China: Security and Trade (IRDC Report)

Lord Campbell of Pittenweem Excerpts

Thursday 20th October 2022 Grand Committee

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)]

My Lords, if I seem a little overexcited today, it is because, after 28 years in the House of Commons and seven in your Lordships’ House, I have at last been given something on which to rest my speaking notes. I should also declare an interest as the chancellor of the University of St Andrews, which has substantial numbers of Chinese students, who come to take advantage of the education provided there.

In preparing for this case, as I am sure others have done, I read again the terms of the summary of the report. It is almost entirely still relevant, but in almost every dimension there have been substantial changes—from David Cameron and George Osborne and from Hong Kong to Huawei. There can be no doubt that the relationship between ourselves and China has deteriorated.

I propose to adopt—brevitatis causa, as the law would say—the two contributions made by the noble Baroness who was the chair of the committee and, equally perceptive, the address recently made by the noble Baroness, Lady Blackstone.

Of all the differences, it seems to me that the disagreement over Hong Kong, involving as it does the suppression of the terms of its return by the United Kingdom to China by the Blair Government, has driven a horse and cart through the relationship, to the extent that it existed on mutual trust. Indeed, just 48 hours ago, we had an extraordinary feature of that suppression, when a peaceful protest was subject to what one might describe as assault and battery. That, I think, tells us the extent to which the atmosphere which characterised the return of Hong Kong has long since dissipated.

However, notwithstanding all these issues, we need a relationship. Some will seek to characterise it as being a contest between human rights and economic opportunity. The difficulty of that relationship is underlined by the fact that China and Russia make common cause, invariably, in the Security Council of the United Nations, in vetoing resolutions which would otherwise pass.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, made clear, there are several indications of the nature of the relationship between Russia and China, but it appears from time to time that the Chinese part of that relationship is put on its inquiry. I have regard, of course, to the fact that Mr Putin felt it necessary to offer an explanation in advance before what he anticipated might be searching questions from China at the recent summit. There are those who argue that China’s reservations about the military action in Ukraine are greater than perhaps has been publicly expressed. All this suggests that China may have an interest in these matters that is more than that of cheap oil and gas—not least because, with regard to China, anything approaching instability is to be avoided.

There does not appear to have been any material impact on the conduct of Mr Putin as a result of this discussion, to which I have referred and, indeed, one could argue, particularly in recent days with the deliberate targeting of civilians and civilian properties, the conduct of Russia and its forces has deteriorated even further. Indeed, one could argue that, particularly in recent days, in the deliberate targeting of civilians themselves and civilian properties, the conduct of Russia and its forces has deteriorated even further.

President Xi is, as the noble Baroness confirmed in opening our debate, likely to be elected for a record third term at the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. Some have described this as a watershed, politically, militarily and economically but, so far, it does not appear that the ambitions of China are anything other than more of the same, except perhaps more extreme. As far as the leader of China is concerned, his confirmation will give him historic authority and, perhaps, overconfidence, which may explain his unspecified warning of the threat of “grave international developments”.

All of this is coupled with the assertion, to which the noble Baroness drew our attention, that military means are still on the table, as far as China is concerned, to further its ambition to bring Taiwan back into the fold. It is an interesting feature of the personality and ambitions of both Putin and Xi that they share a common interest in the pursuit of territory which, once upon a time, was regarded as being within their influence, to restore it in some kind of missionary approach as being truly part of the motherland to which it should now be restored.

As I said, in the case of Hong Kong, there is more than simply disappointment that the terms of the return of Hong Kong to China have been so badly treated. They were maintained for a period and the conditions followed as stipulated, but it is against that unhelpful background of change that the United Kingdom now needs to consider the establishment of a clearly defined relationship with China. As has already been pointed out, there is far from clarity on that matter, when clarity is urgent. It must be a relationship which does not prejudice our values; it must be a relationship that, from the point of view of both parties, is of mutual advantage. It is trite to say that it will almost certainly not be easy.

Such a relationship would best be viable if it is done with allies—I have particularly in mind allies from Europe. Our departure from the European Union is of course unhelpful in this regard, but it is not prohibitive. Respectfully, it seems to me that this would be an important way of establishing a relationship with Europe in which, thus far, the present Government, have shown little interest in creating.

In any discussion about a relationship, there will inevitably be the issue of ethical foreign policy. I remind noble Lords—because I was there when he said it—that Robin Cook never said that we had to have an ethical foreign policy. What he said was that we had to have a foreign policy with an “ethical dimension”. The truth is that in extreme circumstances, where the interests of the nation are at stake, there might be a move to depart from a strictly ethical approach. I do not believe that that is anywhere near what we are discussing in this debate, but it is important to ensure that an ethical foreign policy is not to be used as a blanket and simply the basis for refusal. It also has to take account of the fact that President Xi is open in his belief that the rules conceived in the years immediately after the Second World War do not reflect the circumstances of 2022. There may be some scope for altering rules, but there can never be any scope for abandoning the principles which lie behind them—principles which are as important today as they were in the period after the Second World War.

Let me finish, if I may, on this point. Our interest and our interests in our relationship with China should not be episodic. This is a relationship, if it is achieved, that will require consistent and continuing review. We would not expect the Government to do anything other than to approach the matter in that way, but in addition to government implementation, there is an overwhelming obligation to ensure that the legislatures—both this place and the House of Commons—have the opportunity to keep responsibility for implementing any such agreement, as I have said I believe is appropriate. The reasons for that are very simple: as the summary says, the issue is complex, and it has certainly changed very rapidly over a short period of time. There is nothing to suggest that these two characteristics will not continue to have an influence on our relationship with China.