Pension Schemes Bill

Debate between Lord Davies of Brixton and Baroness Altmann

Committee stage
Thursday 5th February 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

Does the noble Baroness agree that her scheme would work the other way round, because older members will tend to have more pre-1997 service that younger members, whose pre-1997 service will be relatively limited? A scheme along the lines she proposes will have some element of generational fairness.

[Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)]

I thank the noble Lord. I would certainly say that there is a significant and obvious element of fairness in this proposal for lump sums to be paid. I argue that it would level the playing field, because those who have lost the most at the moment will continue to lose the most, whereas if you recognise the past losses and the forward uplifts are still being paid then you equalise, to some degree, the fairness and the losses between people of different age groups.

I hope that we can come back to this matter on Report and that we might have a meeting to discuss the potential for something of this nature to be introduced in the Bill. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I have Amendment 203ZC in this group, but unfortunately the Committee has not received a copy of my amendment.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

It is on a separate sheet.

[Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)]

Good. I now have it and I want to check that everyone else has it too. That is my first question dealt with.

In speaking to this amendment, the aim is to enable members of pension schemes that have gone into the PPF after their assessment period to be extracted, with regulations laid that will govern the terms on which they can be extracted. This is particularly relevant to the AEAT scheme: I know that we will come to this in later groups, with a requirement for a review of the situation. My amendment is trying to facilitate a practical resolution to the problems faced by the Atomic Energy Authority scheme. There are parallels with the Atomic Weapons Establishment or AWE scheme: employees originally had a scheme similar to and in fact derived from that of the UK AEA.

The AWE staff and their pensions were transferred to the private sector, and in 2022 the Government granted a Crown guarantee to the private company scheme. However, members of the AEA scheme were told that the scheme that they were encouraged to transfer to in 1996 would be as secure as that provided by the Atomic Energy Authority public sector scheme. This was not the case, though, because it was not offered a Treasury guarantee. It would appear that the Government Actuary’s Department failed to carry out a proper risk assessment of the various options offered to those members in 1996. Indeed, they were apparently specifically told not to worry about the security of the scheme to which they transferred all their accrued benefits. Of course, all these accrued benefits are pre-1997.

What happened after that is that they went into a private sector scheme. It was a closed section of that scheme, only for the members who transferred their public sector rights into it. The public sector rights had full inflation protection for pre-1997 and members paid an extra 30% or so contribution into that private sector scheme in order to conserve the inflation protection. However, as part of that, the pension they were saving for, the base pension, was lower than the one for those members in the open scheme who had joined not from the public sector. They were working on the principle that that their scheme was secure and that they would be getting the uplifts of inflation. When it failed—the private sector company went bust in 2012—and they went into the PPF in 2016, they suddenly discovered that they had paid 30% more for inflation protection, which was gone. And because they had paid 30% more for that protection and were accruing a lower pension, a 180th instead of a 160th scheme, their whole compensation was lower than that of everybody else who had not had any assurances from the Government that transferring their previous rights into a private sector scheme would generate these kinds of losses.

This is probably the worst example I have seen of government reassurance and failed recognition of the risks of transferring from a guaranteed public sector scheme into a private sector scheme. This amendment seeks to require the Government to lay regulations that would transfer members out of the PPF, those members of the closed scheme, if they wish to. I am not forcing anyone to do so within this amendment. You have to offer them the option of going or staying if they are satisfied with the PPF. Also, a sum of money may need to be paid to the PPF, which would take away the liability and thereby reduce PPF liabilities, but also sets up an alternative scheme that could be along the lines of the AWE arrangements, for example. That would potentially be another option. On privatisation, the Government received a substantial sum of money from the sale of that company, the private sector takeover of the commercial arm of the Atomic Energy Authority. That delivered less money than was paid to the private sector scheme to take over the liabilities. Therefore, the Government have money to pay with, which they have never really acknowledged.

I hope that this amendment is a potentially direct way to help the AEAT scheme, if the Government are minded to consider it. It builds on a provision that is already in the Pensions Act 2004, which talks about situations whereby there is a discharge of liabilities in respect of the compensation, which this amendment would be doing. It prescribes the way in which subsection (2)(d) of Section 169 of the Pensions Act 2004 could be used to help the AEAT scheme.

I have also been approached by a private sector employer whose scheme failed and went into the PPF. At the time, the employer did not have sufficient resources to buy out more than the Pension Protection Fund benefits for his staff. He now is in a position to do that and would like to do so but, at the moment, he cannot get his scheme extracted. He is willing to pay an extra premium to do that, in pursuance of a moral duty to try to give his past staff better-than-PPF benefits. That is what this amendment is designed to achieve. It is built on the connection between AEAT and AWE, but could also help other private sector schemes if the employer feels—it would normally involve smaller schemes—that there is a moral obligation that they can now meet, financially, to recompense members at a level better than the PPF, once the assessment period is over and the resources have gone in, and to take it back out again.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

My Lords, I am going to try to put this issue into context. This is the third leg of our discussion, which centres on what we do now in relation to benefits that accrued for pensionable service prior to 1997.

I am going to take the Committee into a little history. The 1997 date was set by the Pensions Act 1995. I was there; although I had long left the TUC, because the TUC’s normal pensions officer had taken leave of absence for a few months, I was, in effect, acting as the TUC’s pensions officer at the time. On the background, in terms of what people understood about pension increases at that time, I will go all the way back to 1971, when the Pensions (Increase) Act was passed. In 1971, it was obviously under a Conservative Government. They linked public service pensions to inflation—initially RPI then subsequently, from 2011, CPI. That was all well and good. It set the standard, quite properly, for the Government of good pension provision, including increases. I make no apology for that. I am sure that we will return to this issue when we have the debate at our next meeting on public service pensions. The Conservative Government set that standard.

Then, in 1981—again, under a Conservative Government —Margaret Thatcher, the Prime Minister, decided, egged on by Aims of Industry, that there should be a review of pensions and pension increases. She took a personal interest—it is all there in the Thatcher archives—and established the Scott inquiry. Chaired by Sir Bernard Scott, a prominent businessperson at the time, it was a five-person inquiry that undertook a detailed study of pension increases, starting with public service pensions. We do not hear much about this inquiry now—there is another more famous Scott inquiry—because it came up with the wrong answer. Despite the committee being hand-picked by the Prime Minister, it came up with the answer she did not want. It said that index-linking was justified—it is worth saying here that, when it says “index-linking”, it is talking about the limited price index, or LPI, so not full indexation in all circumstances but up to a limit—and that there was no case for its removal from public service schemes.

The committee decided that public service pensions were not overly generous overall. It pointed out that the main driver of costs for public service pensions was not index-linking but the final salary benefit structure. Again, as an aside, it is worth noting that, from 2011 onwards, public service schemes moved away from that; they are now all average salary schemes. The committee advocated for parity of pension increases with state pension increases. So this committee, which was set up to tell the world how bad index-linking was, said that everyone should have index-linking. That was in 1981.

There is another stage. Originally, when schemes contracted out, they promised to provide GMPs. Initially, the GMPs were not index-linked but had a flat rate, and the state scheme was left to provide the indexing on the fixed flat-rate private sector schemes. However, by 1986, it was decided that the private sector schemes could provide LPI, initially at 3%. The scheme had to provide GMP, but it provided inflation linking up to 3%, and inflation over that would still come from the state scheme. This is where the contracting out becomes incredibly complicated, of course. That change to the GMP was when a Conservative Government introduced an additional element of index-linking in occupational schemes.

Then we had the Maxwell scandal, the subsequent Goode report and the Pensions Act 1995. There is a theme here. It was a Conservative Government; William Hague was the Secretary of State. From 1997, they introduced LPI index-linking, initially up to 5% and subsequently reduced to 2.5% in 2005—unfortunately, that was a Labour Government, but there you go. So there is this whole consistent move towards limited price indexation in occupational schemes. It became the accepted approach to providing occupational schemes. A scheme that did not provide some element of indexation in retirement was seen as an inferior scheme.

I was there, as I say, so what was my experience? Many schemes, particularly larger schemes, had LPI in the rules pre 1997, following Scott in the early 1980s. Schemes have gradually introduced it more and more; of course, index-linked bonds were introduced specifically as a follow-on from the Scott report. So many schemes, particularly large schemes, had LPI in the rules.

Other schemes said, “We’re going to provide indexation but we’ll do it under discretionary powers”. However, they still expected to provide increases and funded for them. It is my view, having been there, that, pre 1997, the number of schemes making no allowances for LPI increases was vanishingly small. For some, it was in the rules; for others, it was in the funding basis. Practically every member had a reasonable expectation of LPI in retirement in respect of the benefits that they accrued pre 1997. The statutory requirement was introduced to cover all schemes, as recommended by the Goode report; that was absolutely right.

So the suggestion that people are unreasonable in expecting their pre-1997 benefits to be increased is entirely wrong. It was entirely reasonable for them, and that is what people believed at the time, although they may not have a legal entitlement. This does not affect just the PPF or the Financial Assistance Scheme, where we are told that, if the scheme did not have it in the rules, it will not get these increases. It particularly affects active pension schemes—not necessarily those with new entrants, but those with pensioners to whom the scheme is paying money.

Many of the members will have benefits accrued before 1997, and those members have a reasonable expectation of increases. That is why I move Amendment 203 as a basis for discussion at this stage. In the light of what we hear, I may come back to the issue on Report. The law can now move to requiring increases on pensions accrued pre-1997, whatever it said in the rules, because it is a question of not legal but political justification. Politically, people can reasonably expect the Government to provide them with justice, and there is a reasonable moral expectation that they should now get limited price indexation on their benefits accrued prior to 1997.

The issue here is the position in which so many members find themselves. Their trustees—who were perhaps more engaged, years ago, with the operation of the scheme in those days—gave them a reasonable expectation of the benefits. I wrote to many schemes around that time, asking them what their practice was, having got an increase in the rules. Many of them wrote back to me and said, “Yes, we expect to increase these pensions and we are funding the scheme on that basis”.

Trying now, 30 years later, to distinguish between schemes that provided for these increases in the rules and in the funding basis is politically and morally wrong. These people have a reasonable expectation, and we have this opportunity to see that they are treated correctly. I beg to move.

[Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I have every sympathy with the noble Lord’s amendment, and I would love the Government to find themselves able to accept it. I would certainly agree on the moral case and on the historical justification for members having reasonable expectations that their pensions would not suddenly be whittled away to a fraction of what they would previously have had. The Goode report recommended unlimited inflation protection, but it was limited when it came in and it was only from 1997 onwards rather than retrospectively. There are echoes there of what we have just heard about the Pension Protection Fund.

I see that the noble Lord, Lord Brennan, is here; he was instrumental in campaigning for the Allied Steel and Wire members and worked so hard to help them, as the noble Lord, Lord Davies, also did. The noble Lord, Lord Wigley, is no longer here, but this would certainly apply to the Allied Steel and Wire members, and I urge the Government to look at the amendments. I fear that there may be little appetite, given that our previously much more modest suggestions were rejected and bearing in mind that not all schemes are in surplus—there may be an issue. But, if the Government were so minded, there is certainly a good case for considering the amendment that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, so ably moved.

Pension Schemes Bill

Debate between Lord Davies of Brixton and Baroness Altmann

Committee stage
Tuesday 3rd February 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

I possibly touched on this issue in the wrong group, but as the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, has indicated, I raised, in essence, the same points in the previous debate.

I am in favour of mandation, but what worries me is that the Government do not seem to understand—and have never acknowledged—the consequences, which have been set out so clearly by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. There are consequences if the Government tell people how to organise their retirement income and if, having told them how to proceed to achieve a good income, it subsequently turns out that the Government are wrong. As I said last week, they will not necessarily be legal consequences, but political consequences and moral consequences.

I draw attention to the Financial Assistance Scheme, which we are going to be debating later this week. It was established because the Government had to acknowledge their failure to introduce the appropriate law and protect people, and they lost income. That is an exact precedent for where we are now. That Government had a responsibility to protect those people and failed to do so. After a vigorous campaign by those who had been affected, and the threat of losing a case at the European court, which was possibly more influential on the Government, they had to act. It is not wild speculation that the Government will end up having to meet these moral and political consequences; it has already happened. The Government have to face up to what they are proposing here.

[Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I support this amendment in principle. I share the concerns just expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, about the risk of mandating a substantial proportion of any pension fund to be invested in what is, in effect, the highest-risk end of the equity spectrum, which is meant in other circumstances—if you ask the Pensions Regulator and so on—to be the risky bit of investment.

The Government may need to think again about the consequences of potentially being so narrow—of course, in the Bill, we do not even have the exact definition of what the assets are going to be in terms of these unlisted opportunities—because the opportunity set for risky investments that can actually benefit the economy is a lot wider than seems to be indicated in the Bill. Surely the more diversified the portfolios, the better risk-adjusted returns members can expect. I hope that the Government will give the Committee a more precise understanding of their expectations for the types of assets and for the consequences of being automatically enrolled in a scheme that invests in private equity assets or other unlisted assets that end up failing completely—as has happened so frequently with that type of investment in the past.

Pension Schemes Bill

Debate between Lord Davies of Brixton and Baroness Altmann

Committee stage
Monday 26th January 2026 Grand Committee

[Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I support every word that the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, has said. I hope the Minister understands that this series of amendments is designed, once again, to help the Government.

The policy of excluding the very asset classes that the Government want to promote and want pension funds to invest in, just because they are held in a particular form, seems irrational. The process used to introduce it, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, outlined, was materially flawed. There was a lack of consultation and the policy is directly contrary to some previous ministerial Statements and to the stated policy intention. I cannot see how any reasonable person could argue that excluding these companies is a legitimate means of achieving the stated policy objective. The decision goes against common sense and defies economic logic. It opens pension scheme members up to less choice, higher long-term costs and, potentially, new risks such as gating or frozen investments.

Amendments 122 and 123 are designed specifically to ensure that, if a closed-ended investment company holds the assets in which the Government want pension funds to invest as a result of the Mansion House Accord, they can do so. Amendment 123 includes these as qualifying assets under the Bill and Amendment 122 talks about ensuring that, if securities are

“listed under Chapter 11 of the UK Listing Rules or the Specialist Fund Segment that provide exposure to the qualifying assets”,

they too can be included.

These amendments would not change the intentions of the Bill or the Government’s policy; they would reinforce them. If schemes cannot invest in listed securities, we will exclude the closed-ended funds that hold such assets, for no obvious reason other than, perhaps, the fact that the pension funds or asset managers that are launching the long-term asset funds will obviously prefer to have their own captive vehicle under their direct control, rather than those quoted freely on the market.

I would argue that, by excluding investment trusts and REITs as qualifying assets, we will fetter trustees’ discretion as to what assets they can invest in and how they can do so. I do not believe that the Government want to do this. I think this is an unintended consequence of wanting not to allow schemes just to say, “Well, I invest in Sainsbury’s and it has a lot of property in the UK, so that’s fine”. But this is a very different argument. I hope that the time spent by this Committee on these funds will prove worth while and that this dangerous, damaging exclusion can be removed from the Bill.

If the Government want—as they say they do—pension schemes to invest in UK property, the amendments on this topic would allow them to choose to hold shares in Tritax Big Box, for example, which is a listed closed-ended fund. It is a collective investment REIT, not a trading company, and UK regulators, the stock market and tax regulation recognise its functions as a fund. It is just like a long-term asset fund, but it is closed-ended instead of open-ended. Under the Bill, pension funds would not be able to invest in it, even though it holds precisely the type of private assets targeted by this section of the Bill.

The amendments would maximise schemes’ choice of investable assets within the target sectors. This would widen competition, which should bring downward pressure on asset management costs; it would reduce the risks of inflating asset prices, by channelling demand into fewer investment pathways; and it would enhance potential risk-adjusted returns. There is simply no reason why master trusts and other pension schemes should object to being given additional freedom to make investments to meet the requirements of these reserve powers. Why are we discriminating against a particularly successful British financial sector offering a proven route to holding the assets in which the Government want pension funds to invest? I have not seen any argument to say that, if we include these amendments, pension funds would have to invest in these companies, but they could use them if it suited their needs.

I look forward to the Minister’s answer. I know and accept that she is in a difficult position, but I have not heard a coherent answer as to why we are going down the route that we are. Tritax Big Box is just one example. It owns and develops assets worth £8 billion and controls the UK’s largest logistics-focused land platform, including data centres, which the Government designated as critical national infrastructure in 2024. Tritax Big Box announced that its data centre development strategy will be partnering with EDF Energy, which manages the UK’s nuclear power, to develop such infrastructure. It is remarkable that such a homegrown success story should be excluded from the opportunities available to pension schemes.

This sector has reinvented itself over the past few decades, from being a holder of diversified quoted equities to managing real illiquid assets. It is generally recognised that it is an ideal structure for holding illiquid assets—it has renewable assets, wind farms, solar farms and National Health Service GP surgeries. All these elements of the economy need significant investment and pension funds could be using their assets to support them. Surely that should be part of the Government’s intention for the Bill. I hope that this possible error in the Bill can be recognised and corrected so that we can move forward without further discussion on this topic.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

The noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, called on the support of reasonable people. I think of myself as a reasonable person, and I support her. I find the Government’s position on this totally inexplicable. I say in all honesty to my noble friend the Minister that the reasons given so far for these provisions do not in any way explain their position. It is inexplicable.

In my view, it is possible to make an argument that closed-end funds of this sort are more suitable than some other sorts of investments for pension investment because of the possibility of there being additional liquidity. That makes it even more inexplicable. A further problem is that pension funds could invest in an investment company that is not a closed-end fund but holds these investments. However, if it decided to float on the stock exchange, it could not do so because it would lose all the pension fund investments. So there is not logic at all to the Government’s position. There may be some logic, but we have yet to hear it.

Pension Schemes Bill

Debate between Lord Davies of Brixton and Baroness Altmann

Committee stage
Wednesday 14th January 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

There is a phrase, “esprit d’escalier”—is that how you say it?—for when you are walking down the stairs and you suddenly think of the thing you wish you had said in a previous discussion. Well, this group of amendments provides an ideal opportunity to avoid that very problem.

I do not want to delay the Grand Committee unnecessarily but I feel forced to say something. In essence, these amendments are fundamentally misconceived. I do not object to these questions being asked, but have the two previous speakers ever looked at a Local Government Pension Scheme valuation report? All the information for which they are asking and more is set out in those reports, in accordance with the professional standard that all actuaries must meet.

It is worth saying that that professional standard is set not by actuaries but by the Financial Reporting Council, which sets technical standards for the actuarial profession. The profession looks after professional standards but technical standards, and specifically what should appear in a valuation report, are set by the Financial Reporting Council, which is not part of the actuarial profession. Obviously, there is big actuarial input, but the final decision is made by the council, and all the information called for by the noble Viscount and the noble Baroness is in those reports. Of course, there may be cases where it does not appear in those reports, in which case that is a case of technical malpractice and the Financial Reporting Council should be told.

[Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)]

I apologise for intervening, but I feel that there is a bit of misdescription here. Yes, it is true that Regulation 64, for example, includes this information, but the FRC does not have the authority to insist on these issues being fed through. Indeed, there is non-statutory guidance that seems to override all this. For example, it says that you should not consider changes in contribution rates on the basis of liabilities that have changed due to market changes, so the interest rate environment, which has changed so fundamentally, is supposed not to feed through to the conclusions on contribution rates. That is part of this mindset which, I feel, it is so important for us to try to adjust as we go forward, given the fundamental changes that have happened.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

I apologise, but I do not understand what the noble Baroness is saying. Actuaries have to comply with these professional standards; any valuation report they produce has to meet them—that is not a question for debate. If a report does not meet those standards, it should be pursued on its merits. To claim that this information is not available is simply untrue: it is there in the valuation reports. I always have problems with the word “transparency”, because to me it looks like something you can see through and you cannot see it, but I take it to mean that a full explanation of the degree of prudence, a wide evaluation of the assumptions chosen, what effect different assumptions would have and the outcome in terms of the contribution rate all have to be set out. They are publicly available.

The second point is that actuaries do not decide on the valuation assumptions; the management committee decides, on actuarial advice, what the assumptions should be. The local, democratically elected representatives take the decisions, including about what the contribution rate should be. We are currently in an odd state where lots of information on the situation is becoming available, but that is because we are at the end of a three-year cycle of valuations. By the end of this year, all these issues will have been resolved. Not everyone will be pleased; it is entirely possible that some admitted bodies will find that their contributions go up. Perhaps they had significant changes in their workforce—who knows? But the mere fact that some contribution rates go up while the overall move is a reduction does not in itself mean that the system is broken.

I find it difficult to understand what exactly these amendments intend to achieve. The information is available, the decisions are made by the local government bodies involved, and they take the decisions based on their democratic responsibility. What more could we want?

[Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)]

Perhaps I could assist the Committee. These amendments are asking for a publicly available report that clarifies and sets out all this information on a basis that council tax payers, for example, whose money is being used, can see with clarity: it is provided to them. With all due respect, they will not read the actuarial report, but having a properly set-out review that explains all this clearly, in language that people can understand, would have huge value.