Brexit: UK-EU Relationship

Lord Desai Excerpts

Thursday 1st December 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Desai (Lab)]

My Lords, this is about the fourth time I have spoken on the result of the referendum and I shall say the same as I did in the first debate: I voted to remain but out means out. I do not think that we do any good by demeaning those who voted for Brexit or describing them as—to use Hillary Clinton’s word—“deplorables”. In England, 28 million people voted out of 34 million, and the margin for Brexit was seven percentage points—53 to 46. The difference in England of two million votes was also the national difference. In all the devolved regions, three million voted for and three million voted against. So this is very much an angry English decision—and we should listen to it carefully.

My noble friend Lord Monks described it as a divorce, and so did I. The point of a divorce is to get it over with quickly. Then, you want to cohabit, but you cannot begin the discussion on cohabitation until after the divorce. We have walked out of the house; now we have to proceed with the divorce. If we are going to go through with this divorce, it is neither a hard nor soft Brexit but a quick Brexit that is of the essence. Once you get a quick Brexit, then you can have a smart framework agreement for cohabitation. Much more time should be spent on discussing cohabitation than on either delaying the invocation of Article 50 or making it very complicated.

I know that I am in a minority on this side of the House in that respect, but I sincerely think that, to end the uncertainty, we have to have a quick Brexit. It is no good hoping that, somehow, the world is going to change, the British people are going to change, France is going to break down and Germany is going to go up in flames—none of that is going to happen. The 27 other member states are not going to treat us nicely, whether we insult then or not. They have their own interests to protect. We have walked out and so we have to take the consequences.

The important question now is: what role does Parliament play in this, whatever decision the Supreme Court makes? It would be good to have a discussion in Parliament like the ones we have been having more or less continuously since June before Article 50 is invoked—a much more extensive discussion, along the lines of the one we are having today, with different views. However, as I have proposed before, once Article 50 is invoked we should have only a Select Committee of both Houses of Parliament to get detailed information from the Government on a Privy Council basis so there can be interaction between Parliament and the Executive. Finally, when the decision has been made, Parliament can come back into the decision-making process and vote either to approve or not approve the package that has been agreed. If Parliament does not approve it, I do not know where we go from there—but that is the way we should conduct our business.

As I have said, there should be much more interest in what happens after the Brexit negotiations. Everybody else deals with WTO. We can do that as well—it is not a miracle and we should not be frightened of it. That is what others do, so we will do it as well. We have to be prepared for that and not wait for some miracle reversal of our decision.

Israel and Palestine

Lord Desai Excerpts

Thursday 13th October 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Desai (Lab)]

My Lords, I, too, am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Dykes, for getting time for this debate.

I will start by saying that next year we will have the centenary of the Balfour Declaration, and in many ways what is going on in the Middle East right now—not just in Israel, Palestine and Syria, but what has already happened in Iraq and so on—is basically cleaning up the mess left by the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. We played a big role in dismantling the Ottoman Empire and in the unsettled business of the borders of Syria, Iraq and Kurdistan. All those problems are still there and we are still trying to solve them. Indeed, we see from Syria how bloody it can get if people do not take a reasonable view of where they belong.

I have always held the view, which was once upon a time held in the Labour Party, that the two-state solution is not viable. There is a single piece of land and two peoples each believe they have an historic right to it, going back to time immemorial. In some points of view they are both right; they are both passionate; and of course the settlement that has been made has not satisfied anybody—neither the winners nor the losers.

I have always believed that we ought to abandon the search for a two-state solution in drawing or not drawing boundaries. There ought to be one multi-ethnic, multireligious state in that territory which can accommodate the Arabs and the Jews together so that they can live in harmony and peace. It will be the land of both those people, not exclusively of one of them. That is why the only sensible solution to this problem—but of course it will not happen, because nobody gives up what they have, especially when it comes to land. The history of the 20th century and now the 21st century is littered with land disputes in which people have killed each other in incredible numbers.

I do not know how we can create a neutral force of well-intentioned people who can promote the idea that it is possible to have a state in the Holy Land in which Muslims, Jews and Christians can live together. Jerusalem, after all, is the centre of all three religions. Somehow, because they are ultimately the same people—they are not different people—I hope that at some stage somebody, somewhere, will start a movement to create a single, peaceful, multifaith state in that territory.

I am reminded of how we solved the problem of Northern Ireland. There was a very passionate dispute there among people of the same religion but different sects. It took a long time—100 years—but we solved it. There was the good will to solve it, and I hope that we can solve this problem.

Outcome of the European Union Referendum

Lord Desai Excerpts

Wednesday 6th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Desai (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure and a privilege to follow the noble Lord, Lord Norton—and just as he stuck to his speciality, I will stick to mine.

The women’s movement has taught us the very interesting slogan: “what part of no don’t you understand?” I say, “What part of ‘out’ do people not understand?”. People say that the referendum was based on too simple a question, but a referendum cannot be based on multiple-choice questions. It was in or out, and the message is that we are out. It is our duty to implement what the people told us.

Forget about the fact that they were misinformed. We have fought elections, and do we think that people were better informed in elections than in the referendum? Do we not think that people were made false promises in manifestos? I belong to the Labour Party, where every conference is about the betrayal of manifesto promises. The people may be illiterate; they may be racist; but they are the people and they were right. Our duty is to implement.

Secondly, on Thursday 23 June we had an economy. Today we have the same economy. It has not changed. It has not collapsed. Whenever the stock market collapses, people say, “The fundamentals are all right”. They never talk about fundamentals when the stock market is rising. I think that the fundamentals are perfectly sound. The British economy has not run away anywhere. The same people are working in the same jobs with the same ingenuity and enterprise. I also believe that the forecasts of recession are exaggerated. If we keep our heads there will be no reason for any panic or large-scale capital outflow because this happens still to be one of the most prosperous and productive economies—as it was on Thursday 23 June, and as it is today.

I would say only one thing about the right honourable gentleman the Chancellor. I expected him to be out there on Friday morning, giving the message that I am giving. He should have come out and said, “Don’t panic”. He might have added, “I don’t like this result but the economy is sound, and from there we proceed”—because we do not want to make mistakes in false panic. Let us remember that.

I will move on to what to do next. There are two phrases that people are confusing. One is the divorce. We have decided on a divorce, and then of course there is the problem of remarriage. What arrangements will we make when we are out? Shall we come back in with half a step, or really pretend that it never happened and be friends ever after, and act a little bit like Switzerland, Norway or whatever?

These things are sequential. The technicalities may be left to lawyers, but first we have to negotiate the out. The divorce has to be negotiated. There are 6,987—or however many—pieces of legislation that we have to review and decide how many of them to accept or not accept. It will be an enormous task. A friend of mine who works in the private sector said that one leading agency had made some contingency plans. He told me that two months ago they had decided to hire 4,000 people in case Brexit was voted for—and they have done that, let me assure you. The Government may have to hire 10,000 extra people to get through this, because it is going to be an enormous task. We will need a very large Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament to be able to absorb the amount of work which has to be done. I think that the noble Lord, Lord Boswell, will have to bear most of the burden—and good luck to him.

Once we have worked out the divorce, we should work out what alternative arrangements we want. As far as I can understand—though I may be wrong—legally, those things are treated as separate negotiations by the European Council. We may be able to do something but first the divorce has to be worked out. Since the divorce will take two years from whenever we trigger Article 50, we are looking at the end of 2018 or 2019. Until then, we are in the EU; everything is fine, all the grants and agreements are still working, we are still in low-carbon territory and so on. So let us all calm down, let us say that we may be in this position until the end of 2018 or maybe the middle of 2019. Our rearrangement negotiations will start then, but it is very hard to predict how long they will take. They may take another two years.

Regarding Norway or Switzerland, I have one suggestion, which your Lordships may or may not like. The WTO option is the only option that does not require negotiations; it is a case of, “Okay, we have done the divorce, we will walk away, thank you very much”. In the remain campaign there were two tendencies that were mixed up. One was the liberal, free-trade element of the Conservative Party, which has never liked the customs union logic of the European Union. They are Adam Smith people, not Friedrich List people, and good luck to them; they got a bit nervous when they won, but that is another issue. If we are in the free-trade, liberal area, WTO is the best option—and, since everybody else is in the WTO, we may as well be there. That was the promise made by a lot of people. It is something that we had until 1973, so I do not know why we could not try it again. So I will just say: first the divorce, then the WTO—good luck.

EU Foreign and Security Strategy (EUC Report)

Lord Desai Excerpts

Tuesday 7th June 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Desai (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Tugendhat, for his committee’s excellent report. Its title is “Towards a more effective EU foreign and security strategy”, and I will concentrate on just how we can get a more effective strategy.

Given that the EU, despite its size, total income and so on, has 28 separate foreign policies, which the 28 member states are entitled to have, the question is: what can the EU, as a sort of weak confederation, do to have an effective security strategy? One almost feels like quoting Dr Johnson who, in another context, mentioned a dog standing on its hind legs: it is not that it is done well—the remarkable thing is that it is done at all.

I note one great success the EU has had: the policy on Iran. It is a significant achievement of the office of the high representative—which was of course lately occupied by my noble friend Lady Ashton—that somehow, the EU ended up playing a much more pivotal role in the delicate negotiations than anyone expected. If we ask why that was so, it is because while the EU is a large collection of countries, it is non-threatening as far as Iran is concerned. Iran does not trust the US, the UK or Russia to have its interests at heart, but it somehow thought that the EU being there was a guarantee of fair play in the process. Perhaps one of the things the EU ought to reflect on is how to exploit that advantage—being large but having a low profile—because it is convenient and helpful at certain times.

While that was a success, it did not work that well as regards Syria. Let us look at the Syria process. Of course, the EU was a late joiner in that process; it should have been there right at the beginning when the conference was being organised. As I have told noble Lords before, my own preference is that the conference should be not only on Syria but on all the interconnected Middle Eastern problems. The EU could have taken a much bigger lead in that process than it has, and perhaps there may yet be time for it to play a more significant role.

The third issue is the refugee and migrants problem. Here, there has been a substantial failure on the part of the EU because there is nobody who corresponds to a high representative on refugee policy. Individual countries have tried to take the initiative, especially Germany, as we saw eventually in the negotiations with Turkey. But there are a lot of differences among member countries as to whether the initiative taken by Germany in dealing with Turkey was a success. That tells us that there is a possibility of achieving good results if there is a single high representative who can be trusted by member countries to represent their interests. At the same time, the high representative has to act early enough and strategically enough. If that had been the case with the Syrian process, there would have been more success.

It is clear that there is no agreement—not even a weak agreement—among the 28 countries on the best policy on admitting refugees. The refugee problem has been confused with the problem of migrants. The refugees come from Syria and the Middle East, and the migrants come from north Africa, and they have a completely different motivation. The refugees are involuntarily displaced, whereas migrants come voluntarily, and somehow we have not been able to make a distinction between which ones to be nice to and which ones not to be nice to. The lesson that I take from reading the report is that, if there is better co-ordination among the 28 member countries and if there is someone like a high representative to speak for a united policy, the chances of success will be greater; otherwise, there is bound to be failure.

That leads me to make a suggestion. In relation to the eurozone, there is a council—the eurogroup—headed by a president, Mr Dijsselbloem, which formulates economic policy on the euro. I do not see why there should not be a similar group underpinning the high representative to help properly to represent the policies of the various countries. Maybe thought should also be given to having a high commissioner for refugees. Such a role will be needed because the refugee problem will not go away any time soon.

Having said that, the report is very welcome because it raises these questions. Whether we are a member of the European Union or not, the report will continue to be relevant not just to the rest of the world but to us as well.