Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill [HL]

Lord Collins of Highbury Excerpts

Report stage (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 15th January 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Deben (Con)]

My Lords, I remind the House that I was fortunate enough to take part in the Space Industry Bill on exactly this basis. That is the reason I come to this amendment. I hope that my noble friend will recognise that this is about not just this amendment in this Bill but a whole range of ways of looking at taking into our domestic legislation the things that we have to. I choose to speak on this simply because this is not an issue on which I can be accused of having a parti pris position—although I will be perfectly happy to be accused of that when we have the withdrawal Bill, on which clearly I take a very strong view.

On this, I am talking about an amendment to a Bill which has a great danger. If you produce a Bill called the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill, it is very easy to put almost anything in it and feel that it is perfectly reasonable to support what you have put in—because none of us is in favour of not having sanctions and all of us are opposed to money laundering. Therefore, this is the moment in which I always become particularly careful. I am worried about this because it seems to be an area in which lawyers have taken a major part. That always worries me, and I feel that one has to make sure that one is not being led astray down some legal path that is other than sensible.

On this occasion, I think that what is being proposed is not acceptable within the constitution. As the noble Lord, Lord McNally, said, this is a constitutional matter. If we are here for anything—and I believe that we are here for a very good purpose—dealing with the constitution is clearly the central part of it, and dealing with it in the detail that we can, when the House of Commons is unable to deal with it in that detail, makes this even more important.

I cannot believe that my noble friend really intends to say that Ministers should have these powers. I know that I have said it before, but I was a Minister for 16 years and I have to tell him that I should not have been given those powers. I do not agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, that it does not matter because of the excellence of the Minister. In a sense, it matters more because of the excellence of the Minister. It is very important as a Minister to recognise that there are restrictions on any Minister, however good. In a sense, that is when I particularly want those restrictions to be strong.

I say to my noble friend that there is a reason why this amendment is very important, and it is a constitutional reason. But there is a practical reason, too. It is that we do not want to feel that the Government are not prepared to understand the distinction between constitutional propriety and the urge and necessity to change the law in order to face up to the regrettable effects of Brexit. This is an opportunity for us to say that this is not about this issue; it is about the constitutional concern. I hope that my noble friend will be able to give the House some reassurance that, now that this has been pointed out to him, he will look again at the debates on the Space Industry Bill, think forward to the debates that we will have over the Trade Bill and the withdrawal Bill, and recognise that perhaps this is a moment to find a way of accommodating a very serious criticism.

[Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Lord and noble Lords for their contributions. I agree wholeheartedly with their comments in relation to the thrust of this legislation. We are here because of another decision. We are here because we are being forced to take action speedily because of the precipice that we will be facing.

I said at Second Reading and will say now that we support this Bill because we are required to have a proper and full sanctions regime. I completely share the concerns expressed by your Lordships’ Constitution Committee. But, as I said in Committee, your Lordships’ Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee examined these clauses in some detail and did not quite share the view of the Constitution Committee. It referred to its previous memorandum on the subject and said that the reason for this clause related to the enforcement of the prohibitions and requirements set out in the regulations. In Committee, the Minister said that the Government were replicating existing enforcement regimes. He said:

“To be clear: these types of offences already exist”.—[Official Report, 21/11/17; col. 165.]


In Committee, I said that if that was the case, and the Minister was hearing us in terms of the concerns over principles, I hoped that he would come up with something better to address the concerns of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. I am afraid that, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, said, I do not think that the Minister has come up with adequate provisions to address these concerns. They are limited, as the noble and learned Lord said, to some of the all-embracing powers such as determining evidence and the process for evidence. I welcome those changes but I do not think that the Government have gone far enough in terms of being very clear how these wide-ranging powers will be dealt with. If the noble and learned Lord presses this issue, I hope that the House will support him.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, first, I thank the noble and learned Lord for tabling his amendment. Again, I also thank him for the extensive discussions we have had in this respect.

The amendments seek to remove the ability to make provision in sanctions regulations creating offences for breaches of sanctions. I say from the outset that I sympathise with the concerns that noble Lords have expressed during various parts of the debate, not just today but in previous stages. I am sure noble Lords will also acknowledge that we have done a lot of work to try to respond to these concerns. I have tabled some government amendments in this area, which the noble Lord, Lord Collins, acknowledged.

The powers in question enable offences to be created for breaches of sanctions, in line with our current practice when implementing EU legal acts. They also enable other enforcement tools to be used, such as deferred prosecution agreements or serious crime prevention orders. Having the power to punish individuals and entities for breaching sanctions deters non-compliance and ensures the measures are robust. Sanctions without teeth, as I am sure noble Lords acknowledge, are essentially meaningless. Indeed, we debated earlier an amendment that would have included preventing,

“the violation of sanctions regulations”,

as one of the explicit purposes to be set out in Clause 1. Although I argued against that amendment on technical grounds, I agree with the spirit.

EU sanctions against countries such as Russia and Syria are imposed through EU legal acts that require member states to put in place enforcement measures at a national level. In line with that requirement, the UK routinely creates criminal offences for breaches of sanctions by way of statutory instruments made under powers in the European Communities Act 1972, as well as other legislation such as the Export Control Act 2002 and the Policing and Crime Act 2017. Other EU member states implement similar enforcement measures through their national legislation.

As foreshadowed in the White Paper consultation before this Bill was introduced, the Government want to be in a position to maintain continuity in this area. Whatever one’s views on Brexit, I think there is wide support for the principle that the UK and EU should remain closely aligned on sanctions policy. If the UK’s future sanctions regime against Russia was stripped of any enforcement provisions, I am sure noble Lords would agree that this would send a very unfortunate signal to our EU partners and to other close allies. Amendments 45 and 47 would mean that breaching a sanctions regime would not be an offence. If they are passed, as existing criminal offences in EU retained law fall away when new UK regimes are introduced, we would be unable to replicate those offences in the new regimes.

We have covered some of these issues previously, and I hope that what I have said will persuade the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment. As I have said, I understand the concerns that have been expressed, including today, about the scope of these powers and will set out in a moment the government amendments that I have tabled in response. But the abolition of offences from sanctions regulations clearly undermines the purpose of the Bill and would make the UK a weak link in broader international implementation of sanctions, which I am sure is not noble Lords’ intention. I know and totally accept that this House is concerned about the creation of criminal offences through secondary legislation, a point eloquently made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, the noble Lord, Lord McNally, and my noble friend Lord Deben. I can provide this House with the following reassurances.

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[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, this is an extremely difficult question which amounts to whether or not the courts of this country have an authority to set aside a decision of the United Nations. We are under a clear obligation to follow a sanction decision imposed by the United Nations. However, I wonder whether the courts of this country, without absolutely challenging the decision of the United Nations, could give force to the Secretary of State’s attempt to change that decision: in other words, a system could be adopted under which the fault that is found with the United Nations procedure is endorsed by our courts in a way which reinforces the attitude of the Secretary of State in seeking to set aside that sanction rather than just going ahead with a decision which seems to fly in the face of our international obligations under the treaty to which my noble friend referred. I would like to believe that it might be possible for our Secretary of State to go to the United Nations in a case of this kind, with support from the courts of this country, to say that, so far as they can see, the decision of the United Nations is incorrect according to the circumstances narrated in a judgment of the courts here. That might be a way of handling this situation.

I understand the position so far as Europe is concerned. I am not sure whether this situation has ever arisen in that context. That can be looked at but I think there is a question about that. A slightly different situation arises for a group bound by treaty—as the European Union is—as against that for single nations, because if we can do it, who else cannot? We do not necessarily think that the rule of law is observed in the same way in every other country in the world but we cannot make a judgment on that point as a justification for this move. I wonder whether something of this sort should not be done.

[Lord Collins of Highbury]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, said accurately that there was a balance to be struck here, and there is a debate to be had. I am not legally qualified and therefore wish to address the political and moral issues that have been raised. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said that this is an extremely rare situation and that we cannot pick and choose. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, said in Committee:

“I see the force of the Government’s argument that the UK has no alternative under international law but to give effect to our obligations under the UN charter; indeed, Article 103 of the charter expressly dictates that these obligations prevail over any conflicting international law obligations.”——[Official Report, 29/11/17: cols. 703-4.]


The Opposition are concerned about the signal we would send if we adopted the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I hear his comments about the United Nations but this Parliament must uphold international law and the supremacy of the United Nations. It should not undermine that. If we adopt the amendment, we would send the signal to other countries, which may flagrantly flout decisions of the United Nations, that we insist that they should. We judge other countries by our own standards. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, is absolutely right that there should be provision for the British courts to consider a decision of the Secretary of State. However, ultimately they should support the Secretary of State and the United Nations, not say to the United Nations, “We are not going to accept that decision”. We cannot pick and choose; that is the fundamental point. Therefore, while I totally understand the power of the arguments put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and have a lot of sympathy with them, there is one point that trumps all else—I use that word advisedly—namely, we must uphold the decisions of the United Nations.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, as Minister for the United Nations, among other things, I echo the sentiments of the noble Lord, Lord Collins, about our commitment to the United Nations. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, the UK is at the heart of shaping the UN’s response to crises around the world, as we have seen. I know that all noble Lords respect that. The United Kingdom takes this role very seriously, including in our approach to sanctions in the UN Security Council. We are one of the leading voices for UN sanctions where there are good reasons for them, as recently to constrain North Korea’s nuclear programme. At the same time, we place great importance on the need for sanctions to be used responsibly, with proper respect for due process and the rule of law. It is important to remember that as a permanent member of that Security Council, the UK exercises real authority over which sanctions are and are not adopted by the UN.

I thank all noble Lords for their comments, to which I listened carefully. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, made important points. We have exercised authority by committing that we would never support in the UN Security Council a designation that we considered unlawful. Put another way, we would not support a designation unless we had reasonable grounds to suspect that the person met the relevant criteria. Not only is this the right thing to do, it also reduces the risk of the UK being obliged to implement a UN designation that might be vulnerable to challenge in court.

The Bill recognises that persons designated by the United Nations must have a right of redress, including the ability to bring a legal challenge against the Government in the UK courts. The Bill accordingly contains the ability for such a person to have access to the court, and to obtain a remedy for any unlawfulness that the court uncovers. If the court were to consider the UN designation unlawful, the court could instruct the Minister to use best endeavours to secure a delisting at the United Nations. This is a significant remedy not to be underestimated. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, the UK is particularly well placed to make representations that a designated person should be delisted.

The Government recognise there may be rare cases in which the Minister’s best endeavours are not sufficient to secure a delisting at the UN, as we discussed with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, between Committee and Report. The question then is whether the UK courts should have the power to quash a UN designation and thus leave the Government in breach of their obligations under the UN charter. Our view is that this cannot be right.

First, the Bill recognises that the UK is under a duty in international law to designate those persons designated by the UN, and this proposition has not been criticised. Secondly, failure to implement a UN designation would damage the UK’s reputation as a country that stands by its commitments under international law—a point well made by the noble Lord, Lord Collins. Thirdly, it would restrict the ability of the UK to call out other states where they were falling short of their obligations under international law. If it was open to the UK not to implement our legal obligations, irrespective of whether it were following a court decision, it would be impossible to criticise other states where they were not implementing their obligations.

I take the point the noble Lord made that the EU court has very rarely quashed EU legal acts which implement a UN designation on procedural grounds. However, it has never done so where that would leave the EU member state itself in breach of its UN obligations. We should bear in mind that the EU itself is not bound by the charter, but EU states are. The noble Lord mentioned the case of Kadi, which has frequently been cited. In that case the UN had, in fact, delisted the person concerned by the time of the judgment, so EU member states themselves were spared the choice between respecting a decision of the EU courts and abiding by their UN obligations. Had they been forced to choose, I am confident that they would have prioritised their UN obligations as required—as a number of noble Lords mentioned—by Article 103 of the UN charter, which makes it clear that where there is a conflict between obligations under the UN charter and obligations under any other international agreement, the obligations in the UN charter shall prevail. The United Kingdom and all other EU member states are bound by that charter, even if the EU itself is not. That too is part of the rule of law—upholding those international laws where they bind the United Kingdom.

The United Nations has many flaws, but it is crucial to maintaining international peace and security. To allow the UK courts to stop the Government implementing sanctions agreed by the UN Security Council is not the right approach for a country such as ours that seeks to lead by example at the United Nations. I sincerely believe that any Minister, regardless of political persuasion, would share this view. I also believe we are in agreement that by continuing to make the UK’s support for UN designations conditional on fair procedural standards, we can and should do all we can to prevent this problem arising. However, in the unfortunate event that such a case arises, I remain of the view that a “best endeavours” obligation is the right way to square this difficult circle.

I deeply respect the noble Lord’s position. Again, we have had constructive discussions on this, although on this occasion we did not reach agreement. However, I hope that with the reassurances I have given, the noble Lord will be minded to withdraw his amendment.

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[The Earl of Dundee (Con)]

My Lords, while supporting this amendment, I welcome and recognise the Minister’s continuing resolve to issue guidance—thus the text to that effect, as is already within the Bill. Yet there is no certainty about it, as subsection (2) specifies only what such guidance “may” rather than “must” include.

Also to be welcomed is the recent guidance given by the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation to NGOs about their sanctions obligations. Nevertheless, this focus is upon general legal obligations. It is not regime or programme specific. So far, it appears that there is no official guidance which deals with regimes such as Syria, where financial sanctions coexist with a major humanitarian situation. Since 2012, the banking sector has repeatedly urged that guidance should be given to address all the many complications in sending funds to Syria in order to assist humanitarian activity. As we know, and as the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, has just said, the process is not working nearly well enough. Therefore, it is now a priority for humanitarian agents and their banks to find safe, transparent banking and payment channels.

It may be objected that the issuing of too much specific guidance might enable sanctions to be evaded by criminals and terrorists. At the same time, appropriate guidance can only help to ensure that the vast humanitarian sums entering Syria are not diverted instead to benefit those who are sanctioned. This can be prevented by a shared view between government, banks and NGOs on how best to risk-manage such payments, and by them as well through a shared identification of viable avenues to make sure that funds arrive safely where they are intended to go.

The Government are also to be commended for setting up a tri-sector group comprising government departments, NGOs and banks. Yet, while supporting that development, all the same we should perhaps appreciate that such arrangements rarely produce the type of outcome that the amendments seek. In fact, as the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, has observed, this particular group has had only one short meeting and none of the sub-groups has as yet met at all. Moreover, as government officials move their positions rather frequently, it can be notoriously difficult to ensure proper traction.

[Lord Collins of Highbury]

My Lords, I shall be very brief. I have added my name to this amendment and support everything that the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, and the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, have said. Here, we are trying to acknowledge what the Minister has committed to in terms of guidance and ensuring that the licence regime operates efficiently. However, we know from the NGOs that there is still great uncertainty. Certainly, as the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, said, banks are risk-averse, and often urgent humanitarian aid gets halted and is extremely difficult to implement. On the other hand, we have to balance the need to create certainty with the need to maintain an effective sanctions regime. We do not want to see the sanctions regime undermined by any system of licensing. That is why it is important that the Government should move speedily on the guidance situation, which I know the noble Lord is committed to.