Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Lord Garnier Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 11th November 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Garnier (Con) [V]]

My Lords, my noble and learned friend Lord Stewart has made both his first appearance at the Dispatch Box and his maiden speech. He spoke kindly and accurately of our noble and learned friend Lord Keen and modestly of himself, but we have already benefited from his being here with us. He is most welcome, and I look forward to meeting him in person before too long. I also congratulate my noble friend Lord McLoughlin on his maiden speech. His work in the other place in government and in opposition over many years, the way he performed it and the content and manner of his speech today suggest to me that we will have much to gain from his arrival here.

This Bill is being debated after the decision of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal last December in the third direction case but before its consideration by the Court of Appeal. Although it has no retrospective effect, it will clear up some of the questions left hanging by that case, which concerned the lawfulness of a secret national security policy apparently authorising Security Service agents to engage in criminal activity, including, according to the claimants, torture and murder.

The facts of any particular operation involving the use of covert human intelligence sources are necessarily kept from the public and even from Parliament. That mystery creates mystique for some and suspicion in others. While the security services can cope with the mystique, some suspicions are better allayed than fomented. I used to think that there was an advantage in keeping things vague so that the Foreign Secretary or Home Secretary and their security advisers could pragmatically, but legitimately, apply their discretion and common sense to the difficult legal and operational problems that come with deploying agents at home or abroad.

In my experience of the senior officers of the security and armed services when I was Solicitor-General, they never wanted to bend or break the law, be it the criminal law, the law governing military action or the laws concerning surveillance and counterterrorism. Indeed, they were meticulous about staying within it, and I really do not think they were just telling me things they thought I wanted or ought to hear. Putting the law into statute would, I once believed, inhibit their ability to take quick decisions and create sclerosis within the chain of command. No one needed reminding not to murder or torture people because it would be in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights. Intercepting suspected terrorists’ electronic communications was clearly a proportionate interference with their convention rights.

Part of me still thinks that keeping things pragmatically vague is sensible, but I am now persuaded that, even if the operations themselves and the identities of those providing vital information to the security or other services may often have to remain confidential for ever, the law governing their work should not be hidden, largely within the common law, to be revealed only when a judge’s interpretation of the law, often arrived at by necessary implication, is made public, as in the third direction case. It is also right that the government agencies to be covered by this Bill, and some other important questions, are thoroughly scrutinised in Committee.

The security services were put on a statutory footing in the 1990s, and other statutes have followed, but we now need to know what the rules are and to be able to say whether, in a democratic society, we approve of them. Some things must be kept secret, so we need to have confidence in the people who do this work in order that we can trust them, even if we do not know exactly what they are doing. Knowing what is permitted by statute, even if distasteful to some, helps to enhance that confidence. There are some things that, when known to the public, remove suspicion, even if they do not always lead to universal approval, but, in saying that, I do not expect the state to be absolved of all responsibility for its actions. The innocent bystander and his dependants, whose life, limb or livelihood are taken or damaged by someone whom this Bill absolves of particular criminal conduct, should not be left helpless and without remedy.

The preservation of our national well-being sometimes requires us to permit good people to do bad things. Today, especially, we remember that, in war, we justify the doing of terrible things by and to our Armed Forces to protect our freedoms and recognise that, in other fields of national conflict, we must permit that which, on other occasions, we would abhor.