Act of Parliament to give effect to it. What we have here is an Act of Parliament first, followed by a referendum that might overrule it. If Parliament makes a decision, surely that decision should be binding. If Parliament wants to leave it to a referendum, so be it. What we have here is a ridiculous system that is contrary to the constitutional practice of this country.
My Lords, the noble Lords proposing these amendments seem not to understand yet, notwithstanding the amount of time we spent in Committee, the whole point of the Bill. Put very simply, the point is that, whether by intent or by being beguiled, over the past 20 years British Governments have continued to give away sovereignty to the EU, notwithstanding that they have frequently pledged not to do so. Agreeing to the Lisbon treaty, clearly in opposition to the majority view of this country, was a huge example of just that.
This rather strange Bill and the arrangements for referenda are, I concede, a constitutional novelty. How it will work, assuming it becomes law, we shall have to see. However, it is clear that the referendum locks are there as a deterrent to prevent Governments repeating the behaviour of the past. It is fine to talk about letting the decision be made by Parliament, but we all know perfectly well that if one party has a substantial majority, Parliament is, alas, in practice an elected tyranny. There is absolutely no guarantee that even the wisest heads of this noble House will vote against the Government of the day if that Government have a substantial majority of Members in both Houses.
The issues that these amendments cover are among those that have been red line issues for Governments of both sides for some time. They are not issues that have been plucked out of the air. As was apparent from debates in Committee, there are several other issues that could have been picked up in both Schedule 1 and Clause 6, where there are clearly some aspects of transferring of power but where, for better or worse, the Government have decided not to make them subject to a referendum. It is not a case of issues being protected by the referendum lock—this is not something new that has been pulled out of the air—but about issues which have been seen as important red lines that should not be crossed by, I repeat, Governments of both persuasions.
I am grateful to the noble Lord for his intervention. I listened carefully to what he said and took on board the fact that the suggestion was that some other matters might also be the subject of a referendum if they were joined with those explicitly dealt with by the amendment. I also listened to what he said about the fact that there had been a change since Lisbon because now there was to be parliamentary approval, which was not the case before. I hope that the noble Lord accepts that I had listened to what he said, but, time being as it was, I was trying to truncate my remarks to make them digestible.
I return to the European public prosecutor, which is a matter which I suggest would not be in our national interest for the reasons I gave in Committee. It would involve us adopting the corpus juris, as it has been called; it might well involve us having national prosecutors representing the European public prosecutor; and it might involve an attempt at harmonisation of legal systems, so that we would have to take on board, for example, rules in relation to evidence; hearsay—
My noble friend may be right on those particular points, but that would surely be a good reason for Parliament rejecting British participation in the EPPO, not for saying that that is an appropriate matter for members of the public to decide in a referendum.
I am grateful to the noble Lord and I accept his point. I am not quite sure what is the position of the party opposite in general terms on the European prosecutor. In Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Triesman, said, “Just say no”—as he said in respect of several proposals—from which I understood him to mean that Parliament would not put forward the possibility of a European public prosecutor and that there would therefore be no need for the referendum lock. However, from observations made by the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, I was not at all sure where he stood on the European public prosecutor.
I am, however, in no doubt about the view of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Stamford, because he described the matter as being, to use his words, a no-brainer. Were somebody with his views to be the Minister for Europe in some Government to come, it would no doubt be said that the establishment of a European public prosecutor was generally to be the policy of the Government. The matter would then go through Parliament without the British people having been consulted and we would then have a European public prosecutor, with all the disadvantages which I have attempted to identify.
I am not in any way lacking in enthusiasm for the European project but, as a lawyer, I am aware that whereas sometimes I would like to conclude a negotiation without consulting my client—often I think I do much better without consulting my client—it is sometimes necessary to do so and to seek their instructions. It seems to be accepted on all sides of the House that enthusiasm for the European Union is, sadly, not as great as it might be. It is therefore, I suggest, incumbent on us as parliamentarians to consult and inform the people by means of a referendum, so that we can reconnect with those who are the source of our power.
Although I accept the qualifications made by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, the amendment would take away that reassurance which has been identified by the coalition Government. I suggest that they have identified the zeitgeist. The Bill reflects what the country would like. To remove the referendum lock in the way proposed by the amendment would undermine that.
I accept that other countries in the European Union have been very reluctant, as have our Government, to join up to the EPPO and I think it is unlikely that there will ever be an EPPO, but that is mostly because of the inadequacies of the legal system in a number of those countries. For this country, under Article 86 of TFEU:
“The European Public Prosecutor's Office shall be responsible for investigating, prosecuting and bringing to judgment … the perpetrators of, and accomplices in, offences against the Union's financial interests, as determined by … regulation”.
That makes it perfectly clear that those who would suffer would not be ordinary citizens in this country. If the EPPO was brought into this country, those who would be subject to it would be international criminals and some major commercial companies. It would not affect the ordinary people in this country in the slightest.
I respect what my noble friend is saying, but one has only to pause for a moment and think about the phrase, the European Union's financial interests. Who will interpret that? How widely or narrowly will that be interpreted? Will offences be generated by the misuse of structural funds or other arrangements to do with the EU's finances? We do not know. We do not know who will define these things, but we can see clearly that they may well lead to a prosecution authority outside the UK, when we have our own prosecution authorities which are perfectly adequate in most—indeed, in all—cases to deal with those matters. We will have a prosecution authority from outside the United Kingdom for the first time charging and prosecuting British citizens. That is one reason why a huge uncertainty hangs over that.
Furthermore, once set up, although it is confined to EU financial interests now, the range can spread. Who is to say that it may not? We do not know. All those matters are reasons why many European countries—possibly the majority—are reluctant to see a development of that kind and why, if a Government in this country decided to change their mind, flatly against what the previous Labour Government wanted and flatly against what the present Government want, that should certainly be one item that should be put to a referendum.
I turn now to some of the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, which were very reasonably put. I know that he felt that he was in a consensual and concessionary mood and looked for some reciprocity from the Government. In that, I fear that he will be disappointed. The passerelles allowing for a move to QMV, which are listed in Clause 6(5), have been included simply because they are covered by Schedule 1. That is obvious to most of your Lordships. It would be wildly illogical to provide for a referendum on an amending treaty which abolished those vetoes without also providing for a referendum on any decision to use the passerelles attached to the specific articles listed in Clause 6(5), which would achieve exactly the same result. That would be tantamount to locking the front and back doors of the house—not closing them, locking them; and not throwing away the key either, but giving the key to the British people—but leaving the kitchen window open.
(13 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, we have now moved on from Clause 6 to Schedule 1. I am speaking to Amendments 45 and 47. I selected them because they are related to law and I am, of course, a lawyer.
Amendment 45 would exclude TEU Article 19(2) from the list of articles where a referendum would be required to approve a treaty which removed the need for unanimity, consensus or common accord with respect to that article. Amendment 47 seeks to exclude TFEU Articles 82(2)(d), 83(1), 86(1), 86(4), 87(3) and 89 from a similar list. None of these articles is remotely appropriate for a referendum.
TEU Article 19(2) is concerned with judges and advocates-general of the European Court of Justice. This subject is miles outside the interests or knowledge of anyone other than a few legal specialists.
TFEU Article 82 deals with the principle of mutual recognition of judgments, with judicial and police co-operation in criminal matters having a cross-border dimension. TFEU Article 83 deals with the establishment of minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences in the field of particularly serious crimes with a cross-border dimension. TFEU Article 86 deals with the EPPO, which I discussed in a previous debate and do not need to repeat. TFEU Article 87 deals with police co-operation between states involving the prevention, detection and investigation of criminal offences. TFEU Article 89 concerns conditions under which competent authorities subject to Articles 82 and 87 may operate in agreement with authorities of another member state. These involve cross-border agreements which are a matter of specialist information and would have a minimal effect on any citizen of the United Kingdom.
All these articles are already operative and require unanimity, consensus or common accord. There is nothing in these articles which provides for anything other than unanimity. As I read it, Schedule 1 would apply if—but only if—an amendment to the TEU or the TFEU is in future introduced to allow QMV or other modifications of unanimity. These amendments apply only to judicial and police systems and would have virtually no effect on the United Kingdom judicial or police system.
The circumstances in which a Government might wish to agree to removing the need for unanimity are entirely uncertain and unpredictable. It might be patently in the interests of the United Kingdom to switch to QMV so as to block the future misbehaviour of some other member country. The alteration involved might be trivial. Would it not be better to leave it to the Government of the day to decide whether or not to call a referendum?
Referendums are expensive and time consuming. They should be used only for matters which are of real interest and importance to the community which is called upon to vote. None of the provisions that these two amendments would delete can be said to fall into that category. I beg to move.
My Lords, I have waited rather a long time to come into this debate. Having spent 16 years extremely closely involved in the European Union, more so than any other Member of the House, I thought I might come in briefly on this point in particular. We have had a presentation by the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, which is quite specific to the proposal—a unique experience in some days of this Committee—and therefore we can concentrate on the point specifically, and that is what I would like to do.
We have now come to Schedule 1. The amendments to Schedule 1, which are all grouped together, are what I might call an à la carte menu, in that they all refer to separate issues but are grouped together. The amendments, including the one that has just been moved, would affect Schedule 1 quite substantially. They would have quite different effects but, they would reduce the extremely long list of 40 items in Schedule 1 which would be subject to the referendum block. If we examine them—if these referendums ever happened, which I do not think will be the case—there could be well over 40 referendums as a result of this schedule because some of the points cover various different issues within one article. Let us take it that Schedule 1 provides for 40 potential referendums dealing with issues such as the appointment of judges and other European Court of Justice personnel.
The whole of Part 2 of Schedule 1 would be deleted by Amendment 46. Specified issues relating to criminal procedure are the subject of Amendment 47. We also have the reverse, in that we have a proposal to add to the list in Schedule 1. Of course, we shall then come to whether Schedule 1 stands part. Therefore, the whole of Schedule 1 is in issue here.
The specific points under discussion require examination. This Chamber is the type of body that should look at these things in detail, and we should do that rather than just discuss broad issues about whether we are for or against the European Union. We should look at the proposals in front of us. The possibilities presented here should cause us to reflect on whether it is right to have a single mechanism—that is, a referendum—as the method of dealing with any possible changes in all the articles that are referred to in Schedule 1.
I have intervened only once to pose a question to the Minister. I do not think he actually replied but he is reflecting on it, no doubt. I will put the question again. Will the Minister consider, between now and Report, whether there are any items in Schedule 1 which could be removed from it and treated in the traditional manner in which we deal with issues in our system, namely by an Act of Parliament? We will come on later to articles where there are decisions to move by Act of Parliament, to which the Minister has already referred. It is our duty as a revising Chamber to decide whether all the items in Schedule 1 should remain there or whether some of them could be dealt with, as was recommended by the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, by the traditional method. That is an issue which should not just be put aside but should be reflected upon and referred to again on Report to see whether any changes should be made there.
I have one other point. Irrespective of the disagreements that we have seen demonstrated in this Committee about whether we are for the membership of the Union or wish to leave, or at least wish to have a public opinion on that point, we need to look at these quite specific points. When you look at the scale of this schedule, we are taking what I think is really a step change in the way in which we deal with issues by referendum or by parliamentary discussion and parliamentary Act. This is a really enormous change. It goes beyond the scope of this Bill, in my view. To tell the British public that we are presenting and perhaps passing a Bill which has the potential to give rise to 40 or 50 referendums on issues which a large number of people think are not very important is in fact quite an important issue.
I am sure that in future years people will say, “Well, we’ve moved over quite a bit towards a system of operating by referendum, so why do we not have referenda on other important things that involve our resources going outside the country?”. A good example would be international aid, which would be quite an interesting choice of the sort of issue that is being dealt with in the Government’s proposal in this Bill. We could have one on immigration or quite a lot of other things. In my view, there will be pressure in future years for more referenda on many of these issues because, by taking this Bill through, we will have accepted that we are abandoning the system of decision by Acts of Parliament on a large number of issues. We are accepting that and changing very basically how we do things. We may think that we are just dealing with this Bill; in my view, we are dealing not just with this Bill but with an important precedent for the use of referenda elsewhere.
I would like to make that point because it is customary in the Committee stage of this Bill to make points that go rather wider than the immediate issues. I thought I should like to have my chance to do that before we come to the seventh, or possibly eighth day, of Committee. I welcome what the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, said on the specific amendment.
Does my noble friend agree, however, that a situation might arise in which it is desired to change from unanimity to a qualified majority vote on the ground that some member states might become very obstructive to the choice of particular members of the judiciary or the advocates-general, and that it, might be the only way of ensuring that the problems did not become overwhelming?
It becomes a matter of hypothesis and judgment. This is an area where, somehow, one has to have solidarity and consensus. Given that it requires unanimity to go to QMV, it would be a pretty odd action by the country that did not want to go to QMV to act totally against its interest. It is an inconceivable situation. However, if a country did so, it would be a very bad basis for supporting the independence and overall quality of the EU judiciary and of the key figures like the advocates-general and judges. It remains the view of this Government that to move away from a consensus and concord of agreement and support for these kinds of appointments would be very unfortunate. I think this would be the view of future Governments, too. I do not regard this as binding; I simply regard it as common sense.
Neither under this amendment nor under Amendment 47—which I also want to speak to because the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, put his point so keenly and strongly—is there any question of not being able to operate or contribute to the election and appointment of advocates-general or anything else under any of these articles. The issue is simply whether it is right that we surrender the veto, so that in a future situation it might be possible that we would not be able to resist measures and proposals that were directly against our own national interest and judgment.
Let me turn to Amendment 47, which would remove key justice and home affairs provisions from Schedule 1 and therefore from the referendum lock. I know that the noble Lord is a keen expert in this area. As I said before, Schedule 1 does not prevent the use of these articles. This is a narrow exposition of a much broader point which I would urge many noble Lords who have spoken to comprehend. The noble Lord, Lord Liddle, talked about a meeting of minds, and I would love to see one, but it is difficult if it is not understood that the central point is about whether we abandon vetoes, not whether we use the articles and competences that are already there.
My Lords, I have listened with considerable interest to what my noble friend Lord Howell has said, but it has not really led to any conversion of my views. I have of course recognised that Schedule 1 referendums arise only where a universal pattern has been replaced by something that is not universal but is QMV. However, that does not alter the situation.
My noble friend the Minister said that very detailed consideration has been given to this, which I entirely accept was the case. However, because it was detailed does not mean that the consideration was correct, and I find it extremely difficult to accept that it was. In the amendments that I have proposed, let us take the appointment of judges and advocates-general. This is something on which unanimity has so far been necessary. I was in fact very impressed by what the noble Lord said. In a case of this kind, it might well be in the interests of the country to have a QMV system rather than one of unanimity. This applies also to the other branches of the schedule which I dealt with.
All the treaty provisions in the schedule to which I have specifically referred are limited to cases of legal systems, and each of them is inappropriate for inclusion. I have not attempted to go through in detail the rest of the list in Parts 1 and 2 of Schedule 1, because the situation for some of them may be different. However, it is clear that not only in the legal systems but in a number of others it is not possible to say that the case has been made out. As I said, just because the investigation was detailed that does not mean it was correct.
In the circumstances, I will withdraw Amendment 45 —the others have not been moved—but it is likely that this issue will be brought back at a future date, perhaps not specifically limited to legal issues but with a wider list. On that basis I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 45.
(13 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe Maastricht treaty and other treaties make clear that common defence means common control and common finance. There may be all sorts of arrangements short of that with some aspects of existing competencies already available to the European Union for all kinds of co-operation. I am going to come particularly to the question of enhanced co-operation and other military aspects in a moment. The noble Lord is splitting hairs. In the treaty it is perfectly clear what this step would involve. He says that there might be just one small step and it will be all right because we can have adjustments later on; that is not how it really works and certainly not how it works in law and under the treaties.
Let me move on, as I have plenty more to say on the other areas that were apparently described as trivial. Those included abolishing border controls—I feel it absolutely extraordinary to put that in the trivial category, as it is a major issue. Joining the European public prosecutor system, which is already in the treaty, or extending its powers when we had joined it is a very serious issue affecting the whole of our judicial system. Then we come to—
Is my noble friend aware that the EPPO would have virtually no effect on litigation or law in the United Kingdom? It would affect only a few elements which involve entirely cross-border matters.
Again, is it not distinctly possible that QMV would have considerable benefits for the United Kingdom? With unanimity, things that we want to do can be blocked by another member state. Is it not best to have the decision about whether to go for QMV taken by Parliament?
I have always found this argument very curious. To go to QMV requires a unanimous decision by those involved in taking the decision. The suggestion is that a country that is anxious to protect its national interest by blocking the move to QMV should nevertheless vote for QMV and for the power to be overridden by itself. That seems to be a turkeys-for-Christmas argument that does not add up in the real world. To imagine that by the muscle of QMV—I will not call it a sledge-hammer—one is going to get other countries to fall into line with a proposition that we might like to see pushed through is unrealistic. Why should they vote against themselves? That is not the way the pattern is ever going to work. The truth is this—my noble friend Lord Lamont touched on it—that the reason there is a long list of items in Schedule 1—
(13 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe point of my remarks is very simple. I believe most profoundly, along with a number of others who support the Bill, that that is exactly the sort of transfer of sovereignty—absolutely au fond the transfer of real sovereignty of the kind that matters most of all to us, which is our defence—which should surely be put in front of the British people. I refer to the making of a common defence and security policy. Let us take Amendment 28A; let us recall that the Council of Ministers and the European Council and the institutions of the European Union in their wisdom can make unanimous decisions without many people being present—not only without ourselves being present but without others who would agree with us and are also members of NATO, for example. So we can have a unanimous decision without core members of NATO being present. Those are common defence and security policy issues. I believe most powerfully that that is the fundamental transfer of real sovereignty, which puts many other things in the pale. It really matters.
I would be aghast if that happened through the mechanism that the Government have put forward in this Bill, which is a good Bill and not a great constitutional Bill as the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, suggested. I do not think it is that at all; it is a very good, solid, small and middle-of-the-road Bill, which opens the door for us to speak directly to the British public. I cannot help but feel that if we close the door again, as the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, and his colleagues would recommend, and put down a referendum merely on the euro, which it is extremely unlikely that we will ever join—look at Greece, for a start—and we do not have referenda, it will all be done by Twitter anyway. It will all be done on the web. This mass of knowledge base that the public have will be expressed in another way, and our Parliament will become ever more excluded from what in effect will be the national debate.
My only point is a simple one. The integrity of the Bill is demonstrated by the linkage with the people. The only way in which we as parliamentarians can offer the people a true linkage is by referendum power. I was interested and pleased to see—result or no result—that 42 per cent of the electorate turned out on the referendum last Thursday. People want to express their views. They want to be asked; if they are given the knowledge, they will respond. They are very used to it these days—are not we all, with iPhones and so on? It is most foolish and self-defeating to say, as the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, did, that these amendments, which are in many ways contradictory, as I have already pointed out—some going too far and some not going far enough; in that sense they are really wide of the mark in some respects—do not remove the context in which the Bill is based and would not be foolish in terms of Britain’s future.
My Lords, I am entirely in disagreement with what my noble friend has been saying. This Bill is full of absurdities, and the most absurd of those is that referendums will have to be held for changes in 56 sets of EU rules, even if they are minor changes that are of no particular interest to members of the public.
There is a large number of these possible proceedings, listed especially in Clause 6 and Schedule 1. Of these, only one—the decision to make the euro the currency of the United Kingdom—would clearly justify a referendum. In practice, it is inconceivable that there will be any decision to seek to make our currency the euro. It is arguable that a decision under the Schengen protocol to remove UK border controls would also justify a referendum, but none of the other matters in the Bill does so.
I think that it is common ground that we are all in favour of increased national involvement in treaty changes and changes in the competences and the power of the European Union. That is a point that the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, has gone out of his way to emphasise. That is common ground; the argument is about where there should be referenda. My argument is that, whatever the general arguments about the Bill, these provisions, particularly the European defence policy, the euro, our borders and the European public prosecutor are suitable projects on which to have a referendum.
I said that I had listened carefully to the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, and that I always do. I was with him on a committee that considered the European arrest warrant, and I was in a small minority in expressing strong reservations about it. Some of the arguments that were put forward then were, “Well, it’s going to apply only to a few criminals”, “It won’t apply to very many people”, and, “Why should people be worried about appearing in a court?”. Many of us would argue now, though, that it was a hugely significant transfer of powers that has now worked out in the way that it was intended to. There have been many examples of injustice, certainly several that are known to me personally, and it is something that I very much regret. I hope that we might return to that subject and amend the arrangements that exist.
Article 86 of the TFEU, which refers to the possibility of the public prosecutor, talks about,
“offences against the Union’s financial interests”.
Fair enough if we are talking about offences against the Union, as the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, has often emphasised, but one wonders in what ways those words might be stretched. One notices that subsection (4) says:
“The European Council may, at the same time or subsequently, adopt a decision amending paragraph 1 in order to extend the powers of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office to include serious crime having a cross-border dimension”.
I know that the noble Lord said that he was not in favour of that extension, but this is a big area and one that is suitable to give great consideration to. Peter Hain, Britain’s representative at the convention leading up to the constitution that never was, strongly opposed participation in the EPP. He said:
“Criminal prosecution should be essentially a national responsibility. Our national prosecutors must be accountable to national courts and ultimately to our national parliaments. The European Public Prosecutor would be accountable to neither”.
It is true that these are not treaty changes but they are big increases in competence, brought about through the passerelle, which we do not have to endorse. In ratifying Lisbon, we were not endorsing that we would automatically let these things go through. For that reason I am strongly against the amendment.
The noble Lord is right to say that the European arrest warrant has not worked out as properly as it should have done or as we expected it to at the time. However, this matter wholly involves people who are concerned with international crime. How does the noble Lord see that it could operate to the damage of ordinary citizens of this country, who make up the vast majority of those who find themselves in court?
Perhaps my noble friend will explain why judicial independence is damaged by our relationship with the EU.
I will be delighted to. I will come in a moment to a discussion of various elements such as passerelle clauses, which I hope will cover this point.
Clause 6 sets out which passerelles would automatically trigger a referendum if powers or competences were moved from the UK to the EU. We touched, for example, on the matter of defence. This reflects the reality for us that EU member states have different relationships with third countries and different foreign policy priorities. For example, the UK has particularly strong relationships with interests in the Commonwealth. It would be wrong to give the EU the ability to prevent us developing these relationships. I am sure that that is perfectly logical, and it is covered in Article 31(3).
I turn to measures on working conditions and social security. Noble Lords will know that QMV already applies to many decisions concerning the health and safety of workers, working conditions, informing and consulting workers, combating social exclusion, modernising social protection systems, as well as to decisions in areas such as the European social fund. However, there are important things left for unanimity; for example, social security and the social protection of workers, the protection of workers when their employment contract is terminated, et cetera. These things can have a huge impact on the life of an individual nation and the businesses that add to the prosperity of that nation. Any move to QMV could jeopardise independent national decisions on that score. If we look at environmental matters, for example, they are mostly covered by QMV, but there are others that are still subject to unanimity. We would, of course, like to retain national control of what is left on the environment where there is a fiscal element attached to them: town and country planning; the management of water resources or the availability of those resources or land use; and, of course, the choice of energy resources and the general structure of the energy supply. These are very important for people at an individual level, a community level and a national level.
So, as we look at this debate and hear the discussion, I find it rather perplexing that our currency alone seems to have a critical aspect for our relationship with the EU. I think it is misplaced. There are all these other areas of vital concern to our national interest which concern people in terms of our relationship with the European Union. Coming back to my original point, it is precisely because we want to defuse the difficulties that have arisen in terms of public opinion and the public’s attitude to the European Union with a totally pragmatic Government—that has been obvious in the past year—that this Bill is in place. If we have red lines, they have to be very clear and very red. The amendments would make the Bill incoherent and make the public very suspicious and alienated. That is exactly what this Bill seeks to avoid.
(13 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberNo, not yet. The next paragraph refers to,
“where the United Kingdom has become a participant in a European Public Prosecutor’s Office, a decision under Article 86(4) … to extend the powers of that Office”.
What will you ask in relation to that? Will you say, “We have already decided that we will be a member of the public prosecutor’s office. Are you, the great British public, now in favour of an extension of those powers”? It is fatuous. How could you possibly campaign on that, and how could you possibly respect any result that you got?
I am most grateful to the noble Lord for raising these points. I should make it clear that I have tabled amendments, which will be dealt with later when we get to Clause 6, that deal specifically—and very much in line with what the noble Lord has said—with these subjects and other rather similar ones.
I am glad to have such approval of what I am saying in advance. I entirely agree with what the noble Lord appears to want to do.
Go on and read the thing. See what it demands in terms of a referendum. Further on, the Bill gets even better. I implore the two noble Lords who talked about balance to look now at Schedule 1 to the Bill. Its heading is:
“Treaty provisions where amendment removing the need for unanimity, consensus or common accord would attract referendum”.
There are lists under Parts 1 and 2. Look at the list under Part 1, particularly,
“number of, and system for appointing, Commissioners”.
Will we have a referendum in which we go the British public and say, “Do you agree with this system for appointing commissioners, or would you prefer that system for appointing commissioners”? How on earth could you run a campaign on that basis? You could not because the issue is so narrow. You certainly cannot use it as balance.
With respect, I will respond to the noble Lord, Lord Pearson, before giving way to the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart. The only answer that I can give to the noble Lord, Lord Pearson, is that his remarks indicate clearly what is wrong with the position of UKIP. If he really believes, as a member and, indeed, as a quasi-leader—I suppose that is what we should call it—of a serious political party in this country, if it is meant to be serious, that we could have a sensible referendum campaign on those issues, that seems to me highly indicative.
The noble Lord said that people would be very upset by having a European public prosecutor’s office, but is he aware that the EPPO would deal only with matters of international litigation and would have no effect whatever on any litigation inside the United Kingdom?
My Lords, I am sorry that I gave way to the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, because he was interrupting the noble Lord, Lord Pearson, and that point has nothing to do with me. I am sure that he is right and that we will consider that matter in due course.
Finally, I urge noble Lords to read the Bill before they make up their minds on any of these issues because, frankly, in 45 or 50 years of political activity, I have never read a Bill that I find more distasteful or absurd.
I agree absolutely with my noble friend. I only wish that I could believe that we were going to see repatriation of powers, but unfortunately with the acquis and so forth that will be extremely difficult.
The plea that has been made for the amendments is that, in special circumstances and when there is great urgency, discretion should be given to Ministers to allow things through without a referendum. You can imagine how that will be abused. The procedure, like so much done by past Governments, will be abused to let things through without referenda and we will be back where we started. I totally oppose the amendments.
If the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton, thinks that what happens in the European Union is of immense concern to the average member of the United Kingdom, will he consider the result of the general election in 2001, when the right honourable Mr Hague was the party leader and fought that election largely on the basis of dislike of the European Union? Perhaps the noble Lord remembers the result of that election.
Yes, and perhaps my noble friend would like to remind himself why William Hague fought the election on European issues. It was because he had done so incredibly well in the European elections not much before, and it seemed at that point that the country did not want to have anything to do with Europe.
(13 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberI would say that a large number of people spend a great deal of time misleading as many people as possible on the European Union and it is not surprising that some of it has rubbed off. However, I named no names and I will not do so now. That intervention shows us exactly that what I have said is true. Any Government proposing anything in Europe will come to this part of Europe and present it to the House of Commons, and someone will say, “Why are you not moving for a referendum to be held under this part of the Bill?”. There is no subject which would not come under it. I say to the noble Lord that this is a serious issue for any future Government because, if this part of the Bill goes through, no Government will be free of it in any decision they make. What will be the result of that in the Council?
Of course, I yield to the experience of the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, in negotiations but I think that my experience as a Minister is at least as long as that of anyone else in the country. Sixteen years of that experience was spent in the European Union, much of it in agriculture dealing with the detail of tiny issues that really mattered and much of it in environmental matters. However, I do not see how I could have negotiated, because any bit of this part of the Bill could have been brought up. Therefore, I say to the noble Lord that, if there is something of an argument here, can we please present it in a different way which does not bring all this baggage with it? If there is nothing here, it should be his devout wish that the Committee divides and he loses on this amendment, because it will damage Governments of all kinds. However, what it will damage most is the country that I love—the United Kingdom. It will mean that no Minister will be able to negotiate with the freedom of any other Minister in the European Union. We will be like the Belgians, who, for any decision, have to go back to three Ministers, all of whom have different views, and, as a result, they decide and contribute to nothing.
Therefore, I simply say to the noble Lord that, if he can move on this, he will give me confidence in the claim of my Government that this provision is intended merely to prevent huge changes being carried out without the consent of the British people. If he can move on this, he will protect this and other Governments from the effect of the provision, and I think he will find much of the rest of the debate very much easier. However, if he does not, I fear that many of us will have to vote again and again against a Bill which, for me, is the Conservative version of the Hunting Bill. It has been brought forward to look after a particular group of atavistic individuals and it is not in any way sensible. Everyone else knows that it is not sensible and that it is there for a purpose, and I am ashamed of the Liberal Democrats for not making sure that it was never there at all.
My Lords, my noble friend Lord Deben will no doubt be pleased to hear that I agree with every word that he has just said, and I do so with a good deal more feeling than I agree with the views of the coalition.
In her speech at Second Reading, the noble Baroness, Lady Symons, said that the use of referendums in this Bill is unprecedented in terms of constitutional practice. That is absolutely true, but I would go further than that because I believe that important parts of the Bill are unconstitutional. Those parts of the Bill are the provisions that will require, for effective enactment, favourable decisions from both Parliament and a referendum. Here, when a Bill comes before Parliament, the decision by Parliament to enact the Bill may be overridden by its rejection in a referendum. Nothing like that has ever happened before in this country. What is proposed will set a precedent which could, and may well, lead to referendums being put on an equal footing with decisions by Parliament. We could, of course, consider a fundamental change to our constitution that would enable referendums to be incorporated into our system of legislation. However, this Bill is definitely not the place for doing that. I believe that once a Bill has been approved by Parliament, it is the law and cannot be overridden by a referendum imposed not by itself but by Parliament at an earlier date.
We have heard from the other side, so to speak. I feel very sorry for the noble Lords, Lord Howell and Lord Wallace, as they have been attacked not only by their enemies but by their friends as well. I ought to remind the Committee that before the general election the Conservative Party said that it would bring forward measures to ensure that no further powers would be transferred to the European Union without the consent of Parliament and the people. I believe that if there is a manifesto commitment to that effect, the Government should do their best to carry it out. Presumably, that is what the Government did when they promoted this Bill and brought it before Parliament.
I ought also to remind the Committee that this is a Bill of the House of Commons. The House of Commons—the elected representatives—had long discussions about this Bill. The Bill before us is the Bill which the House of Commons, as the representatives of the people, believes is right. We have a duty to scrutinise it. I do not think that the speeches so far have been so much about scrutiny as attacks on the whole concept of giving power to Parliament and the people. It has certainly been shown in this debate that there is a huge opposition to referendums. The noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, said that he did not agree with referendums.
I wanted to say that I do not agree with the referendums in this Bill with the exception of the one about the euro. However, that does not mean that I disagree with referendums altogether.
I am glad that the noble Lord has clarified that because I well remember that when the Lisbon treaty was going through the House of Commons an amendment was moved by the Liberal Democrats to the effect that we should have a referendum on whether we should stay in or get out of the European Union. If I am not mistaken, the Liberal Democrats walked out of a Sitting of Parliament on that very issue. Therefore, we have to get this into perspective. I know that some people are against referendums.