Hong Kong

Lord Chidgey Excerpts

Thursday 24th October 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Chidgey (LD)]

My Lords, the Chinese position now—that the “one country, two systems” agreement is obsolete and no longer valid—is a clear breach of an international treaty, ratified in the UN, which enshrines the autonomy, rights and freedoms in the Hong Kong Basic Law. In response to an Urgent Question on 26 September, the Foreign Secretary confirmed that the United Kingdom expected China to live up to its obligations. He confirmed that he had spoken to the Hong Kong Chief Executive, Carrie Lam, and the Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, and made clear our concerns about human rights and the mistreatment of those exercising their right to lawful and peaceful protest. He said that their concerns should be addressed, not crushed by force.

That is a fine and noble sentiment from the Foreign Secretary, but there is scant evidence, more than a month on, of a positive Chinese reaction—until this morning, when it was announced that the extradition Bill had been withdrawn, according to the Times. But that is only one of five key demands of the protesters.

The Foreign Secretary also said that our international partners had placed on record their strong support and that the Prime Minister had raised Hong Kong at a recent G7 meeting, where all partners supported the joint declaration and called for an end to violence. The Foreign Secretary stressed to the Chinese Government that it was Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy that guaranteed its future prosperity and success.

Again, there was no positive response from the Chinese, apart from saying, as the noble Lord, Lord Alton, mentioned, that the Sino-British joint declaration was an historical document that no longer had any practical significance and had no binding effect on the Chinese central Government’s management of Hong Kong. The British, the statement said, have no sovereignty after the handover, nor power to rule or power to supervise. That is a pretty clear statement, but wildly divergent from the fact that the treaty is registered with the UN, remains in force and obliges both signatories to adhere to the terms they agreed.

Over the past several weeks, Members have received a steady flow of emails from Hong Kongers, some setting out their analysis of the situation with great fluency. I will not give names, for fear of retribution, but outstanding arguments include:

“Unlike other British Overseas Territories, the British Hong Kong residents were denied a vote on the future. The land and the people were handed over to the Chinese without asking their consent”.


“Hong Kong Britons born in British Hong Kong before the handover were British by birth. After the handover, those of Chinese descent had Chinese nationality brutally imposed by Beijing. It is now impossible for them to register as British citizens due to the imposition of Chinese nationality”.


“Beijing is not concerned about the justifiable rights of the Hong Kong people, but only on how to silence opposition views”.


That is just a sample of the many emails that I and others have received appealing for help.

Should the situation in Hong Kong be seen as part of the broader picture of Chinese foreign policy? Most people will be familiar with China’s belt and road initiative—a massive infrastructure and investment project, a new Silk Road to transport Chinese goods through the heart of central Asia and into Europe, with defined maritime routes through and beyond the Indian Ocean, served by a string of naval bases, including in Sri Lanka and Djibouti, to protect their passage.

It smacks of imperialism on a global scale not seen since the 18th and 19th centuries. Chinese foreign policy includes extending territorial claims to a network of disputed islands, reefs and atolls throughout the South China Sea, stretching into the Pacific and closing on Australia. Harbour and airport facilities with military capabilities and defence infrastructure have mushroomed on islands that make up the Paracels and Spratlys.

China has just secured a 75-year renewable lease on the whole of the island of Tulagi in the heart of the Solomon Islands, complete with fully functional naval and air bases initially provided by the Allied forces in World War II. Last month, China persuaded the Solomon Islands to join Kiribati in switching diplomatic ties from Taipei to Beijing.

There are worries, particularly in the US and Australia, that these developments provide a foothold for establishing a military presence in their backyard. The annual Bersama Lima military exercise is currently in full swing, with the intention of five nations combining to provide defence across Asia from a potential Chinese conventional threat: the front line. However, the allies’ combined power compared to China’s is extraordinary: the details do not bear reading. However, given that military engagement would seem an invidious course of action, we must examine combined economic and other actions to persuade China to address the plight of the Hong Kongers. In the words of Hong Kongers:

“Hong Kong is not Hong Kong anymore. No freedom, no justice, not safe. Please help to save the Hong Kongers’ life”.


I look forward to the Minister’s response.

Sudan

Lord Chidgey Excerpts

Thursday 6th June 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

The noble Lord is quite right. He will recall that the Saudi Arabian Government, along with the Emirati Government, have offered £3 billion of assistance to Sudan. Of that money, about £500 million has been deposited. I assure him that the US Government are raising this with the Saudis, as we are. On working specifically with US Government, I had a conversation about 10 days ago, in advance of the latest situation, with Ambassador Sam Brownback on freedom of religion, which is a key part of ensuring that there is a new Sudan with a full civilian Government incorporated. We continue to work closely with the United States Government, but also with the Saudi and Emirati Governments.

[Lord Chidgey (LD)]

My Lords, civilians are being killed close to military headquarters by soldiers in uniform. Journalists are being expelled on the orders of men in uniform. Supplies are being looted by men in uniform. I think we are getting the message that the military leaders look more and more like the regime they claim to have overthrown. Yesterday, the Transitional Military Council arrested opposition leader Yasir Arman and are holding him in an unknown location. Surely action is now vital through the African Union suspending Sudan, while condemning the massacre; through convening an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council to force Russia and China’s hand; by beginning a process to prevent the TMC from representing Sudan in the General Assembly; and through insisting on the immediate release of Yasir Arman. Does the Minister agree that, without these actions, words of remorse, regret or disapproval are merely feckless and expedient measures?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

I agree with the noble Lord, and assure him that with the United Nations—in terms of the Security Council in New York and the Human Rights Council in Geneva—the United Kingdom as a penholder is taking these responsibilities very seriously. I am in discussions with our ambassadors in both places to see what next steps we can take. On the Security Council, we are co-penholders with Germany and will continue our discussions. The troika is focused on these issues, and, as I said in an earlier answer, we are impressing on the Sudanese authorities—including the ambassador in the United Kingdom—that all options are on the table, including looking at the current sanctions policy. Those who are culpable will be held to account.

Attacks on Journalists

Lord Chidgey Excerpts

Tuesday 14th May 2019 Grand Committee

Asked by

[Lord Chidgey]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what is their assessment of the effectiveness of national and international measures to curb attacks on journalists and the media generally.

[Lord Chidgey (LD)]

My Lords, shortly after the London CHOGM, I was approached by the Commonwealth Journalists Association—the CJA. It briefed me on its work on Commonwealth principles on freedom of expression and the role of the media in good governance. It was concerned that, despite its efforts to gain a commitment to enshrine Commonwealth media principles in the final CHOGM communique, no consensus could be found among the Commonwealth Heads of State. With more than 100 journalists killed in eight Commonwealth countries between 2006 and 2015, mostly with impunity, there was a strong call for the UK, as chair-in-office, to build that consensus to ensure that the principles relating to the role of the media in good governance are considered at the Rwanda CHOGM in 2020, in accordance with the Commonwealth fundamental values. The promotion of accountable Governments, as well as independent media, can be successful only if political participants show leadership in safeguarding those democratic standards. The CJA set of principles drew on existing Commonwealth declarations, international commitments and soundings with experts from many countries. What progress has been made since CHOGM in achieving a consensus among Commonwealth Heads of State on freedom of expression?

To understand the extent of press and media persecution, just refer to the reports of Reporters Without Borders. Its World Press Freedom Index evaluates the state of journalism in 180 countries and territories every year. For 2019, the index shows how hatred of journalists has degenerated into violence, contributing to an increase in fear. An intense climate of fear has been triggered, which is prejudicial to a safe reporting environment. The hostility towards journalists expressed by political leaders incites increasingly serious and frequent acts of violence. Norway is ranked first in the index for the third year running. The UK has improved slightly from last year’s 40th position, while the USA has slipped from 45th to 48th. Many authoritarian regimes have fallen in the index. Only 24% of the 180 countries are classified as “good”, compared to 26% last year. Threats, insults and attacks are now part of the occupational hazards for journalists in many countries. What measures are the Government taking to accelerate the rather mediocre position of the UK and to lift the country into the top echelons of European nations?

Punish the Crime not the Truth: Highlights from the 2018 UNESCO Director-General’s Report on the Safety of Journalists and the Dangers of Impunity makes grim reading. Some 94% of all killings were of local journalists covering local stories. Nearly one quarter of killed journalists were freelancers, widely considered to be more vulnerable, frequently working alone without media staff back-up. In 2016-17, a journalist was killed every four days; the total reached 182. Impunity for these crimes remained a huge challenge. Of the 1,010 killings recorded by UNESCO in the past 12 years, only 115 were followed by a judicial procedure, leaving 89% unresolved. The overall effect is to impede progress towards “public access to information” and “fundamental freedoms”, an agreed target in SDG 16.10. UNESCO stresses that increasing the safety of journalists worldwide and combatting impunity for crimes committed against them requires a concerted effort of all stakeholders. What measures are the Government proposing for that aim in their freedom for the media campaign?

In 1993, 3 May was established as World Press Freedom Day, in response to a call by African journalists who in 1991 had produced the Windhoek declaration on media pluralism and independence. This year, the day took place under the theme “Media for Democracy: Journalism and Elections in Times of Disinformation,” aimed at highlighting the current challenges faced by the media in elections. What were the outcomes of those deliberations and what actions were agreed to tackle these issues collectively?

In November 2018, the Foreign Secretary, writing in the Evening Standard, said that defending a free media must be a central element of British foreign policy and outlined the links between a free media, good governance and defeating corruption. He wrote:

“Hard evidence shows a striking overlap between the countries with the least corruption and the countries with the freest media”.


The Foreign Affairs Committee in the other place is undertaking an examination of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and global media freedom following the Foreign Secretary’s statement. Written evidence from the BBC and the National Union of Journalists is now in circulation. The NUJ has produced a comprehensive 83-point statement, concluding with a request that the previous Foreign Secretary’s £l million scheme to boost press freedom be published—assuming that it has been launched and is still operating. Will this be done?

The BBC World Service produced a comprehensive written submission to the committee with an overview of particular concerns for their Persian journalists and their families. The BBC points out that it remains the most trusted global news provider, with its news services reaching more people than ever, some 347 million. I can confirm from my experience in years gone by that whenever you are in a country where there is a problem, with riots or whatever, it is the BBC news service you turn to first. Will the Government work closely with the BBC in its quest to preserve, maintain and expand free media globally? The Foreign Secretary stated that his aim was to bring together the countries which believe in the cause of defending a free media in order to mobilise a consensus behind the protection of journalists, with Britain as the chain that links the nations who share our values, by alerting public opinion and imposing a diplomatic price as an incentive. Does the Minister agree? Does the Foreign Secretary propose to start with Commonwealth countries who share the Commonwealth values of freedom of speech and expression but have yet to sign up to them post-CHOGM? Would that work?

The Foreign Secretary also cited work undertaken by the Government and British embassies to support media freedom worldwide. He announced £8.5 million funding for essential work in Eastern Europe and Central Asia to lead the struggle against propaganda and the misuse of the internet. Can the Minister be more specific about what this work entails? There has been much comment in recent weeks about the engagement of contractors from Asian countries, China in particular, in work of this nature, which is, I imagine, not something we wish to encourage.

In Addis Ababa on 3 May—World Press Freedom Day—the Foreign Secretary announced a new Chevening fellowship programme for 60 media professionals across Africa. It will focus on promoting and protecting media freedom and improving the safety of journalists. As an extension of the much-admired Chevening scholarship programme, this has to be all to the good, provided that the scholarship programme is not diluted to fund these fellowships, as has happened with ventures of a similar nature in the past. Can the Minister give an assurance that the fellowships will be funded with new money and not by syphoning funds from existing budgets of the Chevening scholarship programme?

Finally, we should welcome the initiative of appointing Amal Clooney as the United Kingdom’s first special envoy on media freedom and chair of a new panel of legal experts in April. The timing attracted some cynicism, as it came within hours of Wikileaks warning about the potential expulsion and likely arrest of Julian Assange, but that is no matter. It so happens that I had the opportunity to talk with officials, and latterly Mrs Clooney, at some length in February. I was clear that the Clooney Foundation for Justice, and TrialWatch can provide a new initiative in cases where courts are being used as tools of oppression against government critics and minorities. While it was clear that this would not be a campaigning programme, there was interest in liaising with parliamentarians engaged with these wider issues, for example, by jointly contributing to media freedom events organised by the All-Party Parliamentary Groups on the Commonwealth and on Africa. Will the Minister agree to meet me at a later date to explore the potential scope of this initiative?

Nigeria: Fulani

Lord Chidgey Excerpts

Thursday 9th May 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My noble friend is quite right to point out the extensive level of support. I assure her that our work in Nigeria represents, I believe, the fifth-largest DfID support programme and our second largest in Africa. Various organisations are engaged on a series of initiatives; whether we are talking about schoolchildren, teacher training or building community capacity, we are working at all levels. When my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary visited Nigeria, he went to Maiduguri and saw directly how the UK is contributing to a programme for Nigeria to fight against terrorism. Again, we have emphasised the importance of the British Government standing in support of all initiatives. We are working with a raft of organisations on the ground and I will write to my noble friend in that respect.

[Lord Chidgey (LD)]

My Lords, in answering the Question that I put to the Minister last December, he said that the development of policies and plans with European partners to address the escalation of violence and deaths in Nigeria was “work in progress”, and that the Nigerian Government were planning to introduce a Bill to address the events that have occurred between the Fulani and the farmers. Can he confirm what progress has been made in developing these policies and plans with our European partners since then, and advise how much, if any, of the £150 million of new British aid announced by the Foreign Secretary will be allocated to these projects?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

The noble Lord is correct to ask that question. Progress is being made; obviously, the election in Nigeria may have caused certain things to come to a halt but there has been a renewed focus. I have already referred to the vice-president’s initiative. On the Bill that the noble Lord refers to, we are providing direct assistance to the communities affected. Consideration is currently being given to that very Bill, which will look at, for example, grazing reserves, routes and cattle ranches, to ensure that we can address the issue of land in Nigeria.

Syria (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Lord Chidgey Excerpts

Thursday 9th May 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Northover (LD)]

I thank the Minister for introducing these SIs in somewhat more detail than he introduced the last set. I think he was in a considerable hurry last time, which we all appreciated. If we leave the EU, we need to incorporate into UK law the sanctions regimes we have as an EU member. These reflect our support for the rules-based international order to which he has referred.

There has to be a concern that we may lose influence in this field in the future. When we acted as part of the EU we had greater effect and are credited with playing a leading role. If we end up outside the EU, we lessen our effect. I am sure the noble Lord knows that, even if he is not willing to admit it. In addition, there will be new pressures on the UK from allies such as the US, which may wish us to align more with them, and maybe from the City of London, which may not wish us to take certain actions. Maybe our own economic short-term interest will mean that we are less keen to sanction those who may bring their funds to the UK. That is a completely predictable situation.

We considered a series of sanctions regimes last week and we now come to another set. I am grateful once more that my noble friend Lord Chidgey will deal with Zimbabwe.

On chemical weapons, I note that, in answer to a recent Written Question, Sir Alan Duncan stated:

“The UK played a key role in EU efforts to establish a new Chemical Weapons sanctions regime, which was adopted on 15 October 2018”.


This is a case in point. Will the EU be as proactive as it was without the United Kingdom there?

On 21 January this year, the EU added nine individuals and one entity to the regime, which included those involved in the use of chemical weapons in Syria and members of Russia’s main intelligence directorate deemed responsible for the Salisbury attack in March 2018. Sir Alan referred to, “This strong collective action”. Does the Minister agree that “collective” is key?

Sir Alan also stated on 7 February, in response to a Question from my honourable friend Jo Swinson:

“The UK has actively supported proposals for three new EU thematic sanctions regimes in order to strengthen our international resilience to hybrid threats. These regimes are in different stages of development in the EU”.


These included the chemical weapons regime. The second was a mandate for work on EU cyber sanctions, and the third followed a Dutch initiative to establish a regime on global human rights. All are important developments but, having supported them, the UK is of course in danger of no longer being able to play such a leading role. Can the Minister update us on how these three strands will be taken forward and what part we might play in them?

On Belarus, the measures include an arms embargo, financial and immigration sanctions, and restrictions on goods or technology that may be used for internal repression, as the Minister has laid out. The Explanatory Memorandum states:

“This sanctions regime is aimed at encouraging the Government of Belarus to respect democratic principles and institutions, the separation of powers and the rule of law in Belarus, refrain from actions, policies or activities which repress civil society in Belarus”.


The EU is calling for the proper investigation and institution of criminal proceedings against those responsible for the disappearances of four named people, and for Belarus to comply with international human rights law and to respect human rights. What effect does the Minister think the sanctions are having in bringing any change in Belarus? Are there any plans to extend or limit sanctions against Belarus? I note that some were removed in 2016.

The stated aim of the Syria sanctions regulations is to deter the Syrian regime from,

“actions, policies or activities which repress the civilian population”,

and to encourage a negotiated political settlement to end the conflict. The sanctions against Syria have been in place since December 2011. They are reviewed annually and the next review will be on 1 June—just coming up.

The sanctions comprised an oil embargo imposed in September 2011, restrictions on trade, a freeze of Syrian central bank assets, export restrictions on arms, weapons and equipment that might be used for internal repression, and a ban on export of equipment and technology for the monitoring or interception of internet or telephone communications.

In April 2013, the EU eased the oil embargo to allow oil exports and oil equipment exports to areas under opposition control to help the civilian population. As of March 2019, 277 Syrians are targeted by a travel ban and an asset freeze. Seventy-two entities are targeted by an asset freeze. Will the UK abide by the results of any EU sanctions review? Is there any plan to share intelligence on such matters? How is the review into oil sanctions to be conducted? What kind of impact assessment was made of sanctions on the civilian population? What actions must the Syrian regime take to get sanctions lifted? Has consideration been given to the difficulties of international development NGOs working in Syria, an issue discussed in the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill? However, I note that the much-respected former FCO Minister, the right honourable Alistair Burt, emphasised in the Commons,

“the importance of the roll-over of these sanctions, in particular in relation to Syria”.

He expressed his concern that there was,

“a risk of Syria becoming almost a forgotten conflict because it is no longer on the front pages and it needs to be”.—[Official Report, Commons, 29/4/19; cols. 78-79.]

He is surely right.

I hear what the Minister said about the sanctions in relation to Russia. I note that the Commons has not debated these and he has given some explanation of why they were separated and not put forward with the others. As he said, the EU sanctions against Russia broadly relate to the aim of bringing about Russian policy change on Ukraine. They followed restrictive measures after Russia’s actions in Crimea. These regimes are reviewed regularly, two on a six-monthly basis and one annually. How will we play a part in that, and will we follow what the EU decides?

The sanctions regime was most recently strengthened in March 2019, when eight Russian officials were added to the sanctions list after escalation in which Russian forces took Ukrainian sailors into custody. The EU has called for the release of the sailors and their ships, as well as free passage for all ships through the straits in the future. The US and Canada have also adopted similar sanctions in response to the incident. There are currently 170 persons and 44 entities from Russia on the EU’s sanctions list. This will next be reviewed in September 2019. The assets of individuals responsible for misappropriating Ukrainian state funds have also been extended until March 2020. All these review dates will be important for the United Kingdom. Where will we fall in our reaction to those? Do the Government anticipate remaining in line with the EU? Since March 2015, EU leaders have aligned—or sought to align—the economic sanctions with the implementation of the 2015 Minsk agreements but these have not been implemented and many political commentators think it unlikely that they will have an effect. What are the implications for the sanctions regime? The US has generally imposed a harsher sanction regime on Russia and dealt with other issues, such as interference in the 2016 US presidential election. We have not become involved in those. Does the Minister think that we might align ourselves on them too?

The general effectiveness of sanctions against Russia has been contested. Some have argued that Russian actions demonstrate the failure of EU sanctions to influence Putin and Russian policy. The Minister referred to the separate Magnitsky provisions put into the sanctions Bill by the Commons but there is no sign of them there. The Minister made brief reference to that and said that they might be brought forward when parliamentary time allows. Given that parliamentary time clearly does allow, might they be brought forward sooner rather than later?

In conclusion, we support these SIs, but are concerned about exactly how we will liaise with the EU down the track, how we align ourselves, and how we will have most effect in the future.

[Lord Chidgey (LD)]

My Lords, the sanctions regime is aimed at encouraging the Government of Zimbabwe and anyone else involved in human rights abuses to respect, as the Minister said, democratic principles and institutions and the rule of law; to refrain from actions, policies and activities which repress civil society in Zimbabwe; and to comply with international human rights law and respect for human rights. There has not been much sign of that in recent months. I note from the Minister’s remarks that there will be scope for the UK to update the sanctions in time, so I will just put down a few markers in advance.

Burma (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Lord Chidgey Excerpts

Wednesday 1st May 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Chidgey (LD)]

My Lords, I am delighted to thank the Minister for opening the debate and for giving me the opportunity to contribute and talk about Guinea-Bissau, which lies in an incredibly complex part of Africa, given its history and the influences placed on it, not just by western, European colonialists but by Asia, by religion and by their own ethnic empires in the region. It is a real melting pot. The point is that here we are in the 21st century looking at sanctions on Guinea-Bissau specifically to try to influence the way it relates to the values we believe to be absolutely fundamental in a modern state.

We have to take into account that the political evolution of Guinea-Bissau, before and after independence, has been as troubled and turbulent as that of any country in the region. The armed rebellion against Portugal, the colonial power, began in 1956 with the support of Cuba and the Soviet Union—and China, which was almost unheard of in those days. Meanwhile, in the neighbouring Republic of Guinea, or Guinea Conakry, Ahmed Sekou Toure’s Government were choosing not to join de Gaulle’s post-colonial French community. This resulted in the immediate withdrawal of all French investment and assistance, creating an economic crisis. In the 1980s, I gained first-hand knowledge of the results of that situation.

Sekou Toure’s soldiers crossed into Guinea-Bissau to join the rebels fighting the Portuguese, and the rebels gradually took control of the country. In 1970, the Portuguese organised an attempted coup in Guinea Conakry, with the aim of releasing their troops captured in the fighting in Guinea-Bissau and then held in appalling prison camps just outside Conakry. They succeeded and withdrew, leaving the exiled Guinean troops they had accompanied to fight on alone. Those troops failed to reach the radio station in Conakry in time to prevent a warning being sent to Sekou Toure, the President, thus allowing him to evade capture and certain execution. Following independence, the ruling party in Guinea-Bissau massacred hundreds of thousands of local soldiers who had fought alongside the Portuguese. In Guinea Conakry, over 50,000 people were killed in massive purges. A third of the population fled to neighbouring countries and all French citizens were banished.

Against this background, the introduction of democratic elections in Guinea-Bissau in 1994 was almost bound to end in failure, culminating as it did in civil war. It is a matter of record that, since 1998, Guinea-Bissau has had 10 Prime Ministers and three elected Presidents, none of whom has been allowed to complete their mandate. Four chiefs of general staff of the armed forces have been removed by the military, two of whom were assassinated by fellow officers. With the latest crisis also being marked by military intervention, it is no wonder that, in December 2018, the UN Security Council warned that unless political actors in Guinea-Bissau demonstrate renewed good faith to hold,

“genuinely free and fair elections”,

the country is set to face a continuing cycle of instability.

According to the UN’s deputy special representative, David McLachlan-Karr, the recent elections were a very positive result for people, heralding the dawn of a new chapter for democracy in Guinea-Bissau. I note that in the SI, however, the Government acknowledge that the democratic process in the Republic of Guinea-Bissau remains uncertain. The SI needs to promote the rule of law and good governance and seek to prevent threats to democratic principles, and the Government plan to continue to hold Guinea-Bissau to account for any action that undermines the peace, security or stability of the country. This of course is very commendable, and much to be welcomed and supported.

We understand that the identity of designated persons targeted by the SI cannot be revealed in advance, to limit the opportunity for them to remove assets from the UK. However, if the Minister could advise us, it would be helpful to know the scale of the assets considered and an approximation of the number of designated persons there might be, given that Guinea-Bissau’s population is well under 2 million. Are they resident in Guinea-Bissau? Are there conspiracies of organised crime involved? How do the Government expect to monitor their activities and respond to their actions?

[Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)]

My Lords, I too welcome the Minister’s introduction to these SIs, and his brevity. I also welcome the contributions from other noble Lords that related to policy issues. Whenever we talk about sanctions, there is a reason for them, and those reasons need to be clearly expressed. I therefore welcome the contribution of all noble Lords in that regard.

I shall raise specific points that arise primarily from the discussion in the other place, in particular on the Magnitsky clause and the question of human rights. During the passage of the sanctions Bill, we had a detailed debate on human rights, and it was this House that pushed for amendments to include that as a primary reason for sanctions. The Magnitsky clause is an opportunity to expand the scope of the impact of our sanctions.

In the other place, we heard quite a few reasons why we were not going to see anything on the Magnitsky clause in these SIs. It was a bit confusing. The reasons given included that we cannot act too rapidly, and that we have had various pieces of legal advice. Sir Alan Duncan also said that we have about 3,000 statutory instruments to get through, and that there is a risk of constant legal challenge. A different explanation seems to have been given by the Permanent Under-Secretary and the Foreign Secretary. When pushed, the Government seem to be arguing that we cannot do this because we are operating within the EU framework and cannot act independently. Yet we know that there are EU countries that have exactly those provisions—Estonia and Lithuania, to name two—where individual Russians who have committed human rights abuses are specifically named.

If Sir Alan Duncan, the Minister, is saying that that action is not consistent with the Government’s legal advice, perhaps the noble Lord the Minister can tell us exactly how and when it might fit properly within the implementation period. When pressed, Sir Alan Duncan said that it was difficult to forecast—that seems to be the position of the Government at the moment on this uncertainty. When pushed again, he said that it would be as soon as was practicable. That sounds like quite a short timeframe to me, because it ought to be practicable to do this. I hope the noble Lord will be more precise than the Minister in the other place.

I want to focus on the following questions. What are sanctions for? How do we measure their effectiveness? We have had previous debates on sanctions, and often we get a report from the Government which says that sanctions are effective because they have stopped X, Y and Z. We then have to ask ourselves what impact they are having: are they actually influencing the people committing all these things?

The noble Lord, Lord Alton, is absolutely right. Stopping military leaders means stopping those who control not only the policy of Burma but the economy of Burma. We are not talking about individuals who simply have a role in government. Their influence and the way they have exploited the economy of Burma goes well beyond their military role. We need to address that. The idea that we should simply stop them going on a shopping trip beggars belief.

Sudan

Lord Chidgey Excerpts

Tuesday 30th April 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, I think we have learned the lessons of previous engagements. As far as Sudan is concerned, my noble friend will be aware that the United Kingdom is one of the troika of nations—together with the US and Norway—which have been leading the diplomatic engagement. Aside from Bashir, we have dealt with other members of the Administration, and I assure the noble Lord that we are working with, for example, the forces of the Declaration of Freedom and Change, which is made up of professionals, trade unionists and other civil society leaders. During the time of Bashir’s regime too, we dealt directly with civil society leaders who have played an important role in ensuring that all communities in Sudan, most notably the persecuted Christian communities, see their rights being restored.

[Lord Chidgey (LD)]

My Lords, western Governments have supported the forces of freedom and change, but Sudan’s key Gulf lenders back the military council, while African states have called for more time for the army to hand over power to civilians. There are wider issues coming into play, such as Sudan’s support for the Saudi-led coalition war in Yemen, the deepening economic crisis and the call for Sudan to join the International Criminal Court, with the repercussions of that, but surely the priority has to be the ongoing humanitarian challenge. What assistance are the Government mobilising, particularly to address the food crisis and malnutrition in Darfur and the Kordofans? What plans do the Government have to address the expected increase in returnees to South Kordofan and Blue Nile, putting pressure on already stretched resources?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

The noble Lord is right to raise the issue of humanitarian aid. The two regions he mentions are exactly where aid is currently being directed. He mentioned the broader issue of other partners. We are working very closely with the African Union and we have also engaged directly with the Emirati Foreign Minister and the Saudi Foreign Minister, Mr Jubeir, on the situation; my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary has had calls with both of them. It is my understanding that those two countries have already pledged £3 billion of humanitarian aid.

Zimbabwe

Lord Chidgey Excerpts

Thursday 31st January 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Chidgey (LD)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, on securing this debate at such an appropriate time. He referred to neighbouring countries that I, too, know fairly well, including not just Zambia but Botswana. There is a hub of countries which we can compare with Zimbabwe.

Reading a blog from an expatriate Zimbabwean returning to his country from Cape Town reminded me of the times when my organisation had thriving design offices in burgeoning Bulawayo and Harare. I shall quote the anonymous blogger:

“Once upon a time, my country was one of the most developed in Africa, with an envied infrastructure and education system. It was … blessed with abundant mineral resources, well-educated people, and regarded as Africa’s bread basket”.


The city streets were well maintained and people took pride as they walked around the centres of Bulawayo and Harare, which were free from hustlers and street vendors. He went on to write that,

“things started changing ... The roads are rutted … and full of potholes. The struggle is real as people’s stories tell of hardship, deepening poverty and unemployment. The youths standing on street corners … drug use. Communities are falling apart … Life has become survival of the fittest ... I thought a new dawn had come … Robert Mugabe resigned … The once-proud people are now reduced to hawkers and black market hustlers, yearning to just earn enough for a meal”.

Christina Lamb, foreign correspondent of the Sunday Times, reported that just the other afternoon in Pumula in the Bulawayo suburbs, two girls—one aged 11 and the other 12—were playing between each other’s homes. They made the mistake of peeping through the wall of the police station to see what had happened to their neighbours, who had been locked up. They were spotted by the soldiers, dragged inside the compound and raped in the courtyard.

Rapes, beatings, floggings, shootings and murders, handed out by the army, have become commonplace as a reign of terror spreads across Zimbabwe. In this regard, we must congratulate the DfID personnel and the whole UK FCO team in Zimbabwe on the outstanding support they are giving to the victims. The abuses are the worst seen in Zimbabwe for at least a decade, dashing any remaining hopes that the departure of Mugabe would lead to political reform. Leading human rights lawyer Beatrice Mtetwa states that there can be no question but that Zimbabwe is under military rule—the army is in control.

In response to the strikes in protest at the doubling of fuel prices and the crackdown by troops using systematic and brutal torture, government spokesmen reportedly said that the people had to learn to behave “correctly”. Hundreds have suffered gunshot wounds and more than 800 citizens—possibly over 1,000—have been arrested, often without reason or charge, since the “stay away” protests were called by the unions. The monitoring report by the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission on the “stay away” and the subsequent disturbances resulting from the deteriorating economic and security situation highlighted that on 16 January the commission’s monitoring teams were denied access to, or any interaction with, those detained in police stations across Harare and Bulawayo provinces. Efforts to monitor detainees proved futile.

Nevertheless, the commission has produced an extensive monitoring report on the actions of the police and on the military crackdown and arrests. It reports on the losses of life through gunshots—at least 12—and the targeting of members of the opposition and civil society organisations. It reports on the beatings and arrests late at night, the denial of bail, the excessive use of force and police brutality, and countless examples of breaches of citizens’ rights under the constitution.

There are chilling parallels with Zimbabwe’s history under the Mugabe regime, perpetrated in the past by Manangagwa, reinforced by the demands for personal enrichment by those leading the Government and the armed forces by directing the country’s precious resources into their own pockets.

Over the last 12 months, the UK has given financial support to election monitoring initiatives and has set up a $100 million investment facility for growing businesses in Zimbabwe—the first such initiative for 20-odd years. Can the Minister say whether this initiative is now under review? In April last year, the Government strongly supported Zimbabwe’s application to rejoin the Commonwealth. Are they now reviewing their support for that application, given the fresh outbreak of atrocities?

According to Stevens Mokgalapa writing in the Zimbabwe Situation, lifting sanctions would serve only as a reward to the Zimbabwean Government. President Ramaphosa and the Minister of International Relations, Lindiwe Sisulu, have failed to grasp the repercussions of economic and political instability in Zimbabwe on the neighbouring country of South Africa. They must not reward brutal regimes that gun down their own people in the streets. They should use their influence to defend the victims, not to protect the aggressors. Does the Minister agree?

Finally, the Democratic Alliance in South Africa notes that, given the failure to manage border security, the only option is to stop the problem in the first place. South Africa’s standing in Africa, as well as its position on the UN Security Council, are platforms from which to draw attention to the crisis in Zimbabwe. Does the Minister agree? In that context, can he enlighten us on the outcome of the Minister for Africa Harriett Baldwin’s meeting with the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security and the outcome that she hopes to achieve during her visit to the region?

Sudan

Lord Chidgey Excerpts

Tuesday 15th January 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, the noble Lord is aware that, on these issues of direct engagement, the strategic dialogue allows for exactly those conversations to take place. For example, at the last strategic dialogue in November last year, issues of human rights, including human trafficking, modern slavery, freedom of religion or belief and gender equality, were all raised in a productive and structured way. I assure the noble Lord, and your Lordships’ House, that we will continue to do so and use those dialogues to ensure that we hold the Government to account.

[Lord Chidgey (LD)]

My Lords, the Minister recognised that the largest demonstrations for some considerable time are taking place in Sudan right now, with the same measure of reaction from state security. It is rather disturbing that Qatar, Saudi Arabia, China and even the United States seem to continue to side with President Bashir. Now we have reports that Russia’s mercenary army—the Wagner—fresh from atrocities in Syria and Ukraine, is now seen on the streets of Khartoum, presaging an escalation of peaceful protest into bloody violence.

In the meantime, is the Minister aware that the Mo Ibrahim Foundation reports that Sudan has dropped towards the bottom of its index of African governance, because of its human rights abuses and lack of freedom? Will the Government now liaise with that foundation and work with African Governments, beyond the IGAD arrangements, to protect the well-being of the Sudanese people?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

I will certainly follow up on what the noble Lord suggests. He mentioned IGAD at the end of his question. The returns that we have seen from the IGAD relationship demonstrate directly the benefits of Uganda and Sudan working for the betterment of near neighbours, including South Sudan.

Nigeria: Intercommunal Violence

Lord Chidgey Excerpts

Tuesday 18th December 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

The noble Lord is right to raise that issue. There are many underlying reasons for the conflict in Nigeria but its population growth and the challenges that that poses to the country’s public services, wealth and economy are well known. I assure him that we are working through a series of initiatives with the Department for International Development to provide support in health and education to address some of the challenges caused by the country’s population growth.

[Lord Chidgey (LD)]

My Lords, following Amnesty International’s report yesterday which confirmed that more than half of the 3,600-plus deaths over the past three years of the conflict in Nigeria have occurred this year, what discussions are the Government planning with their Nigerian counterparts about the failure of their security forces? I note the Minister’s comments about the 30,000 who are being trained. Will he also comment on the negative impact that the corruption among senior officers is having on the welfare and security of their troops? Does he agree that it contributed to the recent massacre at Metele, which was not helped by the ineffectiveness in these matters of the ex-general, President Muhammadu Buhari?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

The noble Lord is right that there has been an escalation in violence and the number of deaths in Nigeria in a variety of different conflicts, and it is extremely concerning. I assure him that we have raised the issue at the highest level with President Buhari, who has not only condemned the violence but is investing government time, effort and resource to ensure that he is speaking to the regions impacted and has convened a meeting of the different states. Equally, as I said, we are working with European partners to see what policies and plans can be developed in that respect. That is work in progress. Most recently, we have been encouraged that the Nigerian Government are planning to introduce a government Bill to address some of the events that have occurred, particularly between the Fulani and the farmers in Nigeria. It will look at reforms relating to farmland and private-property protection and at ensuring that agriculture is protected. It will seek to build a positive relationship and co-operation between communities not only in different states but across the country as a whole.