Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Bill

Lord Caine Excerpts

2nd reading
Wednesday 23rd November 2022 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Caine]

That the Bill be now read a second time.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Northern Ireland Office (Lord Caine) (Con)]

My Lords, as I rise to speak in this Second Reading, before I move to the Bill itself, I would like to put on record my thanks and gratitude to the Police Service of Northern Ireland and partners who, at this time and around the clock, are working to keep Northern Ireland safe and secure. I am sure the whole House will join me in condemning the recent attacks in Northern Ireland on the rule of law, and condemn terror in all its ugly guises.

The period of what are sometimes euphemistically referred to as the Troubles in Northern Ireland has left a terrible legacy and an indelible mark on society. More than 3,500 people were killed during the Troubles, with an estimated 40,000 more maimed or injured. Families were shattered, businesses destroyed along with livelihoods, and society was torn apart by atrocities that for many of those who suffered are as vivid, raw and painful today as they were at the time they occurred. Widespread disruption, either as a result of terrorist activity or the security presence needed to counter it, was a daily fact of life. In this Government’s view, the main responsibility for this appalling legacy rests firmly with the terrorist organisations, both republican and loyalist, which between them caused some 90% of those deaths—or, more specifically, the 60% that were down to republicans and the 30% down to loyalists.

Of those groups, the Provisional IRA was the terrorist organisation responsible for more deaths than any other: approximately 1,700 people, including some 300 Catholics. That is more than the police and the Army combined—something, I suggest, that those who today think it cool to chant “Up the Ra” might wish to reflect on.

This Government are equally clear that none of the terrorist campaigns that took place in the Troubles could in any way be warranted. Terrorism was always wholly wrong. No injustice in Northern Ireland, either perceived or real, justified the taking of a single life and the violence of paramilitary groups. There was always an alternative to terrorism in the past, just as there is today. The terrorist campaigns caused untold misery and suffering, and this Government will never agree with a version of history that seeks to legitimise them, just as we will always reject any suggestion of moral equivalence between the security forces and those who carried out acts of terrorism.

Ultimately, of course, terrorism in Northern Ireland did not succeed. In our view, there are three main reasons for that: first, the sheer resilience of the overwhelming majority of people in Northern Ireland who rejected violence and would never bend the knee to terrorism; secondly, the determination of successive UK Governments of all parties that the future of Northern Ireland would only ever be determined by democracy and consent, which is enshrined in the 1993 Downing Street declaration and is such a key pillar of the 1998 Belfast agreement; and, thirdly, the extraordinary dedication of the men and women of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and our Armed Forces.

More than 1,000 members of the security forces lost their lives during Operation Banner, the longest continuous deployment in British military history, while over 7,000 awards for bravery were made. Of course, I fully acknowledge that, at times, some might have wrongly acted outside the law and that mistakes were made, sometimes with deeply tragic consequences. We should always be prepared to admit that—I speak as one of the authors of David Cameron’s statement in June 2010 in response to the report of the Saville inquiry into the events of Bloody Sunday—yet of the more than 250,000 who served, the overwhelming majority did so with exemplary professionalism, bravery and restraint, and without their efforts there would have been no peace process. So, this Government will always salute their service and their sacrifice, and we will always remember the debt of gratitude we owe them. As I said in this House in July, we will always resist a pernicious counternarrative of the Troubles that seeks to put the state at the heart of every atrocity, denigrate the record of the security forces and, as I said earlier, legitimise terrorism.

Terrorism did not succeed but the legacy of the Troubles, as I indicated at the outset, continues to cast a dark and long shadow over Northern Ireland. As we have seen all so vividly in recent years, legacy issues retain the capacity to poison and paralyse politics, divide society and, in certain circumstances, create the potential for public disorder. For all the progress we have seen over the past quarter of a century, education and public housing remain highly segregated in many areas, while so-called peace walls still loom large in a number of areas. Far too many still live with the physical suffering and mental scars of what happened, and the costs of division continue to place additional burdens on an already highly overstretched public purse.

Against this background, therefore, the Government have a responsibility to do what they can to attempt to tackle the legacy of the past. While I am the first to acknowledge that we will never agree a common narrative as to what happened, the question is whether we can find structures that will enable society as a whole in Northern Ireland to move forward.

Of course, there have been a number of attempts to do this since 1998. The last Labour Government established the commission chaired by Denis Bradley and the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Eames—who is in his place, I am pleased to say—which reported in 2009. In 2013, the Northern Ireland Executive invited the former US special envoy to Northern Ireland, Ambassador Richard Haass, and Meghan O’Sullivan to examine the issues of flags, parading and the past. In 2014 the Government reached the Stormont House agreement which, although motivated primarily by the need to address problems at the time around the Executive’s finances, contained far-reaching proposals to tackle legacy issues based on earlier initiatives.

Yet despite the best and very genuine efforts of many, over a number of years, none of these initiatives has succeeded in delivering for those directly affected by the legacy of the Troubles. I speak as someone who from 2010 to 2019 served four Secretaries of State and was intimately involved in trying to find ways forward on these issues. I participated in all 11 weeks of the talks leading to the Stormont House agreement, and then spent the subsequent four-and-a-half years in extensive and painstaking efforts to implement it—without success.

I know that some, including members of your Lordships’ House, still regard the Stormont House agreement as the best way forward. Yet as somebody who was there, it is clear to me that any broad consensus once held no longer exists, and it is easy with the benefit of hindsight to overplay the extent to which it ever did. Even in December 2014 it was not supported by all the parties, and in the months and years that followed what high-level support that had existed began to diminish as the Government and political parties sought to convert the paragraphs of that agreement into legislation.

Indeed, I recall in early 2015 Peter Robinson and Martin McGuinness asking the then Secretary of State to take all the Stormont House agreement through Westminster, due to the difficulties of doing any of it via the Northern Ireland Assembly, even though most of it was technically devolved. I remember clearly in November 2015 Martin McGuinness vetoing any reference to the Stormont House legacy proposals in the fresh start agreement, such were the difficulties Sinn Féin had with them at the time.

Stormont House was eight years ago next month, and, in the absence of an agreed way forward, those affected by the Troubles continue to be left with processes that have largely evolved piecemeal and which for the vast majority will never deliver justice, information, accountability or any form of acknowledgement. That is why the Government have introduced the Bill before your Lordships’ House today.

Taking into account previous attempts to tackle legacy, the Bill seeks to deliver an approach that focuses on what can practically be achieved when dealing with events that in some cases occurred half a century ago. It provides victims and survivors with information in a way that can provide some acknowledgement and some accountability. It has the potential to provide better outcomes both for those who suffered and those who served, and is able to help society look forward together to a more shared future, which I hope is the objective of all of us in your Lordships’ House.

The Bill seeks to do these things in the following ways. Part 1 of the Bill sets out for the purposes of this legislation the meaning of “the Troubles” and establishes its period as beginning on 1 January 1966 and finishing on 10 April 1998, the date on which the Belfast agreement was reached. Part 2 of the Bill provides for the establishment of a new independent commission for reconciliation and information recovery—the ICRIR. I think the first prize in Committee will be for anybody who can come up with a snappier name. This will carry out reviews, mainly at the request of families and surviving victims, into deaths and incidents resulting in serious injuries that occurred during the Troubles.

More than two thirds of Troubles-related cases are now over 40 years old, and it is commonly accepted that the likelihood of prosecutions, regardless of resources, is extremely remote. The Government have therefore taken the view that better outcomes for families are more likely to be achieved by a process of information recovery, acknowledgement and accountability, and that is what the ICRIR will seek to provide.

The commission will be chaired by a former or serving senior judge and will be equipped with the same investigative powers as the police to carry out criminal investigations, as well as, like coroners in inquests, the power to compel witness testimony and documentary evidence from individuals. It will be able to use these powers in relation to any case to fulfil outstanding procedural obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights. Although the term “review” in the Bill is deliberately broad, the commission will be under a duty to look into all the circumstances of a death or incident, including criminal activity.

The commission will be fully operationally independent, while, for its part, the state will be under a legal requirement to disclose all relevant information to it. Written reports of the commission’s findings to the families and surviving victims who request a review will be publicly available. To encourage those who might have relevant information to share it, the commission will be able to grant immunity from prosecution, on a case-by-case basis, to an individual who acknowledges their role in a Troubles-related incident by providing an account that is true to the best of their knowledge and belief. These accounts will be tested against information that is already in the public domain and information that is not—for example, from previous investigations and intelligence. Where an individual chooses not to engage with the commission, they will remain liable to prosecution in the normal way should the evidential test be met.

Part 3 of the Bill deals with ongoing and future proceedings within the current criminal, civil, inquest and police complaints systems. As the Bill is drafted, once it comes into force, no other body in the UK other than the commission will be able to take forward an investigation into a Troubles-related incident. Where a decision has already been taken to prosecute an existing case, this will continue. Any civil claims filed before the Bill was introduced will continue but no new cases will be allowed. Inquests that have reached an advanced stage by the time the commission becomes operational will continue; however, new inquests and those that have not reached an advanced stage will not continue but may be referred to the commission.

Part 4 of the Bill will build on proposals in the Stormont House agreement and provide for the establishment of an expert panel to devise a memorialisation strategy designed to promote reconciliation and greater understanding, as well as a major new oral history initiative.

I am the first to acknowledge that some of the proposals outlined in the Bill have met with far from universal acclamation in Northern Ireland itself. I fully appreciate that, for many, this legislation, despite some significant changes since the publication of the Command Paper in July 2021, remains deeply challenging. In being completely candid with your Lordships, I count myself among that number. I personally have found this legislation extremely challenging.

I have been involved in the affairs of Northern Ireland for some 35 years, and worked in the Northern Ireland Office while the Troubles were still raging in the 1990s. Only weeks before he was murdered by the Provisional IRA in July 1990, I had lunch with the very great man, Ian Gow, in the Strangers’ Dining Room in the other place, where, with typical generosity, he offered to sponsor me for the Conservative Party candidates’ list. Indeed, one of my first jobs in politics was to take the minutes of the Conservative Back-Bench Northern Ireland Committee, of which Ian was chairman. I have probably spent more hours with victims and survivors than just about anybody outside of Northern Ireland, and have heard countless harrowing and heart-wrenching stories of suffering. So I am hardly immune to the feelings of those affected by the Troubles who find this Bill difficult and challenging.

At the same time, I am as conscious as anyone, based on experience, that we will never solve the past or bring, to use that horrible word, closure in every case. Equally, I am clear that no Government can legislate to reconcile people, though we can strive to promote it. However, we can attempt to provide better and realistic outcomes. It is because of this, and in fulfilment of a commitment I made to the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, in this House on 14 July, that, since late July, I have carried out some 25 legacy-related engagements and meetings, all but a couple in Northern Ireland itself. I have done so on the basis of being open to sensible and constructive proposals to improve the Bill—commitments I have also made individually and collectively to Members of your Lordships’ House.

As a result of my discussions, and of those between my right honourable friend the Secretary of State and a number of groups within Northern Ireland, I intend to bring forward a series of proactive government amendments in Committee to address a number of concerns that have been raised. These will include amendments to underpin the Bill’s compliance with the ECHR, by making it clear that the commission will be able to carry out Article 2 and 3-compliant criminal investigations in cases where it judges them to be appropriate. We will strengthen the commission’s independence by making clear that the Secretary of State should consult named individuals before appointing the chief commissioner.

To make the information recovery process and the provisions around immunity more robust, we will create an offence for those who choose willingly to mislead the commission and give the commission the power to revoke immunity where individuals have been found subsequently to do so. We will disapply the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998 for individuals who choose not to tell the commission what they know and are subsequently convicted of an offence, so that they face a full rather than a reduced sentence, as well as increasing the fine for non-compliance with the commission.

I wish to work with noble Lords across this House to enable us to fulfil our important constitutional role as a revising Chamber and make further improvements to the Bill where possible as it proceeds. That is my commitment, and that of a Government who are prepared to listen. On that basis, I beg to move.

Amendment to the Motion

Moved by