Asylum: UK-Rwanda Agreement

Lord Fox Excerpts

Monday 22nd January 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to speak in this debate, where we have heard many excellent, informed and expert views on this issue. As a member of the International Agreements Committee—as the noble Baroness, Lady Kingsmill, pointed out—I will try to move our focus back on to the report and the two Motions.

As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, and his predecessor as chair, the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, set out, if we needed a demonstration of the shortcomings of the CRaG process, this is indeed it—albeit the first time it has ever reached your Lordships’ House. As a member of the committee, I realise how little time CRaG gives us to scrutinise something as important as this treaty. Nevertheless, thanks to our colleagues, the committee and the tireless work of the clerks, advisers and administrative team, we produced this report, which I and all the other members of the committee wholeheartedly support.

I will address an element that came up from, I think, the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst—although I may have inferred something that he did not mean. There seemed to be an inference that because we did not comment on something, we agreed with it—a sense of “silence is assent”. I undertake that, as a committee, we adopted a very specific focus: we did not seek to determine the morality of the Rwanda deportation concept; we did not analyse the applicability and cost-effectiveness of the scheme; we did not examine whether the central deterrence theory has any validity; and we did not probe how, in conjunction with the Bill—I look at the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, in saying this—it affects the constitution and our international reputation.

As your Lordships will have gleaned from the excellent speeches from my noble friends, we on these Benches believe that the Rwandan scheme is a politically partisan, immoral proposal that is neither cost-effective nor achievable. We think the deterrence theory is unproven and, in any case, too high a price for breaking the constitution and dragging our international reputation through the mud. But no, this report did not look in those directions. The committee took a simple approach of examining the journey from the memorandum of understanding to the treaty, via the Supreme Court judgment. It tested the claims made by the Government for the treaty. As the only parliamentary committee doing such scrutiny, I am delighted that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, has laid this Section 20 Motion. This is our only power under CRaG, and I am pleased that we are seeking to apply it.

In mid-November, the Supreme Court found that the Rwanda policy, as expressed through the MoU, was unlawful. As we have heard, the basis for the ruling was that Rwanda is not a safe country in this context. The Supreme Court was clear—so clear, in fact, that it revealed a range of institutional, legal and procedural measures that needed to be in place to render the country safe enough for the Rwanda policy to be lawful. As the Secretary of State, James Cleverly, says in the policy statement document, the Government produced a policy that

“carefully considers and responds to the Supreme Court’s judgment”,

adding that the policy statement

“should be read alongside the treaty”.

During his evidence to the committee, the Home Secretary repeatedly took the line that because the words in the treaty meet the requirements of the Supreme Court, Rwanda will be a safe location to achieve the Government’s ends. As he said,

“Once the treaty has gone through the legitimate democratic process, in Westminster and Kigali, we can legitimately say that their”—


the courts’—

“concerns have been addressed”.

As an aside, I would ask, as others have: if his confidence really was that strong, why is the Bill necessary? If, as he suggests, the Supreme Court’s demands have been satisfied by the treaty, why turn the constitution on its head to keep judges away from making a ruling? But that is a debate for another day.

The committee’s report does not question the integrity or the willingness of the Rwandans to deliver on this treaty. It does, however, review in detail what needs to be done in Rwanda—on the ground, not just on paper, but actually existing and operating. We can see from the evidence presented to the committee that much needs to be achieved to meet the terms of the treaty—much to be achieved, therefore, to meet the Supreme Court’s criteria for a legally safe process.

While giving evidence to the committee, Secretary of State Cleverly was unable to put a timeframe on the achievement of those activities. He did not furnish a copy of the law that must be passed in Kigali. He was generally very light on detail, but he asserted that it could all happen quite quickly. In paragraph 45 of the report, the committee set out 10 paramount legal, practical steps that have to be implemented to properly meet the terms of the treaty. As your Lordships will have seen, this involves passing laws, setting up new processes and appointing and recruiting a wide range of people, as well as training them. None of this is trivial, or indeed routine.

Given the importance to the legality of the scheme of these 10 measures, James Cleverly was asked to confirm that the Government would not ratify this treaty until they were satisfied that the agreement had been fully implemented. Given what he had said moments before, his answer was quite curious and a little surprising. I make no apology for quoting the Secretary of State’s words, because they perhaps demonstrate a little lucidity for a moment.

James Cleverly said:

“We have a process that we are running through. They”—


the Rwandans—

“have a process that they are running through. The point is that we will not operationalise this scheme until we are confident that the measures underpinning the treaty have been put in place; otherwise, the treaty is not credible”.

I repeat his words for emphasis. He said that

“we will not operationalise this scheme until we are confident that the measures underpinning the treaty have been put in place”.

Clearly, he has some doubts, but never mind. I suggest that there is very little difference between waiting for the conditions to be operationalised and meeting the conditions of this Motion. Both require evidence that the treaty’s requirements are in place and operational on the ground; the difference is that this Motion expects Parliament to be involved in that process. We, as noble Lords, should always protect Parliament’s role in making decisions such as this.

If the Secretary of State’s confidence is demonstrated, it will not in fact take very long; he said that it might not take very long. If that is the case, we will not have to wait long for this process to be operationalised. I must say, as many of your Lordships have set out, there is a strong belief that the Home Secretary may have understated the scale of the challenge and underestimated the time it might take for all these things to happen. None of the evidence we received suggested that the 10 criteria set out in the report can be realised with any degree of speed.

Leaving aside the moral, financial and constitutional issues surrounding this treaty and its accompanying Bill, focusing instead on the necessarily narrow grounds adopted by our committee, there is more than enough reason to delay the ratification of the treaty until the conditions for its lawful operation are in place. We support the Motions in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, and will take that support through the Lobby if he chooses, as I hope he will, to move them.