Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts

2nd reading
Friday 12th September 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

As an amendment to the amendment in the name of Lord Forsyth of Drumlean, to leave out “and to provide full support at ministerial and official level to the peer in charge of the bill for its remaining stages in the House of Lords”.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I should make it clear at the outset that I am opposed to this Bill in principle but, above all, I am opposed to it because it is not an adequate Bill to deal with all the issues raised and does not provide anything like sufficient protection for those vulnerable people who might be persuaded, against their real will, to accept assisted suicide.

I agree with the words in the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, apart from his bold bid that, in effect, this Private Member’s Bill should be treated as a government Bill. That was not what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, said was happening; I am sure that he would confirm that civil servants are insisting on their neutrality being maintained, even when they are looking at the feasibility of the Bill—I see him nodding in agreement. The noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, asks for

“full support at ministerial and official level to the peer in charge of the bill”.

That would put the noble and learned Lord in the position of a Minister. Such support is inappropriate for a Private Member’s Bill of this kind. It does not pretend for one second to be neutral or even-handed.

If the last 27 words of the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, were removed, I would agree with it completely, but he seeks to take the steps that I have just described. Indeed, despite the large resources supporting the purposes of this Bill and the involvement of many experts, including the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, one of our most respected and knowledgeable legislators, this Bill earns a D-minus for its draftsmanship, even after all those committee meetings in the other place. It needs to be dismantled if it is to be an effective and proper Bill, to give it what I would, as a shortcut, call legislative legitimacy.

What evidence is there for the propositions that I make? I will cite two pieces of evidence that emerged from your Lordships in the last two days. First, the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Ramsey of Wall Heath, produced a report a couple of days ago which there is no time to read out. I will simply summarise that, by the calm standards of that committee, its criticism is excoriating. I was on that committee for a considerable period, and I never saw any Bill criticised to that extent. It says that the Bill is simply not fit for purpose, breaking several standard rules of draftsmanship. It is incompetently drafted, after all the time that has been spent on it, with the steersmanship of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer. Then yesterday, the Constitution Committee reported and endorsed the views expressed by the other committee, saying, in effect, that the Bill was not fit for purpose.

We must remember that this Bill would allow a citizen deliberately to perform acts which are intended to cause the death of another citizen. Since the end of capital punishment, no such act is allowed in our law to any citizen other than in war. That is the weight of the change which this Bill seeks to make. We must be given time, the space and the methods to amend the Bill if that can possibly be done, hence my support in due course for the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Berger, which would allow a Select Committee to hear evidence which the Commons committee chose not to hear and would have been very persuasive. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I will focus on the content of existing law relating to end-of-life issues. I do so to make the point that the current law recognises the fundamental importance of autonomy. It rejects the absolute sanctity of life, about which we have heard much from the Bishops’ Benches and noble Lords, and the Bill will introduce greater dignity and greater safeguards than currently exist.

There are two basic legal principles. The first is that you have a legal right to end your life. Since the enactment of the Suicide Act 1961, attempted suicide is no longer a crime. You do not need to satisfy a panel of doctors or psychiatrists. There is no special protection against your relatives. If you are a competent adult, the doctors cannot require you to eat, to have a blood transfusion or chemotherapy, and they cannot stop you going to Dignitas. Why is that? Because the law recognises that it is your life, and so it is your decision, and because the law rejects the absolute sanctity of life.

There is a second legal principle that follows from this, and it is that the health system has a legal duty in some circumstances to take positive steps to implement your wish to end your life. I will give noble Lords an example: the case of Re B (Adult, refusal of medical treatment) [2002] 2 All ER 449. This was an adult woman who was paralysed from the neck down. She was dependent on an artificial ventilation machine to breathe. She wanted the machine turned off: she wanted to die because of the poor quality of her life. Her doctors declined to do so, so she applied to the courts for an order that they do so. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Baroness Butler-Sloss, then the president of the Family Division, granted that order. She said the woman was an adult; she was of sound mind; it was her decision whether to live or die.

Parliament has intervened in this area. We made provision by the Mental Capacity Act 2005, Sections 24 to 26, to allow an adult of sound mind to make an “advance decision” refusing treatment to prolong their life, should the occasion ever arise, and should the person at that time lack the capacity to indicate their wishes.

I have one other example. When Tony Bland, a victim of the 1989 Hillsborough football stadium tragedy, was in a persistent vegetative state with no prospect of recovery and could not express a view about whether to live or die, the Appellate Committee of this House decided in 1993 that because he had no quality of life, there was a legal duty on the health authority to end his life support—to pull the plug. That is what the doctors did, and there have sadly been many similar tragic cases since.

For this Bill to authorise doctors to assist a person to end their life by providing a drug so they can die with dignity is entirely consistent with well-established legal principles which respect autonomy on end-of-life decisions. The Bill contains many more safeguards than already exist. It enables terminally ill people to end their life in a less painful and more humane manner than starving themselves to death or otherwise committing suicide, or travelling to Switzerland.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords—

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I cannot take questions.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

Why not?

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Because we are restricted to four minutes.

I support the Bill. I look forward to debate—including debate with the noble Lord, Lord Carlile—in Committee. Thank you.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

Before the noble Lord sits down—

[Noble Lords]

No.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts

2nd reading
Friday 19th September 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean (Con)]

My Lords, I do not know if I am alone in being frequently asked by people, from time to time, “What is the point of an unelected House of Lords?” I now have the absolutely mind-blowing answer, which is to refer them to these two days of debate on this really difficult subject and the range of expertise which we have heard.

I am speaking because I tabled an amendment. That was last Friday, so some noble Lords may have actually forgotten what it said. It called

“upon His Majesty’s Government, in the light of the 32nd Report from the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, to ensure sufficient time is available for consideration of amending stages of this bill, and to provide full support at ministerial and official level to the peer in charge of the bill for its remaining stages in the House of Lords”.

Despite the differences that we have heard in these two days of debate, there is a clear and absolute consensus across the House that the Bill is in need of amendment and further scrutiny.

I listened very carefully to the speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Berger, and I see her amendment. I am a little doubtful about how a Select Committee—which is not really a Select Committee because it is not going to produce a report; it is simply going to hear evidence—is going to change or alter the noble Baroness’s opinion on this matter, or indeed anyone else’s. However, it means we cannot actually start that task until 7 November, so we have lost some time.

As many speeches pointed out, none of us knows when and how we are going to die; none of us even knows when the end of the Session is going to be. So, between 7 November and the end of the Session, having listened to all the speeches and thinking of the number of issues that are going to have to be addressed, I venture to suggest that four Fridays for private Members’ legislation, unless we are going to completely destroy the prospects of other people with Private Member’s Bills, are not going to be sufficient time. It therefore seems essential that the Government provide time.

I understand why they do not want to do that: if I were in government and in the Prime Minister’s Office, I would be saying, “But that means we won’t have time for this, that or the other”. But this is an absolutely life-and-death issue and it is important that it is considered properly and put on the statute book, if it is to be put on the statute book, in a way that will satisfy my noble friend Lord Wolfson of Tredegar in his brilliant speech. He showed that what we are doing here is making legislation and we should put legislation on the statute book that has been properly thought through, which means that there has to be government time.

I happen to know that the Cabinet Secretary advised the Government that this should be treated in the way that all Private Members’ Bills dealing with matters of conscience are. Abortion, the death penalty and the decriminalisation of homosexuality were Private Members’ Bills that the Government took on board in order to ensure that they had proper time and were properly supported, and I do not—I was going to say “for the life of me”—understand why that should not apply to this Bill, having listened to these two days of debate. I suspect it might be because the Health Secretary and the Justice Secretary were opposed to the Bill—but we are told that the Government are neutral, and therefore I do not see why they should not provide that time in order to satisfy those people who have written to us on both sides of the debate.

I say to the right reverend Prelate the Archbishop of York, who threatened to vote down the Bill at Third Reading, that I hope he will think again about that. The expectations are sky high and to vote down a Bill that had not been properly considered or given enough time would put this House in a very awkward position, for no good reason. Our duty is to scrutinise the Bill, send it back to the House of Commons and ensure that we have the time to do a proper job.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, noble Lords may recall—but I will remind them in case they have forgotten—that I tabled an amendment to amend the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, because it seemed to me that the noble Lord wanted to turn this Bill into a government Bill and give it all the authority of a government Bill, with a Minister in charge, or by putting the noble and learned Lord in the position of being a Minister. However, I have listened to the noble and learned Lord and he has said—absolutely rightly, and I totally agree with him and the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson—that this absolutely should be, and should remain, a Private Member’s Bill.

I have also looked at the potential effect of the amendment to the commitment Motion from the noble Baroness, Lady Berger, who I think has approached the Bill with great energy, superb intelligence and good judgment, and has done great credit to the House. Having considered that and the state of play as it is now, I think it is right that I should withdraw my amendment so that we can move quickly on to other, more substantive matters. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment (to the amendment) withdrawn.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts

Committee stage
Friday 21st November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Berridge (Con)]

I will just reply to the noble Baroness, then, that within the Bill that is not necessary. I have outlined Clause 10. This applies to the people who are verifying in the process, not to the individual. It was not in the Motion your Lordships’ House approved that that evidence should be taken.

To continue, Dr Annabel Price said:

“Pressure has a broader definition of perhaps strong encouragement, expectation or the worry of letting somebody down”.


The noble Lord, Lord Patel, joined in this mini focus group and asked:

“If I were to use the word ‘pressure’ and if I were to use the word ‘coercion’, how would you interpret the two?”


Professor Mumtaz Patel from the Royal College of Physicians—again opposed to the Bill—said, “It is grey”.

Amendment 846 also reflects the view of the Law Society, which is neutral on assisted dying but opposed to the Bill. Kirsty Stuart said:

“I think it is really difficult because there is not a definition at the moment … in the Bill”.


That is why Amendment 846 is based on the statutory guidance principle from the offence of coercion under the Serious Crime Act. I note that the Home Office has recently had to issue 91 pages of statutory guidance on that offence. It seems the courts are struggling with it.

Even if Thomas Teague is right that you look at the dictionary, are we talking about economic pressure, emotional pressure, financial pressure, spiritual pressure, reputational pressure, internalised or externalised pressure, or pressure of circumstances—for instance, no one provides you with a hospice bed? As Dr Suzanne Kite, from the Association for Palliative Medicine, said:

“We know that there are pressures of, ‘Can we afford the electricity for the oxygen supply?’ … Yes, these are issues”


that people face “on a daily basis”. The Bill is silent as to what kind of pressure is meant.

To move from individual sources of pressure, there can also be group sources of pressure. Alasdair Henderson, from the Equality and Human Rights Commission, spoke to the Select Committee about

“this wider issue of coercion or pressure at a societal level or an attitudinal level”

and

“the broader trends or cultural issues”.

He said that

“pressure is not always applied directly by another individual, but can result from attitudinal barriers, particularly around disability, and lack of services and support in society as a whole”.

Could pressure come from NICE refusing you, on value-for-money grounds, the drug that you think will wipe out your metastasised cancer? Indeed, the pressure could emanate from the Chancellor of the Exchequer in her Budget, or from the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, to encourage vulnerable people to take assisted dying, a matter I put to the Government Minister, Stephen Kinnock.

Caroline Abrahams of Age UK said:

“The context again for this is a system in which adult safeguarding is under acute pressure because local government is under such acute pressure”.


The British Association of Social Workers also said that unless these statutory services

“are adequately resourced, that may bend people’s decision a certain way … much of social care is self-funded now. If you are poor and you cannot have access to those personal resources, even more pressure is applied to you”.

I look to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick: how does a medical practitioner sign to say that this kind of pressure—from culture, society or attitudes, or lack of statutory services—is not being put on the individual?

There was unanimity in the Select Committee when we started asking the professionals about training. I said that pressure

“is not defined in the Bill, so I am afraid I cannot help you. We have no definition in the Bill. You are going to need training, though, in pressure. Has any of you received any training like that?”

Professor Nicola Ranger from the Royal College of Nursing, Professor Mumtaz Patel of the Royal College of Physicians and Dr Michael Mulholland from the Royal College of GPs all said no. So we now have additional costs added to the Bill, because we have to devise training in pressure and deliver it to a whole raft of professionals, care staff, et cetera, so that they understand it, in particular bearing in mind the vulnerability to criminal prosecution that exists in Clause 34.

I am going to give the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, this opportunity to shorten Committee proceedings. Deleting “pressure” from the Bill, when it has not been consulted on and has not been subject to pre-legislative scrutiny, would aid the Committee in evaluating the Bill.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, in a group such as this, which has so many conceptual, linguistic and semantic alternatives on offer, it is very difficult to see how a Committee stage such as this is going to help very much in determining a final solution to the matters under consideration. Therefore, it could become very tempting to enter into the nice and easy solution suggested by my noble friend Lord Pannick, to the effect that the Bill is quite enough and provides sufficient protection. It is right to say that the Bill certainly seeks to provide sufficient protection, and I do not in any way attribute anything other than good motives to those who sponsor the Bill, in particular the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

If I could just finish. It has been a long time in this debate without hearing from my side—I want to come on to something that the noble Lord, Lord Deben, said anyway.

The amendments to this Bill are about coercion or pressure. As stated by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, the situation at the moment is that people can go to Dignitas without even proving to a doctor that they are dying, and without any check as to whether there is coercion or pressure, or whether someone is going to inherit their house. They can go, and that is the way they end their life, and they feel it is not worth living any longer. On the definition of coercion, are we really content with continuing the status quo where there is absolutely no check—from a psychiatrist, a social worker, a lawyer, or anyone else—on whether they have been coerced? That is the alternative: allowing the status quo to continue with no checks whatever.

We have to ask, therefore, whether these discussions about definition are really about that, or whether they are about trying to stop the Bill. Perhaps we could discuss whether those who want the wording changed would then support the Bill. If they would, let us get down to discussing that, but if they are never going to, they are wasting the time of those who want it to go through.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords—

[Noble Lords]

Order!

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

I was not suggesting wasting time. I was asking whether, if these changes were agreed, people would then allow the Bill to proceed.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

Before the noble Baroness sits down, I have great admiration for her, but I and many others resent her waving her hands at us. The reason we wish to have the sorts of discussions that I was mentioning was so that, believe it or not, we can make a judgment as to whether we are prepared to support the Bill, or to be silent on whether we support the Bill, or to oppose it at Third Reading. It is unworthy of the noble Baroness to allege that all of us here who are expressing concerns are wasting time. It is not true, and it is what she said.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

I never said that about wasting time. The words did not come; I did not say them. I was asking whether the people who want a better definition will then be able to support the Bill.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts

Committee stage
Friday 5th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

I thank the noble Baroness for her question, and I certainly will consider it, but I think it is important that we have a discussion about what I regard as a compromise Motion, which may be useful in the discussions noble Lords have with the sponsor or those who wish to proceed in that way.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

Would the noble Baroness, for whom I have a great deal of respect, consider whether she is really adding anything at all to the debate by continuing? We can read her amendments; we know the difference between 18, 21 and 25. I and the noble and learned Lord, with whom I do not disagree on the fundamental principle behind the Bill, are both of the view that we should have proper discussion on it and get through Committee in the way that is expected of us as the House of Lords, so when the noble and learned Lord intervenes and says he is willing to hold meaningful discussions, we should do that and move on to the next business.

--- Later in debate ---

The noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, commended a test of domicile. Domicile is one of the most complex legal concepts that we have. There is domicile of origin, domicile of choice and domicile of operation of the law. In my opinion it would be disastrous for us to incorporate such a concept into this legislation, not least because I can have domicile in this country simply because it was the domicile of my parents when I was born. I could have lived my entire life in the United States, France or wherever, but would be able to come back to this country to benefit as a health tourist and take advantage of this Bill if enacted. That is exactly what we all want to avoid. Domicile should be ruled out. I hope that the noble and learned Lord, when he responds, will confirm that.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I agree with my noble friend Lord Pannick. The concept of residence is clearly understood. I recommend to the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, that he might need a criminal lawyer just in case he was prosecuted for doing something wrong. I would be very happy to act for him, of course.

I recommend that all of us who are considering this matter should have a good look, as I have, at the National Health Service ordinary residence tool, which was revised in March this year. It gives a very clear outline of all the possibilities and where they fall in the ordinary residence judgment. What concerns me about the example that the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, gave, which we will come to on another group, possibly even today, is that if somebody has been living in Spain and wants to come back to their former country of ordinary residence for an assisted dying, if this Bill becomes law, it will prove extremely difficult to detect where there has been undue influence, particularly within a family. It would be extraordinarily difficult to investigate that evidence, whether it was done by a court or by a panel. I would be opposed to it on those grounds.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

I also entirely support, including the word “disastrous”, the points that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, made. As he said, domicile is complex. You would end up in court dealing with the issue of domicile. It really is not a good idea.

Under Clause 1(1)(c), there are two requirements. One is “ordinarily resident”. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, that if I was trying the case I would have no problem at all. If it says “ordinarily resident”, that is what I would accept, so long as there was the evidence to support it. I do not think we need to be caught up in the Human Rights Act in dealing with such an issue. What worry me are the two requirements,

“ordinarily resident … and has been so resident for at least 12 months ending with the date of the first declaration”.

That seems to be a complete bar for someone who is in an embassy. It is very difficult if they are not ordinarily resident. It looks as though the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, does not agree.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

I hesitate to interrupt my noble and learned friend, whom I regard as being of almost biblical correctness in almost everything. If she were to take a look at the NHS tool that I referred to, which sets out all the requirements to prove ordinary residence, she would find that people who work in embassies, for example, are excluded because they are given fixed-term contracts for a certain time, even though that contract may be extended at some time. It also specifically refers to people who work for charities and who go to work abroad for a temporary period fixed by a contract. I do not think the issue that she has raised is very worrying.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

I am delighted to hear it in relation to embassies and charities, but the other example given was the person living in Spain who wants to come back to die here. It seems to me that needing to be resident in this country for the last 12 months would not allow that person to do so. The noble and learned Lord might just look again at that particular element of residence.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts

Committee stage
Friday 9th January 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

25: Clause 1, page 1, line 12, at end insert—
“(e) has had their application for assistance under section (Application for assistance with suicide order) approved by the Court,”

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I welcome what the noble and learned Lord has just said, which I am sure will be welcome to most Members of the Committee.

Amendment 25 stands in my name and those of my noble friend Lady Hollins and my noble and right reverend friend Lord Harries of Pentregarth. As is obvious, Amendment 25 is part of a large group. I apologise for the number of amendments and clause stand part notices in my name in the group. I was given excellent help by the Public Bill Office, and many of those amendments and clause stand part notices are simply designed to fit my proposals into the architecture of the Bill as it arrived in your Lordships’ House from the other place.

Amendment 25 is entirely dependent on Amendment 120, which is the key amendment in this group. That is also supported by my noble friends Lady Hollins and Lady O’Loan and my noble and right reverend friend Lord Harries of Pentregarth. I suggest that they are a formidable Cross-Bench group of medicine, the Church and the law, to which all will wish to pay close attention.

Amendment 120 sets out a matter of some principle which, if not conceded by the promoters, will have to be determined on Report. The conclusion on Amendment 120 reached on Report may well affect how some noble Lords will vote if there is a vote at Third Reading, because Amendment 120 is all about the safety of the proposed legislation.

Early in my remarks, I want to mention a very important point that may shorten the debate on this group. The promoters have rightly enjoyed assistance from neutral officials, including parliamentary counsel, in the drafting and structure of their revised proposals. Before we reach Report, or shortly after if successful with the principle I am raising, I am sure that those of us who support these amendments will receive and welcome comparable access. I invite the Minister to confirm that there would be equality of arms in perfecting the proposed clauses and amendments.

The issue of principle is whether permission for assisted suicide should be given by the court or via a panel. The promoters’ original intention was very clear: it was to be a court-based process. But by amendment they moved their choice to the panel procedure that currently appears in the Bill. I believe that they had two main reasons. First, the courts may not have enough judges to deal with the volume of applications they expect. The court in question at that stage was simply the High Court of Justice Family Division. Secondly, it might prove more difficult to obtain permission from a court than from the panel as now described.

As to the judges, Amendment 120 offers a simple and sound solution that I am surprised had not been thought of before. It would broaden the range of judiciary who would be designated to reach these momentous decisions, which involve the deliberate participation of one individual in bringing about the death of another. That a judge should be involved is, I suggest, self-evidently appropriate and what we should expect, given that third-party participation in a death would otherwise involve the offence of murder. I remind your Lordships that murder is defined as being involved in bringing about the death of another with the intent to kill or do grievous bodily harm.

Decisions about whether life support should be switched off are regularly heard by judges of the Family Division of the High Court, as are other extremely important decisions concerning family life, including matters affecting contact between parents and their children. There are, however, only 20 High Court judges in the Family Division, including the president. But, around the country, there are more than 40 designated family judges: specialist circuit judges who deal with the most difficult and important cases. By adding those 40-plus designated judges into the cohort of judges who would decide cases envisaged by this Bill—they were not envisaged as part of the process originally—there would, I suggest, be an ample supply of skilled and diverse expert judiciary, who would provide confidence-inspiring judgment in this important and difficult new area of the law.

The training of judges is very important in this context. The Judicial College provides expert training for all judges, including in specialist jurisdictions. There are those in this Chamber who have acted both as students and tutors in the work of the Judicial College. I add that there is a cohort of recorders, who are part-time judges, who could fill any listing gaps caused by this new jurisdiction.

As to the second objection—that it might prove more difficult to obtain permission from a court than from a panel—I suggest four cardinal points. First, it should not be easy to permit third-party involvement in someone’s death—nor should it be impossible, which is not the aim of these amendments. These amendments are predicated on the assumption that assisted suicide becomes lawful. It should be the subject of a procedure proportionate to the great legal change involved. In some cases, that may make an application more challenging, but those are exactly the cases in need of increased scrutiny and protection.

Secondly, where do we expect difficult issues of this level of seriousness and complexity to be tested and adjudicated upon? Generally, the answer is: in the courts, of course. There is no comparable precedent in which a matter affecting life and death is handed to a panel, even one chaired by a senior or retired lawyer. There are good reasons for that expectation. The court has special powers, which include, importantly, ordering the disclosure of documents, such as relevant correspondence and medical records, and the power to examine in a balanced way the arguments and evidence of both sides of a question, and to make a reasoned decision about what evidence to accept or reject. An example of such an issue might be whether, for example, an applicant is ordinarily resident in England and Wales or the UK—not necessarily an easy question to answer.

The court procedure allows the intervention of what are called interested parties—close relatives, for example, between whom there may be important and relevant issues—if the court regards the interventions as of potential value. Every day of the week, courts consider whether interveners should be allowed in a particular case, on the merits. Another thing that courts do is produce reasoned judgments in which clear findings of fact and law are set out. This is part of the everyday work of judges in every court around the country.

My third cardinal point is the appeal process. An appeal process is well understood and would be available through the courts. The court has a very good reputation for efficiency and prompt action in cases that clearly require it. Where real urgency is required, the courts respond, in a familiar jurisdiction that does not have to be designed from scratch and commands as much public confidence as any process that we have in our polity in this country.

My fourth cardinal point is that courts are familiar with the concept of individual capacity, with hearing and deciding upon expert evidence, and—above all in this context—with dealing with allegations of undue influence. The greatest worry I have about this new jurisdiction is that undue influence, often financially motivated, may feature heavily in some cases. There is some evidence—from Canada, for example—that that has been a real issue in a significant number of cases. Rooting out undue influence after the event offers absolutely nothing in this jurisdiction because the individual whose life is being discussed will already be dead.

The experience of judges, honed in practice in which, from time to time, they all encounter examples of the most egregious and devious behaviour, together with the forensic nature of the court process, promises a reasonable prospect of fair and proper decision-making. It may be of interest to note that, yesterday, we welcomed into our House a new Member—the noble Lord, Lord John—who has spent his legal practice dealing with just that issue of undue influence as a distinguished probate lawyer. That is just an example of the way in which lawyers and the courts deal with these issues. In addition, the recruitment of judges is statutory, well tested and very successful. The recruitment process suggested for the panels has none of those known qualities. Indeed, it is an unknown quantity.

I promise your Lordships that I do not propose these amendments in a way that is intended to undermine the Bill. My aim is based on the presumption that a Bill of this kind will be passed. My amendments are intended to make it safe—an aspiration I know is shared by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer. Confidence in his proposals would be greatly increased by his acceptance of the principles behind these amendments. I beg to move.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Geddes) (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Shinkwin, is taking part remotely. I invite him to speak.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord. If he just looks again at paragraph 5 of Schedule 2, it may be that there is a wholesale ambiguity. Sub-paragraph (2) says:

“Decisions of a panel may be taken by a majority vote; but this is subject to sub-paragraph (3)”,


which the noble Lord has read out. Do those two paragraphs contradict one another?

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

No, they do not, because the majority vote does not apply to the question of whether a certificate of eligibility applies. There may be a majority vote on other issues; for example, whether to have a hearing or to require documents, or something of that sort. But on the fundamental issue—the noble Lord is shaking his head, but that is what it says—a majority vote is not permitted on the crucial, core issue of whether a certificate of eligibility is required.

Paragraph 9 addresses another of the concerns the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, has mentioned. It says, in paragraph 9(1), that panels must—I emphasise must—give reasons in writing for their decision.

Finally, it is not irrelevant—and these were points made very powerfully by the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, if I may say so—that our courts are currently massively overburdened. Of course, judges do their best to hear urgent cases as speedily as they can, but delays are a serious problem in our court system. The Minister will no doubt have something to say about this. When the Committee considers what is the best, most effective and efficient way to address the real issues of independent assessment, it is important to bear in mind that the provisions of the Bill will apply only to those with six months or less to live. To have a system that builds in delays is going to damage the whole purpose of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

On the essence of the amendment, as the noble Lord described it, he in effect says that the expanded number of judges should say “Yes” or “No” to an assisted death. The material they have to work on is the evidence they think appropriate. I think he is saying—I am not clear about this—that the High Court judge decides and there does not need to be the two doctors dealing with issues such as firm and settled view. As I read his proposal, the only requirement for the two doctors is that they have to give evidence or have a view in relation to the terminal illness aspect. That is why he objects to the various clauses standing part which involve the first doctor and second doctor.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

I do not want to take up unnecessary time, but the purpose of the judges’ role is to receive the evidence relevant to the issue under consideration. There are many tribunals, such as mental health tribunals, on which doctors serve, but in my view and that of many, where critical issues are being considered, a more satisfactory process, on the whole, is for the judge to hear the evidence and adjudicate on it. To pick up a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton, as the noble and learned Lord knows, judges are perfectly capable of rejecting medical evidence that is put before them and do so with reasonable frequency.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I take that to be a yes. The position the noble Lord is proposing is that the judge hears the evidence of the doctors on issues, for example, of coercion, capacity and firm and settled view, and then makes the decision. The comparison we have is between what is in the Bill—two doctors each forming a view on the terminal illness decision and the issues of capacity and whether the person has reached a voluntary decision as to whether to have an assisted death, and the panel either endorsing it by giving the certificate or rejecting it—and, as the noble Lord is suggesting, letting the court in effect decide the whole thing. I reject that view because I am absolutely satisfied, although I accept that this issue requires a lot of work and thinking about, that you are much better off having a multidisciplinary approach to somebody making an assisted death decision. It is much better to let the social worker, the psychiatrist, the doctor and the legally qualified person look at the situation and then decide whether somebody should make that decision on assisted death.

The evidence given in Committee—

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

Can I answer what the noble Lord, Lord Taylor, whom I greatly respect, has said? I have answered in some degree of detail the main substantive points and I believe that I have dealt with them in a way that is appropriate for Committee. One of the things that one has to do in Committee is focus on the things that really matter and avoid the other things—that is what I have done. I am open to anybody coming to see me. I started this process by writing to individual Peers to say, “Come and see me to raise anything you’ve got.” If there is anything that they want to talk about, I am more than willing to talk about it. However, I very much believe that I have answered in detail the substantive application made for an amendment.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to everybody who has taken part in this debate. I hope your Lordships would agree that, although this debate has taken over three hours, it has been conducted in precisely the spirit that was discussed in the short debate yesterday and that it has justified taking that time. I said yesterday that I thought we should move more quickly in this process and I believe we will be able to do so in the future. This has been an example of doing so on a very important subject.

May I express my grateful thanks to both Front Benches for the way in which they summarised their particular interests in this debate? I thought both were extremely helpful. For those who have seen my noble kinswoman, the Minister, during the year she has been here, I think they will be reassured and understand that she is perfectly capable of erecting Chinese walls that put the Great Wall of China to shame.

A point that particularly caught my attention was made by my noble friend Lord Empey. He happens to be a very valued member of a Select Committee of this House that I chair and I can confirm that he is an expert in labyrinths. He is an expert in finding his way out of labyrinths and it is just possible that, from time to time, he is quite good at making labyrinths longer— I hope he takes that in good heart. He raised a question about whether, as he put it, there should be a “special chamber”. It occurs to me that, given that the purpose of my amendments is to ensure that this is a judicial process that falls into our judicial architecture, there may be room for the sort of discussion that we talked about in yesterday’s debate with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer. One might be able to find a hybrid form of what the noble Lord, Lord Empey, and I have proposed that falls within the legal, judicial architecture.

--- Later in debate ---

My other concern is that a lot of people who work in palliative care have deep religious beliefs and do not wish to discuss assisted dying with their patients. We have to find a way round that in order to ensure that patients are given options but we do not lose important people from our healthcare teams because they are expected to do something that makes them very uncomfortable. We have dealt with that in relation to abortion; we need to think about it in the longer term. I am not proposing an amendment now, but I really felt that I had to speak.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak very briefly in relation to Amendments 186, 251 and 380, all of which were tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, and two of which are supported by me. The noble Lord has asked me to give his apologies to the Committee; his wife has suffered an accident and he is, quite rightly, looking after her at home.

I know that the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, would have agreed, as I do, with many of the speeches that have been made to the effect that palliative care knowledge must be a prerequisite in any person’s decision-making. There have been many excellent speeches. I simply refer to two as examples: one from the noble Baroness, Lady Brown of Silvertown, and the other from my noble friend Lord Carter.

I represented a constituency in rural Wales that consists of 839 square miles with no general hospital. I absolutely take the point made by my noble friend Lady Watkins that a great deal of the skill and knowledge in relation to palliative care does not depend on there being a general hospital and can be supplied by nurses; for example, those who work in the area concerned. However, it is extremely important that nobody—whether they live somewhere remote, or they live somewhere populous but feel remote—should be deprived of a contribution from, and knowledge of, palliative care before ever making such a decision.

[Baroness Wheeler (Lab)]

My Lords, it is now 2.33 pm. I suggest that the Committee might like to hear from Front-Benchers now to ensure that we can conclude proceedings in an orderly manner, as planned, around 3 pm.