Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Lord Eatwell Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 8th June 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, I begin by drawing attention to my interests listed in the register. The financial crisis of 2007 to 2009 left lasting scars on the UK financial system. The costs of that crisis have reverberated in the form of embedded risk aversion, particularly among financial services regulators.

Yet, risk aversion has its uses. Since the 2009 crisis, the financial services industry has been battered by further successive crises: Brexit, Covid and the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. It is to the credit of the Bank of England and the financial services regulators that the industry has displayed a remarkable level of financial stability throughout these storms.

Yet there remains a persistent dissatisfaction with the performance of the regulators. The costs of compliance are excessive. A PwC study puts the sector’s annual compliance bill at nearly £35 billion—roughly 13% of total operating costs. Regulators are said to take excessive time over crucial decisions, such as authorisations. There is no consistent cost-benefit analysis of regulatory measures, despite the fact that the 2023 FSMA required the FCA and the PRA to establish cost-benefit panels. Regulatory decisions often create uncertainty, stifling innovation and discouraging investment.

The fact that the Bill addresses some of these concerns is certainly to be welcomed. The simplification of the senior managers regime and other administrative requirements should reduce costs. The new provisional licences should speed up effective authorisation. The changes to the relationship between the FOS and the FCA will perhaps reduce regulatory uncertainty, although it may have other effects, as the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, suggested. Moreover, the increased flexibility provided to the FCA and the PRA in several sections of the Bill must be used with care, lest flexibility generates uncertainty.

While I welcome these measures, I am concerned by the changes to ring-fencing. The claim in the Explanatory Notes that,

“updating the statutory framework underpinning the ring-fencing regime as part of a wider programme of ring-fencing reforms”,

sets alarm bells ringing. Updating may well be the origin of increased systemic risk. The protection of activities within the ring-fence must be a primary objective. Weakening the ring-fence in the name of financial innovation would be unacceptable.

Moreover, the claim that:

“These reforms will unlock more finance for the UK economy”,


sets alarm bells ringing even louder. When he sums up, could the Minister enlighten us about the content of the,

“wider programme of ring-fencing reforms”?

What exactly do the Government have in mind?

The Explanatory Notes claim that Bill,

“modernises how the financial services sector is regulated, supporting it to grow and to lend more to businesses”,

but overall, the Bill gives the impression of tidying up, rather than embedding greater financial commitment to investment and growth. Of course, the emphasis on investment and growth is surely correct. It is necessary for the economic well-being of the people of this country. In this vital respect, for many years the financial services industry has failed, and it is continuing to fail.

Since 2000, the share of financial services in GDP has grown by 50% from 6% to 9% of GDP. Over the same period, the share of investment in GDP has not grown at all and, indeed, has tended to decline and has been persistently lower than in other major industrial countries.

We have to reflect on the fact that the prosperity of the UK’s financial services sector is not solely a success of private enterprise; it is a success of a particular institutional framework in which public authorities and the market are deeply intertwined. The prosperity of the City of London depends upon the global prestige of English law and the public institutions that enforce it. Similarly, financial services depend on the public provision of a stable monetary framework and a respected code of financial regulation, ranging from the role of the Bank of England as lender of last resort and guardian of systemic stability to consumer protection and the prevention of financial crime.

Public provision defines the environment within which financial services prosper. In return, financial services should work in a way that serves society by funding the investment in innovation, productive capacity, research and skills that the country needs. That is the settlement between the public realm and financial services.

That settlement is not working. A new settlement is required but what might that look like? It should begin with a framework of financial institutions that are committed to the needed investment. I do not mean greater flows of funds into stocks, shares and bonds in secondary markets. Britain needs financial institutions that fund real investment, new research, new products and services, new infrastructure, new homes, new international competitive industries. The Government have made an attempt at this by creating the National Wealth Fund. However, that fund will invest only if a firm that seeks funds from it has already acquired private sector funding. In other words, an institution that exists because private markets have failed defers to those failing markets to guide its own investment decisions. That is just not good enough. The new settlement must not rely solely on government, regulators or even politicians. The financial services industry itself must play its part, building on current initiatives such as the Capital Markets Industry Taskforce, convened by the London Stock Exchange.

The Bill before us is not part of this new settlement to which I refer. It is worth while and sensible, but the task of building a financial services industry that truly serves our society needs to go a lot further.

Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Lord Eatwell Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 29th June 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I have added my name to the Clause 17 stand part notice. As has been explained so clearly, the Government’s intention appears to be to put most of the consideration of the regulatory principles and “have regards” into the five-year strategy created by Clause 16. They believe that, having done that and thereby provided long-term clarity as to how those principles and “have regards” will be met at a strategic level, it is no longer necessary to apply them to the nitty-gritty of individual rule-making, which is why Clause 17 effectively removes them from that process. Rightly, the Government consider the secondary competitiveness and growth objective to be extremely important, so they have singled that one out for special treatment in Clause 20, and it alone must be reported on annually. That, at least, is to be welcomed but does have the somewhat odd effect of making the secondary objective more important than even the primary objectives, or any other principles which are not subject to specific reporting.

As we have heard, there are very real problems with this overall approach in terms of the impact on the ability of Parliament to scrutinise the activities of the regulators, including the committees that have been established for that purpose. As the Minister is aware, the Financial Services Regulation Committee of this House, of which I and a number of others in this Grand Committee are members, has taken the unusual step of writing to the Minister to set out our unanimous concerns in that respect. I very much look forward to the meeting that he will attend next week on that.

In passing, just before we started today, we received a letter and a Treasury note from the Minister. Point 15 in the Treasury note would slightly bring together the strategy and the Clause 17 elements, in that it says:

“The Bill will require the regulators in their annual reports to update on the extent to which, in their opinion, they have implemented their long-term strategy”.


I spent a fair bit of time since I received that trying to find where the Bill actually says that. I may be being very dim, but I cannot find it, so perhaps the Minister could point out specifically where that is. I may well have missed it, and I apologise if I have.

I also spent part of the weekend reminding myself of what the FCA’s existing 2025-30 strategy document looks like. I lead a very exciting life, as you can see. While “vacuous” might be too strong a description, it is a classic of its type, being full of motherhood and apple pie generalities and lots of attractive diagrams and pictures, but very little of real specificity or genuine measurability. Statements such as

“We will be a smarter regulator; predictable, purposeful and proportionate”,


sound great, but is this really something that could be meaningfully scrutinised? When I compare the rules in Clause 16 with what is actually in the current strategy, it appears to me that the current strategy would actually comply with Clause 16.

During the previous day in Committee, the Minister said, in reply to a question from the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, about the existing strategy and whether it is the model on which Clause 16 is based:

“this is the starting point. There is definitely work to do and it needs to be improved”.—[Official Report, 24/6/26; col. GC 337.]

I cannot see how Clause 16 would improve it— I think it already complies—so I have no argument with the FCA having to have a longer-term strategy, but Clause 16 does not provide a sufficient basis on its own for parliamentary scrutiny and accountability, and that is where Clause 17 becomes such a problem. Clause 17 removes the need for the regulators to have regard to the regulatory principles and other “have regards” when going about its general duties, so apart from the annual report on competitiveness and growth in Clause 20 that I mentioned earlier, the only time the regulators will have to consider the regulatory principles—including, but not only, the critical issue of proportionality—will be in its five-year strategy. This would remove the need for regulators to explain how the regulatory principles apply to any draft regulations, at a time when they should be explaining not only the application to individual regulations but the cumulative impact of those regulations.

We debated last week how there is scope for an overhaul of the regulatory principles and other “have regards”, which have a tendency to proliferate. Perhaps that is where the Bill ought to be concentrating its efforts. Clause 17 represents a considerable downgrade on the ability of Parliament and indeed the Treasury to hold the regulators to account. Even as the Bill delegates ever-increasing activities to those regulators, this is a move in the wrong direction. So, by all means let us have a long-term strategy, but that does not substitute for the need for the regulators to have regard to the principles and other “have regards” when setting regulations, and to explain how they have been met. Clause 17 should be removed from the Bill.

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, I want to follow on from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, who commented that the committee was unanimous in its letter to the Minister. It was indeed: Conservative, Liberal Democrat, Labour and Cross-Bench Members were unanimous in rejecting Clause 17. The reason is that Clause 17 embodies the requirement to remove the principles from consideration by the committee. But those principles are the essential toolkit of the committee. This actually neuters the committee and leaves it just examining five-year strategies and annual reports, and without the ability to deal with specific proposals, which is the reason why the committee was established in the first place. By removing that ability, the Bill also weakens the regulators.

I am sure there are regulators in some office who thought that that was a neat way of getting rid of a very awkward committee. But it weakens, because, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, pointed out, of the need for political cover—the need for a relationship between the political decisions and regulatory decisions. At the moment there exists this “proposal, accountability, critique” relationship between the regulators and the Financial Services Regulation Committee of your Lordships’ House. Remove that and the regulators are exposed to significant issues in a way they would not have been before.

I cannot see how in any way this measure improves a regulatory system that was built on the principles relationship established in FSMA at the beginning. It became particularly important once we left the European Union and the responsibility to examine the regulatory structure shifted from the European Parliament to this Parliament; and now, Clause 17 is taking away parliamentary accountability in any serious operational sense. It really should not stand part of the Bill.