Defence Acquisition Reform

Lord Coaker Excerpts

Thursday 7th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Earl for coming to the House to respond to these questions and the necessary scrutiny, on a repeat of the Statement from another place. It is welcome that the Government are finally beginning to acknowledge what we on these Benches and many others, including the National Audit Office, the Public Accounts Committee and the Defence Committee, have been saying for a long time—that defence procurement is not working.

The Statement referred to the narrative of the acquisition system being dogged by major programmes and, while certain programmes have indeed been over budget and over time, the issues go much wider. Some 46 of 52 major projects have been either late or over budget under this Government. It is a systemic problem. In the past 14 years, £15 billion of taxpayers’ money has gone to waste, £5 billion in this Parliament. Report after report from the NAO and the committees that I have mentioned have been critical.

This is not just about the wasted money, as important as that is. Continuous failure in MoD procurement sends a message to the world, to both our allies and our adversaries. Good defence procurement can strengthen our sovereignty; make our country more secure; provide economic growth by creating and supporting jobs; and ensure that our troops can fulfil their roles and fight, while allowing us to fulfil the obligations that we have to our NATO allies. As we would all agree, it is therefore a top priority.

The changes are right and welcome and we agree with the reasons for the reforms set out by the Minister. Indeed, there is not too much in the Statement that you can disagree with, but the real concerns with the Government’s approach stem from the lack of action to tackle the bigger issues, which is a disappointment and a missed opportunity.

The Government’s policy for acquisition reform, as set out in the Command Paper refresh and the Statement, do not address the waste and poor value for money that have plagued the Government’s mismanagement. Without addressing the waste of taxpayer money at the scale that I have set out, it is difficult to see how the reform as set out by the Government will fix the problem. How will the Government ensure that these reforms offer value for money and stop the waste that we have seen? What steps are they taking to address the underlying systemic issues that have contributed to the delays and mismanagement that the Minister has acknowledged in the Statement, which have led to these projects being late and over budget? It certainly does not appear that they would have prevented the issues with some of the major programmes mentioned in the Statement, such as Ajax or Morpheus, or others that were not mentioned, such as the E-7 Wedgetails. Is that analysis wrong and, if so, why?

We are under no illusions that the problems can always be eliminated entirely—as the Statement says, these are incredibly complex programmes and procurements—but they should not be on the scale that we have seen. Does that not mean that there is real scope to improve in this situation? How will these reforms ensure proper accountability to prevent further delays and mismanagement of these vital defence contracts, those that we have now and those we will have in future? A fundamental question that the Government need to answer is how the report will make the difference that we all want, and why it will be successful when so many other reports have failed.

We believe that we should create a new strategic leadership in procurement. If we form the next Government, we will establish a fully fledged national armaments director, responsible to the strategic centre for ensuring that we have the capabilities needed to execute the defence plans and operations demanded by the new era. We envisage core delivery tasks that currently do not seem to be vested properly anywhere in the system; they should have sufficient authority or accountability to carry these out effectively. This leadership includes alignment of defence procurement across all five domains to cut waste and duplication, securing NATO standardisation, collaboration with allies, driving export campaigns and delivering a new industrial strategy. What is the Government’s view of a new director such as this to drive the change that we all want? Which of the things that I have said does the noble Earl disagree with? They are a sensible plan for driving forward change.

We have to do better. Report after report promises action on the problems in defence procurement and promises that there will be improvement as we move forward. Yet our procurement process is dogged with failure and delay, which means that our troops and Armed Forces do not have the equipment that they rightly should. The fundamental question that the noble Earl needs to answer is this: why will this report be different from the reports that have gone before it?

[Baroness Smith of Newnham (LD)]

My Lords, “over-complex, over-budget and over-time” is how major programmes of defence procurement have been characterised not just by the opposition, our enemies or even our allies but by the Minister for Defence Procurement in giving this Statement in the other place. Defence procurement has, over years, been riddled with problems, as the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, pointed out. While this Statement is very welcome, there is a question about whether it goes far enough or thinks about the wider pattern of defence procurement.

I read the Statement as it was produced and put into the Printed Paper Office last week. It said, “Check against delivery”. I read it, and there were various points where I thought, “Surely no Minister actually said this”. I went back and looked at Hansard to see what the Minister for Defence Procurement said in the other place and, indeed, some of the slightly strange comments were made in the House of Commons. I will therefore ask a few very specific questions.

What we have as the fifth aspect of the new approach to procurement is:

“Fifthly, we will pursue spiral development by default”.


Other noble Lords might know what spiral development is, but I am afraid that I do not. The Statement did not give me much clarity on it, nor does the document that was produced to go alongside it, so I hope the Minister can explain a little more what spiral development means.

Even more, however, I would like to know what is meant by the next line:

“seeking 60% to 80% of the possible, rather than striving for perfection”.

I realise that there have been concerns about the fact that we have looked for exquisite solutions and platforms that are so highly specified that they become ever more complicated, with the timeline for procurement shifting ever further to the right. However, “60% of the possible” raises a lot of questions. Does it mean that only 60% of our ammunition is going to work, or that only 60% of our trials of Trident will work? Given that we seem to have had a couple of problems with Trident recently, I very much hope that the Minister can explain what this means. There is nothing in the Statement or the document that explains clearly that we do not want to spend so long over-specifying things that we never deliver the platforms or equipment that our Armed Forces need. Do we think that we need to specify less? What do the Government mean?

The Statement talks about learning the lessons of experience, which is clearly very welcome. We do not want another Ajax. Learning from that experience is highly welcome and I am sure the Minister would be very grateful not to have to face the situation that his predecessor, the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, did, of repeatedly coming to your Lordships’ House and having to answer questions about Ajax for which, frankly, there were not any good answers.

Do the Government think that just learning the lessons of the recent past is enough? Will that deliver, at pace, as we say we need, the defence equipment that the United Kingdom needs in an era of unprecedented challenges? Will the noble Earl, in his response, tell the House how far this procurement model will really help us deliver beyond what we have been seeing and help ensure that, if we are sticking at 2% of GDP on defence expenditure, which seems to be the case from the Budget, that we are actually going to be equipped at the level we need to be to face the challenges that we and our allies are facing, and send the messages that we need to be sending to Russia, China, Iran and other countries, some of which we certainly would not think of even as collaborators in international relations?