Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland

Lord Godson Excerpts

Thursday 3rd March 2022 Grand Committee

[Lord Godson (Con)]

I join the tributes to the noble Lord, Lord Jay, for securing this debate and for his broader chairmanship of the Sub-Committee on the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland, on which I am privileged to serve. I also join the tributes to the efforts of my noble friend Lord Frost in respect of recouping some of the ground lost during his period in office.

I wish to pick up on some of the matters referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Goudie, in respect of the impact and tension between the protocol and the Belfast/Good Friday agreement. I hope that my noble friend the Minister will reflect on the conflict between those two and the impact on the ground. To what degree has he witnessed a change in the Commission’s understanding of the problem with the protocol from one centred on operational issues, as experienced by businesses, to one centred on political issues that relate to the compatibility of the protocol as presently designed with the Belfast agreement? The compatibility of the protocol as presently designed with the agreement puts at risk the very aim of the protocol, which is to uphold the agreement in all its parts.

As has been mentioned by many noble Lords and Baronesses, there are three strands to the agreement. We have known for some time that strand 3, which deals with the totality of relationships between these two islands, including between Northern Ireland and Great Britain, was at risk, as was highlighted in the UK Government’s position paper as long ago as August 2017. The risk to trade between Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the consequent problems for Northern Ireland consumers in general—for unionists in particular—is to be found in the failings of that strand. However, in consequence of that and the instability caused, we have a failure of strand 1—the devolved internal government of Northern Ireland—and, as a result of the protocol, further difficulties therefore with strand 2 on north-south, cross-border issues. All these of course have to be based on cross-community consent.

All three strands of the Belfast agreement are now in jeopardy because of a protocol supposedly designed to uphold the agreement in all its parts. Even the European Commission in its September 2017 principles—its response to the UK Government’s then position paper—stated as first principle:

“The Good Friday Agreement established interlocking political institutions which reflect the totality of the relationships on the islands of Great Britain and Ireland. The institutions, which provide frameworks for cooperation between both parts of the island and between Ireland and Great Britain, will need to continue to operate effectively.”


This protocol has clearly failed the test set by the UK Government. It has not won the necessary cross-community support in Northern Ireland and it has now failed the test set by the European Commission itself.