Victims and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Garnier and Baroness Brinton

Committee stage
Wednesday 11th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Garnier (Con)]

My Lords, I rise with a degree of caution. I entirely understand the motives behind the amendments moved by my noble friend Lord Sandhurst, and that moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. Shall we begin by trying to remember what an unduly lenient sentence is? It is one that falls outside the range of sentences that a judge, taking into consideration all the relevant factors and having regard to the sentencing guidance, could reasonably consider appropriate. In other words, the sentence must be not just lenient, but unduly lenient. One of the things the Court of Appeal must consider when it is looking at an application to review a sentence is that the offender has been put through the sentencing process, or will be put through the sentencing process, for a second time, and that it will not intervene unless the sentence is significantly below the one the judge should have passed.

Law officers often receive applications—I say this with some experience, as I was a law officer from 2010 to 2012, and in England and Wales it is the law officers who have the ability to make these applications to the Court of Appeal Criminal Division—on the basis that the person complaining about the sentence just thinks it is not adequately severe, but that is not the test. One therefore needs to not encourage an expectation—this is what may follow from the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton—that, by getting a government department or the Crown Prosecution Service to write to a disappointed victim or family member, it must follow that the CPS, or whichever government department is required to do this, agrees, or that it will lead to a successful appeal before the Court of Appeal.

I remember that all sorts of people used to read newspaper articles about a particular sentence that often bore very little resemblance to the sentencing remarks or the details of the case. Sometimes, in some newspapers, you would get an editorial saying that it was a disgrace that this lenient judge has done this, that or the other, and that something must be done, and all sorts of people would then write to the law officer’s department demanding that something be done. Very often the sentence was passed in relation to an offence that did not come under the scheme, or, if it did, on proper examination it did not fall within the ambit of what the Court of Appeal was likely to disturb. So I suspect that all sorts of expectations could be built into the public mind, which could lead only to disappointment.

Secondly, there is something to be said about finality. Although one does not always have any sympathy for a criminal defendant, they are entitled to justice and finality. Having sentenced people, I assure noble Lords that sentencing can be difficult, certainly for a judge who is dealing with, shall we say—I do not mean this in a silly way—the less serious types of criminal offence that none the less come within this scheme. I always found sentencing to be the most difficult part of the judicial function. This is a generalisation, but if you are a High Court judge dealing with criminal cases, the chances are that you will probably have to decide the tariff only on life sentences. But if you are sitting in the Crown Court as a recorder or circuit judge, you may very well have to deal with all sorts of quite complicated considerations when working out the just sentence for a particular defendant based on the facts of a particular offence. It is not always easy.

In my experience of having to seek the advice of the Treasury counsel and making up my own mind about whether an application should go to the Court of Appeal, I found that, by and large, the overwhelming majority of judges passed a just and correct sentence—when I say “correct”, it is not a binary exercise—that was entirely defensible and not the sort of thing that the Court of Appeal would have disturbed. To encourage people to make applications would be a mistake when it is going to lead only to disappointment.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

The amendment would not encourage the CPS, or whatever the notifying body is, to encourage the victim to appeal; it would merely be notifying them of the right. Does the noble and learned Lord accept that?

[Lord Garnier (Con)]

I can see what the printed words say, but if the Crown Prosecution Service was to write to the victim saying, “Do you realise that you can apply to the law officers to have this sentence reviewed by the Court of Appeal?”, it would give an imprimatur and an indication. That is the implication, and we should resist it.

I do not want to go on too long. Anybody can write to the law officers to say, “Will you review this sentence?” It does have to be a victim, or the family or next of kin of a deceased victim. There are plenty of avenues available to the public and to victims if they wish to explore this. To come back to my first point, we need to exercise a degree of caution before opening the floodgates to lots of disappointment.

Victims and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Garnier and Baroness Brinton

Committee stage
Monday 9th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Garnier (Con)]

My Lords, this is not the first time I have argued that this jurisdiction does not do enough to ensure that domestic—but more importantly, overseas—victims of economic crime committed by people or organisations based here are adequately compensated for their losses.

If the last Government and the present one have been less than enthusiastic about my proposals, I have received support from, among others, Sam Tate, a partner of the London law firm, Clyde & Co, other legal practitioners who have read my speeches and articles on this subject over the years, and from Sam Hickey, a lawyer qualified in Australia and the United States, in his paper entitled Compensating the Victims of Foreign Bribery: UK Legislation, Practice and Recommended Reforms, published in February 2025 by the International Centre for Asset Recovery, which is part of the Basel Institute on Governance, at Basel University in Switzerland.

Having been the initiator politically of the deferred prosecution agreement—DPA—system in this jurisdiction, and as a vocal advocate for the extension of the failure to prevent economic crime regime, and, I should make clear, also as a barrister whose practice includes economic crime cases, I have taken a long-term interest in this aspect of our justice system. It is, regrettably, my experience from the time I was reappointed as the shadow Attorney-General in 2009, then as Solicitor-General during the early part of the coalition Government in 2010, followed by what is now 14 years on the government and opposition Back Benches, both here and in the other place, that all three parties of government—the Conservative Party, the Liberal Democrats and the Labour Party—have acknowledged with warm words the problems my amendment outlines but have not done enough to make the necessary practical changes.

I do not say that the United Kingdom has done nothing, and there is a reasonable case to suggest that we have been at the forefront of efforts to get a grip on foreign corruption. Several of the DPA cases concluded here have involved admitted allegations of failure to prevent bribery overseas, leading to the imposition of serious financial penalties. But when it comes to compensating the overseas victims of these offences, we have fallen short. It is not right that Crown Court judges—and it will usually be High Court or senior Crown Court judges well able to make the necessary assessments with the right evidence who will be dealing with these cases—should feel inhibited by existing statute law and practice from assessing and awarding compensation to the victims I had in mind because the assessment is or may be thought to be complicated. These judges deal with complex points of law and evidence every day, and victims should not be required to take out separate civil proceedings that are expensive in terms of cost and time in order to get justice.

As I said in your Lordships’ House on 7 February 2024, since the introduction of DPAs in 2014, the courts had by then fined corporations more than £1.5 billion for violations of the Bribery Act, yet only 1.4% of that sum had been given to the citizens of victim countries of the indicted corruption. We are therefore open to charges of hypocrisy, because the United Kingdom has been essentially acting as the world’s policeman while keeping the fines for the Treasury.

Sam Hickey in his paper makes six recommendations on how we can improve our performance as providers of just and appropriate compensation to the victims of overseas corruption. Having overburdened the House only last Thursday evening with my thoughts on the need to reform the criminal law of joint enterprise, I will not go into such depth or detail in arguing for my amendment today. But I recommend that the Minister just takes a few minutes to read Mr Hickey’s paper and the basis for his recommendations, even though he kindly makes several references to things I have already said in your Lordships’ House. If the Minister is really short of sleep, I invite her to read my speeches and published articles on the subject—but in any event, Mr Hickey’s paper should be part of the review I am asking for via Amendment 40.

In essence, Mr Hickey and I, both jointly and severally, urge upon the Government—and I have said as much myself several times in this House and in the articles I have written—that we should no longer simply rely on legal principles relating to compensation orders in favour of identifiable human victims in this jurisdiction when deciding whether to include compensation in the terms of a DPA or when sentencing a corporate defendant following a conviction or plea of guilty by the Crown Court. There should be a rebuttable presumption in favour of including compensation in such agreements or following conviction. Where compensation is included in the terms of a DPA, it should be tailored to the facts of each case.

More specifically, the Serious Fraud Office, as the usual prosecutor in cases of this sort, should actively apply for compensation to be awarded to discrete victims who have suffered quantifiable losses. In the case of Glencore, the SFO did not, despite my prompting when I was acting for the Government of Nigeria, seek to apply for compensation. There were legislative problems that prevented the court dealing with it, but at least the judge had the decency to hear my argument before saying, “Thanks, but no thanks”. However, it does seem to me that there should be a preference for compensation to be put toward the benefit of victim communities or societies in the foreign state through, for example, infrastructure projects such as schools or medical facilities, or towards the reduction of national debt. If none of those is possible, compensation moneys should be put towards the anti-corruption initiatives of governments, NGOs or international organisations—as I have suggested in the past, a United Nations ESCO account might be a suitable destination—as a final resort to ensure that some measure of compensation is paid in every case.

In any event, we should legislate for a rebuttable presumption in favour of real compensation. We should, as I have suggested before, consider a variety of methods for calculating the amount of compensation, including a victim’s losses, the value of the bribe, a percentage of the fines and penalties, or the gross profit of the briber. If there are no discrete victims with quantifiable losses, we should look to whichever measure of compensation is the greatest.

We should devise a formal procedure that victims, states and NGOs could use to request compensation. We need to clarify the concepts underlying compensatory practices, including the kinds of remedies available, the harm that might lead to compensation and the victims who might receive it. We also need, as I have said on several occasions before, to incentivise corporations to pay compensation by, for example, subtracting the compensation from the penalty. I accept that it could be said of my argument that repetition never made a bad point better. But I gently suggest that successive government failures to listen to a reasonable argument, year after year, is not evidence of its successful refutation but of a wilful or negligent refusal to see what is in front of them: that is to say, injustice piled on injustice, and corrupt companies being given license to bribe with impunity and to act without concern for their victims because it is happening out of sight and overseas. Amendment 40 is, if I may say so, a moderate amendment in its ambitions—perhaps too moderate—but it is certainly worthy of the Government’s consideration, and I urge them to do so. I beg to move.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I have tabled Amendment 46 in this group. In the Commons, it was tabled by Sarah Champion MP, who has long argued for supporting victims effectively and has a particular interest in the function of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority. The amendment asks the Secretary of State to amend the criminal injuries compensation scheme to widen eligibility for compensation to all victims of child sex abuse, including online-facilitated sexual abuse, to ensure applicants with unspent convictions are not automatically excluded where offences are linked to the circumstances of their sexual abuse, and to increase the time limit for applications for compensation from victims of child sexual abuse to seven years. I will not give any more detail of that.

The reason for this is that, until the 2012 scheme, a crime was generally considered violent if it involved physical injury, the threat of immediate violence or a non-consensual sexual assault. Those were the ones the compensation scheme could look at. In practice, this means that many cases of online child sexual abuse are excluded, even where the abuse involves sustained coercion, blackmail or domination and the child experiences profound and lasting harm.

We know that victims often face significant barriers in accessing compensation for this reason. There is a problem with the strict time limits that the CICA imposes, because that means that many traumatised victims, who may be navigating complex criminal justice processes and/or are unaware of their eligibility, often struggle to apply in time. The independent inquiry into child sexual abuse report on accountability and reparations recommended extending the time limit for child sexual abuse cases and giving claims officers greater discretion, but these proposals were sadly rejected by the previous Government.