Northern Ireland (Executive Formation and Exercise of Functions) Bill

Lord Cashman Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 30th October 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Shinkwin, on his excellent speech. I think he has captured it all here this evening, and I put on the record my appreciation of what he said.

I shall speak to Amendments 16, 10 and 11. I begin by responding to the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Adonis. I shall first touch briefly on the effect of each before reflecting on their immediate implication and then on their broader constitutional consequence. If the departments were advised not to enforce Sections 58 and 59 of the Offences Against the Person Act, it would allow abortion for absolutely any reason up until 28 weeks’ gestation. It would propel Northern Ireland from a place where it has the highest abortion legislation in the British Isles to having the loosest. In supporting this measure, parliamentarians from England, Scotland and Wales would be thrusting on Northern Ireland a far more liberal abortion law than they think appropriate for themselves. There is simply no justification whatever for this approach.

Setting aside the fact that no declaration of incompatibility was made by the Supreme Court in June—and that even if it had been, it would not have changed the law—the only criticism in the obiter comments was in relation to abortion in two very narrow contexts: first, when a baby is so severely disabled that there is a likelihood that it will die in the womb, will not survive birth or will die soon after; and, secondly, when a baby has the misfortune that the father was a rapist. This would not justify anything remotely resembling not enforcing Sections 58 and 59. Indeed, adopting such a course would be diametrically opposed to the statement by the court that Northern Ireland’s abortion law—Sections 58 and 59—is human rights compliant in prohibiting abortion on the basis of severe malformation.

The amendment is also deeply problematic because of the way in which it would expose people to the risk of prosecution. In the first instance, where these amendments would direct departments not to enforce the law, the law would remain in place. The Secretary of State would effectively be directing departments to make people aware that the law would not be enforced by them—which is likely to result in some people feeling more at liberty to break the law. This, however, would not stop private prosecutions. It is not right that we ask the Secretary of State to put officials in a position where they send out messages that are likely to result in some people breaking the law, thinking they will not end up in court when they will. This would be monstrous.

Amendment 11 is also deeply problematic. If the hope is that officials enforce Article 15 of the Matrimonial Causes (Northern Ireland) Order 1978, the amendment is misconceived. That piece of legislation relates to the conduct of judges, not departmental officials. If the hope is that officials will enforce Article 15 of the order by directing judges, that also will not work because it would contradict the principle that the judiciary is independent and not instructed by the Executive.

There is an even more profound difficulty with both amendments and their attempt to encourage the Executive to dispense with enforcement of the law. In examining them both, one cannot help but think of that very formative period in our history that, arguably, has done more than anything else to give us the constitutional system of government that we enjoy today. The Glorious Revolution was, in part, a response to the tendency of James II to dispense with the enforcement of laws—laws that remain on the statute book. His actions created a constitutional crisis that provoked the Glorious Revolution.

I know that the parallels are not exact. The noble Lord, Lord Adonis, is not a king: nor does he claim to be. He is raising this as a parliamentarian and suggesting that Parliament takes this step. However, I feel deeply uncomfortable about the idea of Parliament sanctioning one law to undermine another one that remains on the statute book. There is a real sense in which effectively he is asking Parliament for permission to overthrow the sovereignty of Parliament. This request is wrong-headed, and acceding to it would be destructive of our laws.

I support Amendment 16, in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, and the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan. It seems to me that Clause 4 is one of the most problematic provisions in the Bill. Although those who secured the inclusion of Clause 4 believe that Northern Ireland’s abortion law has been declared incompatible with human rights, no such declaration has been made. Even if a declaration of incompatibility had been made, it seems that the champions of Clause 4 have completely misunderstood what it means. When a declaration of incompatibility is made, the law is not changed and does not have to change. This point is made absolutely clear by Section 4(6) of the Human Rights Act 1998. The fact that, constitutionally, a declaration of incompatibility brings with it no imperative for legal change is set out very clearly by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, in paragraph 39 of her judgment in the recent Northern Ireland Supreme Court case back in June.

I now turn to examine some of the specific problems with the understanding of how the declaration of incompatibility applies in the context cited by Clause 4. The first specific example of incompatibility is set out in paragraph (a). This statement is problematic for two reasons. First, as I have already noted, no declaration of incompatibility was made; and secondly, again as already noted, the majority of the noble and learned Baroness’s commentary in the Supreme Court judgment also questioned the balance struck by the law in Northern Ireland in two very narrow contexts—foetal abnormality and rape. The commentary did not provide any justification for suggesting a general problem with Sections 58 and 59 of the Offences against the Person Act. Repealing Sections 58 and 59 would result not simply in adjusting the balance of rights in relation to those two specific contexts, but instead would permit abortion on demand for any reason up to 28 weeks’ gestation. The idea that the majority of her commentary suggests a problem with Sections 58 and 59 of the Offences against the Person Act per se is extraordinary. Subsection (1)(b) is equally confusing.

It is plain wrong to suggest that the Supreme Court has identified any human rights problem with Article 6(6)(e) of the Marriage (Northern Ireland) Order 2003. There is a challenge to that provision before the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal, the case having already been rejected by the High Court. To date, however, the definition of marriage has not been considered by the Supreme Court.

Having considered the immediate problems with both provisions, I now turn to the wider constitutional point. It cannot be right to require the Secretary of State to produce guidance for officials that has the potential to critique or undermine existing legislation. The only guidance that it would be proper for the Secretary of State to provide, mindful of Section 4(6) and Section 6 of the Human Rights Act, is guidance that upholds current primary legislation unless and until it changes. For the Secretary of State to do anything else would undermine the rule of law.

Mindful of this I have asked the Minister for an assurance that any guidance issued under Clause 4 will make plain, first, that even binding declarations of incompatibility do not have the effect of changing the law or of creating a legal imperative requiring the law to be changed in line with Section 4(6) of the Human Rights Act; and secondly, that no convention right can negate contrary to domestic legislative obligations in line with Section 6 of the Human Rights Act. Unless and until such a time as the law is changed, any guidance provided by the Secretary of State must require officials to uphold that law as it stands.

[Lord Cashman (Lab)]

My Lords, I speak in favour of the principles outlined by my noble friend Lord Adonis in Amendments 10 and 11, and against Amendment 16. I will be very brief indeed. Basically I am speaking in defence of Clause 4 because I believe that I have listened to a misrepresentation of that clause. For me it is as simple as this: the women of Northern Ireland and the lesbian, gay and bisexual people of Northern Ireland should be afforded exactly the same rights and opportunities as other citizens across the rest of the United Kingdom, and no one should face discrimination based on where they were born or where they now live. For those reasons, I support my noble friend’s amendments, but particularly Clause 4 as it stands.