European Union (Approval of Treaty Amendment Decision) Bill [HL]

Lord Davies of Stamford Excerpts

Wednesday 23rd May 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

There is complete freedom outside the treaties to take any decisions we want. I will come in more detail to what I have just said in reference to the EFSM, and during the afternoon we can discuss what other mechanisms of support for economies, whether in Europe or the eurozone or not, are justified, but that is the position in relation to what we are discussing today.

It is not the first time that this treaty amendment has been considered by Parliament. Before the Prime Minister signed the treaty last March, a Motion in favour of signature was passed by both Houses, with no opposition in your Lordships’ House. At the time I committed to bringing the decision before Parliament again. Thus we are applying the more rigorous requirements for parliamentary control over European Union decision-making, as we committed to do in the European Union Act 2011. Parliamentary approval will enable the UK to complete its ratification process for this treaty amendment.

I recognise that 14 months is a long time in eurozone terms, so it may help your Lordships if I recap how the European Council came to decide to amend the treaty. In May 2010, in response to the first Greek crisis, two emergency instruments were established to respond to the financial crises. The first is the European financial stability facility. This is an emergency facility established intergovernmentally by euro area member states. It is used to provide loans to euro area member states in difficulty. The UK is not—I repeat, not—a member of the EFSF and has no exposure to the financial assistance provided by it.

The second is the European financial stabilisation mechanism, which I have already mentioned, which we inherited from the previous Government. Under this mechanism, the Council can agree, by qualified majority, to the Commission providing assistance using money raised on the financial markets, backed by the European Union budget. It therefore created a contingent liability for the United Kingdom, which is a very important point.

As uncertainty continued in financial markets, the European Council agreed in December 2010 to amend Article 136 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union. The amendment confirms that member states of the eurozone may establish a permanent stability mechanism. This mechanism—the European stability mechanism, or ESM—which I have already mentioned, will provide a permanent means for dealing with events that pose a risk to the financial stability of the euro area as a whole.

Having gained Parliament’s approval in March 2011, the Prime Minister returned to Brussels to agree to the decision at the European Council. The decision must now be ratified by all 27 members before the amendment to Article 136 can come into force. The target date for entry into force, as set out in the European Council decision, is 1 January 2013.

As I have already mentioned, the Minister for Europe and I committed to further consideration of the decision under the terms of the EU Act 2011 when it came into force. Under the provisions of Section 5 of the Act, the Foreign Secretary laid a Statement before Parliament in October 2011. He indicated that in his opinion a referendum is not required to give parliamentary approval. The proposed amendment to Article 136 applies only to member states whose currency is the euro. Consequently it does not transfer further competence or power to the European Union from the United Kingdom. The statement was open to judicial review, but in the intervening eight months no one has sought to challenge it in the courts.

To comply fully with the requirements of the EU Act, I am now presenting this Bill to the House. Should Parliament grant its approval, the Government intend to ratify the European Council decision by the end of this year.

Now I turn briefly to the European stability mechanism itself. The ESM is a stability mechanism funded by eurozone countries to provide financial assistance to eurozone countries. The intention is that it will replace both the EFSM and EFSF. It is being set up under an intergovernmental treaty that was signed on 2 February by eurozone member states. It must now be ratified by all 17 member states and is expected to come into force in July 2012.

The treaty amendment does not establish the ESM. The UK, of course, will not ratify the ESM as we have not signed up to the intergovernmental agreement, and the amendment certainly does not commit the UK to contribute to any bailout fund. However, let me make it clear what the decision does. The treaty amendment that we are asking Parliament to approve will put beyond doubt the ability of eurozone countries to set up a financial assistance mechanism. It does this by adding a third paragraph to Article 136, which states that eurozone member states may establish a financial stability mechanism to assist other eurozone member states in financial difficulties. Article 136 applies solely to member states whose currency is the euro. Therefore, the provisions of Article 136 do not apply to the UK.

Alongside the agreement to enshrine the legal basis for the mechanism in the EU treaty, the Prime Minister secured an important agreement. Once the ESM is established, Article 122(2), on which basis the EFSM was established, should no longer be used for such purposes. Our liability for future euro area financial assistance programmes under the EU budget will be removed. This is strongly in the UK’s national interest.

The intensification of the crisis has led eurozone member states to agree to bring forward the introduction of the ESM to July 2012. When they announced this decision in January, we carefully considered the implications that it would have on our handling of the treaty amendment. Would it need to be ratified sooner, and was it still needed at all? We decided to proceed as planned, as it has always been the Government’s opinion that without the agreement to amend the treaty there would be no European stability mechanism. The clear message from eurozone member states is that they still need this treaty amendment.

That brings me back to the central point of why this Bill is important.

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

I am most grateful to the Minister for giving way. He said that it was the intention that the ESM should now enter into force next month. Indeed, we support the urgency of that, as I understand it. Therefore, why are we taking so long to ratify this? If we really support the initiative and recognise its urgency, why cannot we ratify it as soon as Parliament has approved this Bill?

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, I do not think that it has been the usual practice of this House to interrupt Ministers in the middle of their opening speeches, when they are also winding up and when the interrupter has his chance to take part in the debate afterwards. These are questions that the Minister can answer in his wind-up speech.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Lawson of Blaby]

If 90% of people say that they agree with some particular European convention, that is probably a lie. I doubt whether 90% of people know about any European convention.

To come back to the Bill that we are debating, a few days ago an item appeared on the Foreign Office website which read:

“Foreign Office Minister introduces EU Treaty Amendment Bill to the House of Lords … Foreign Office Minister Lord Howell said … ‘A stable and healthy eurozone is important for the UK’s long-term growth and prosperity. This treaty change is firmly in the UK’s national interest’”.

That is the basis for the Bill before us. I have the greatest affection for my noble friend Lord Howell. Indeed, I can hardly blame him for saying that, because it is government policy. But it is, of course, complete nonsense. It is not a stable and healthy eurozone that is important for the UK’s long-term growth and prosperity; it is a stable and healthy European economy which is important for the UK’s long-term growth and prosperity. So long as the eurozone staggers on, we will not have a healthy European economy. That is the problem that we face.

Greece has been mentioned. It has a number of special economic difficulties and also a special political difficulty. Greece is, and always has been, a “phavlocracy”. I owe this term, which is little used, to when I was editor of the Spectator, 45 years ago. I recruited an excellent Athens correspondent, because the colonels had just come in, and he explained that “phavlocracy”—a word the Greeks use—meant “government by corruption”. The high economic cost of that is an additional problem but we are not debating a Greek problem. This is a fundamental problem of the eurozone project. It is not the tired old argument of growth versus austerity, as if somehow you can say, “Let’s have some growth, what a good idea”. It is the particular problem of the eurozone that we need to address.

The European Monetary Union was fundamentally flawed right from the start. It was predictable and indeed it was predicted. I think I was the first Minister to point this out in a speech at Chatham House in January 1989. I analysed the eurozone project and I concluded in these terms. It is a long quotation but it is important to put on record what I said at the time, well before the eurozone came into being. It was a few days before publication of the Delors report on which European monetary union was based, but we all knew what would be in it. As Chancellor of the Exchequer at that time, I concluded in these words:

“Nor would individual countries be able to retain responsibility for fiscal policy. With a single European monetary policy there would need to be central control over the size of budget deficits and, particularly, over their financing. New European institutions would be required, to determine overall Community fiscal policy and agree the distribution of deficits between individual Member States.

The setting up of a European Central Bank or a new European institution to determine Community fiscal policies go to the very heart of nationhood. What organisation would really be the government? It is clear that Economic and Monetary Union implies nothing less than European Government—albeit a federal one—and political union: the United States of Europe. That is simply not on the agenda now, nor will it be for the foreseeable future”.

That is what I said as Chancellor of the Exchequer in January 1989. I elaborated on a number of further occasions, both in speeches and in articles, during the interim period until 1999 when it came into being. Then I gave up. I was seeking to persuade our European friends and partners not to make the huge mistake of going down this hugely damaging route. Once they had done it, I had failed and I gave up.

I was not the only one. My friend Hans Tietmeyer, when he was president of the Bundesbank in 1996, in the more measured terms that central bank governors are inclined to speak, said:

“Monetary union means a restriction on national sovereignty, on national manoeuvring room and the ability to go it alone. Participants lose the instrument of exchange rate adjustment … In a monetary union, countries have to tackle and solve their economic problems and challenges in a similar way and with similar speed. If the countries decide fundamentally different answers, then great problems will arise”.

He could say that again.

So why did this happen when everybody who was informed knew that this was fundamentally flawed? It happened because this was not economic at all; it was entirely political. There were of course some innocent worshippers at the church of Europe who believed that anything that was more Europe must ipso facto be a good thing. But most of the promoters were more sophisticated. Their objective, and they were clear about it, was full-blooded political union—a United States of Europe. That was the view of Jacques Delors and most of those who supported him. They thought that since monetary union and political union have to go together, if you want political union then you have the monetary union and it will inevitably lead to the political union which is the objective. That is a fundamental misreading of history; it is the wrong way around.

The example of Germany in the 19th century is interesting. German unification came in three stages. First, there was the zollverein, the customs union. Then Bismarck and Prussia forged a political union from blood and iron. It was only after they had political union that they had monetary union. That was the sequence. Doing it the other way around simply does not work.

One reason why you must have political union is that, as we all know, there must be transfers from the German taxpayers to the poor Greeks or whoever. However, you cannot make that work—nor does it have credibility—if it is on a sporadic and discretionary basis. You must have a single system of taxation, as there is in any currency union, such as the United Kingdom, which takes more money from the wealthier sections of the economy; and a single system of spending so that there is more spending on, say, social security in the poorer parts of the economy. The transfers become automatic and there is no discretion.

You must also have control of deficits. This simply means that you must have a single Finance Minister at the head of a single finance ministry in a single Government. That is the only way that it can work. Even then, it would, in my judgment, be economically harmful to the European Union. To use the economists’ jargon, which the noble Lord, Lord Giddens, enjoys so much, it would be suboptimal.

There is a great literature about what is known as an optimum currency area. No one quite knows what an optimum currency area is. We all know that you do not get individual cities with their own currency but, equally, you do not have a world currency. That is too big and the first is too small. Where is it right? I think all economists would agree, as would the noble Lord, Lord Giddens—even though he is not an economist, he follows these things—that an area as big as the European Union, with its great size and diversity, is not an optimum currency area. In particular, to help the transfers and so on to work you need wage flexibility, which the United States has but Europe does not. Indeed, it is anathema to the European social model, which is opposed to wage flexibility.

Above all, you need labour mobility. That is what happens in the United States. If one area is not doing too well, people move to another area. However, what do you have in Europe? For cultural and linguistic reasons, when there is 25% unemployment in Spain—indeed, 50% youth unemployment—but little more than 5% in Germany, the Spanish do not move to Germany. They riot in Madrid and call on their Government to do something to help them.

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

Is the noble Lord aware of Mundell, the author of the seminal article that defined the concept of the optimum currency area? Indeed, he invented it. That article produced the key criteria that define an optimum currency area and an equation that became part of standard theory and won a Nobel prize for Mundell. Is the noble Lord aware that Mundell is on the record as saying that he regarded the eurozone as meeting the criteria for an optimum currency area?

[Lord Lawson of Blaby]

Yes, I am aware of that. I am also aware that he subsequently changed his mind on that point.

Those who promoted European monetary union were guilty of great arrogance and unbelievable irresponsibility. They were arrogant because the only way to have political union was with the consent of the peoples of Europe. The people of this country, the people of France, where I live nowadays, and the people of most, if not all, of the countries of Europe—Luxembourg may be an exception—do not wish to give up national self-government. They do not want to be part of a full-blown European political union. It is a sad thing but I am afraid that for all its, no doubt, high-minded motives, the European movement has been marked by the most appalling contempt for democracy throughout the years that I can remember. The irresponsibility is that political leaders must have known that if this gamble did not come off and they were not able to achieve the political union, the disaster which we see all around us was bound to ensue. That seems to me to be the most irresponsible thing that political leaders could ever have done.

What now? In my judgment, the least bad course—I say “least bad” rather than best because I accept that it is not good—is the orderly dissolution of the eurozone, which will begin with the departure of Greece in only a matter of time, and it will not be a long time. This dissolution is already happening before our eyes, even if the politicians do not accept it. Holders of euro deposits in Greek banks are taking them out at a rate of knots and they will do so increasingly. After that, I am afraid that the same thing will happen as regards euro deposits in the banks of other countries considered to be likely candidates for withdrawal—whether it be the Spanish or Portuguese banks, or wherever.

I agree that the dissolution of the eurozone will be far from painless. There will be a whole lot more sovereign defaults. We have already had getting on for an 80% write down of Greek government debt. That will be bigger. There will be other sovereign defaults. There will be banks in difficulty.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

My Lords, I do not normally agree very much with what the noble Lord, Lord Dobbs, says about Europe and I disagree with some of the things that he said today. However, I enjoyed his speech and agreed with several of the things that he said; notably, first, that fiscal austerity, though necessary, is not enough and should not be pursued excessively; and, secondly, with his quite wise statement that the ESM, though important to a solution, is not a sufficient solution to the instability we face.

I have no problem with this Bill. I enthusiastically endorse it. I am very much in favour of it and very happy with the transfer of the basis for this form of firewall from Article 122 to Article 48. My one considerable sadness is that we are not part of it or have not made a voluntary contribution to it, as Poland and Sweden did to the previous financial stability facility. My reason for that is, partially, solidarity—I believe in solidarity, although it always seems to be a very long-term self-interest—and because of our immediate self-interest. We all agree that we face a desperate crisis. We are on the edge of a precipice and so forth, and we hope that there will not be collapse. We desperately hope that this firewall will be effective, so we ought really to be contributing to it. In my view, it would be a good use of the nation’s reserves to make some contribution.

If one’s neighbour’s house is likely to burst into flame or if one fears that might happen, it seems sensible to contribute to the local fire brigade, instead of which there is the Prime Minister’s approach. I agree with Members on both sides of this House who have criticised that approach, which seems to be not to make any positive contribution at all but simply to stand on the sidelines criticising loudly what is going on. He reminds me of a man who might be on the shore when he sees people in trouble in the water. He is not willing to take any risks by trying to help them and does not even want to get his feet wet. He just calls for a loudhailer and shouts at them where he thinks they have gone wrong. The Prime Minister is the last person to give any lessons to our European friends and allies on this subject, because he has got his own economic policies so wrong. He inherited growth and has produced recession. In the first quarter of this year the eurozone, despite its well publicised problems, had a positive rate of growth overall and we had a negative rate. I do not think any more needs to be said on that subject.

It has been generally agreed in this debate that the ESM is necessary but not sufficient. There are actually six pillars required for a viable solution to this crisis. First, of course, there is fiscal deficit reduction. That has happened on the continent, as here, but it should not be pursued excessively and certainly not to the point where the reduction in gross domestic product as a result of recession more than undermines the positive effect of reduction in the fiscal deficit on the debt to GDP ratio. When there is any danger of that happening, it is a time for Governments to think again. That rule should apply everywhere. It should apply here. We should be thinking again, as Christine Lagarde has said, and we should be thinking again about Greece. I hope there will be some revision of the austerity programme in Greece and some reduction, or at least elongation, of the deadlines in the bailout package. I hope it will be available for the Greek electorate to take full account of it and therefore be able to make a proper democratic choice at their forthcoming election.

The second central pillar of progress is supply side reform. Immense progress has been made in this direction under the pressure of the crisis. I have said before in this context that very often in human affairs—it is certainly true of the history of the European Union—people do the right thing but do it almost too late under the pressure of a crisis. We all know how that happens. It happens in our private lives and in business lives all over the place. That is just a fact of life. I thought that the 30 January European Council produced some very important supply side measures. I hope they are going to be pushed through by this Government and other Governments. I salute the progress that has been made by Mario Monti in Italy in producing labour market reforms and pension reforms. I think Italy is now the only country in the world which has a pension system that is formally linked to life expectancy, so that when life expectancy increases the pension age is automatically increased. The Greeks and the Spaniards have been tackling their labour market issues with a vengeance, which they would not otherwise have done. Of course, they should have done it years ago, but at least they are doing it now. Therefore, supply side reform is very much in place.

The third pillar is firewalls. I have a suggestion to make which I made in this House some months ago. It should be within the powers of the ESM to lend money to sovereign Governments who would be subject to a bailout and whose debt is trading at below the bailout price. That is certainly the case of Greece at present. We have missed a lot of opportunities over the past year or so for the Greek Government to buy back their debt at a much better discount—it was at 80%—than the bailout discount, which is about 50%, and then cancel it. It has been foolish that there has been nobody able, willing or empowered to lend for that very sensible purpose. I hope that may be taken on board as a positive suggestion.

The fourth essential pillar is banking recapitalisation. Nobody has been making the point in the public debate or in the debate in the press that banking recapitalisation is very problematic and dangerous in the present circumstances. At a time when we want banks to lend more money and want demand to be relaunched, banking recapitalisation produces a disincentive for banks to increase their lending. The easiest way, and some banks in the present circumstances will say the only way, that banks can achieve better capital ratios is by reducing their lending and maintaining the same capital base. It is certainly true that they cannot be expected to go for rights issues with their share prices on the floor as they are at present and for that reason other forms of tier 1 capital would be prohibitively expensive to raise. They cannot cut their dividends in the present market conditions as that would really shoot the value of their shares to pieces, which would be extremely destabilising. So what do they do? The only thing they can do is to reduce their staff costs. Of course, an individual bank cannot reduce its staff costs because people would just walk out of the door. It can be done only by governmental action to impose some limitation on the staff costs of undercapitalised banks, and that has to be enforced throughout the European Union. I hope that that thought will be taken on board.

It sounds very draconian, but the present circumstances require draconian measures. Of course, some people will say, “Don’t worry”. When I have raised this matter previously in the House I have had that response from the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, who I am sorry is not in his place to hear it once again. He always says that it does not matter because the Basel criteria for capital adequacy come into force only in 2018 or 2019. I have been on the board of a bank so I know perfectly well that if you are told that you have to achieve certain capital ratios in five years’ time, it is going to affect your lending decisions and your policies right away because you know you have to move on that trajectory. Therefore, that is not an answer to the problem. The problem is in fact very urgent. We need to make sure that banking recapitalisation is not pursued at the expense of a solution but actually contributes to one. I fear that in the present circumstances you cannot possibly get rid of these requirements because for Governments to go back on them would be very destabilising. Therefore, the only way through is the one that I have suggested.

The fifth essential pillar for a solution is the use of market mechanisms, allowing the price mechanism to work in the factor markets throughout the European Union and particularly in the eurozone. Where demand is less, demand conditions are much weaker and there is unemployment, factor costs should be allowed to fall and wage costs need to be allowed to fall in nominal terms. Where demand conditions are much stronger and unemployment is much lower, then the price mechanism should be allowed to work and nominal wages should be allowed to increase; indeed, real wages should be allowed to increase. That is precisely what is happening now, I am glad to see. The other day, as we all would have noticed, IG Metall came to a Tarifvertrag—a wage agreement—in Germany, involving millions of engineering workers with an increase of more than 4%. Equally, in Greece, wages are falling quite substantially in the public sector—by 20%—which is absolutely enormous. I saw the other day that in Spain over the past year wages had fallen by 1% in nominal terms, which of course means more than that in real terms.

That is already a considerable element of internal devaluation—or revaluation, in the case of Germany. I say to the noble Lords, Lord Lamont and Lord Lawson, that that is infinitely preferable to the kind of external devaluation which they always advocate. It avoids the great problems of external devaluation. It avoids the idiocy and distortion of changing every price of every good and service overnight by the same amount irrespective of demand for it, which is completely crazy. It avoids the inflationary impact, through import prices, of a devaluation. It avoids suffering from the enormously excessive swings of currency markets in times of uncertainty, so that you can be certain that the external devaluation or revaluation will be far greater than is required by the circumstances. Of course, it avoids completely the threat to the solvency of households, corporates or banks—this is very relevant in Greece—which happen to hold their liabilities in the stronger currency, in this case the euro, and risk having their assets and revenues translated into a weaker currency with great threat to their solvency. This kind of internal devaluation is infinitely preferable and it is the most sensible way to go.

Finally, we need a growth package. Austerity is not enough. That is the message which is coming through loud and clear. It is not a message which the Government seem to want to hear in this country, and not a message in which they therefore have any credibility when, in contradiction to their policies in this country, they convey it abroad. But, of course, it is necessary. I hope that we will have really good, dramatic news tonight. We need some news which affects psychology and confidence. I hope that there will be some good, imaginative thinking coming out of the informal European Council meeting which is taking place this evening.

I support the idea of increasing the EIB capital. That is a splendid move, but it does not go that far. I strongly support the idea of making sure that we are spending the unspent structure funds. It may be necessary in Greece, and I hope that this happens, to relax the co-financing terms of the structure fund programme. If Greece is under this fantastic fiscal pressure, where can it find the money to come up with even 10% of the investment cost of schemes that are being funded out of the structure fund programme? Of course, there is a good argument in most circumstances for co-financing, to avoid moral hazard and so forth. In the present circumstances, however, it seems sensible to reduce that to an absolute minimum or to find some other way, like appointing outside consultants to vet programmes to achieve that flow-through. Above all, I hope that there will be some new initiative, which I cannot anticipate but I hope will come out very quickly. That is necessary to make sure that there is a new boost to growth and demand, ideally through infrastructure spending, in the eurozone and particularly in those countries which have been affected most by the downturn: Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Liddle]

My Lords, this is a small Bill consisting of two clauses but, as we have heard in this excellent debate, it is about the huge topic of the future of the euro. As the noble Lord, Lord Howell, explained to us with his usual clarity, the Bill is an enabling measure. We are legislating here not on the substance of the European stability mechanism but only on the enabling treaty change to allow it to happen. Labour recognises the need for this enabling measure. As the noble Lord, Lord Lamont, said, it is already priced into the markets. No one should kid themselves that the establishment of the European stability mechanism is a sufficient response to the crisis that we have now. There is an enormous crisis in Greece and a growing calamity of collective austerity. To that extent but not much more, I agree with my noble friend Lord Reid.

My noble friend Lord Giddens said that he had had enough of talking about being on the edge of precipices. Perhaps I may say what I think is at stake here. At stake is a crisis that threatens the success of the post-war settlement that we have seen in Europe and the stability and prosperity that the European Union has brought to Europe. That is what is at stake in this crisis. I disagree profoundly with the noble Lord, Lord Flight, and his parallel with the gold standard. The difference between the European Union and the gold standard is that it is a political union, and politics can do something about it. If leadership is shown we can avert a crisis that threatens to break up the post-war settlement.

What we need, as the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, said, is a bit more solidarity and a bit less emphasis on limited liability. How should we go about trying to save the situation? First, the firewall needs to be a lot bigger in scale and more flexible in operation. The existence of the stability mechanism cannot be a substitute for a central bank. The central bank must be willing and prepared to intervene decisively in the bond markets to stem self-fulfilling speculation and panic. I do not think that we will get eurobonds at this stage; I do not think that the Germans will agree to eurobonds until there is established a European fiscal authority. However, we could have a more flexible stability mechanism.

Secondly, the stability mechanism should be preparing now to act quickly on recapitalising the banks in Europe on a pan-eurozone basis. If responsibility for sorting out the banks remains with the national countries—the sovereigns—the problems of countries such as Spain can only get worse because sorting out the banks increases the fiscal problem; dealing with the fiscal problem involves a squeeze that makes austerity more severe; and the impact of this fiscal squeeze on growth ultimately also deepens the problems of bad loans and zombie banks. We have to deal with this on a pan-European level and the ESM is the body to do it.

Thirdly, we need a more balanced strategy—not choosing growth over austerity but a balanced strategy. François Hollande’s victory has changed the political weather in Europe. There is a growth plan under preparation in Brussels. We have heard about it in our debate—unspent structural funds to be used better, recapitalisation of the European investment bank and an experiment in project bonds. Put with that, the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Stamford, talked about the need for structural reforms and the need to revive the single market which Prime Minister Monti is so behind. That is a credible package. They are welcome initiatives but from our side we not think that they are enough. For one thing, their impact would take too long to work. Infrastructure schemes and renewable energy projects are rarely ready to go. Southern Europe needs stimulus to growth now.

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

I am grateful to my noble friend for giving way. He will be aware that in Greece the motorway building programme was stopped midstream because of the bailout conditions. Those projects are shovel ready—a lot of work has been done on them and they are all ready to go. Some financing there could affect demand very rapidly.

[Lord Liddle]

The noble Lord, Lord Davies, is absolutely right. In addition to infrastructure, I think that we need a more moderate pace of deficit reduction. The Commission argues that the fiscal compact gives you all the flexibility that you need in a crisis situation. That should be done. Secondly, we should be mobilising the structural funds to tackle the employment issues, particularly the fact that in countries such as Greece and Spain, getting on for half of young people are out of work which is completely unsustainable socially and politically. It is also the case that a major competitive weakness of southern Europe is the low skills level of its workforce. That must be addressed from Europe through the structural funds—a crash programme of social investment in human capital.

Thirdly, the eurozone needs more balance between the strong and the weak in the urgent competitiveness adjustments that it must make. Stronger countries such as Germany have room for manoeuvre. Noble Lords talked about higher wages for German workers, which are certainly affordable. German wages have gone up very little despite the country’s enormous export success. I am glad that there is now a consensus between the Social Democrats and Christian Democrats on the introduction of a national minimum wage. Germany would have to tolerate only a bit more inflation to help the south, which is suffering debt-trapped deflation. That would enable the ECB to meet and maintain its target level of inflation of around 2% across the whole eurozone.

Our hope is that the political ramifications of the Hollande victory will result in a wider and bolder set of actions to build a stronger firewall, recapitalise the banks, adjust the pace of deficit reduction, offer immediate help on jobs and increase demand in countries with surpluses. That will not get us out of the need to make harsh adjustments. However, if we continue with collective austerity it will lead to collective suicide.

What is the coalition’s view? Is it still backing Mrs Merkel’s priority of fiscal austerity, which has been its policy at home for the past two years? Or is it undergoing a latter-day Keynesian conversion to the need for growth in Europe? If the eurozone can have a plan B, can we not have one at home? That is what we need. It is very odd for a Eurosceptic Conservative Party to argue that it is all right to have additional public borrowing through the EIB and project bonds at European level, but that of course it would be a complete disaster to tolerate any flexibility in the public borrowing of the UK. I find this an amusing contradiction in the present situation.

That confusion and contradiction, with a sharp eye for public relations, have been characteristic of the Government’s conduct of their European policy. As the noble Lord, Lord Williamson, said, they treat the eurozone as a convenient whipping boy to cover their own failures. As we know, last year growth in the eurozone was higher than in the UK. I am interpreting what the noble Lord, Lord Williamson, said.