Lord Eatwell
Main Page: Lord Eatwell (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Eatwell's debates with the Cabinet Office
(1 day, 17 hours ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in principle, the growth problem is straightforward: invest in the quality of labour via education and training, and in the quality of capital via research and development and innovation. On the one hand, the state is the main investor in education and skills and plays a crucial role in providing efficient infrastructure and much of the budget for fundamental research. The funding of research is particularly important because the state is able to invest in areas that only yield an uncertain return in the long term. Consider, for example, the fact that all relevant innovations embodied in the iPhone were developed in public sector institutions. It was the genius, then, of Steve Jobs to put them all together.
On the other hand, business investment requires incentives and means. The incentive is clear: the expectation that the investment will be profitable. That depends on the prospective demand for the goods and services that the investment is designed to produce. It does not matter if interest rates and taxes are low or even zero; if you cannot sell the product due to a lack of demand then investment is a waste of money, so the maintenance of a high level of effective demand is the vital precondition for the stimulation of competitive investment. Even if demand is there, though, the means are required—namely, the finance. Much investment is financed by retained profits, but truly innovative investment—the investment that changes the world—requires the medium-term to long-term support of financial institutions.
That is where Britain fails. Our major financial institutions define the concept of investment peculiarly: they claim they are investing billions in Britain, but what they mean is that they spend billions in the purchase of financial assets in secondary markets. They do not finance the creation of new, real, productive investment—investment in national accounting terms. It used to be argued that liquid secondary markets were a necessary complement to primary investment, but the relationship is declining, with an increasing proportion of investment being funded through private vehicles.
There are exceptions to the non-real investment and non-growth stance of UK finance. Some of the larger institutions have small real investment divisions. However, investment is usually confined to fintech. There are some specialist small and medium-sized banks that spread their investment outside fintech into other growth areas, often with a real estate content. Some private equity firms promote organic growth in their target companies, and venture capital trusts are a valuable source of SME funding. Unfortunately, however, it is clear from the overall lack of second-stage SME funding in the UK that these exceptions do not add up to the scale required to transform the growth prospects of the economy.
For example, the entire assets of the venture capital trust sector amount to around £6.2 billion. This compares to the £1.5 trillion size of Barclays’ balance sheet alone; that is 250 times greater than the entire venture capital sector. This suggests that we cannot simply look to the financial services industry as it is currently structured to do more. More of the same will simply not be good enough.
The structure of financial services must be changed. The new National Wealth Fund will contribute to that change, but for scale we need the private sector, so carrots and sticks are required. On the carrot side, there are already significant tax advantages associated with innovative investment, but these do not achieve what is necessary. The reform of pension funds will be very important. The US pension reform in 1978, which enabled investment in alternatives, gave rise to the professional venture capital industry in that country. It is striking how many successful UK SMEs raise their secondary funding in the United States—another indicator of the failure of UK financial services.
How about the stick? Well, how about requiring appropriate financial institutions of over a certain balance sheet size to devote a given proportion of their assets to real investment, either directly or indirectly via funding organisations such as venture capital funds? We must also find a way of weaning the banks off algorithm-driven lending and get back to old-fashioned relationship banking. For how that is done, see Handelsbanken: the point being that real investors need a close advisory relationship with their funders, where advice flows in both directions.
It is a remarkable paradox that our wonderfully successful financial services industry is one of the main reasons for our growth failure. But until fundamental reform, by carrot and stick, induces greater flows of finance into real investment, that sad paradox will remain.