Strategic Defence and Security Review

Lord Davies of Stamford Excerpts

Friday 12th November 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

My Lords, I congratulate my noble friend Lord Rosser on so effectively and so definitively refuting the bogus myth of the £38 billion deficit, about which we have heard too much. After my noble friend's refutation, I hope that no one will be so shameless as to purvey that any further. I was going to speak on that but now I do not need to do so.

I was delighted to hear the noble Lord, Lord Sterling, make the suggestion that we should have available in the House, and no doubt in the House of Commons as well, on temporary secondment, uniformed officers of the Armed Forces to keep us informed on military and defence matters. That was one of the 40 recommendations of the study on the national recognition of the Armed Forces, which I was privileged to chair three years ago, and it was one of only two recommendations out of the 40 which was not accepted by the previous Government. I hope that, with the advocacy of the noble Lord, we may have more luck with the present Administration on that point.

It has been said, quite rightly, so many times from different sides of the Chamber today that the strategic defence and security review was neither strategic nor a review that I do not need to repeat it. I think that has become the consensus in the country. However, I wish to comment on one very important aspect that has not been mentioned. The lack of consultation in the review process was particularly regrettable. There was no effective consultation with industry. As I have pointed out in the House before, there was only one meeting of the National Defence Industries Council between the election and the defence review. That is a terrible mistake. We now know that there is to be a Green Paper and a White Paper on defence industrial policy. In other words, the Government recognise that there are important consequences for our defence industrial structure of the defence review, but those consequences should have been taken account of in the consideration of the defence review. The defence review should have included precisely what we intended to preserve by way of defence industrial capability and structure in this country.

If the procedure was regrettable, the results of this so-called review have been utterly deplorable. I take in turn a number of the points where there have been devastating reductions in the nation's defence capability. First, I ask the Minister what are the savings from the reduction of the infantry of the AS90 and Challenger 2? My instinct is that the reduction is very small. If you reduce just part of the inventory and not all of it—thank God they did not get rid of all of it—you still have the fixed costs, such as training costs. I suspect that the actual savings—I shall bet a drink in the bar for the noble Lord on this—are very derisory and probably not much of a multiple of the 27 photographers and beauty or vanity consultants, or whatever they are, which the Government have seen fit to take on the public payroll for the benefit of the Prime Minister.

Secondly, I turn to helicopters. The Government have cut in half our order for two Chinooks. I am delighted to take full responsibility for that order. I am very proud that we made that order and that I got rid of the original future medium helicopter project and put the money into buying helicopters off-the-shelf as rapidly as possible. We have heard from the Conservative Benches this afternoon, from the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, that he considers that there are still too few helicopters, but I am very proud that there are now 50 per cent more helicopters on the front line this year in Afghanistan than there were in the summer of last year as a result of the measures that we took. However, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, that we actually need more. It is a great mistake to cut that order. It is all part of the Government focusing on protecting Afghanistan, which is absolutely right and important, but at the expense of all flexibility for our future ability to respond to different threats so that we shall end up well equipped for Afghanistan and able to fight no more than the last war once we have got through the Afghan conflict. That is a classic mistake to make in defence procurement; it is not one that we made in office, but it is one that I am afraid the coalition is now sadly making.

The prolongation of the Vanguard class and the postponement of the construction of successor class submarines was dealt with so devastatingly by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Boyce, that I do not need to enter into that. I just say that it appears, since that announcement was made, that far from saving public money, the Government will end up spending £1.8 billion more on keeping the Vanguard class in the water for that extended time—with the law of diminishing returns which always applies towards the end of the life of any class of naval vessel. That was not a very intelligent decision either.

I come on to the most important issue, which is the decision about the Harriers and carrier strike. I think that the decision to get rid of our Harriers is utterly unforgivable. It is quite the wrong decision. The right decision would have been to do what we were planning to do, and what I was working on at the time of the election. That is to withdraw the Tornados well before the original date, the official date, of 2022—I queried that date when I first saw it—but to withdraw them as and when we were able to upgrade the Typhoon with a ground support capability, with a full suite of weapons, with Paveway IV, Brimstone or its successor, with Storm Shadow and with a sensor equivalent of the Raptor, which has done so well in the Tornado. That was why, last year, we put more money into the Typhoon enhancement programme. I was hoping to be able to withdraw the Tornados by 2014 or 2015. There would have been a considerable saving there, but we would have continued to have a carrier strike capability right the way through.

I think that the Government think that they are geniuses—not, sadly, military geniuses but geniuses in predicting the future precisely and accurately. What they are saying to the country in this document amounts to this: “We need a carrier strike capability. There are threats in this world to which we might have to respond in desperation with that carrier strike capability. We have to spend the money, we have to invest in that capability, but”—they are telling the nation, “between the years 2011 and 2019, those threats will not arise”. How remarkable. How do they do it? I do not know whether they do it by astrology or tarot cards, but one can only either marvel or shake in one's boots that defence planning is being conducted on that basis.

Not surprisingly, that has opened up a very useful and healthy debate about our ability to fulfil some of our obligations—to defend, for example, the Falklands. I am not going to make any judgments about this, I will deal just in facts. The Government are saying that we have the capability, without any carriers, to defend the Falklands. What do we have? We have four Typhoons in Mount Pleasant. We have a company of troops. We have one runway fit for combat aircraft. What happens if, by subterfuge, sabotage, bomb attack, missile, or whatever, that runway is taken out? Presumably, if the Typhoons happen to be in the air at the time, the crew will have to eject, and we certainly cannot expect to be able to replenish the Falklands by airlift.

The Government talk about submarines. We have not got a submarine in the Falklands and I do not think—because they have not told the nation so—that they have any intention of basing a submarine on the Falklands. Let me tell them that if they did, they would have to assign two—probably two and a half—of the hunter killer submarines, Trafalgar class and, potentially, Astute class, to that role alone. That is not provided for in the number that we plan to build—the seven Astutes. If the Government are going to put a submarine there, they had better tell the nation that they are going to do that and explain how. If they are not, if there is not going to be a submarine there, they had better stop saying that submarines provide an adequate protection against a potential invasion of the Falklands. Some very serious issues have come to light over the past few days on this and we need an answer.

[Lord Trefgarne]

My Lords, I apologise for interrupting the noble Lord. He has been very good at describing how he thinks the money ought to be spent to defend the Falkland Islands. Does he not realise that he and his right honourable friends left the financial arrangements in the Ministry of Defence in a complete shambles: there is no money?

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

I absolutely do not recognise that. Indeed, my noble friend Lord Rosser has already dealt with that particular falsehood. What is more, I think that the Government are absolutely wrong to cut public spending generally, as they are doing, so far and so fast; and they are certainly wrong to take it out on defence in the way that they are.

[Lord Selsdon]

My Lords—

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

I shall give way, but of course I will have to take a bit longer as a result of dealing with these interventions.

[Lord Selsdon]

It is only that those of us who have been in this House for more than 45 years understand modern technology. Will the noble Lord recognise that he is so close to a microphone that he is shaking our eardrums over this side? If he would step back a bit or move away from it, we might find it easier to hear him rather than dying.

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

I will, of course, take the noble Lord’s advice, which I know is kindly intended.

The Government have shown what their priorities are. Nothing could be more dramatic than the fact that the Government are giving about £300 million to India by way of aid. India is buying aircraft carriers and aircraft to put on them, and then the Government say that they do not have the money to continue with our own carrier strike capability. In response to the noble Lord, I think that says it all.

Finally, I take the last rag of cloth that protects the nakedness of the Government in these arguments: the Anglo-French alliance. Can we rely on the “Charles de Gaulle” being mobilised to defend the Falklands? I do not think that anybody in this House seriously suggests that we can. All my life, I have been in favour of European defence collaboration and, indeed, of a common European defence policy. I am delighted by the treaty that has been concluded, but any successful relationship of that kind requires three things. The first is that it is done out of conviction, sincerity and long-term commitment. The noble Lord is nodding his head. I hope and pray that that long-term commitment is there. I am not going impugn the good faith of the Government; I am going to assume that it is there, but I have to tell the noble Lord that, because of the background of Dr Fox and Mr Cameron, there is bound to be considerable scepticism on both sides of the channel about that, so the Government are going to have to make sure that by their every word and deed this is taken seriously. Secondly, if you are going to have that kind of relationship, you need a shared view of the world and a shared foreign policy so that you know that your partner is going to take the same decisions and will be there with you when you need him. None of that is present. Thirdly, you need some kind of coherent decision-making structure that can give one confidence that we will be able to work together effectively no matter what the threat is and where it comes from. On that basis, I see enormous scope—not just involving carrier strike but also escorts, tanks, helicopters and so forth—for collaboration and synergies with the French, but those three things are essential, and if the Government can provide them, in that matter they will certainly have my warmest support.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Gilbert]

My Lords, I ought to start by declaring a couple of modest interests. First, I am a trustee of the All-Party Armed Forces Group, to which the noble Lord, Lord Sterling, made generous reference earlier in the debate. Secondly, I am chairman of a small IT company that has a contractual relationship with a major MoD contractor in the field of information security.

I wholeheartedly welcome the two noble Lords who made their maiden speeches today: the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Birmingham who, as I was Member for Dudley for 27 years, will no doubt have taken care of the interests of some of my constituents in the past, and above all, if I may say so, my noble friend Lord Hutton, who I am delighted to welcome to your Lordships’ House. I know that I am going to make some enemies of some of my noble friends but I consider him not only one of the most intelligent but certainly the most courageous Defence Minister I have had the pleasure of knowing, and I hope to hear his contributions many times in the future. I was delighted to hear what he had to say today.

I should disclose some of my prejudices for the benefit of those of your Lordships who have not heard them before. First, I believe that we can and should spend a lot more money on defence. The stories that are being put about at the moment are absolute nonsense. I should like to see us spending at least 2.5 per cent of our gross domestic product on defence. Secondly, in contradiction to some of the things that have been said recently—I shall refer to this later—I do not believe that our closest neighbours to the east or to the south are our best friends. I make that clear. The best friends of this country are to be found in the English-speaking world, wherever it may be and however many thousands of kilometres away. I do not resile from that and I never have done.

I shall touch briefly on one or two things that have been mentioned, which was not part of my original intention. I welcome the Government’s emphasis on cyberwarfare. It is long overdue that the House has started to pay attention to these matters. I welcome the commitment to Trident, which I think will be for four boats—it had better be, or I shall withdraw my support. I am rather unhappy about this business of delaying Trident. That is probably a false economy. In fact, I think it will end up with us spending a lot more money than we started off having to spend. I welcome the decisions on the Chinooks and on the tanks as well as the theoretical decision on the Special Forces, although I have to say that some of the Government’s decisions seem to run contrary to their professed support for Special Forces.

I have one note of criticism before I get down to the subject of procurement. I was moved to hear my noble friend Lady Dean telling us how this Government were apparently going to treat widows. I could hardly believe my ears. I confess that I had not read the relevant passage, but I give notice to the Minister that he is going to suffer a strong campaign from all parts of the House unless the Government change the way that they intend to treat war widows.

I come to one or two more controversial matters. Of course, the Ministry of Defence has wasted an awful lot of money; it is still wasting it today in a lot of the things that it is buying. I am afraid that I do not share the universal welcome that is given to Eurofighter. You will never have seen a letter signed by me saying what a wonderful plane the Eurofighter is. It is only a fourth-generation plane, for God’s sake. It is a very agile fourth-generation plane, but that is all it is. Its radar cross-section is similar to that of a London double-decker bus. I am not giving away any state secrets; everybody knows that. Who would want to fly in a London double-decker bus against a Russian S-600 surface-to-air missile system? I certainly would not want to fly in a conflict where I knew that that sort of surface-to-air system was available.

The fifth-generation plane is another matter. It is probably the best fast jet that the Royal Air Force has ever had. It will not be nearly as good as the joint strike fighter, but it has marvellous agility. I do not know whether the figure is classified, but its ability to pull G-forces has measurements for agility somewhere in the middle teens. That would be marvellous, except that we have yet to invent a human being who can sustain G-forces above about eight and a half to nine. So what would the pilot be doing? He would be singing Hail Mary while the plane was pulling 14. It is absolutely ridiculous. With every single plane that we buy, we are wasting a hell of a lot of money. Everybody knows it and they are laughing at it. I do not find it funny at all; I have a sense of humour failure. I do not find it funny that we are spending this sort of money on a plane which has a totally otiose capability that nobody can use. Right, I have got that off my chest.

We are going to sell them. The trouble is, we are going to be selling Tranche 3, not Tranche 1. We are keeping Tranche 1, the clapped-out ones, while we flog off the really good, modern new ones to somebody who has got the sense to buy them. India says that it will no longer buy clapped-out planes from us. My view is that we should give away the Tranche 1 and keep the Tranche 3. Right, I have got that off my chest.

Now we are really getting down to the nitty-gritty: I want to talk about the A400M. It will come as no surprise to your Lordships that I regard the decision on the A400M as the most bone-stupid in the 40 years that I have been at one end or other of this building. It is an absolutely idiotic decision. We have a military airlift fleet of C-17s and C-130s. We have total interoperability with the United States, which flies the same combination of airlift planes, apart from a few clapped-out Galaxies. It is also getting something called the C-27, which is replacing the C-23 or C-25—I get mixed up with figures these days. Basically, we have total interoperability with the United States. We have total interoperability with the Canadians. We have total interoperability with the Australians, with the Indians, with the UAE and with the Qataris. This week, I put down the following Question for the Minister:

“To ask Her Majesty's Government with which countries the Royal Air Force will lose its interoperability as a result of the forthcoming replacement of the C130 by the A400M.[HL3190].

I received this absolutely unbelievable Answer:

“The Royal Air Force will not lose interoperability with any countries as a result of the drawdown of the C-130J Hercules and entry into service of the A400M”.—[Official Report, 9/11/10; col. WA 46.]

I am almost tempted to read it again because I am sure that your Lordships could hardly credit it. We are acquiring a plane for which only the manufacturing consortium has placed orders. The South Africans cancelled an order, and only one other country outside the manufacturing consortium has an order on the books at the moment. That means that six or seven countries altogether will be flying the A400M. Flying the C130, which it is intended to replace, are 60 countries, with 2,600 or so C130Js currently being used. That is the interoperability that we are losing. Noble Lords will be glad to know that there is another question on the Order Paper for the Minister. How do Her Majesty’s Government define interoperability? It probably has not reached his desk yet, but I shall be interested to see the Answer.

Why on earth are we doing this? I once described this rather vulgarly as a Euro-wanking make-work project and I do not resile from that. I hope that this time Hansard will leave that in and not take it out. It was in the next day’s version but Hansard funked it and took it out of the Bound Volume. I hope that this is all on the record.

I can tell your Lordships why we are buying the A400M because I want to pay special tribute this afternoon to the defence Minister of France, who is our new best ally in Europe. The New York Herald Tribune on 6 November states:

“The A400 M is an emblematic program which Europe could not abandon”,

Monsieur Morin said at a news conference on Friday.

“Giving it up would have meant Europe saying it wanted to be dependent on the United States in military transport”.

How pathetic. We are spending hundreds of millions of pounds on a plane just to make sure that nobody thinks we are dependent on the United States for military transport.

We are told that the new arrangement we will have with our friends across the Channel will in no way dilute our relations with our best friends the Americans. Yet the defence Minister involved in our new great alliance with the French has this attitude. Another question is coming to the Minister asking whether Monsieur Morin has many other emblematic symbols in the field of defence procurement that we will have to acquire just to prove that we are not dependent on the United States for transport.

Your Lordships will be familiar with the phrase “barking mad”. A few years ago, some wit invented the phrase “Dagenham mad”. When asked what it meant he said it was three stops beyond Barking. This is not “Barking mad” nor “Dagenham mad”: it is “Upminster mad”. It is at the end of the line. You cannot go any further: it is sheer madness. The Minister responsible is sitting here. He is carefully not identifying himself and I am not going to be so cruel as to identify him either.

This is not a party point. Both parties have been involved. When I was a Minister, I was told, “You don’t have to cancel the A400M because the Germans will do it for us. The Germans have a very tight defence budget and cannot possibly buy everything that they say they will buy, so don't worry they’ll do the dirty work for you”. It was a great reassurance to my boss at the time because he was unhappy. We had just cancelled MRAV and a NATO frigate and it was more than his sensitive soul could bear to be accused by our European friends—I hope he does not mind me letting this cat out of the bag—of being anti-European. That is why we are stuck with the A400M. I asked more than one Conservative defence procurement Minister and they told me that they were told exactly the same by their officials. It is a disastrous decision. It is actually a criminal waste of public money. We will have to buy stocks and train crews and so forth, and will lose the worldwide interoperability that we currently enjoy with the C130.

When one criticises, one has a responsibility to suggest a solution. We should get together with our Commonwealth friends, particularly Australia, Canada and India, to set up a Commonwealth heavy lift force that could be available to deal with natural disasters because the C17 has a capability that nobody else has.

I have said what I think we should do about the Eurofighter. I would advise the Minister to think very carefully about the advice—

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

I apologise for intervening, but the noble Lord will be aware that the C17 is going out of production and that the C130 does not carry our new generation of armoured vehicles—for example, a Mastiff or a Warrior. In those circumstances, how does the noble Lord expect to replace the strategic airlift which we currently have with the C130J fleet?

[Lord Gilbert]

The C17 is not yet going out of production and, with any luck, the order from the Indians will help to keep it going. I hope that there will be more orders of C17 around the world. The noble Lord is quite right about the Hercules not carrying the latest army kit, but the C17 has an enormously good capability on short-field runways and can be used for that task, as the noble Lord well knows.

I am glad to say that the noble Lord has reminded me of something else which we will lose when we get rid of the C17, which is support for the Special Forces. I hope that the Minister will tell us exactly what discussions he has been having with Hereford on this subject, because it is a very serious matter and the Americans place great weight on our co-operation in the field of Special Forces. We are particularly interoperable with their C130 Talon aircraft, as the Government know.

I hope that the Minister will carefully consider the recommendation that he has received that we should have five-yearly defence reviews. That would be too frequent; once a decade is often enough. We can pull things up and look at the roots far too often, and I think that the Americans suffer from having quadrennial defence reviews.