(12 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I beg to move Amendment 35 and will speak to Amendment 38, standing in the names of my colleague the noble Marquess, Lord Lothian, and myself, and to which the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, and the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, have added their names. These two amendments invite the Government to look again at the drafting of Clause 3(3) and (7).
Subsection (3) says that the committee must send a draft of its report to the Government. This may reflect the old, rather patriarchal attitude, if I may describe it as such, that the Government took towards the committee. The committee submits its report; it is independent. It does not submit a draft report to the Prime Minister; the report is the report is the report. It submits its report and then the Prime Minister may insist on redactions: that is how the procedure works, so the reference to a draft report is technically incorrect, and impugns the independence of the committee.
Subsection (7) refers to matters that would be excluded from the ISC’s report to Parliament when it reports to the Prime Minister. Again, the words “the ISC considers” that they would be excluded under subsection (4) are necessary because, at the time the committee makes its report to the Prime Minister, he has not seen the report; he cannot decide what would be redacted in a report submitted to Parliament. So, again, the committee would submit a full report to the Prime Minister and when it comes to excluding things it would have to be the ISC which considers it, rather than anybody else.
These are two drafting amendments which would make the position clear.
I shall add to what the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, has said on these two amendments, to which my name is also attached. On the second one he makes the short point that it is for the committee to decide whether the report should be published to Parliament or to the Prime Minister. He makes it clear that it is only the committee that can make that decision. There is an additional factor, in that until the report is completed, only the committee knows that that report is being drafted, so no decision could be made before the committee had finished drafting its report. That is one reason why it is a necessary amendment.
With respect to the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, I think that Amendment 35 is more than a drafting amendment. It is asking to remove subsection (3), the only drafting element of which is the word “draft”. It is an incorrect statement as it stands, because it suggests that the committee submit a report to the Prime Minister which is capable of alteration or amendment—that is the definition of a draft. In fact, it is the opposite that occurs. The report that is made to the Prime Minister can only be changed in respect of inserting asterisks—by redactions where there are matters which should not be seen in the public report submitted to Parliament, but of necessity are in the report that is sent to the Prime Minister. I suggest that, rather than being a drafting amendment, the removal of the subsection is the answer. The reason I say that is because, if the Government accept that this is not a draft, the whole subsection becomes otiose because the following subsection makes it clear that the report goes to the Prime Minister before redactions are made. I hope that, on this occasion, the Minister will feel able to consider very seriously the points we are making in this amendment.
(12 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I shall speak also to Amendment 9.
It is right and customary to declare an interest in these amendments. I certainly do so in this case because I have a direct financial interest in Amendment 4. The purpose of the amendments is that the chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee should be treated in the same way as the chairmen of Select Committees in terms of remuneration. The purpose of Amendment 4 is that the members of the Intelligence and Security Committee should, similarly, be treated in the same way as members of Select Committees.
I wish to make it absolutely clear that Amendment 9 is not tabled at the behest of the current chairman of the ISC, the right honourable Malcolm Rifkind, who does a great deal of work for the committee on an entirely voluntary basis. I think that my colleague the noble Marquess, Lord Lothian, will agree that this committee chairman certainly does not do less work than the chairman of a Select Committee. He works many more days of the week than the days on which the ISC meets. For financial purposes—and leaving aside the particular individual, Sir Malcolm Rifkind—the chairman of the ISC should, as a matter of justice, be treated similarly to the chairmen of Select Committees and receive remuneration accordingly. I think I can say that that is the view of the other members of the ISC, who are similarly grateful for and deeply impressed by the work that our chairman does.
As regards Amendment 4, the House of Lords is kind enough to provide that attendance at meetings of the Intelligence and Security Committee should qualify for half the daily allowance—£150—but only on the days when this House is sitting. There seems to be no logic in that. We do exactly the same amount of work regardless of whether this House happens to be sitting at the same time. If one day should qualify for the £150 allowance then it seems that the other day should. This point arises because, these days, and as we will see in the next couple of weeks, the sittings of the House of Commons and the House of Lords do not always coincide with each other. I regret that. It may happen in September that the House of Commons will sit and the House of Lords will not. If there is a meeting of the ISC on those days, my noble colleague and I will not be eligible for the daily allowance. There is a greater injustice as a result of the unevenness of the sittings of the House of Commons and the House of Lords.
I have, as I say, a personal interest in this perfectly simple point of equity, which ought to be put right. It can easily be put right in the rules on the financial support of the House. In order to draw attention to it and try to ensure that it is put right, I have put down Amendment 4.
My Lords, I support the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, in both of his amendments, to which I have attached my name. Like him, I declare an interest in Amendment 4—on which I shall say no more than he has said. He has argued the case with great eloquence and I hope that the Government will listen to his argument.
In general terms, I say to the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, that these amendments are slightly ironic, given what I was saying in answer to his previous amendment. We are asking to be treated like a Select Committee and, once more, this underlines the fact that the argument on that is not polarised. It is not about the theory of a Select Committee but about the practice of one. We may well return to this matter in the future.
I strongly endorse the proposal in Amendment 9 that the chair of the committee should be remunerated in line with the chair of departmental Select Committees. I have served under four Intelligence and Security Committee chairmen, I think, and in each case I have been amazed at the amount of work they are required to do compared with the ordinary members of the committee. The ordinary members do preparation behind closed doors in secure surroundings for an afternoon and then we have the meeting the next day, but the chairman is in almost every day, going through issues, deciding whether they should be brought to the committee. The chairman has a major piece of work. It is therefore only fair that the chairman should be properly remunerated, as he would be if he were a chairman of a Select Committee.
My Lords, Amendment 5 is an amendment to Clause 1(4). It seeks simply to fill out an obvious point that is not currently covered by the Bill.
Under the arrangements proposed in the Bill, the Prime Minister will propose members of the committee but it will be for Parliament to agree to the appointment or not. Therefore, we need to provide for the situation in which Parliament does not agree to an appointment. At the moment the Bill says nothing about that. The purpose of this amendment is to make clear that in those circumstances, if either the House of Commons or the House of Lords does not agree to the nomination of a Member of that House to the Intelligence and Security Committee, the Prime Minister would have to nominate somebody else for the appointment for the approval of the respective House. I think that is obvious and that is what would happen. It is not provided for in the Bill and this amendment is therefore just to fill that gap.
My Lords, once again I rise to support the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, on this amendment, to which my name is also attached. I will not add much to what he said. I think that the real purpose here is to remind the House that the committee has nine members. That is written in to the statute. It is one of the smaller committees involved in the sort of work that this committee is doing and it is very important, in my view, that we retain that number at least. In the absence of this amendment it is theoretically possible that this House might decide that it did not want the two nominations from this House made by the Prime Minister and that the Prime Minister might decide to leave it at that—have a committee of seven in total from the House of Commons and nobody from this House. This amendment would make sure that that cannot happen by ensuring that, were this House or, indeed, the other House to say no to nominations by the Prime Minister to this committee from those Houses, the Prime Minister would be required to make another nomination.
(12 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this is a probing amendment. Before the dinner break, we were discussing the circumstances in which information might be withheld from the Intelligence and Security Committee on grounds of national security. Paragraph 3(3)(b) refers to the withholding of information other than on grounds of national security, and the purpose of the amendment is to inquire of the Minister what sort of other information this sub-paragraph has in mind.
A characteristic of the Intelligence and Security Committee is that the agencies convey to it a good deal of information which would not be confided to a normal Select Committee. The ISC would be dismayed if that practice were to cease because this provision was in the Act. Therefore, I ask the Minister to give an example or examples of the sort of information that this sub-paragraph is included in the Bill in order to protect. If the box were empty, it would be a pity to have it in the Bill—indeed, doing so would make it poor legislation. However, if the Government have in mind information other than security information which should not be confided to the Intelligence and Security Committee, I know that the ISC would be very happy to consider that point.
My Lords, I wish to add briefly to what the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, has said. I am puzzled by this sub-paragraph because it does not say “information other than national security”; it says,
“not limited to national security”.
That suggests that anything that cannot be allowed to go to another Select Committee should not be given to the Intelligence and Security Committee. We debated earlier why the ISC should not be a Select Committee, and one reason is so that it can receive information which cannot be passed to an ordinary Select Committee. It may be that this provision is very well meaning and that it touches on advice given to Ministers or on other matters where I think we would all accept there have to be limitations. However, I wonder whether the draftsman has this slightly wrong. One reason for asking for the sub-paragraph to be deleted is in the hope that the Minister, along with the draftsman, will look at it again and come back with something which meets what I think the sub-paragraph is trying to achieve in meaning but which it does not achieve at the moment.
My Lords, Amendments 30 and 32, in my name and that of my colleague the noble Marquess, Lord Lothian, raise substantial points.
Amendment 30 deals with the point where the Bill cannot mean what it presently says. I will read it out and that will be the best way of making it clear. Clause 2(3) states:
“The ISC may, by virtue of subsection (1) or (2), consider any particular operational matter but only so far as the ISC and the Prime Minister are satisfied that … the matter … is not part of any ongoing intelligence or security operation, and … is of significant national interest”.
The Intelligence and Security Committee accepts entirely that those are the two categories of operation that the committee should—and does—normally look at. I note that the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, seeks to remove the ban on looking at any ongoing intelligence operation. The committee agrees that its oversight of operations should be retrospective and on matters “of significant national interest”.
However, the effect of the drafting is that when an operation “of significant national interest” is over, the agencies should have to get clearance from the Prime Minister as well as the ISC before discussing those matters with the committee. That is not only bureaucratically very intensive but a step backwards from what happens now. What happens now is that when an operation involving important matters is over, the intelligence agencies, of their own accord, report on it to the ISC, which looks into it and discusses it with them. The committee has had access to that sort of material for a number of years. In some cases the agencies volunteer it and in other cases the ISC asks to see it. I cannot believe that it is the intention in such cases, which have been routinely going on, that the Bill should require the Prime Minister to be consulted whenever the agencies wish to report such matters to the committee.
That having been said, the ISC is content that its normal purview should be of operations retrospectively where there are significant national interests. Amendment 32 would add a new subsection saying:
“The ISC may, notwithstanding subsection (3), consider any particular operational matter if the relevant Minister of the Crown agrees to the consideration of the matter”.
That is simply to give flexibility. As I said, there is no difference from the Government’s view that the purview should normally be retrospective. However, if it suited the Government that the committee should look at an ongoing security operation—this would be at the discretion of the Government—clearly it would be unfortunate if the Bill ruled that out. This is simply to allow flexibility on a matter where in general the committee and the Government are in agreement.
If I may, I will quickly add a word to what the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, said. He talked about this provision creating bureaucracy. In my view it could be worse. It could create an enormous logjam in Downing Street if every single item needed the consent of the Prime Minister. The danger then is that the logjam will continue to grow until you get to a stage where information that should have been looked at either will not be looked at or will be looked at so late in the day that it is not worth looking at.