Trade Act 2021 (Power to Implement International Trade Agreements) (Extension to Expiry) Regulations 2025

Debate between Lord Fox and Lord Lansley

Monday 10th November 2025 Grand Committee

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord for his follow-up question. This Government are trying to go beyond the statutory requirements.

The noble Lord, Lord Fox, asked this question earlier: is CRaG inadequate in the modern context? I will go away and read the report so that I have a further written answer for him, but I come back to the idea that CRaG provides an effective and robust framework for the scrutiny of treaties that require ratification, including free trade agreements. Although it was formally legislated for in 2010 under the previous Labour Government, its origins date back more than 100 years. Under CRaG, the Government must lay relevant treaties before Parliament for 21 sitting days before it can ratify them. Parliament has the power to prevent ratification; in the case of the House of Commons, it can do so indefinitely.

In line with the Government’s commitment to transparency, we have gone well beyond the statutory requirements for CRaG and provided comprehensive information to Parliament to support its scrutiny of our trade policy approach. In addition, no trade agreement can in itself alter our domestic legislation, and any changes to our UK legislation that are required for trade agreements will need to be scrutinised and passed by Parliament in the usual way. However, I take the noble Lord’s comments on board; we will come back with a fuller answer.

On the noble Lord’s other points, which were about protections in trade agreements for human rights, animal welfare and the NHS, as I have said, preserving our world-class standards is a priority. We will not compromise them in our trade policy. Regulations 2, 5 and 7 contain safeguards in the areas mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Fox; we will ensure that they are upheld. None of our FTAs, which are not covered by this power, has undermined our NHS or domestic standards. Parliament has debated this matter at length in its debates on the Australian FTA, the New Zealand FTA and our ascension to the CPTPP. Both required primary legislation.

The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, asked a question about devolution. DBT Ministers wrote to their counterparts in the devolved Governments on 11 August 2025 to inform them of our intention to lay this SI before Parliament. In keeping with our commitment to transparency, we also shared a draft version of the SI for comment. In addition, we committed to maintaining the safeguards around the Section 21 power, as laid down in the Trade Act 2021.

On the question about the use of this SI’s power, before laying the SI, the Government reviewed whether the circumstances were such that the power in Section 2(1) ought to be extended; this provided an opportunity for the power in Section 2(1) to be reviewed. It was HMG’s conclusion that an extension to the power would be necessary. It is possible that the power in Section 2(1) may be relied on to enable the effective domestic implementation of major forthcoming trade agreements with key partners, such as Switzerland and Turkey, but also for the ongoing maintenance of existing agreements.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

The Minister has again referenced Switzerland and Turkey. Let us leave Switzerland to one side because there is a pretty comprehensive continuity agreement between the European Union and Switzerland, which we have replicated.

Where Turkey is concerned, I want to stick with the question of mutual recognition agreement on conformity assessments. As I understand it, the European Union’s agreement with Turkey does not include a mutual recognition agreement on conformity assessment, although the negotiations between the United Kingdom and Turkey around an extension of a free trade agreement in future might include such a thing; we do not have to decide whether it would or would not. If such an agreement were entered into with Turkey, that would create an agreement with Turkey beyond the scope of the agreement that constituted the continuity agreement because it would include something that was not in the original continuity agreement with the European Union. My question is, therefore, very simple. The Minister does not have to answer it now; he can take it away and have a think about it. If we were to agree with Turkey something that was not in the European Union-Turkey agreement and, hence, not in the continuity agreement that we signed way back in 2021, could it be implemented under the Trade Act 2021 or would that require additional primary legislation?

[Lord Fox (LD)]

We could extend the same question to the situation with Korea, where my understanding is that the current continuity agreement is being rolled over again prior to the negotiation of a new deal. Were a new Korea deal to be negotiated, the question would be the same as the one put by the noble Lord, Lord Lansley.

Product Regulation and Metrology Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Fox and Lord Lansley

Committee stage
Wednesday 27th November 2024 Grand Committee

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, I also support Amendment 35 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Lansley. As opposed to the last group, which focused on a large number of slightly different issues, these two amendments focus on one area and, given that they are only in the names of the noble Lord and myself, you can be sure that they will be technical in content.

I am sure the Minister has often wondered why his mobile phone can operate on Bluetooth in any country of the world, and why the automated vacuum cleaner that my noble friend Lord Foster so ably described in the last session can pick up wireless instructions no matter where it is working. The answer is that sitting underneath all of those are things called standard essential patents, or SEPs. They are patents that are necessary to the implementation of a collectively-agreed technical standard—5G, wifi, Bluetooth and so on. Standardisation across communications technologies makes it possible for devices to work with one another wherever they are.

Connectivity is increasingly a part of the products that the Bill seeks to regulate, as we have heard. UK industry is at the forefront of developing connected products that aim to address some of the biggest issues that we face, including healthcare and climate change. The Bill is about ensuring product compliance with technical standards. Compliance or conformance with the technical standard can often be premised on the implementation of a particular technology; as I have said, wifi is an example. For a product to use the wifi logo and technology, its technical performance with the chip set has to be tested and certified. Bluetooth and other wireless technologies used for power management in the context of electric vehicle chargers and smart metering are all examples of where the technical standards of operation are underpinned by these SEPs.

I realise that the Bill is not about intellectual property, but it is about regulating the properties of things. Unless the situation of SEPs is fixed, those properties can be in a state of flux. SEPs should be treated differently from other patents, which is why we are introducing them into this debate.

Of necessity, as a result of a dominant market position, the SEP holders have to voluntarily commit to license their technologies on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms. The licensing of SEPs is important in ensuring that UK businesses are able to use the most modern and effective versions of these technical standards. In practice, SEP holders often evade their voluntary commitments to license their patents fairly because of a lack of clarity over what constitutes fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory, caused by weaknesses in the UK’s legal framework. SEP holders can abuse their position as gatekeepers of these technical standards by using the threat of costly court action and injunctions to force potential licensees to accept excessive royalty demands or quit the market. That can effectively prevent smaller companies from entering into, and being able to operate in, a market. In the previous group, the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, asked whether the Bill was pro-innovation or anti-innovation. Unless we round up this issue on SEPs, I have to say that it is absolutely stifling innovation.

In most cases, SEP holders are well resourced and aggressive, while many licensees, especially SMEs, lack the knowledge and resources to defend their rightful position in court or push back against the mere threat of litigation. Increasingly, there is a third sector of people who buy up the rights to these patents and treat them as a revenue stream, whereby they go after and literally squeeze the people who have to use these SEPs. In essence, it becomes a secondary market for these things, without the necessary protections.

There are two issues. First, the availability of injunctions to the UK’s current SEP framework means that both small and large technical innovators who operate downstream of the primarily foreign SEP holders can be forced to accept excessive SEP licensing fees because they want to use this technology. The second problem is the lack of transparency: they quite simply do not know who holds these patents until they get an injunction through the mail. That is the problem. With the threat of injunctions and lack of transparency, UK manufacturers are frequently faced with a no-win situation. They have to either pay these fees or get out of the market, because they cannot afford to defend them at an injunction. This is in spite of the SEP holders making a voluntary commitment to license the SEPs on fair terms as part of the standard-setting process. So there is a problem.

The situation creates significant cost and uncertainty for some of the most innovative UK firms, it stifles innovation and, importantly, in the context of this Bill, it challenges the efficiency and effectiveness of products that rely on SEPs and are regulated by this legislation. That is why it is appropriate to have this discussion here today. The UK IPO is aware of issues concerning the licensing of such technology but to date has done nothing, or has insufficiently acted, to protect UK businesses that must use these technologies. This amendment is an opportunity for the Minister to commit to legislative action on SEPs to address the critical issues of products being threatened with exclusion from the people who need them, the imposition of unfair royalties and SEP licences being refused to companies that need them. I beg to move.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

I am most grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for explaining so expertly what standard essential patents—SEPs—are and how important they are to the use of legislation in specifying product requirements, which of course are directly linked to the standards that we will go on to talk about. We have previously talked about the importance of standard-setting, but there is no point in setting standards if they cannot be fulfilled, turned into product requirements and brought to the market—that is what we are talking about. In particular, the noble Lord was absolutely right to stress that we should be thinking in this legislation about how we can promote innovation. Addressing this issue is one of the central ways in which we can do that.

Our two amendments serve the same purpose. The only distinction is that I was trying to suggest, in this particular instance, the importance of taking a power and not attempting in the primary legislation at this point to specify precisely how that power should be structured, because it is necessary for there to be a full consultation about the changes that would need to be made—not least, probably, to the Patents Act itself. When we come back on Report, if we go down this path there may be a need to have a power to amend the Patents Act as well.

The point here is that, as the Intellectual Property Office itself said, SEPs will be

“of growing importance to the UK economy”.

This is not a small matter, and it is becoming more important because of connectivity, the internet of things and the multiple range of SEPs associated with many of these standards. The noble Lord, Lord Fox, is absolutely right about the problems that can emerge for companies, particularly SMEs, in understanding the visibility of SEPs and who holds them—and, for that matter, in being absolutely clear about which ones are essential and which are asserted to be so, but which are not in fact essential to the standard.

I shall not delay the Committee now, but I want to focus on the question of why we need a power. First, the Intellectual Property Office is trying to do its best within the powers available to it. In July, Ministers announced the establishment of the resource hub, which gives guidance in relation to SEPs and enables companies to understand the SEP ecosystem. However, that does not change some of the fundamental issues to which the noble Lord, Lord Fox, referred. There are licence holders who are delaying access to their patents, and who are using that as a mechanism to get terms that are not fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory. SMEs are finding it very difficult to know what FRAND terms look like in relation to many of these products.

There is another issue: not only the individual royalties that must be paid in relation to these licences, but the global royalties that need to be available. Although there is case law that can be looked at, it is very difficult for SMEs in particular to understand how that may be applied to them. Of course, there are global royalties being established through large cases, which delay access to this intellectual property for some of those who need to use it; they are therefore unable to know how viable their product may be.

These issues have been addressed in the European Union. At present, there is a regulation agreed between the European Commission’s proposal and the European Parliament, and it is awaiting the conclusions of the Council of Ministers. Let us just focus on that for two seconds. What does it do? It sets out that there needs to be transparency, a mandatory register, and the ability for an official body to undertake a reality check asking, in essence, whether something is actually essential to a standard. It facilitates fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms. It also delays for nine months the point at which any licence holder could go to court to secure an injunction for these purposes while there is a requirement for a negotiated process; indeed, it entertains the possibility that, under the regulation, this may relate not only to individual royalties for licences but to the aggregate of those royalties for licences. So there is a legal structure in the European Union for these purposes, in order to overcome what is otherwise, for SMEs in particular, an extremely difficult set of circumstances arising from case law for them to understand and interpret.

This is not a small problem for some SMEs. For example, I have been talking to Tunstall Healthcare, which I know well from its role in providing connectivity, particularly for people who require care at home; it looks after more than 100,000 of them. In order to access licences for 4G and wifi connectivity, it needs to negotiate many licences and to identify where they exist. A company called Bullet was trying to develop and market highly resilient smartphones, but it ceased trading, owing millions of pounds to SEP holders, which contributed to its inability to continue trading. So I think we need to act.

The IPO has said that it will respond to the consultation at the end of 2024—so any minute now. I am told, however, that that will not now happen in 2024. What I really want to hear from the Minister is, first, that this is a suitable Bill and a suitable opportunity to take a power—without specifying all the details of that power—to make provision in relation to SEPs. Secondly, I want to hear that the IPO and Ministers will undertake to respond to the consultation in the early part of next year, putting forward proposals for how the new power is to be used and inviting responses.