Official Controls (Plant Health) and Phytosanitary Conditions (Amendment) Regulations 2025

Lord Empey Excerpts

Monday 9th June 2025 Lords Chamber

So it could be entered into by the EU, under its law, only because it was intrinsically temporary. I did ask a very distinguished lawyer, who I shall not name, what “temporary” meant in European law; he said “Ooh, about eight years, generally”. Well, eight years are up, so, as a temporary arrangement, we ought to be moving speedily to think about some system of mutual recognition that would enable us to have a fully functioning internal market within the United Kingdom, and the most sensible arrangements across the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic, with the minimum of controls, none of which would take place at the border. Then we would all be happy and able to debate other things late at night.

[Lord Empey (UUP)]

My Lords, to some extent, as previous speakers have said of this set of regulations, it is almost preposterous that we are debating it several months after its implementation. But I would have to say to the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, that there is nothing as permanent as the temporary; he will, sadly, be familiar with that phrase.

On the idea of protecting our plant life and so on, there will not be a word of discontent around the Chamber about our trying to do that; it is common sense. However, we are dealing here not simply with the regulations that are in front of us; we are dealing with the circumstances in which they have been brought forward. Other speakers have drawn attention to this.

Going back to the beginning, after the decision to leave the European Union, my party was uncomfortable with that at that time, simply because we could see that this sort of thing was going to happen. We triggered Article 50 far too soon. We had not negotiated and worked out among ourselves what we were going to do, and that showed up very quickly in the negotiating process. We accepted the fundamental top three things that the EU had agreed before we even sat down at the table. The first was leaving citizenship out of it, on which I think there would be no argument. We agreed on payment, so we decided to buy a house before we knew what it was going to cost, and we then agreed to take the Irish question out of the trade set-up and put it into a political context. That had to be done before we even got started. So, to some extent, you were fighting a losing battle from that point onwards. If anybody was to renegotiate the situation today, I do not think they would even contemplate such a proposal.

I also suspect that we are also in a totally different context from when the noble Lord, Lord Frost, put in his bid for this Motion. He referred to 19 May and the reset. However, this is a skeletal set of agreements. There is no substance or detail in any of those agreements with the EU, and anybody who knows anything about the European Union knows that it is good at the small print. So we may have these high-level ideas of reset, but the minutiae is where the European Union is at its best and we are at our worst.

I have argued for some time—I hope the Minister will look at this, and I think I have said it in other debates—that, given that the review of the trade and co-operation agreement is due next year, the United Kingdom should be working today to work out what proposals we want to put to the European Union in those negotiations. It is perfectly obvious that the European Union will want to compress that renegotiation to the minimum and the reset will play into that, but it is an opportunity. It is written into the agreement that its operation will be reviewed in 2026. We should be preparing a position now and not end up crashing in at the last minute with a few things jotted on a piece of paper. We need to know what it is that we want.

Fundamentally, the problem of us in Northern Ireland being half in the European Union and half out of it is insoluble. Even if you have all the fundamental technical solutions—there are many now that are applicable and could work, as has been referred to—if we are in one trading bloc and the European Union is in another, that is a politically insoluble position to be in, because we are under a totally different regime, subject to different laws with no impact on or say in what the laws should be.

I have to say that things are changing. All of a sudden, people in Great Britain are saying, “How awful is this? People are going to be making our laws and we’ve no say over them”. Well, I have to say, “Folks, wakey wakey”. We have had to live with this for some years. Now it appears that, in part, people in Great Britain are going to be in the same boat. Looked at that way, “dynamic alignment” is a significant term. We have had expressions of what that actually means. I draw the House’s attention to the fact that, if people are uncomfortable, since many Benches have by and large been empty when we have been discussing these issues, they may not be quite so empty in a year’s time when some people have to take a dose of their own medicine.

Personally, I believe that we as a nation could have avoided a lot of this. I think we negotiated and handled things badly after the people took a decision, and we are living with the consequences of that. Thereafter we have been mitigating, trying to ease the pressure and trying to make things easier for traders and businesses to operate. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, referred to, not one scintilla of the Windsor Framework has been changed.

I want to ask the Minister about a particular issue that has not really got above the parapet yet: the new European Union customs processes. The European Union is undertaking a massive review. Like the Americans, it has had a situation where the movement of goods of small monetary value does not require any paperwork. I think there was a limit of about €125, and in the United States context it was about $850. That is coming to an end. Every single thing, irrespective of its value, will have to have a number and will be under the new regulations that will come in in the European Union in the next few years. That will apply to the whole of the United Kingdom in significant measure, but I have not seen or heard any comment in Parliament about it. Is the Minister aware of that? Do she and her colleagues have anything to say about it and what the implications would be for the movement of products of a very low value?

Of course, that will hit the very small businesses. It will make life more difficult for individuals who may be bringing things in online, or in whatever mechanism that is used. As the Minister knows, we have a parcel issue. We are in the process of spending £200 million on border inspection posts. People are saying, “The new reset means we don’t need them”, but that is not the case. We will continue to need them, and the European Union is insisting that we have them.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord for bringing this up. I am sure he will be able to remind me of the clause in the Northern Ireland protocol—to which the EU signed up—that says the EU will use its best endeavours to ensure that there is no need for checks and border posts at the ports and airports of Northern Ireland. Now it is insisting that they exist, rather than trying to find ways of doing without them.

[Lord Empey (UUP)]

I suspect that the answer will be, “We need them there just in case there’s an outbreak of disease and we have to inspect animals and get back to crawling under tractors to see if there is any Scottish soil underneath”, and so on. There will be an answer. As the noble Lord is aware, there is always an answer.

Can the Minister tell us what the implications of the new customs rules that are coming down the track—which our committee is aware of and looking at—will be for the situations we are facing tonight? I think they mean that intrusive interference will be coming down to a very low level—to the level of an individual. Maybe Members do not realise that the Select Committee to which the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, referred—and of which he and I are members—is the only committee in this Parliament that is looking at EU regulations and laws that apply to Northern Ireland. Nobody else is looking at them. There is nothing down at the other end. I think that is an outrage; the House of Commons should be looking at these things. Ours is the only committee in Parliament that is looking at these matters; maybe that says a lot about what people’s priorities are.

I ask the Minister to refer to the customs issue, because I think that is going to come very much to the fore. Can she also tell us what preparations are being made for the 2026 renegotiation of the trade and co-operation agreement? Are the Government preparing and working with other interested parties to decide the best way forward and to see whether, while we cannot solve these problems in their entirety—and certainly not constitutionally—we can perhaps mitigate them further to at least alleviate some of the obstacles that are in the way of business?

[Lord Bew (CB)]

My Lords, it is with considerable regret that I rise to oppose the regret Motion from the noble Lord, Lord Frost, because I respect enormously the work that the noble Lord did on this question when he was in government. I wish to stress in particular tonight that the introduction of unilateral grace periods was the beginning of the fight-back against the authoritarian implications of the 2017 EU-UK agreement. That was of considerable importance and helped to give us space for further developments—developments with which, I understand from listening to him, he is now radically dissatisfied. I am not satisfied; I am rather less dissatisfied.

It is crucial to understand that the 2017 EU-UK agreement is the core of the ideas that are then to be found in the protocol—that is absolutely clear. It is important to understand also that that agreement involved a flouting of key elements in the Good Friday agreement. Strand 3 of the Good Friday agreement insists that there be harmonious mutually beneficial relationships between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK. Nobody could see how those mutually beneficial relationships could remain in the full implementation of the 2017 EU-UK agreement. One of the key themes of that agreement is that the British Government were compelled to commit themselves to supporting an island economy.

Look at the Good Friday agreement and the frame- work document that precedes it: it is explicitly about co-operation between two economies on the island of Ireland. To the surprise of many economists who believed that there should be more of an island economy in the early years of the 20th century, suddenly there was a thing called the island economy. By the way, in certain respects there is: in electricity, the dairy industry and so on. But there is not, overall, an island economy—there is absolutely no question about that—and the two economies on the island of Ireland remain a profound reality.

Funnily enough, in recent weeks, as a result of Donald Trump’s probings—is that the right word?—of the Irish economy, the indignant insistence all over the Irish press and media that there are two economies on the island of Ireland has become explosive. But the island economy, and the British Government’s commitment to support it, was one of the great problems in the 2017 agreement and the protocols—both the May and the Johnson versions. It is based on a very unrealistic assessment of the realities of the island economy. In the Gallimard edition of Michel Barnier’s memoir, around pages 137 to 140, there is a discussion of Ireland that is largely mythical. None the less, these mythical concepts became the heart of policy and, more importantly, a British Government were compelled to support that.

If the Windsor Framework has been treated very dustily tonight, there is one thing it does: it calls a stop to that. It says no, and the European Union agrees. It is absolutely explicit. The island economy driver of policy for the British Government and the dynamic alignment that people have talked about are dispelled by the Windsor Framework. That is one of the achievements of the Windsor Framework and why it played a role in the return of Stormont.

This was followed by the Safeguarding the Union document, the importance of which was to demonstrate, on the subject of the Irish Sea border, that, for large parts of the history of the union—for many decades—there has been an Irish Sea border of one sort or another. It is absolutely explicit—it reproduces the documents. You cannot say that the Irish Sea border as such is corrosive of the union; the union somehow survives. The phenomenon known as the Irish Sea border is in a different form today, but what is not in doubt is that it is not corrosive of the union as such. That, again, is one of the important things about the Safeguarding the Union document.

The other important thing is that it lays out the first declaration of something that is now commonplace in debate in this House: the necessary role of the Northern Ireland defence industries in the protection of the United Kingdom. It makes this absolutely clear, and it is the first signal of something that this Government have taken up very strongly. One of the reasons why I mention this is: where is the dynamic alignment with the Irish Republic, when we are emphasising above all the importance of the defence industries of Northern Ireland in the defence of the United Kingdom? It is important to remember these realities.

As I listened, I pictured the frustrations of life with the Windsor Framework. There are many such frustrations. The new SPS agreement may help, and I hope it does. One thing is clear, and the noble Lord, Lord Empey, made the point: one can no longer say in Northern Ireland that we alone are rule takers from the EU. The whole of the rest of the United Kingdom will now be rule takers from the whole of the EU in a different sense. The reason why it is fundamentally democratic is that this Parliament has a right to make these decisions.

Traditional unionism always accepted that. In the 1930s, when traditional unionism disliked the 1938 agreement, it still said, “Nothing to do with Stormont’s decisions. It is up to this Parliament to make these decisions, even if we are uneasy and dislike the various provisions of a particular trade agreement”. That is what traditional unionism stands for: the idea that this Parliament has a right to make these decisions. They are often very difficult and, it so happens, often very unsatisfactory in Northern Ireland.

There are difficulties. The University of Ulster economist Dr Esmond Birnie has been quite right to insist—other speakers have mentioned it tonight—about the fall-off in trade from Great Britain into Northern Ireland, particularly smaller concerns. The paperwork has put off smaller concerns exporting from the rest of the United Kingdom into Northern Ireland. There is absolutely no question that this is a problem, but there is also no doubt, for example, that many Northern Ireland businesses enjoy dual access and enjoy the access to the Irish Republic. There is no doubt that the Ulster Farmers’ Union seems increasingly relaxed, especially in the context of possible new SPS arrangements, about the Windsor Framework.

So, while it is perfectly correct that there are many unsatisfactory aspects of the current reality—Dr Esmond Birnie in particular has drawn careful and precise attention to this, and I hope the Government will pay attention to the various scholarly papers that he has produced—and while there is no doubt that these possibilities exist, there are also areas of success. The services industry in Northern Ireland is doing far better than anybody expected at this point. It is protected in the Windsor Framework quite explicitly and is doing far better than anybody—certainly myself—expected at this particular point in history.

Finally, I will say something on the point of phytosanitary arrangements. Back in the days of the BSE crisis, Dr Ian Paisley, leader of the DUP, went into No. 10 and said to Tony Blair, “I need to tell you that my farmers are British but my cattle are Irish”, because he wanted to make special arrangements. BSE was not so marked a feature in Northern Ireland as it was in the rest of the United Kingdom and, basically, he wanted a privileged relationship for Northern Irish farmers—“My farmers are British, but my cattle are Irish; respect that they currently do not have the same levels of BSE as they have in Derbyshire”. The logic behind this legislation is, “My gardeners are British but my plants are Irish”. It is hard to dispute or argue with it.

Finally, the noble Lord, Lord Frost, talked about those who suggest that you have to live with ambiguity and compromise in Northern Ireland. He expressed doubt and said that some of these compromises had been very unsatisfactory in the past 25 years. I am absolutely certain that there is no way that Northern Ireland can survive as part of the United Kingdom without compromise of the sort that has been made. He mentioned, for example, the logic of the Good Friday agreement. I am also clear in my mind that the union is never going to be available on exclusively unionist terms. That does not mean that the union is not available—the union has, at this point, a strong future ahead of it—but it is not going to be available on exclusively unionist terms. This is the point that we all have to accept.

There is irreducibly an element here. I have criticised the Irish negotiators of that agreement in 2017; they overplayed their hand, and the best Irish officials, in my view, now accept that. It left a lot of problems that the noble Lord, Lord Frost, had to struggle with, and in the first instance dealt with successfully. It left lots of problems, but the truth of the matter is that there are these two identities and Northern Ireland does face both ways. This cannot be avoided in the settlement, which must involve, at some level, a compromise. The protocol was definitely unfair to the mainstream unionist community, but the idea that we can just drop the Windsor Framework now—which, as I pointed out, has significant elements that work well for the unionist community—is not realistic.