Nuclear Regulated Asset Base Model (Revenue Collection) Regulations 2023

Lord Callanan Excerpts

Wednesday 22nd February 2023 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Lord Callanan]

That the Grand Committee do consider the Nuclear Regulated Asset Base Model (Revenue Collection) Regulations 2023.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (Lord Callanan) (Con)]

I beg to move that these draft regulations, which were laid before the House on 15 December 2022, be considered. The Government recently took the historic step of investing in the development of Sizewell C—our first investment in a nuclear project for 35 years—and have designated the project as the first to use a RAB model. In approving the instrument, we would be helping to fully establish the model for potential use on all new nuclear projects, which we need to ensure a low-carbon, low-cost and resilient electricity system, so that we can reach our emission reduction target and provide energy security.

The RAB model offers a chance to do this in a way that draws in new sources of finance at a lower cost of capital, thereby reducing the overall cost of a nuclear project for consumers compared to current funding models. A nuclear company that is designated under the Nuclear Energy (Financing) Act is entitled to receive a regulated revenue stream, overseen by the regulatory authority, Ofgem, which of course has a duty to protect the interests of all consumers. This would cover the cost of activities related to the design, construction, commissioning and operation of the relevant nuclear project, as well as activities related to an approved funded decommissioning programme. These regulations provide the framework to implement secure, long-term funding to nuclear projects.

In accordance with Section 18 of the Act, the Secretary of State may direct the designated revenue collection counterparty, the Low Carbon Contracts Company, to offer to contract with a designated nuclear company. Once the revenue collection contract is entered into, the regulations establish a mechanism for all licensed electricity suppliers in Great Britain to make payments to the counterparty so that it can pay the amounts owed to nuclear companies. The revenue collection counterparty may also return money to suppliers, hold sums in reserve and cover up its losses through requiring suppliers to post collateral and undergo a payment mutualisation process in case of supplier default. The regulations also set out the arrangements for a supplier levy to pay for the revenue collection counterparty’s operating costs.

The contracts for difference revenue stream was designed with similar considerations in mind to the nuclear RAB revenue stream, such as incentivising private sector investment in secure low-carbon electricity. The CfD revenue regime has been operating for a number of years and is familiar to suppliers, investors and generating companies. In developing these regulations we have therefore strived, where possible, to replicate the revenue regime set out in the CfD legislation, with differences to account for the specific features of a nuclear RAB model.

Two key features of this are, first, that the revenues which the nuclear company is entitled to receive from suppliers under these regulations would be regulated by Ofgem, whereas CfDs do not have this regulatory oversight. Secondly, these regulations will allow the revenue collection counterparty to collect revenues from suppliers during a project’s construction phase as agreed in its revenue collection contract, not simply during the operations phase, as with the CfD regime.

Throughout the project’s duration, the revenue stream from suppliers under these regulations will work in a similar fashion to the CfD regime. We anticipate that using a recognised and reliable revenue model will minimise the impact of introducing such measures on suppliers and their consumers.

We carried out a full public consultation last year and sought views on the general idea of these regulations replicating those which underpin the CfD revenue mechanics, and the differences needed to account for the specific features of a nuclear RAB. Overall, we received 40 responses from organisations and members of the public, who were mostly in support of the proposals. Accordingly, in our government response, published on 14 December 2022, we set out plans to proceed as proposed.

Following careful consideration, we consider it preferable not to exempt specified groups under these regulations, as costs could be shifted on to other vulnerable groups not included under such an exemption. Instead, we want to pursue measures which support wider protections for vulnerable groups, such as the cost of living payments for pensioners and those on means-tested benefits announced in November’s Autumn Statement. I assure the Committee that, as the Government set out during the Act’s passage, we will ensure that consumers’ interests are protected and steps taken to prevent consumers bearing unacceptable costs. We have estimated that a generic nuclear project approved in this Parliament would add approximately £1 a month to a typical household bill during the project’s construction phase.

In conclusion, this secondary legislation represents an essential step towards implementing the nuclear RAB model by ensuring a secure and consistent revenue stream. This model is a key enabler for the Sizewell C project, and the nuclear projects we need beyond that, to help ensure a secure, low-carbon and low-cost future electricity system. I commend these draft regulations to the Committee.

[Baroness Blake of Leeds (Lab)]

I will try to be brief in my questions; I am happy to take answers in writing if that is appropriate. I thank the Minister for his very thorough summary of the regulations we have before us today. I agree that this is an interesting way of securing funding for what I think we are all coming to realise is going to be an important contribution to the energy crisis we face at the moment.

The Minister tried to give reassurance about the customer and the role of Ofgem in that. One of our concerns is that this model is complex and long-term. Potentially, if things go well, it could be very successful, but our concern is about if things do not go so well, costs overrun and all those sorts of things. Some reassurance on how customers’ interests will be protected would be very helpful. The other factor in terms of costs is whether we are talking just about Sizewell C or about all the other nuclear projects. Where do we stop? If £1 becomes £10 or £20, perhaps those affected might have more to say about this.

The other concern is that, if things do not go so well, projects get cancelled or other things happen, we are talking potentially about a large sum of money that could be accrued through this model. Could I have a bit more explanation about how the mechanisms could ensure that money not used in the project or any future project would be returned to the customer? There is a concern that the Low Carbon Contracts Company would just sit on customers’ money rather than handing it back. What would the mechanism be to hand that money back?

Moving on, there was a question in the debate in the Commons about whether this will be reviewed or not. There was a suggestion that a review could cause a lack of confidence, and therefore that there should not be one, but the Minister then commented that there will be a review in 2025. It would be good to have some clarification about when a review is a review or not.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

I thank the noble Baroness for her questions—and for being the only one to turn up and take an interest in this statutory instrument. Of course, I assure her that we will keep a close eye on the costs. Ensuring that we do not allow the costs to run out of control is probably the most crucial aspect of the project, so both Ofgem and my department will be closely monitoring this.

We can give her the reassurance she is looking for that consumer interests will be protected if there are any cost overruns. Proposals for the RAB model include multiple mechanisms for ensuring that consumers are protected from unacceptable costs. This includes: robust due diligence before a final investment decision to be confident that the project will be effectively managed; requiring a project to move through various staged approvals; and value-for-money tests fully in line with the Treasury’s Green Book. The noble Baroness also asked about how money is returned to consumers through beneficial payments. We will ensure to do that if it is at all possible.

With regard to a review, we have decided not to include a statutory review clause in order to retain stakeholder confidence in the stability of the revenue stream. I think that that is probably in line with the noble Baroness’s thinking. There are plans for the operational costs levy rates to be next reviewed in 2025, and we will then consult on the costs for the next three financial years—that is, from 2025-26 to 2027-28. This is in addition to the other plans that we have in order to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of the RAB policy, which we will keep under review as necessary or appropriate. As she said, these are long-term schemes, over many years—if not decades—to provide secure funding for the next generation of nuclear reactors in this country.

I thank the noble Baroness for her support. We are grateful for the support the Opposition have provided both for the legislation in the first place and for this statutory instrument. I hope I have resolved her complaints; I am very happy to write to her if there are any additional points.

Motion agreed.