Eritrea and Ethiopia
Lord Chidgey Excerpts(9 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Chidgey
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of recent events in Eritrea and Ethiopia, and of their impact on migration to western Europe.
Lord Chidgey (LD)
My Lords, according to the UN refugee agency, in the first 10 months of 2014, the number of asylum seekers in Europe from Eritrea nearly tripled. In Ethiopia and Sudan, the number of Eritrean refugees also increased sharply. By November, some 37,000 Eritreans had sought refuge in Europe, compared with around 13,000 a year ago. Most asylum requests have been lodged in Sweden, Germany and Switzerland, with the vast majority arriving by boat from across the Mediterranean. Eritreans were the second largest group to arrive in Italy by boat, after the Syrians. An unprecedented number of Eritreans are fleeing their country as refugees, on a precarious journey to Europe as well as to bordering countries. As at mid-2013, the UNHCR estimated that the total population of concern originating from Eritrea was more than 313,000 people, including more than 292,000 refugees and 20,000 asylum seekers.
Sheila Keetharuth was appointed special rapporteur on the human rights situation in Eritrea by the UN Human Rights Council in September 2012. Since then, she has made several requests to visit Eritrea; so far, her requests have been denied. She has nevertheless reported on the human rights situation in Eritrea. In her second report, in May 2014, she confirmed that violations included indefinite national service; arbitrary arrests and detention; extrajudicial killings; torture; infringement of freedom of movement, assembly, association and religious belief, and so on. In November 2014, the UN announced that the commission of inquiry into human rights abuses in Eritrea, established in response to the steep rise in migration out of the country, had begun operations. It is due to report in June 2015.
A common argument from Eritrean pro-government supporters is that the exodus of Eritreans is due to economic pull factors. If this were the case, one would surely expect to see refugees from other developing countries fleeing in similar epic proportions. They clearly do not. On the other hand, there are apparently numerous human rights violations that incite Eritreans to leave the country. In this regard, the indefinite national service and arbitrary arrests and detention, or fear of them, are the top push factors for flight, according to the special rapporteur.
According to reports from the UN Human Rights Council, Eritrea holds many detainees without charge or due process. Some have been in prison for more than a decade. Others have died in detention. Apparently, detention without recourse to justice is common in Eritrea, there being no avenues for detainees to submit complaints to judicial authorities, or to request investigations of credible allegations of inhumane conditions or torture. There is no independent authority serving on behalf of detainees. Furthermore, detainees and family members do not challenge, allegedly for fear of reprisals. The state does not investigate or monitor conditions in detention centres, nor does it appoint independent monitors to do so.
The Danish Immigration Service undertook a fact-finding mission to Ethiopia, London and Eritrea in the autumn of 2014, publishing its findings and conclusions in November 2014. The conclusions of the report differed significantly from the body of the text in its interpretations of the causes of emigration, quoting information from UN agencies that could not be verified by the UNHCR. Supporters of the Eritrean Government have nevertheless quoted the report widely in response to concerns about the unprecedented number of Eritreans fleeing the country. The UNHCR published its concerns regarding the methodology used by the DIS, stressing that information ascribed to the UN in the report was not provided by the UNHCR, as inferred. Information provided by the UNHCR about Eritrean arrivals was not included; instead, the report relied on the speculative statements of others.
In December 2014, the UNHCR published a detailed, point-by-point commentary and critique of the DIS report. It pointed out the absence of any information on regulatory frameworks for the media, NGOs, research institutes and other actors, and of any assessment of the reliability of information from those sources. It is understood that the DIS has withdrawn its report for further consideration. In the mean time, the 17 recommendations made to the international community in the first report of the UN Human Rights Council special rapporteur on Eritrea still stand.
With regard to development co-operation, for more than a decade, the Eritrean Government have encouraged mining and exploration firms to participate in the exploitation of the country’s mineral resources. Although major firms have stayed away, possibly aware of the risk of complicity in human rights violations through the use of national service conscripts, a number of smaller firms have acquired mining and exploration licences.
According to Human Rights Watch, those mining firms are walking into a potential minefield of human rights problems, particularly getting entangled with the Eritreans’ uniquely abusive programme of indefinite forced labour—the inaptly named national service programme. The programme was originally set at 18 months, but now requires all able-bodied men and most women to serve indefinitely, often for years with no end in sight, under harsh and abusive conditions. Some conscripts are assigned to state-owned construction companies, which have a complete monopoly in their field. International firms operating in the country are more or less forced to engage those companies as subcontractors, thus indirectly supporting a system of forced labour.
The relationship between Eritrea and Ethiopia is arguably the most important and volatile in east Africa. The fall-out between the two former brothers in arms initiated a two-year long border war in 1998. Apparently triggered by a dispute over the border district of Badme, the war claimed about 100,000 casualties, cost billions of dollars, and remains the main source of instability in the region.
Fighting ended with the signing of the Algiers peace agreement and establishment of the Ethiopia-Eritrea border commission in 2000. The commission delivered its delimitation decision in early 2002—importantly, placing Badme inside Eritrean territory. Initially, Ethiopia refused to accept the commission’s findings and refused to withdraw to the border that it had established, leaving thousands of internally displaced people in refugee camps.
Ethiopia eventually accepted the commission’s ruling in 2006, but its implementation continues to be the source of severe tension between the two Governments. Indeed, the UN special rapporteur on Eritrea stated in her second report in May 2014 that she holds the view that border issues should not serve as an excuse for the Government of Eritrea to violate the rights of their citizens within their own territory.
Furthermore, a sustainable peace is unlikely to emerge as long as conflict is seen solely in terms of border demarcation. The economic, political, cultural and historical links that bind the two states together should be the basis for a sustainable framework for peace. According to the Royal Institute of International Affairs—Chatham House—opportunities exist for external efforts to foster improved relationships. A fresh approach should involve engaging with each country separately, rather than immediately attempting to promote dialogue between them.
Economic incentives are central to enabling improved relations between the two states, although prospective economic benefits from reopening the border are unlikely to be persuasive, given that they were unable to prevent the war. International engagement on areas of mutual interest could help foster a sense in Eritrea of stable economic sovereignty against Ethiopia’s economic predominance. Waiting for changes of leadership before making significant efforts to engage is, however, untenable, with no guarantee that successors would adopt a different foreign policy.
In discussions prior to this debate, it has been claimed by Eritrean Government supporters that the Eritrean Government now plan to restrict national service to 18 months as set out in law, probably by the end of the year. I have also acquired a document issued by the Permanent Mission of Eritrea to the UN in New York. The document is entitled “Leaked Memo” and claims to reveal Ethiopia’s destabilising policy against Eritrea. It is apparently a translation into English from Amharic of a news item from the Shabait news agency website last February. I would be grateful if my noble friend the Minister could comment on these developments and perhaps give a considered response in due course.
My noble friend will be aware that since December 2014 a number of responses have been given to Written Questions on Eritrea submitted by noble Lords, including the noble Baroness, Lady Kinnock. These have been commented on in the past but can my noble friend provide an update, for example on the outcomes of meetings of FCO and Home Office officials with Eritrean Ministers in December; on EU negotiations on policies towards Eritrea, to suppress the number of refugees from that country; and on the release of political prisoners in Eritrea since FCO officials raised the issue with the Eritrean ambassador in March 2004, considering that since then a new ambassador has been appointed?
Central African Republic
Lord Chidgey Excerpts(10 years ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Baroness Anelay of St Johns
First, I pay tribute to the work of the noble Lord, Lord McConnell, and my noble friend Lady Berridge in continuing to bring these issues before the House. We fully support the extension of the EUFOR mandate, which currently runs until the end of March. The intention is that, by that time, MINUSCA will be up to its full complement of peacekeeping forces and civilian support staff. At that stage, they should take full control. The noble Lord mentioned elections: that is clearly a matter for President Samba-Panza to implement. I know that she is working as hard as she can to get the elections in place.
Lord Chidgey (LD)
My Lords, first, can my noble friend confirm that the UN peacekeepers are briefed not to hesitate to act in compliance with their mandate in rapid response to outbreaks of violence against civilians, establishing that they and not the militias enforce law and order in Bangui? Secondly, can she confirm that the warring parties and their leaders will be held accountable for any crimes that they commit and are on notice that incitement to violence—and violence itself—will be prosecuted?
Baroness Anelay of St Johns
First, the conduct of MINUSCA troops falls under the United Nations rules of engagement, which are covered by international humanitarian law. In the first instance, it is for the country which sent the troops there to hold those people to account, but the United Nations as a whole makes sure there is no impunity. I think that covers my noble friend’s second question. Where people transgress, impunity should not prevail and President Samba-Panza is trying to enforce her own legal systems, locally, to ensure there is no impunity there either.
Nigeria: Boko Haram
Lord Chidgey Excerpts(10 years ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Baroness Anelay of St Johns
My Lords, I agree entirely with the noble Baroness, to whom I pay tribute for her courageous work, not only in Nigeria but around the world. She is right: Boko Haram deliberately targets the weak and vulnerable, causing suffering in communities of differing faiths and ethnicities. It has no regard for human life. We are in continual discussion with the Nigerian authorities to press exactly as the noble Baroness says, and we give as much support as we can in intelligence matters.
Lord Chidgey (LD)
My Lords, the Nigerian chief of defence staff, Alex Badeh, announced on 17 October a ceasefire agreement with Boko Haram. A little later, the presidential aide, Hassan Tukur, claimed that there was also an agreement to release the girls taken from Chibok. However, as my noble friend knows, since then all we have seen are many more girls being abducted. What action can the Government take to help galvanise the Nigerian authorities into some action to protect these schoolgirls from organised rape, forced conversion to Islam and mass murder? What specific action to protect the family members of the Nigerian security forces from reprisal acts can the Government help the Nigerians with? So far, some 7,000 have been killed in this manner.
Baroness Anelay of St Johns
My Lords, there were several important questions in there. At the core of what we do is the care we have for what might happen, not only to the Chibok girls but to others who have been seized. We are therefore most cautious in what we say in these matters. What I will say is that it is for the Nigerian authorities to resolve the matter. We will give the strongest support we can. Since the Prime Minister announced on 14 May that the UK would provide surveillance assets and intelligence expertise to help in the search for the Chibok girls, we have deployed Sentinel and Tornado GR4 aircraft with surveillance capabilities, and provided satellite imagery. We will do what we can.
Uganda: LGBT People
Lord Chidgey Excerpts(10 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Baroness Warsi
I am a supporter of the Commonwealth, as are noble Lords across this House. We are all realistic enough to acknowledge that despite the Commonwealth charter, which was supposed to be a watershed moment, there are numerous Commonwealth countries that do not live by that charter, including in their approach towards LGBT communities. It is, therefore, important that we use the Commonwealth as a vehicle but that we use all other vehicles available to us to ensure that these rights are protected.
Lord Chidgey (LD)
Is my noble friend aware that President Barack Obama has described Uganda’s Anti-Homosexuality Act as odious, and that in June the US Government announced sanctions against Ugandans involved in human rights abuses? There has also been a shift in funding from the Ugandan health ministry to alternative organisations. Will our Government reconsider and follow the lead of the Americans?
Baroness Warsi
I am aware that the United States reviewed its position after the passing of the Act in June this year. They brought forward a number of proposals, including ceasing support for certain programmes, redirecting healthcare funding and reallocating funding for a public health institute. That is the approach taken by the United States. I come back to this: LGBT campaigners say that different approaches work in different places. It is important that whatever we choose to do, we do it in a way that is in line with the campaigning that is going on, is effective and actually works on the ground.
Queen’s Speech
Lord Chidgey Excerpts(10 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Chidgey (LD)
My Lords, in the limited time available, I shall concentrate my remarks on some aspects of international development, starting with the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation. It has helped countries and organisations to work together towards ending poverty since before the turn of the millennium. The legislative perspective began to be organised through the energetic participation of parliamentary delegations, demanding greater recognition for the key role of parliament and legislators in this debate.
There is a growing emphasis on accrual of natural resource revenues, foreign direct investment, taxation, philanthropy and other domestic resources, and thus the pool of resources to be accounted for has deepened and widened. Partner governments and parliaments are now responsible for managing and accounting for the growth of local domestic resources, as well as for external finance such as ODA.
The new focus on the private sector makes sense. Developing countries need jobs and wealth creation. Strong institutions are vital. In the developing world, parliamentary institutions are not only the political underdogs in an executive-dominated landscape; they are chronically ill informed, barely engaged and sorely under-resourced. In fact, capacity is often minimal. Parliaments, the only institutions to hold the mandate of the people and thus at the apex of every country’s accountability structure, do not have the resources to carry out their roles effectively. In fact, the chief constraint to effective development is often the weak capacity for oversight in parliament.
Donors should not, however, shy away from supporting legislatures and instead invest in CSOs as their “development watchdogs”. They should not seek comfort through the idea of stronger NGOs; instead, they should look at building stronger parliaments. Continuing to bypass parliaments because they are weak just further weakens them rather than developing their capacity.
After I delivered the report from the parliamentary forum at the fourth high-level forum in Busan in 2011, parliamentary capacity was included as a key indicator of aid effectiveness in the final statement. However, by the time we reached Mexico City this April, after 18 months of meetings of the committee for Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation—a committee of which our own Secretary of State for DfID was the co-chair—the role of parliaments had all but disappeared. What we did have, however, was the glossy launch of Unleashing the Power of Business, which is a practical road map for systematically engaging business as a partner in development. It professes to be a road map all about partnerships. Set out on the cover are partnerships between donors, between business, between civil society and between recipient governments. Is anything missing? Parliament— the one organisation with the electoral mandate of the people to hold each of the others to account and to demand transparency is parliament. Over eight pages of glossy diagrams, action areas, sectoral roles and examples of public-private sector partnerships, there is not a single mention of parliament—not one.
To be clear, there is a great deal of support for the Government’s initiative for boosting the role of business in aid and development programmes, including from NGOs delivering major programmes, and from the European Commission, which is not exactly renowned as a haven of capitalism, but it comes with a health warning of risking putting profits before the needs of the world’s poorest people. Surely, the major criticisms by the Government’s aid watchdog, the Independent Commission for Aid Impact, of the £1.8 billion economic development programme have to be a major wake-up call. That includes, for example, the need to define and articulate where the programme can add most value and to be more realistic in its ambitions and impact; the need for clear guidance to staff on how to design well-balanced country portfolios that match the goals for an end to extreme poverty; the need better to calibrate and manage the risks associated with private sector development; and the need to work harder to understand the barriers and business imperatives faced by the private sector engaged in development. No wonder the ICAI gave DfID a red-amber health warning. If these were the comments from the auditors on the company accounts presented to an AGM, I suspect that the rather banal response to the ICAI from DfID would be swept aside, with the company’s share price dropping like a stone as unconvinced shareholders fled in droves. However, in this case, it is not shareholders that the Government have to worry about; it is the voters.
Given that private sector development is a top priority for DfID, the ICAI report should be seen as an urgent call for DfID to put its work on hold and start open discussions with a much wider array of CSOs, businesses and parliamentary representatives in the UK and overseas. In this area, as was demonstrated in Mexico, DfID is a world leader and the private sector has DfID to thank for the larger space that it now has in development co-operation. That is welcome in many ways but the welcome will soon fade if, in the process, DfID begins to abandon the aid effectiveness agenda. The private sector must have a role and supporting economic development is crucial, recognising that our 0.7% GNI aid allocation is a precious resource that must be focused on aid effectiveness.
In conclusion, the new approach in the fight against poverty is as yet insufficiently evidence-based. Not all growth delivers on poverty reduction and broader economic opportunities. The ICAI report highlights how difficult it is to know how much money is being channelled into this tranche of work. Establishing proper impact assessments without the benefit of clear transparency procedures is daunting and weakening corporate accountability, with some aid not directly targeted at the poor. The private sector is just one ingredient of many in the mix of inclusive economic growth. Taxation, education, health and a sound institutional and parliamentary framework all play crucial roles. While we know the ingredients, far less is known on how best to combine them. Setting them in the guidelines set up by the aid effectiveness agenda could be a good way to start.
Nigeria: Chibok Abductions
Lord Chidgey Excerpts(10 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Noble Lords
Baroness Warsi
My Lords, the Government accept that this matter has to be led primarily by the Nigerians, but it is quite right that we make offers of support, as we did right from the outset. However, it is for the Nigerian Government to accept those offers of support.
Baroness Warsi
I think, my Lords, that I answered that question in a previous answer.
Lord Chidgey
My Lords, Nigerian Cabinet Minister Tanimu Turaki has said that,
“dialogue is a key option”,
in bringing this crisis to an end and that the issue can be resolved only outside of violence, yet his colleague the government information agency director Mike Omeri has said that authorities would,
“use whatever kind of action”,
it took to free the Chibok girls, and that a military operation with foreign help is possible. Given that the issues surrounding western education in Borno state arise from the Sokoto Caliphate, which fell under British control in 1903, what assistance is the UK considering in finding a long-term solution to these issues?
Baroness Warsi
My Lords, we have been working bilaterally through our regional CT co-ordinator, defence support, the high commission in Abuja, a small British military advisory training team, our own proscription of Boko Haram in July last year and with international partners to find a long-term solution, but I hope that the very clear message that we can send from this House today for those girls—from Abigail to Amina, from Hana to Halima—is simply this: bring back our girls.
Ukraine
Lord Chidgey Excerpts(10 years, 7 months ago)
Grand CommitteeRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Chidgey (LD)
My Lords, I, too, congratulate my noble friend on securing this debate and giving us another chance to look at these issues, which are obviously very serious. Prior to the recent vote of the UN General Assembly condemning Russia’s invasion of Crimea, it transpired that several countries were threatened with retaliation if they voted against Russia. The resolution was passed by 100 votes to 11, with some abstentions, in spite of the threats of retaliatory measures, such as expelling migrant workers, aborting gas supplies or imposing trade bans. Afterwards, a spokesman at Russia’s UN mission denied any threats had been made, saying:
“We never threaten anyone. We just explain the situation”.
To me, that sounds like a Mafioso making you an offer that you cannot refuse.
At more or less the same time, Vladimir Putin’s previous chief economic adviser, Andrey Illarionov, tells us that Putin’s real aim is to create “historical justice” with a return to the days of Tsarist Russia, reconquering Belarus, the Baltic states and, of course, Finland. He warned that Putin protects what belongs to him and his predecessors—Tsar Nicholas II and Stalin.
So what are we going to do? I would like to make just two points in the three minutes that I have. First, I have to say that I agree entirely with our Prime Minister when in the Hague last week he said that it was our,
“duty to embrace the new technique”,
of shale gas to reduce dependence in Europe on Russian energy, calling it a “wake-up call”.
In our earlier debate in this House on Ukraine, I called for the UK to believe the science and not to be persuaded or dissuaded by the politics. Natural gas was the origin of the crisis in Ukraine. Russia keeps Ukraine and much of Europe dependent on gas at prices just low enough to disincentivise fracking of shale gas. State-run media and propaganda continually spread disinformation critical of fracking and supportive of opponents to the process. As the president of the Association of Liberal Democrat Engineers and Scientists, I can say that its position paper on shale gas is absolutely on the button. There is no doubt that for the foreseeable future gas has to be the fossil fuel of choice, producing less carbon dioxide per unit of energy than the others. We agree totally with the conclusion of the Royal Academy of Engineering and the Royal Society that,
“the health, safety and environmental risks associated with …fracking … as a means to extract shale gas can be managed effectively in the UK as long as operational best practices are implemented and enforced through regulation”.
So I ask the Minister if she could confirm in her reply that the Government are poised to remove potential legal barriers to the exploration and development of shale gas deposits in the UK and that the proposed growth Bill, which I believe will be in the Queen’s Speech, will include measures to change trespass laws to prevent landowners denying access needed to assess prospective shale gas fields.
My second point is that the UK must act in the financial sector, not just in response to President Putin’s actions but to restore a somewhat tarnished international finance sector. There has been a stream of allegations from sources in Ukraine that corrupt officials and business people have been laundering their funds through the UK, yet asset recovery has been insignificant compared with the problem. As a director of the advisory board of Transparency International, I am aware that the UK’s banking sector froze less than 1% of some £30 billion that the Russian Central Bank estimates left Russia as the proceeds of crime between 2010 and 2014.
Our financial authority believes that between £23 billion and £27 billion has been laundered through the City of London each year. The Anti-Corruption Foundation in Moscow has revealed corrupt activities regarding the Sochi Olympics and the Transnet Pipelines company, alone worth more than £12 billion.
My final point is that major changes are required if the UK is to detect, freeze and seize the corruptly obtained assets that are flowing undetected through the financial system. Clean up corruption in the City and hit Putin and his cronies where it hurts.
South Sudan
Lord Chidgey Excerpts(10 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Chidgey
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what is their assessment of the progress of peace talks between opposing armed groups in South Sudan and the influence exerted by Sudan on those developments.
Lord Popat (Con)
My Lords, in view of the absence of my noble friend Lady Warsi, it may be for the convenience of the House to adjourn briefly. I beg to move that the House do adjourn during pleasure for five minutes.
The Senior Minister of State, Department for Communities and Local Government & Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Baroness Warsi) (Con)
My Lords, it appears that four of the 11 speakers are not in the Chamber at the moment. We could either adjourn for a further five minutes or we could start and allow them to speak.
Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, I wonder if it would not be more flexible to start and to allow speakers to speak when they arrive.
Lord Chidgey
My Lords, I presume that the extension of time also applies to the opening speech.
While diplomats attempt to find a lasting solution to the long-standing rivalry that sparked widespread conflict in December, millions of South Sudanese are suffering an acute humanitarian crisis. Fighting spread rapidly from the capital to volatile locations in Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile states, fuelling local political battles and inflaming old civil war grievances.
More than 1,000 people were killed during the five weeks of violence before President Salva Kiir and the former vice-president Riek Machar signed a ceasefire agreement. Terrible human rights atrocities have been documented throughout the crisis. Taban Deng Gai, the rebel chief negotiator at the peace talks in Addis, confirmed that innocent people lost their lives in Malakal, Bentu and Bor, the state capitals of Upper Nile, Unity, and Jonglei states. Human Rights Watch concluded that armed forces from both sides have looted extensively, destroying civilian property and desperately needed aid facilities. They have targeted civilians and carried out ethnically based extra-judicial killings.
A substantial solution to the crisis will come only through an inclusive political process that engages South Sudanese communities and deals with the underlying causes of unrest. A political agreement between leaders that does not address people’s grievances, nor clearly invite citizens across the country to play their part in finding long-term solutions, may be a first step. It will, however, prove a poor foundation in the search for sustainable peace.
On 30 December, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union called for the establishment of a commission of inquiry to investigate abuses perpetrated during the conflict to ensure accountability, reconciliation and healing among all South Sudanese communities.
A five-member commission of inquiry was appointed on 7 March 2014, to be headed by former President of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo. The mandate of the commission is to,
“investigate the human rights violations and other abuses committed during the armed conflict in South Sudan”.
I ask my noble friend what actions the Government are taking to ensure that the commission is adequately supported and that it focuses on all its objectives— including modalities for reconciliation—as well as identifying perpetrators of human rights abuses. How are our Government working with the Security Council to press all the warring parties to allow unrestricted humanitarian access across the country, and to stress the need for UNMISS to fulfil its mandate to protect civilians more effectively?
On 30 March, east African heads of state met in Addis Ababa in the latest push for peace. Leaders from the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, IGAD, were called together, even as fierce fighting took place around Malakal. They authorised the prompt deployment of a regional protection and deterrent force that would operate as part of the IGAD monitoring and verification mechanism established to support the 23 January ceasefire. Riek Machar, the leader of the SPLA in opposition, immediately rejected the proposal, saying that UNMISS already had a clear mandate in the country.
The current crisis has its roots in wide-ranging failures of governance, security provision, reform, justice and reconciliation in Sudan. If the country is to move forward, there needs to be a process that is ready and willing to embrace these issues and address these drivers of the crisis. This will involve a change in political participation, not just a power-sharing deal. The peace talks must lead to a fundamental change in the way in which politics is done in Sudan, not just a political power-sharing deal between two leaders, which would be a return to the status quo. The peace process needs to deal with the roles of current leaders in any future Government, including what the appropriate role is for Salva Kiir.
South Sudanese civil society organisations are calling for robust justice mechanisms as well as reconciliation to be built into final agreements. These will need to deal with historic grievances that are not dealt with by the comprehensive peace agreement, as well as those from the newest outbreak of conflict. What are our Government doing as a matter of urgency to ensure that civil society plays an effective role in the negotiations and in the monitoring and verification mechanisms? What political and material support are we providing to help them to fulfil that role? Do our Government agree that the IGAD and international funds must quickly take steps to expand participation in the mediation process and engage representatives from South Sudanese communities, the diaspora and religious communities to ensure that the process is seen, heard and active across the states of South Sudan?
The Security Council received an advance copy of the Secretary-General’s report on South Sudan on 6 March, which it is understood was discussed on 18 March. The report apparently contains a reprioritisation of the core functions of the mission—protecting civilians, rather than capacity-building. In December, the Security Council voted to increase the mission’s military component by 5,500 to 12,500. However, UNMISS is unable to have a broader impact on the crisis and is increasingly seen as partisan by both sides of the conflict. On 13 March in Western Bahr el Ghazal, an area that has largely escaped conflict, youths demonstrated against the force, citing it as working with the rebels.
That same week, the Government of South Sudan openly accused UNMISS, or agents working with it, of channelling weapons to Riek Machar after they found mislabelled weapons in UNMISS-marked trucks travelling to Unity State. There is a strong perception that agents of armed groups have infiltrated protection areas within UNMISS bases and are monitoring who is inside. These perceptions increase fear, anxiety and tension within camps. UNMISS and UN police should expand their patrolling efforts and engage with communities to better control their perimeters and reassure populations.
Do our Government agree that the UNMISS mandate should be refocused on the protection of civilians and away from giving capacity-building support to either party? It is understood that finding additional troops for UNMISS is proving difficult. What are our Government doing to help to ensure that the reinforcements agreed in December arrive in good time?
On 14 February the UN Security Council welcomed the positive bilateral relations between Sudan and South Sudan. President Bashir visited Juba on 6 January and sent an envoy to the South Sudan peace talks. Sudan’s position is critical to the course of the ongoing conflict in South Sudan. The split in South Sudan mirrors the division seen in the second civil war, when Riek Machar and a number of other groups split from John Garang and ultimately received support from Khartoum. The split differs in a number of ways from that of 1991. For example, the Bul Nuer of Mayom County, who comprised the core of the SSDF forces of Paulino Matip and remained allied with Khartoum until 2006, fought with Salva Kiir this time. The core of the rebellion was also from Bor, John Garang’s home territory.
Ugandan forces have been reported to have been fighting alongside the Government of South Sudan in the recent conflict. There is some argument that worse scenarios might have developed if they had not been present. The consensus at the Addis talks and among the international community, however, is that the involvement of the Ugandan army is counterproductive because it has undermined the ability of IGAD, in which Uganda is a main actor, to act as a mediator between the parties.
The 27 September 2012 agreements on outstanding issues between Sudan and South Sudan still lack implementation, and the situation in Abyei has deteriorated terribly. Sudan’s internal conflicts have also escalated, and the international community should make every effort to avoid its piecemeal approach of the past, of following the crisis and taking its eye off the bigger picture. I ask my noble friend what reports our Government have received, if any, of any international actor providing political or material support to the SPLA in opposition. What are our Government doing to ensure that the Government of Sudan withdraw their oil police from Diffra, and that the SPLA and South Sudan police forces withdraw from Abyei, in line with the United Nations Security Council statement of 14 February?
What representations are the Government of the UK making to Sudan about accessing the 25,000 or so refugees who fled to that country from South Sudan in the recent fighting? Finally, I ask my noble friend to confirm, given the complexity of these issues and what I am sure will be the large number of questions put by noble Lords, that she will write to me to answer the questions more fully than is possible in the time available.
Ukraine
Lord Chidgey Excerpts(10 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Chidgey (LD)
My Lords, I, too, thank my noble friend for setting out the Government’s action so far on the Ukrainian crisis.
Notwithstanding the fraudulent and bogus events surrounding the illegal referendum in Crimea at the weekend, one event stands out as particularly sinister. On the 13 March, the Times carried reports that two prominent Ukrainian community leaders in Crimea were seized by police. When challenged as to their whereabouts, the newly appointed Crimean Minister for Information declared that they never existed. Dmitri Polonsky said:
“There is no Ukrainian community in the Crimea, and so there are no missing community leaders”,
using the logic of Orwell’s thought police, which I am sure noble Lords will remember. As the Times commented, this Orwellian logic allowed Polonsky an answer for everything, from human rights abuses, to prejudice, to the legality of the referendum. According to Polonsky, accounts of Crimean Tatars having their passports confiscated by bogus election commission teams were a distraction. As the Minister of Information said:
“Yes, we know about these events … The actions were carried out by Tartars against themselves, as provocations against the authorities”.
As for the gunfire from pro-Russian militias to block access from Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe—OSCE—observers into Crimea, that was just an,
“expression of disappointment by local people”,
who were irritated by the “interference”. Polonsky had no concerns over the legitimacy of Crimea’s new parliament, or that its leader came from a political party that achieved just 4% in the previous parliamentary elections in Crimea.
The referendum result has, of course, effectively guaranteed Crimea’s secession from Ukraine, despite being conducted in an atmosphere of militarist repression, enforced, as the Minister said, by more than 80,000 Russian troops, some 270 tanks and 140 combat aircraft, and despite being deemed illegal by the OSCE, of which Russia is a member.
President Putin singularly declared that the result of the Crimean referendum was entirely legal and binding and essential to protect the population that is ethnically Russian or had Russian citizenship. He blandly ignored the fact that the UN Security Council, as the Minister mentioned, had decided overwhelmingly that it was not legal—yet another example of Orwellian “misinformation”, particularly if it is to be a precursor to justifying an expansionist annexation policy across eastern Europe and Asia.
Should we be surprised? Certainly my own parliamentary interactions with Russian politicians over the past decade would indicate that no, we should not, for a variety of reasons. Meeting the Russian defence committee in Moscow a few years ago, for example, was anything but diplomatic. Their members, all generals in full uniform, faced us across a long table with open hostility. Mind you, that was shortly after NATO had destroyed the government buildings in Belgrade with precision bombing—although as we subsequently discovered when visiting the city, the Serbs viewed that event far more pragmatically than their Russian supporters.
I recall asking the chairman of the committee—mainly in the hope of deflecting the mounting hostility—where they hoped to see Russia in 10 years’ time. The outpouring of emotion was overwhelming, and best summed up as a universal and fervent wish for Russia to be returned to the great power she had been under communism. Thereby, I believe, lies the rub.
A similar meeting with the foreign relations committee of the Duma, which I think that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, was leading at that time, proved equally hostile, with no attempt to follow the courtesies of diplomacy. Their chairman began by loudly shouting and berating the UK for not supporting Russia in its dispute with Estonia over plans to move a memorial in the centre of Tallinn which commemorated Russian soldiers who died fighting the Nazis in World War II. According to the Russian chairman, this was the most important issue in foreign policy dividing Russia and the west. It gave me a good insight into how politics was conducted in Russia at that time.
At a meeting in Moscow around 2005 with the Russian state economics committee, I believe it was—I did not quite catch the full title—we were lectured by a senior economist who, from his demeanour, appeared to be a survivor from the communist era of centrally planned economics. He pointed out that our North Sea oil and gas reserves were forecast to be exhausted within the next 40 years. In contrast, Russia’s reserves could supply the west indefinitely, with the implication that this was dependent on maintaining friendly and, presumably, agreeable, relations. This was close to a decade ago. There seemed to be no awareness that in the capitalist, democratic, free world, with full flexibility in supply and demand, market forces determined these outcomes rather than political dogma.
If we take Putin’s justification for annexing Crimea—that is, protection of émigré Russians, either by ethnicity or by citizenship, justifies invasion of other sovereign territory—to its logical conclusion, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has already said, we start to move towards the territory of the annexation of Sudetenland in the 1930s. On this basis, we will find a number of smaller countries, previously part of the Soviet empire, at risk—not just in the Balkans but in Central Asia, where the Ukrainian crisis has put a number of leaders in a quandary. For example, while nervous over Moscow’s military show of power in Crimea, they are also anxious to downplay that end in the toppling of corrupt leaders of independent states under Russia’s influence. Leaders in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are now more aware of the risks entailed in hosting military facilities that belong to Russia. The largest military land base outside Russia, the 201st Motorised Rifle Division, is in Tajikistan, while Kazakhstan shares a common border of nearly 7,000 kilometres with Russia and has the second largest ethnic Russian population after Ukraine at nearly 25%.
The Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania also present risks of tension between native populations and Russian migrants. Stalin’s brutal policies of the transportation of tens of thousands from the Baltic states to Siberia, leading to mass deaths through starvation and cold and replacement with Russian workers, servicemen and their families, is a well documented part of history. In consequence, in Estonia, 38% of Tallinn’s population is ethnically Russian and 56% speak Russian as their mother tongue. In the north-eastern cities of Estonia, as many as 82% of the population are ethnically Russian. This legacy of Russianisation spreads throughout the old Soviet empire.
There is no credible evidence of threats against Russian citizens, or of an armed attack, or even a planned attack against Russian military assets. Western leaders have repeatedly called for Russia to abide by the terms of the 1994 Budapest memorandum, where Russia, the United Kingdom and America reaffirmed their obligation to,
“refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, and that none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in self-defence or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the UN”.
Clearly, such treaties mean little in Putin’s thinking. If the aggressive approach of the Russian Duma’s parliamentary committees in meetings with counterparts is any guide, it seems that positive action is the only sensible response to the invasion of Crimea.
Without delay, our Government should follow the recommendations set out in the letter of 21 February from Transparency International UK to the Chancellor to prevent the transfer of suspicious financial transactions to the UK from Ukraine, placing money laundering officers on alert, and taking proactive action to prevent money laundering from Ukraine. Following the Chancellor’s positive response to that letter and that request from TIUK, the Government should provide regular reports to this House, setting out actions taken and the results achieved.
Ukraine has already lost the equivalent of almost half its GDP to outflows into offshore accounts over the past three years. Some of these funds have been laundered through the UK, or through UK-linked jurisdictions, with the help of UK bankers, accountants and lawyers. These assets must be identified and returned without delay. The Government must take preventive measures to stop this happening again.
Russian participation in the G8 should be cancelled, its OSCE membership should be reviewed and trade negotiations suspended. Russian membership of European institutions, such as the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe should be revoked and visas and passes issued to Russian participants withdrawn.
In the medium term, the European Union should consider alternatives to the South Stream pipeline supplying Ukraine. The EU should consult with the Norwegian Government, western companies and liquid natural gas suppliers in the region to move forward with creating strategic gas reserves for Ukraine and east and central European countries. The EU should focus initial assistance to Ukraine on clearing its gas debt to Gazprom to reduce its leverage. The EU’s competition case against Gazprom should be accelerated.
The EU and the UK should begin discussions with the USA on changes to the latter’s domestic law to enable oil, gas, LNG, and shale gas and oil to be freely exported. The UK should review its energy policy as a matter of priority to exploit the opportunities offered by the reserves of shale gas and oil, and should be guided by science, not just opinion.
Finally, we should also be aware that the reaction within Russia is far from totally supportive of Putin. The opposition party, Yabloko, states that the position and actions of the powers that be in Russia in respect of Ukraine are a reckless political adventure and that it is unacceptable even to contemplate using Russian troops in Ukraine, while separation of Crimea from Ukraine and its annexation is an error at the highest level. It is calling for the immediate convening of an international conference on political, legal and military issues related to Ukraine and, in particular, the Crimean issues. The prime aims of the conference should be to restore the underlying legal framework in international relations and security, guarantee the integrity and maintain the viability of the Ukrainian state within the parliamentary framework and restore the rule of law in Crimea, observing the interests of Crimea’s population as a whole, with all its component groups, free from repression by political opponents.
Uganda: Treatment of Women
Lord Chidgey Excerpts(10 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Baroness Warsi
The noble Baroness is absolutely right. She clearly shows that despite the fact we have legislation in countries that protects women, ultimately social attitudes must follow to ensure that the legislation can be properly implemented and the values that we espouse are properly seen in society. All of us have a responsibility. Only last week, when I was out campaigning with a particular female Member of Parliament, she was referred to by somebody on Twitter as a “Harpy”. I googled that and realised it was an offensive word, so I quite rightly blocked them.
Lord Chidgey (LD)
My Lords, everyone is clearly aware that this is yet another piece of gender-based regressive legislation in Uganda, which clearly contravenes the accepted human rights norms on an international basis let alone what we may think. With many UK-based firms working and investing in Uganda, what discussions are the Government having about the implications for United Kingdom citizens located there and, perhaps just as importantly, for UK investment policy in Uganda?
Baroness Warsi
First of all, our travel advice on LGBT issues has been clear to inform people that there could be challenges in relation to how they could be treated when they are in Uganda. Of course, we have a strong relationship with Uganda. It is on that basis that we can have these incredibly frank conversations. I think that all noble Lords would accept that every country is on a journey in relation to its issues around LGBT rights. We have had our own such journeys in this country. What concerns me is the trajectory of some of these countries. Unfortunately, they seem to be heading in the wrong direction.