Financial Services Bill

Lord Davies of Oldham Excerpts

Wednesday 17th October 2012 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Davies of Oldham]

190ZEA: Clause 61, page 137, line 32, after “England” insert “, the FCA”

[Lord Davies of Oldham]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 190ZEA, I will speak also to the other amendments grouped with it. I imagine the Minister feels that his reply earlier was so definitive that the Opposition ought really to pack up their bags and go home at this stage. I have bad news for him—we still have open bags with plenty of issues that we seek to explore, not least because we do not think the Government are clear about the issue of crisis management. This, after all, is the absolute heart of this Bill. We all know the reasons why we are greatly concerned about financial crisis management and the difficulties that have obtained in the past. Therefore, I am afraid that the Minister will have to tolerate the fact that we are going to probe as far as we can within the framework of these Committee proceedings. However, he can of course rest assured that when his answers are totally satisfactory, that will only foreshorten the amount of debate we will need on Report. He stands to gain from giving as full answers as he possibly can that may allay our anxieties at this stage.

All these amendments relate to the memorandum of understanding on crisis management—the blueprint on who has to do what and what would happen in the particular circumstances of any crisis situation. The substance of the memorandum is not in legislation and therefore not quite subject to the scrutiny that we are afforded on other aspects of crisis management. It is being published separately and does not go through quite the same degree of parliamentary scrutiny as the other agents and factors involved in crisis management. Therefore, the Minister is bound to expect us to press hard in this area.

The broad message of this group of amendments is to call for the Financial Conduct Authority to be given an explicit role in the process and its related mechanisms. The tenor of all our amendments today is that the collaboration between the Treasury, the Bank and the regulators is exceptionally important. In particular, why does the Bill allow the Bank, the Treasury and the Prudential Regulation Authority to include in the memorandum provisions on co-operation between any of them and the FCA, but the FCA itself seems to have no reciprocal power? It can like it or lump it; it can accept what is put forward as an agreed position or it can seek to veto, but it is not party to the drafting process. We are concerned about this because the risks of disruption and instability in the financial markets, which are overseen by the FCA, are not being given sufficient weight.

We all appreciate that we are reckoning with the future and that we cannot predict it. We also know that the last people we want to be are generals solving the problems of the last war and not being ready for the next. We understand the very real difficulties that the legislation seeks to address. We can put in place as many suitable mechanisms as possible to try to implement appropriate safeguards, but we cannot be certain that we have got it right, and we cannot foresee totally the type of crisis that might arise. Therefore, we on this side of the House think that properly involving the FCA in crisis management preparations can only enhance the collective pool of knowledge and increase the likelihood of better outcomes.

I recognise that there is an element of repetition in these amendments. The Minister addressed this earlier when he explained how Clause 54 addressed many of these issues. However, we believe that our case merits consideration by the Government. The amendments are framed in a constructive fashion and I hope that the Minister will accept the spirit in which they were tabled and perhaps indicate that the Government might think again. I beg to move.

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[Lord Flight]

My Lords, I want briefly to support the Government’s position here. I am one of the few people still around who participated in the lifeboat back in 1974 in the wake of the secondary banking crisis then. Although I felt that the Bank of England had been less than perfect in allowing that crisis to develop, the way in which it handled it was first class. It did not cost the taxpayer a penny and the lifeboat got to grips and sorted out the various banks that were, in essence, bust.

The fears that I expressed in the other place at the time of the FiSMA about the tripartite agreement were exactly what transpired. The three parties failed to reach agreement, as I think is now widely recognised and known, and it is a miracle that the banking system did not actually collapse because it was dangerously close to doing so. In a banking crisis which is not about, if you like, conduct and how customers are treated, but for whatever reason is about the potential pack of cards implosion of the banking system, it is crucial that it is the banking regulator entity—in essence the Bank of England in consultation with the Chancellor of the Exchequer of the day—that has clear authority to get on and take the necessary measures promptly.

[Lord Davies of Oldham]

My Lords, I am not sure that we are disputing that last point. We are arguing that there may be a crisis in which the contribution of the FCA would be of considerable importance. Perhaps the Minister will answer this point for the clarification of the Committee and all those interested in this matter. We are not quite clear why the other regulator, the PRA, operates in a different fashion from the FCA with regard to the consultation on the memorandum. I should like the noble Lord at least to identify that factor.

[Lord Sassoon]

I am not quite sure I have understood what clarification the noble Lord is asking for. The simple fact is that we are talking about a memorandum to do with crisis management. Crisis management is to be led by the Bank of England under the clear responsibilities that we have in this framework and therefore the memorandum is focused entirely on matters where the responsibility lies between the Bank and the Treasury in so far as public money is at risk. We are talking about matters where essentially the FCA is an ancillary party because dealing with crisis management is not the FCA’s principal role. It has a lot of other responsibilities in the new system, but crisis management is not one of them. That entirely drives the logic behind who is and who is not party to the MoU. I do not know whether that helps the noble Lord.

[Lord Davies of Oldham]

The Minister is always helpful, if not always totally convincing. We shall think further about this matter and the answers he has given today. For the time being, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 190ZEA withdrawn.

Moved by

[Lord Davies of Oldham]

190ZEB: Clause 61, page 137, line 38, at end insert “which must include risks which significantly impact upon the safety and soundness of PRA-authorised persons, or which put at risk relevant markets functioning well”

[Lord Davies of Oldham]

My Lords, again I apologise to the Committee that this amendment is also a casualty of the fact that we ought to have tabled and discussed it the other evening in the context of Clause 54, but in fact we failed to do so. I would therefore ask the Committee to show a degree of patience and bear in mind the content of Clause 54 which, as the Minister has already identified, is absolutely critical to this part of the Bill. We want to make our argument as it relates to Clause 61 because that is where the amendment is actually located. However, Clause 54, which sets out the circumstances under which a decision is made to notify the Treasury about the need for financial assistance to address a risk to public funds, is the background to the amendment.

The amendment seeks to arrive at a clearer definition of what “material risk” means. We have already had one shot at this issue today and I think we made a modicum of progress, but as my noble friend Lord Peston indicated, if we are not careful we might become engaged in a somewhat philosophical debate about the definition of risk. However, the term “material risk” appears in the Bill and therefore we ought to be as clear as we possibly can about what the term means. In the context of the memorandum of understanding, this amendment states that the memorandum needs to make provision for what the Bank and the Treasury regard as material risk. The amendment requires the definition to include risks that significantly impact on the safety and soundness of PRA-authorised persons and factors that put at risk relevant markets functioning well.

These are specifically and deliberately definitions which directly refer to the roles and objectives of the PRA and the FCA respectively. This is because the Opposition argue that the Bill and the draft memorandum are too vague about the role of the FCA and PRA in circumstances of material risk to public funds. I do not think that our discussion earlier this afternoon cleared this matter up. That is why we are once again giving the Minister the opportunity of being clearer about the matter, perhaps. We want to ensure that the Bank—the governor—will involve the FCA and PRA in these matters. The importance of defining material risk, and concerns that the Bill currently falls short on this, was raised by the committee convened to look at the draft legislation. That pre-legislative committee argued that it should be subject to parliamentary approval and should not be left to the memorandum of understanding.

We have parliamentary colleagues who have a real anxiety about this matter. I do not think that the discussions we have had thus far this afternoon allay all those anxieties. However, the Minister may be able to have a better shot at it a second time. I beg to move.

[Lord Sassoon]

Well, I will have another shot at it, but I do not suppose the schoolmaster opposite will necessarily mark me any better, however well I do. I am under no illusions. Nevertheless, I take this amendment suitably seriously. I will go through the arguments in the expectation that perhaps all will become clear and I will get an alpha plus for this one.

Amendment 190ZEB would link the threshold of the “public funds notification” detailed in Clause 54 to risks that could significantly impact the safety and soundness of PRA-authorised persons or undermine the orderly operation of financial markets.

This amendment would make the public funds trigger confusing, and less, rather than more, effective. I should explain why. The phrase “public funds notification” set out in Clause 54, which is a notification that public funds could be at risk, is precisely that. It is not a notification that there are circumstances in the financial sector that threaten the PRA or FCA’s objective.

The PRA will be responsible for prudential regulation of a large number of small deposit-takers and insurers, many of which can and do fail without any risk to public funds. Requiring the Bank to make a formal notification to the Treasury under Clause 54 every time and any time any of these institutions got into trouble could lead to a relatively large number of notifications where there was in fact no risk to public funds.

Similarly, adding a reference to the FCA’s objective to the definition of material risk in this way would broaden the grounds on which the duty to notify would be triggered to risks which do not involve public money. It would mean that the notification under Clause 54 was not in fact a public funds notification at all. Crucially, this would mean that the Treasury’s power of direction in Clause 57, which is available where there is a live public funds notification, would be available when there is no risk to public funds. I do not know whether that is what was intended here but I hope that the noble Lord would agree that that is not what should be achieved. This matters because decisions to use public funds to resolve a financial crisis are for the Government to take, usually the Chancellor personally. As such, the purpose of Clause 54 is to ensure that the Treasury is always informed when there is a material risk to public funds, and not for other, wider purposes.

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[Lord Davies of Oldham]

My Lords, it is almost half a century since I was a schoolmaster so I have forgotten what alpha plus means. I cannot remember ever offering one to a student. I might have done to undergraduates later but certainly not in school.

However, I am not going to grade the Minister. I would not want to flatter him too much. After all, he derives enormous satisfaction from these interesting debates and I do not think that I should add to his sense of self-satisfaction at this stage by marking his last effort. Where I was nodding is obvious enough. Of course I agreed with the Minister when he was emphasising that what we are concerned about with the warning mechanism is where public funds might be engaged. That is the nature of Clause 54 and our amendments with regard to Clause 61 also take that very much into account.

I am grateful to the Minister for his commendable contribution today, which I very much enjoyed and I hope the rest of the Committee did. Like him, I am looking forward to our engagement next week on Part 5. As he predicted, he has not heard the end of this matter, although I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 190ZEB withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord Davies of Oldham]

190ZEF: Clause 61, page 138, line 6, at end insert “, and ensure that the Governor and all Bank of England Deputy Governors and the Chief Executive of the FCA may consult with the Treasury directly”

[Lord Davies of Oldham]

This amendment furthers the points that my noble friend and I have already made this afternoon about widening the range of individuals who should be in a position to contribute their knowledge, experience and advice to a crisis management scenario. We remain concerned that the Government have narrowed the point of action in crisis management. I listened very carefully to what the Minister said about the advantages of that narrowness and fully understand it, but I am still unconvinced that the Government have the Bill right about who should contribute fully to the management of what we all recognise is an issue of very great significance to the nation.

The memorandum of understanding on crisis management must, according to the Bill, make provision about obtaining and sharing information. This amendment seeks to facilitate this requirement and enhance the Bill. We need to ensure that certain key personnel can consult directly with the Treasury. The amendment develops our clearly argued concern that reference in the legislation to “the Bank” is too often taken to mean, or certainly risks being interpreted and acted on as meaning, simply the governor. We argue that the Bank’s deputy governors and the chief executive of the FCA should in the Bill be explicitly enabled to consult directly with the Treasury in such extreme circumstances.

We are worried about the concentration of power and feel that relevant alternative voices must be given the opportunity to be heard in the management of an issue of such great concern for the nation. This is particularly important if there proves to be a difference of opinion within the Bank. We know there are differences of opinion in the Bank on very important matters. One would expect that highly capable individuals with different experience would not always reach an identical opinion. If they did, they would not deserve the high position they occupy because they would be merely yes men or, in one or two cases, yes women.

Under the current formulation of financial regulation, the Chancellor can hear directly from the chairperson of the FSA. Under the new system and the memorandum of understanding, the Chancellor could hear from no one but the governor.

In the other place, the Minister said, “Well, of course, the Bank encompasses a range of people”. We are not convinced about that. We do not feel that the position is explicit enough. It does not address the point about including the FCA in the vital process of obtaining and sharing information. Nor does it indicate that, at a moment of great crisis for the nation, voices which might present a somewhat different view from that of the governor will have their position adequately reflected to the Chancellor. In every other aspect of the role that the Chancellor plays, he welcomes engaging with the opinions of a large section of the population, represented by Parliament. We are talking about crisis management here. It is an extremely important dimension. We all recognise the constraints; I am not sure that it is right that the legislation should so circumscribe those who advise the Chancellor. I beg to move.

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, the arguments represented by the amendment have been raised at virtually every stage of this Bill’s progress in both this House and another place. Indeed, my honourable friend the former Financial Secretary speculated that it seemed to reflect the Opposition’s obsession with dominant figures preventing any dissent emerging from within an organisation. That is probably more a reflection of where those concerns are coming from than anything to do with how the Bank of England operates. This is an extraordinary line with which the Opposition persist. I start by repeating what the Government have said on every previous occasion when this point was made. I agree entirely that frequent communication between Treasury Ministers and the senior executives of the central bank and financial regulators is important. However, there is absolutely no need to legislate to ensure that the deputy governors of the Bank and the chief executive of the FCA can speak directly to the Treasury. There is categorically nothing prohibiting that in the legislation or anywhere else. In fact, Treasury Ministers regularly meet the current deputy governor for financial stability and senior executives in the FSA. Senior Treasury officials maintain a virtually constant dialogue with the deputy governors and senior FSA figures via meetings, phone calls and e-mail. The same was true under the previous Government. I was a senior Treasury official in this area for three years. There were many things that did not work well under the previous regime—that is why we are changing it—but I know perfectly well from experience over a long period that official contact with deputy governors works extremely well. I see no reason why that should change in future. It has existed over a considerable number of years and is just a natural part of the way the system operates.

In a financial crisis where public funds were at risk, if one of the deputy governors or the CEO of the FCA felt that there was something that the Treasury should know about, they would of course be able to speak to the Treasury directly. They are senior figures who are well aware of their responsibilities and quite used to making their feelings felt. In the case of the deputy governors, as well as the CEO of the FSA and the future FCA, they will be in front of the Treasury Select Committee. It is extraordinary to suggest in some way that legislation should be required to allow those senior figures in the system to make their views clear, as they have always done in the past.

However, when it comes to the statutory duty to notify the Chancellor formally of a risk to public funds, this responsibility is rightly given to the Bank of England as an institution. In practice, I would expect that in most cases a notification would be made by the governor personally to the Chancellor, but there is no reason why one of the deputy governors cannot send it on behalf of the Bank. The key thing is that it must be a decision of the Bank. As the Government have made clear on multiple occasions, the Bank must come to a view internally about the best way to fulfil the duties and responsibilities that are placed on it, including the duty to notify the Chancellor of risks to public funds.

On the basis of that further explanation of the position, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw Amendment 190ZEF.

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[Lord Davies of Oldham]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, who seems to have retaliated because of my failure to give him alpha plus last time by suggesting that I am guilty of excessive plagiarism in my arguments this time. If that proves to be the case, I apologise. However, I insist that he at least accepts that in tabling and speaking to these amendments we think that there is real substance to them and that the Government have a case to make in answer to them. I am grateful for the way in which he has presented that case.

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[Lord Davies of Oldham]

My Lords, I rise briefly to say that it gives me considerable and indeed a rare pleasure to agree with the noble Lord, Lord Flight, and we support his amendment.

[Lord Newby]

My Lords, what we are talking about here is how we make sure that all those who should be consulted are consulted in respect of the work of the European supervisory authorities, the EU institutions and other international organisations. We are talking about the international dimension of the work of the financial services authorities as opposed to the domestic work that we have been looking at up to now.

We agree absolutely that consultation is an important part of the formulation of policy at the international level as well as the domestic level. It is perhaps worth starting by saying a bit about the way in which the international bodies themselves have sought to consult. The EU, following the Lamfalussy report in 2001, has increasingly appointed expert groups comprising industry, academics and consumers as the first stage of formulating policy. The UK has provided many distinguished members of those working groups. For example, the Commission set up a financial services user group, whose members included Mick McAteer, who was a founder director of the Financial Inclusion Centre, and Robin Jarvis, professor of accounting and head of SME affairs at Brunel University. We have therefore had strong UK representation on those European bodies for a long time.

One of the other main pillars of the international regulatory framework is of course the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. It has consulted widely on its proposals for Basel III, and the Financial Stability Board’s charter clearly states:

“In the development of the FSB’s medium- and long-term strategic plans, principles, standards and guidance, the FSB should consult widely amongst its Members and with other stakeholders including private sector and non-member authorities”.

So at the international level, there has been growing recognition that the board itself needs to consult, and in many ways that will be the most effective level of consultation in respect of provisions that the board is making.

National regulators also have an important role to play in the consultation and feed their views through to the European supervisory authorities. The FSA already takes that responsibility extremely seriously, and the PRA and the FCA plan to do the same.

The regulators will be required to consult on any proposed new rules that are required to implement EU or international regulatory initiatives, except in cases of urgency. The FSA already does that. For example, in July this year, the FSA published a consultation asking for views on how to transpose Solvency II into the UK rulebook. In addition, the FCA and PRA’s contributions to international policymaking processes will be informed by engagement on an ongoing basis with the industry and other relevant bodies. That means that the views of affected parties will be considered at all stages of the policymaking process.

The UK practice has been a mixture of formal and informal consultation, which has meant that the regulatory bodies—the FSA and the Treasury—when going into negotiations in Brussels or at Basel, have taken a lot of trouble to gauge the views of the UK financial services sector and have sought to reflect them effectively. I may be wrong, but I think that the sector feels that that is the case.

Regarding the question asked about why the MoU does not deal with PRA-FCA co-ordination with the ERAs, the PRA-FCA memorandum of understanding is covered in new Section 3E(3)(a) on page 31 of the Bill. I am afraid that I cannot read that out at the moment, but I refer noble Lords to it.

My noble friend Lord Sharkey asked an extremely good question but, as I have explained regarding the way that the authorities are approaching co-ordination, even though not every last detail will be set out in a memorandum of understanding—and some clearly are—the authorities plan to take consultation extremely seriously. Apart from anything else, they have learnt through harsh experience that unless they have done that and are able to carry the industry with them, it just stores up more problems for the future.

I am convinced that the culture of the regulators is that they consult widely with relevant stakeholders and will continue to do that, and that it is not necessary to have an explicit provision in the Bill to ensure that that continues well into the future.