ISIL in Syria

Lord Collins of Highbury Excerpts

Thursday 21st January 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)]

My Lords, the war in Syria has killed 250,000 people, contributed to the biggest refugee crisis since World War II, and become a breeding ground for Daesh and other extremist groups that threaten not only Syria’s neighbours but all the powers supporting one side or the other. I am extremely grateful to the noble Lord for initiating this debate and giving the House the opportunity to look beyond any one specific action and to consider what is meant by a “strategy” in the context of defeating Daesh.

The lesson from previous conflicts is that having a strategy is one thing but it needs to be followed through to fruition, with clearly defined objectives. The current situation in Syria and beyond highlights that a strategy to defeat Daesh cannot be limited to Syria alone, much as the conflict cannot be confined to its borders. In this context, modern conflict is not just physical so a strategy needs to be comprehensive, targeting Daesh not only in Syria but in cyberspace and at home as well as abroad. A strategy needs to be a broad approach recognising globalisation, the conflict and Daesh itself, otherwise it risks overly focusing on one aspect.

A strategy needs to be proactive and offensive, but also defensive, in the sense that care and attention need to be paid to how the strategy, and, indeed, Britain’s involvement in Syria, is presented. To my mind, too much attention is paid to the RAF bombing missions and not enough to other aspects. If we are to have international security and stability, development, defence and diplomacy have to go together. We need a joined-up, whole-government approach to this conflict.

If there is one lesson that should be learnt from more than a decade of combating Daesh and its previous incarnations, it is that no amount of foreign force can defeat the organisation without enlisting the help of an armed local resistance. Daesh strategy in Iraq and Syria is built around the objective of subduing locals and leaving them with no viable alternatives. The targeting of oil facilities and trucks may be paralysing the economy in Daesh-controlled areas, but we also need to understand how sometimes this pushes people to join the only employer in town to generate income for their families.

As Daesh embeds in residential areas to evade air strikes, it continues making money through taxation, extortion and other means that enabled it to take most of the areas now under its control before it laid its hands on the oil infrastructure. It is also quietly expanding in less strategic but vulnerable areas, such as those between Palmyra, the city of Homs and southern Syria, to avoid intensive bombardment or heavy military deployment.

The Secretary of State for Defence, Michael Fallon, said this week that we are entering a new phase,

“where we aim to systematically dismantle Daesh’s structure and capabilities … That means striking harder at the head of the snake, with an increased focus on infrastructure, lines of communication and supply routes”.

While that element of the strategy may be vital, it should not be the sole focus. We need to encourage local forces to fight Daesh. I therefore ask the Minister: what steps are the UK Government taking to work through existing and new channels to advise, network, train and provide non-military services to armed fighting groups in different parts of the country?

One example highlighted in a recent Chatham House report was support for a unique programme to promote moderate imams in an area controlled by various rebel forces, instead of extremist clerics affiliated to jihadi organisations. Part of the moderate clerics’ focus was to educate worshippers about the danger of takfir, or pronouncing fellow Muslims infidels or apostates. According to a field commander of the faction overseeing the programme, the culture of takfir is a major impediment to getting fighters to combat groups such as Daesh, especially if the faction is backed by western countries.

On the peace process, the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, referred last week to the fact that, as a result of efforts by the International Syria Support Group over the past three months, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 2254 on 18 December, requesting the UN to convene the Syrian Government and opposition for negotiations on a transition process. As we have heard, these negotiations are due to start on 25 January and will be a welcome step towards ending the conflict, but it seems that Russia is determined not to let Assad or his party lose power. Although I hear what the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, says, I am of course aware that it remains the Government’s hope that Russia will use all its power with the Assad regime and persuade him to come to the talks and ensure that the team is engaged in true negotiations about peace to achieve a transition process.

However, does the Minister think that the UN process outlined for a new constitution and elections within 18 months is practicable in that timeframe? Are we actually predicting failure if we do not meet that specific target? Obviously, in any road map for peace, you need certain milestones.

The strategy also needs to focus domestically. I was pleased to note from yesterday’s Evening Standard that Scotland Yard’s anti-terrorism chief praised Muslims in London for coming forward to help fight extremism. However, anyone who watched Channel 4’s programme on Tuesday night this week will have seen it highlight the threat of jihadist extremists and how they can evade prosecution. Is the Minister satisfied that the counterextremism strategy is fit for purpose in such circumstances?

Refugees have, of course, to be a major part of the strategy. Yesterday, the Minister for International Development said:

“The overwhelming majority of refugees remain in the region and this is where our support is targeted. We have been at the forefront of the response and have pledged more than £1.1 billion to the crisis”.—[Official Report, 20/1/16; col. 760.]

However, I remain concerned for the millions of Syrian refugees in the region who remain displaced and, in particular, those in neighbouring countries or in transit. What representations have the UK Government made, for example, to the Lebanese authorities, about the forcible return of Syrian refugees?