Victims and Prisoners Bill

Debate between Lord Garnier and Lord Bach

Tuesday 12th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Garnier (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my former neighbour, the noble Lord, Lord Bach, for permitting me to jump the queue. I want to make some equally brief points to the points made by the noble and learned Lord just now. I will start with Amendment 171. This makes as much sense as requiring the Lord Chief Justice, as head of the judiciary, not to be able to sit in individual cases, either at first instance or at appeal; to deny the Master of the Rolls, who I believe is the head of the civil appellate system, the ability to sit on cases; to deny the chancellor of the Chancery Division the ability to sit on cases; and to deny the president of the Family Division the ability to sit on cases.

These are judicial functions which may have an administrative function as well. If we were really to go down a road whereby the shadow of Dominic Raab is to spring forward into the enlightened era of Alex Chalk, I think we would be making a mistake. That is enough about that.

None of the judicial officers to which I have just referred is removable on the say-so of the Secretary of State. Equally, the constitution should not suffer the embarrassment of having the head of the Parole Board, who is a judicial officer, being removed on the say-so of the Secretary of State. I have a suspicion that if Alex Chalk had written this Bill it would not have contained these clauses.

Amendment 169

“seeks to ensure that the decision as to the composition of the Board is an independent judicial decision made by the Parole Board”.

Again, to go back to my references to the senior judiciary, it is the Lord Chief Justice who deploys the judges within the court system, it is the Master of the Rolls who decides which judges in the appellate court should sit on which particular case, it is the Chancellor of the Chancery Division who decides which of the Chancery Division judges should do what, and it is the President of the Family Division who does the same in relation to Family Division cases. It strikes me as being a perfectly normal and respectable constitutional arrangement. It would be a pity for Mr Raab, who has now moved on, to be able to continue to control the system. He is gone; these should go as well.

[Lord Bach (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to support all three of these amendments. They were tabled by the penultimate Lord Chief Justice, and are supported by the most recent Lord Chief Justice and a distinguished recent Solicitor-General, who spoke just now. I am afraid I can only claim to have been shadow Attorney-General in what was, to use a cliché, a bad year, for a shortish time to make up the numbers. I cannot add to the arguments that have been so persuasively put.

It is wonderful to see the noble Earl the Minister in his place; I did not expect him to take this particular group. I invite him to talk to his noble friend from the Ministry of Justice, who I suspect—I hope the noble Earl does as well—privately has a lot of sympathy for these amendments, because they are commonsensical. I ask the noble Earl to ask the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, to speak to the Justice Secretary patiently and persuasively about these matters.

I start from the position that the Executive should interfere in individual sentencing as little as possible—preferably not at all. Under our constitutional arrangements, it is not the Executive’s responsibility, nor part of their functions. That is why the independence of the Parole Board is so important, as the noble and learned Lord just said. It is hard not to believe, I am afraid, that these proposals would actually have the effect of reducing that independence.

I have down on the amendment paper that I will oppose Clauses 53 and 54 standing part of the Bill. I will not press that at all tonight, but in this short speech I will talk about why I gave that notice; it may save a bit of time later on. It is really because I have two questions for the noble Earl. I asked the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, at Second Reading, but quite understandably he was so overwhelmed with the matters that he had to reply to in the minutes that he was allowed that he was unable to answer them at the time. I absolutely appreciate that.

The first question is to ask why, under the Bill, the Justice Secretary will send some cases where he has found the Parole Board has got it wrong to whichever body it is that he eventually sends them to, but not others. It was argued in this House in Committee, I think last week or the week before, that that should be not the Upper Tribunal but another body altogether. If he sends some cases where he thinks the Parole Board has got it wrong but not others, that will not make any sense at all. Surely he must send all of the case that he finds to be wrong to this judicial body or none of them. If he sends some then surely the position is not satisfactory. There may one day be a Lord Chancellor—certainly not the current one—who is less generous and would not send any that he felt was wrong to a court. If that position may develop, why on earth is this part of the Bill being proposed?

My second question is this, and the Committee deserves an answer to it: will the Justice Secretary himself make these decisions, or will they be passed down to junior Ministers or to senior civil servants? I have no objection at all to senior civil servants taking important decisions but it is not appropriate that they—or, in fact, junior Ministers in the department—should take these decisions. What is the answer: will they or will they not? If they will, the problems associated with the Executive interfering in sentencing become much more acute. Does the Minister agree? I would be grateful for an answer to both those questions.