European Union Referendum Bill

Lord Davies of Stamford Excerpts

Monday 23rd November 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean]

No, I would not accept that. If the Government are people who genuinely have differences of view as to what is right for the country, then those members of the Government should be free to argue their case. As the noble Lord, Lord Stoddart, said, this is matter for Parliament, not for the Government and not for the Executive. It is for Parliament to decide what is in the best interests of our country. I hope that Parliament, by passing this Bill, will decide that the people should have an opportunity to express their view. That will then be advisory for the Government and I would expect the Government to carry on on the basis of what is suggested.

I shall make one other point. Even if the Government wanted to do it, it would be impossible to report on the relationship with the European Union that the Government envisage in the event of a referendum vote to leave the European Union. We do not even know what the European Union will be like. It is the European Union that is leaving us as it struggles with the disastrous consequences of monetary union. It is the European Union that will have to move towards a more integrated fiscal arrangement if the euro is to survive. The amendment is asking the Government to predict what it will do to maintain the stability of the euro and at the same time to predict what they will do.

In response to my noble friend, I have just thought of another argument. I would like to think that in the referendum campaign the Government will be respectful of the arguments which are put across and the way they are received by the public and that they will acknowledge and respond to these arguments.

I know why the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, has put forward this amendment. Of course it would help his case if the Government had to make these points. I have always thought that he was very even-minded and impartial on all these matters, but now he has left his former position he has turned into a politician, and a campaigning politician at that. I hope that my noble friend will not feel able to accept this amendment in any way.

[Lord Davies of Stamford (Lab)]

My Lords, I rise to speak, not that I intended to do so, because although we have been going over the same ground this evening that we have gone over before, and although no doubt many of these points will be debated passionately during the referendum campaign, I had rather hoped that the effect of these debates would be to separate out a bit the wheat from the chaff in the arguments and that those arguments that were found to be obviously unviable would be dropped by the various parties before the referendum campaign started. Therefore we would have a function here of hoping to clarify some of the essential arguments before the public debate begins in earnest.

In that context, I am quite amazed and very disappointed that two grossly invalid arguments continue to be put forward by the Eurosceptic representatives in your Lordships’ House. I thought that we might have seen the end of them. Those two arguments are so irresponsible and illusory that it amazes me that men or women of the world can seriously want to take them any further, even on an electoral platform, where I know the same qualities of intellectual analysis are not always deployed as they are in other contexts in life.

The first argument is the suggestion that this country might simply walk away from an international treaty in breach of that treaty. We have a long tradition going back over centuries of respecting international agreements, and it would be quite extraordinary for us seriously to propose to do that. We all know that Article 50 of the treaty of accession has a precise procedure to be adopted in the event that a member state wishes to withdraw; therefore withdrawal was properly and reasonably discussed at the time we signed that treaty. There was no material non-disclosure of relevant information or anything of that kind. No one was under any illusion. We signed that treaty with open eyes. Now, 40 years later, or whatever it is, suddenly to turn round and say, “We’re tearing it up and walking away”, is extraordinary.

I am amazed that anybody thinks that this country should behave like that. I would have thought that even those who are not influenced by the element of principle in this matter, which seems very obvious, or who cannot estimate or appreciate the diplomatic value—the soft diplomacy and soft power value—of having the reputation we have had until now of being a nation that takes international agreements and international law seriously might at least from sheer cynical pragmatism have realised that the last and worst thing you want to do when you are about to engage in a difficult negotiation with a group of countries, with whom we would be having a difficult negotiation to try to restore some access to the single market with our former partners in the European Union, would be, on the eve of beginning such a complicated, difficult and important negotiation, to tear up a treaty that we had previously had with them.

[Lord Hamilton of Epsom]

Has the noble Lord not missed the point, which is that the key to all this is when you invoke Article 50? Do you do it at the beginning of the negotiations, when we have just voted to come out, or at the end, after two or three years?

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

My understanding is that from the very moment you initiate the process you invoke Article 50, which sets out the procedure to be followed. I have certainly read Article 50, and that is the way I read it. I do not think that any interpretation we have heard this evening, including from the noble and learned Lord, the former Lord Chancellor, is inconsistent with that reading. The fact is that we must act in good faith in these matters. If we do not act in good faith out of moral principle, we should do so out of sheer selfish pragmatism because we will need to get a deal with the people who account for about 50% of our exports in the event that we want to leave the present arrangements we have with them. The idea that we start off by breaking an international agreement solemnly entered into is quite extraordinary.

The second extraordinary thing—I have heard this argument before and I hope I will not hear it again, although I am sure I will; I expect that it will be in the Daily Mail every day during the campaign—is that because we have a balance of payments deficit with the rest of the European Union, we have more leverage on them in these negotiations than they have on us. That is complete nonsense. I dealt with this argument before, and I used an analogy, which no one quarrelled with at the time, to try to make clear that the fact of having a deficit or a surplus is neither here nor there. What is important is the proportion of one’s total exports and, behind that, the proportion of one’s GDP which is exposed in a negotiation of this kind and which could therefore be subject to something nasty happening to it, such as having tariffs imposed or no longer being able to be sold at the same favourable terms as competitors could offer the relevant customers. The proportion of exposure of gross domestic product, and the employment that goes with it, is important.

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

I am very sorry to ask the noble Lord a question, when he has made it so abundantly clear so many times before to the schoolchildren what the real situation is. However, when he says that what matters is the percentage of GDP represented by a market, does he seriously advance the position that Germany would not care if it did not get access to its largest customer for exports just because that is a smaller percentage of German GDP than our exports are to it?

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

Everybody would be a loser in this game. I do not hide in any sense my conviction that we would all be losers. It would be a very sad day if we broke up the European Union or moved out of it. Therefore my point is that the Germans would lose, but we would lose more.

[Lord Green of Deddington]

Does the noble Lord recognise that if the UK were to withdraw from the European Union, the Germans could then find themselves quite frequently outvoted by QMV by the southern members of the union, who have very different interests?

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

It is quite obvious. The Germans have made it very clear indeed, from the Chancellor downwards, that they do not want us to leave the EU, and that is one of the reasons why. In fact, in many cases we have very much the same view about markets as the Germans have, and on deregulation, an entrepreneurial economy, labour market reform and what have you. We have undergone the same kind of supply-side changes, they with the Hartz reforms, we with the Thatcher reforms in the 1980s. All of that is true and is appreciated in Germany. I repeat: the Germans think that it would be a great disaster if we left. However, it would be an even greater disaster for us than it would be for them. It would be a disaster for everybody. Sometimes you break up a relationship and all parties lose. It is an extraordinary idea to think that if you break up a relationship, some parties are bound to win. That simply does not happen. Therefore that is the logical situation.

When I talk about exposure, let me put it this way—I have used this analogy once before. If Micronesia had $1 million-worth of trade with China, and it sold the Chinese $100,000-worth of products every year and bought $900,000-worth from the Chinese, they would have a massive balance of payments deficit with China, which would have a proportionate very substantial balance of payments surplus with Micronesia. Would that mean that Micronesia would have the slightest leverage on China? Of course not. It is not, in fact, the deficit that counts but the extent of the exposure of exports, and the relevant dependence on exports is very simple. I repeat: our leverage—if you like to put it in mathematical terms—would be a positive function of their dependence on us and a negative function of our dependence on them. Our dependence on them is about 14% or 15% of our GDP, which is accounted for by exports of goods and services to other members of the European Union. If you look at it the other way round, there is no member state in the European Union other than ourselves, except for the Republic of Ireland, for whom that figure is higher than 3%. That literally means that there is a 500% greater degree of dependence on our part towards them than on their part towards us. That is an extraordinarily bad basis for going into a negotiation. I do not say that there would not be a negotiation or a conclusion to a negotiation, but I am quite certain that the terms we would get would not at all be the ones we had hoped to get when we started out.