Defence Procurement

Lord Coaker Excerpts

Tuesday 10th December 2013 Commons Chamber

[Vernon Coaker (Gedling) (Lab)]

I thank the Secretary of State for advance and early sight of his statement.

For the second time in a few weeks the Secretary of State has been forced to come to the House to explain and clarify, and reassure Members about, key components of his Defence Reform Bill, which will be read for a Second time later today in the other place. This is the statement that the Defence Secretary did not want to make and did not think he would have to make. His flagship policy on defence procurement has come crashing down around him—not so much GoCo or DE&S plus, but a no-go and D-minus for the Defence Secretary. It is another embarrassing U-turn from the Government.

Will the Defence Secretary tell us when he decided that he could no longer proceed with plans for a Government-owned, contractor-operated model for Britain’s defence procurement? It is three weeks since the Portfield consortium withdrew from the GoCo process. Why has it taken so long for the Government to bow to the inevitable and admit the difficulty of proceeding with only one bidder?

The Secretary of State is in danger of making a bad situation worse by what he has announced today. The Government cannot run Britain’s defence and national security on an ad hoc basis. They cannot make it up as they go along. But is it not clear today that that is exactly what the Government and the Defence Secretary are doing? Why is this the first time that we have heard of this new proposal? What consultation has he had on his new proposed model? When and how will Parliament be able to scrutinise these proposals? What resources did he allocate, and when did he allocate them, to ensure the expertise and time to test the model for robustness and make sure it was properly costed and tested for viability and sustainability? When he talks about new freedoms and flexibilities, what exactly does he mean? What was the process for appointing the chief executive of the new trading entity? Can he update us on what discussions he has had with the Treasury about his new proposal and when they began? This is a mess, and it poses more questions than it gives answers.

Does the Secretary of State really expect the House and the country to think that this is anything other than a last-ditch attempt to rescue what is left of the Government’s credibility, and to try and hide the shambles and chaos that are engulfing the Ministry of Defence? The House need not take my word for that. Last Thursday, Lord Levene published his second annual review on the implementation of his defence reform report. The Secretary of State heralded it as a triumph for his political leadership. But can he explain why he failed to mention one significant part of what the report said about the issue of procurement? Lord Levene said:

“In my opinion, the quickest and most straightforward solution would seem to be via ‘DE&S plus’, and this needs to be developed to the very highest standards as a realistic option.”

Does the Secretary of State now agree with Lord Levene? He says that GoCo is a potential future solution. Is it on the table or off the table? Which is it? What will be the repercussions for part 1 of the Defence Reform Bill?

The Opposition support a DE&S plus model and have expressed similar sentiments on the record to Lord Levene. We were, and are, conscious of the need to reform Britain’s defence procurement. We want the best of the private sector to work alongside the best of the public sector, but we need to see more detail on the proposed DE&S plus model. To date, it has been the poor relation in the whole process. When will the Secretary of State provide that detail? Will he accept that throughout the Committee stage of the Bill we consistently raised poor management of the process and serious concerns about viability? Will he accept that it was wrong for Ministers to continue to insist that everything was fine when it clearly was not? That complacency and unwillingness to listen has cost the British taxpayer millions of pounds. We have been here before with the debacle over the aircraft carriers. Despite his waste and complacency, he repeats the £38 billion figure, which has never stood up to scrutiny.

Will the Secretary of State tell us exactly how much this has all cost and what further costs are envisaged? What discussions has he had with the remaining consortium, led by Bechtel, before making today’s statement, and what is its position? Is it eligible for compensation? What discussions has he had with his senior civil servants and the staff at Abbey Wood, who today must be feeling undervalued and demoralised, having seen colleagues made redundant because they were not needed, only for them to be re-employed as agency workers?

The Government could have pulled back from the brink. They could have taken the advice of distinguished military figures, senior figures from the defence industry, former Ministers from across the political spectrum and, yes, the Opposition. How and why did the Government get it so wrong? Given that, how can we have any confidence in the credibility, rigour and independent analysis that the Defence Secretary claims for his updated proposals? Is it not the case that the Government have wasted three years and millions of pounds in time and money? The Secretary of State must come forward with plans that stand up to scrutiny and are made clearly, concisely and rationally. Only then can we ensure the best way forward for much-needed reforms to defence procurement.

[Mr Hammond]

That was predictable stuff. The hon. Gentleman claims that we have wasted three years. When it comes to reforming defence procurement, his lot are responsible for wasting 13 years. If I can give him a bit of friendly advice, I would be very careful about using the words “debacle” and “aircraft carrier” in the same sentence if I was sitting on the Opposition Front Bench. Let us remember that it was his Government who, by delaying the programme for two years to manage an in-year cash-flow crisis, drove £1.6 billion of cost into it.

The hon. Gentleman tells us that the Opposition support the DE&S plus model, but until now they have supported the competition, which is exactly what we propose to do. The former Labour Defence Secretary, John Hutton, said:

“It is time for a radical rethink that can align the necessary project-management skills with the right performance incentives...This is precisely what the GOCO concept…can offer and why the British government would be well advised to pursue it.”

The former shadow Secretary of State, the right hon. Member for East Renfrewshire (Mr Murphy) said:

“There needs to be rigorous examination of all the possible options and a robust comparison between the two options of a GoCo model and DE&S+…we will support what we hope is a genuine competition.”—[Official Report, 10 June 2013; Vol. 564, c. 53-54.]

That is what we have conducted and the hon. Gentleman is standing at the Dispatch Box complaining about it.

The hon. Gentleman tells me that this is the statement I did not want to make. Well, he gets the prize—of course it is the statement I did not want to make. I hoped that we would find a wide field of GoCo competitors able to engage with the process of delivering a value for money proposition to the taxpayer, but let me tell him how it works. The Opposition can stand on the sidelines slinging mud and insults, but the Government have to deal with the situation as it exists in the real world. We have to take the situation as we find it and manage the risks. [Interruption.]