United Kingdom Internal Market Bill

Lord Campbell of Pittenweem Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 9th November 2020 Lords Chamber

The surge of fascism and extremism, and attempts to destroy the rule of law, that we have suffered in recent years, had their origins in the failure of the old order. Constitutions in the UK and US do not reflect the will of the people but have led them to want to take back control. If the Government want to be “world-leading”, as we so often hear, they have a very long way to go to catch up with the positive signs of turnaround in the international order. But obeying international law, dropping Part 5 of the Bill, is a crucial starting point, although we need much bigger changes.

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)]

I begin by saying to the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, that I spend a lot of my time defending the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and I fear that the task is made more difficult on an almost daily, or perhaps weekly, basis by the fact that the Prime Minister appears to have little sensitivity to what is happening north of the Tweed.

Towards the end of his comprehensive speech at Second Reading, the noble Lord, Lord True, described the position of the Government as being an acceptable one of balance between the union of the United Kingdom and the rule of law. With that analysis I profoundly disagree. The truth is that the Government’s position and their proposed legislation have had the effect of putting these two not into balance but into competition, one with the other.

I will begin by examining the purported balance that the Government claim to have struck. They claim that, to the extent allowed by Part 5 of the Bill, which removes otherwise incumbent obligations, the Government will have increased freedom to act in relation to the departure from the European Union and, in particular, will no longer be bound by legal instruments that they negotiated as of right and successfully recommended to Parliament. It is worth considering the motive for the adoption of this position. It lies in the allegation by the Prime Minister that the European Union has acted in bad faith and may continue to do so. But, just as President Trump has produced no evidence to support claims of a similar character about the presidential election in the United States, the Prime Minister also has signally failed to support his claims.

Two fundamental questions remain unanswered. Where is the evidence that the European Union has acted, or may continue to act, in bad faith? This question has been posed on several occasions since the Second Reading debate, and yet it has still brought no answer. The second question is: why are the available arbitration and dispute-resolution procedures simply to be discarded? What sort of confidence will any subsequent party to an agreement with the United Kingdom which contains similar powers of arbitration and dispute resolution have if we discard them in circumstances in which, so far as can be established, there is no good reason? If you are asked to judge on bad faith, who would you regard as being more or less subject to bad faith—those who set off with a unilateral legislative ambition or those who stick to the terms of an agreement, in particular involving arbitration?

The truth is that the Government’s reasons for departing from the cardinal observance of the rule of law and the provisions of the withdrawal agreement lack both substance and credibility. However, in assessing balance, it is not enough to look at the flawed motives of the Government’s position: we must have regard to the consequences, actual and potential. Without qualification, I say that a breach of international law by this country weakens, at large, the rules system on which this country has steadfastly based its policies, both internal and external. We are justifiably renowned for our adherence to the principle of pacta sunt servanda, or “promises must be kept”, although I confess that, on some occasions in present circumstances, ignorantia juris neminem excusat, or “ignorance of the law is no excuse”, might be a more appropriate way to describe those in the Cabinet Office who are apparently the authors of the legislation that is so controversial in our debate.

The noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, has dealt with the contribution of the noble Lord, Lilley, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, also did. I will add two observations. First, both Germany and the European Union have written constitutions; we have a partly written one with more flexibility. Therefore, what happens in Germany or the European Union does not necessarily form an impressive precedent.

Of course, at the back of these two decisions, to which reference was made, was the question of necessity. Where is this question of necessity in the circumstances that we are discussing in this debate? A breach of international law, even if only in contemplation, damages our reputation and, more to the point, undermines our ability to hold others to account. It also damages our relations with our allies, damages our wider interests and divides Parliament but, perhaps more fundamentally in this case, divides the party of government.

In response to Part 5, the European Union has taken the United Kingdom to law. Who believes that the action of our Government in respect of the controversial legislation and the response of taking the United Kingdom to law will make negotiations easier for the trade deal that is absolutely fundamental to the economic and trade policy of the present Government? We are not trying to please the President-elect of the United States but to ensure that he and, indeed, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, who have already voiced adverse criticism, may be persuaded to grant the trade deal that forms such an important part of the Government’s trade policy. Not to accommodate their anxieties or understand the importance of the Irish question in domestic American politics is foolhardy, in my view. A breach of international law, even if only in contemplation, that imperils that trade deal is wholly contrary to the interests of the United Kingdom.

However, the truth is that the weight of the argument in this matter is wholly against the Government because there is no equivalence between what they seek to claim by way of legislation and the consequences of such a claim being allowed. The noble Lord, Lord McCrea, who is no longer in his place, referred us to scripture. If we are talking about balance, I refer the House to Daniel, chapter 5, verse 25: “Mene, Mene, Tekel, Upharsin”—or, “You have been weighed in the balance and found wanting”. That is the right epitaph for this piece of legislation.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I concede that I am new here, but I will issue a warning: outside this place and the Westminster bubble this row over Part 5 is seen as a last-ditch battle in the Brexit wars—yet another attempt at using legalese to delay the realisation of finally being free of the EU’s jurisdiction.

I beg to differ with the noble Lord, Lord Howard, because a certain type of remain supporter, having lost at the polls, seems keen to use this House to kill the Bill. Again and again, I have heard noble Lords say that this House must block, block, block. Whether or not Brexit is the reason for that, more humility is required in this House. Its job is not to act as a block to democratic decisions, and it does so at its peril.

Surely, an important lesson from the referendum result is that British voters rejected interference by the unelected in their decision-making powers. After all, the demand for more sovereignty and democracy was the decisive driver behind the revolt of 17.4 million leave voters. This Bill should be seen as a perfectly moral and good-faith attempt to temper a treaty that threatens the UK’s geographic integrity as an internal market, and as a democratic mechanism to ensure that political sovereignty is safeguarded.

The controversial part of the Bill is posed in the most dramatic terms around the morality of abiding by international law. At its heart, however, as in everything to do with Brexit, it is about who rules—who has the power to make decisions in a sovereign country. Yet opponents here today seem to believe that national sovereignty and democracy can legitimately be constrained by simply repeating the mantra about upholding international law. That phrase should not, however, be deployed as a counter to national law made by our elected Parliament. This is not a technical, or even a legalistic, question: it is one of principle.

The key question is what should take precedence in a democratic nation state: international law or the will of the democratically elected Government? To those of us who believe in democracy, the answer is clear: democratic will trumps international treaties every time. If we are to live in a democracy, national Parliaments that are elected by, and accountable to, their peoples must have the power to make national law and to seek to amend or override any external rule that might compromise that.

On the broader question, I have heard lots of fine speeches about the ideals of international law; it is talked about with reverence, as if it was a secular form of God’s law, a power above and beyond the grasp of mere mortals such as the voters. In reality, it is often—to quote one commentator—“Cooked up by diplomats in secret, smoke-free rooms and enforced by unaccountable judges”. Regardless of that, international law should never be used to supersede the process of democratic national law-making. Too often, however, it is turned into a supranational instrument for undermining national sovereignty. We cannot let this place endorse that approach.

Noble Lords must not get me wrong: Prime Minister Boris Johnson got himself into this pickle last year, by endorsing the shoddy withdrawal agreement—enthusiastically selling it as “oven-ready” and signing it, warts and all. At that time, and since, many on both sides of the argument have pointed out that it contains intolerable restraints on the exercise of sovereign decision-making. I myself favour repudiation, but the Government have opted for a legislative approach to the conundrum because, importantly—this is a key point—under pressure from Brexiteers, Boris Johnson eventually contested and won the December 2019 general election on a manifesto that effectively repudiated part of the withdrawal agreement. He pledged that the UK would not be tied to EU rules. The Government are now trying to keep that promise to the electorate, and that, at least, is honourable.

Today, great play has been made of a binding promise to the EU. The main binding promise that should concern us, however, is the one made to the electorate. The aim of this part of the internal market Bill, therefore, is to give the UK Government the power to override those aspects of an international treaty that might, for example, bind Northern Ireland to a range of EU rules that could, if not tempered, hand arbitration of disputes to the Court of Justice of the European Union. It is essential that the Government have the power to counter such egregious limits to UK sovereignty.