(7 months ago)
Lords ChamberTo ask the Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs what diplomatic steps he is taking to address conflict-induced food insecurity, and to hold accountable those violating international humanitarian law through the deliberate use of hunger as a weapon of war.
We use all our levers to address the issue of hunger during conflict. We use our diplomatic efforts, including in countries such as Sudan and in Gaza, where we push for humanitarian access. We use our funding and expertise as a development superpower, with £365 million of bilateral overseas aid spent on food security-related sectors. We also work through multilateral organisations, including at the United Nations under Resolution 2417, to call out the perpetrators of conflict-induced food insecurity.
My Lords, most conflict-related starvation occurs in internal and not international conflicts—most recently in South Sudan and Gaza. On 15 April, warning of famine in Sudan, the Foreign Secretary wrote that anyone
“supporting those responsible … must be held to account”.
What mechanism of accountability was he referring to? Given the ICC prosecutor’s action in seeking warrants, partly on the grounds of causing starvation as a weapon of war, that question is pertinent. In 2019, Article 8 of the Rome statute was unanimously amended to include deliberate starvation as a war crime, even in internal conflicts. Why, given the increasing prevalence of such acts and the UK’s support for the amendment five years ago, have we not yet ratified it?
The noble Lord is absolutely right that we supported the Article 8 amendment but have not yet put it in place. It is still under discussion, and we want to get it right. That does not prevent us from taking action, including in Sudan, where we are trying to restart the Jeddah process between the combatants and make sure that we get aid in. Those are steps we can take now.
(8 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I was there in 2021, working through the night on a lot of the Afghans who arrived here in the initial batch of over 21,000, so I can give my noble friend that assurance. We need to ensure that those who are entitled to come to the United Kingdom do so, through the processes we have in place, including normalisation of their documentation. We want to have a very open and constructive relationship with the Government of Pakistan, in particular, to enable this to happen.
As the Minister has said, among the Afghan refugees in Pakistan are a significant number of former Afghan Special Forces, known as the Triples, many of whom are there only because they were wrongly judged to be ineligible for resettlement here under the ARAP scheme. They face certain death if they are forcibly removed to Afghanistan, as do their families. Am I to infer from the Minister’s earlier references to the review, which was set up to look at their cases again, that some of these people are being allowed visas to come to this country? I am not aware of that.
Nor do I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, with whom I have been persistently debating the issue of the review. In the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill debate yesterday, he said the following regarding the much smaller number of people here in the United Kingdom who I am trying to get this Bill amended to cover:
“I reassure Parliament that, once the UKSF ARAP review has concluded”,—[Official Report, 16/4/24; col. 901.]
and went on to say what the Government would do. If these people in Pakistan have to wait for that, there is no hope for them. Time is of the essence. This review needs to be completed as quickly as possible. If it is being incrementally concluded for individuals, perhaps the Minister could tell the House.
My Lords, I am focused on that, and I know that the Ministry of Defence are leading on it. As to these cases, we are not waiting for the end of the review to process those who are eligible for that scheme. As they become eligible, they will be processed appropriately.
(8 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberFirst of all, I am delighted that the meeting of the EPC, the European Political Community, is going ahead. I am also delighted that it is at Blenheim, because that is in my old constituency and is one of the finest places in Britain to hold a summit. We will not necessarily remind all the participants who was on which side at Blenheim, but I am sure we can find a way through that. In fact, there were Germans on both sides, so perhaps that will help. We will certainly talk about security and Ukraine, and I am sure that there will also be discussions about the issue of illegal migration, which we are all wrestling with around Europe. However, I am sure the Prime Minister will have more to say about it closer to the time.
My Lords, I do not disagree with the Foreign Secretary about the importance of the United States, but, whether we like it or not, we are in a context where future US leadership can be hoped for but not relied upon. In such a context, defence co-operation and co-ordination between the UK, France and the wider EU is crucial. President Macron has said:
“Our partnership with the United Kingdom must … be raised to another level”.
Given that openness to a deeper defence and strategic relationship, what discussions have the Government had with France and other European allies in respect of the important issue of co-ordinating defence production to ensure that our procurement harmonises rather than conflicts with the proposed European Defence Industry Programme?
That is a very important question. The way that the UK has worked with other European powers in response to Ukraine has shown that, although we are outside the European Union, we can work together very effectively and put in place arrangements such as those around the Wiesbaden arrangements and others that work extremely well. Of course we should look at what other co-operation and collaboration we should do, but quite a lot of clarity will be required, including about the European Defence Industrial Strategy and on what terms it should be open to non-EU members. Collaboration makes sense only if we are acting in a way that not only benefits our own industries as well as other European industries but is open to collaboration with others at the same time. So far, from everything I have seen in this job, I can say that where you have good ad hoc arrangements and can make them work, that may well be better than a very structured and potentially rather bureaucratic dialogue—unless you are really getting what you want.
(9 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberIf bonds are the form of lending, there are collective action clauses that can prevent private sector hold-outs. With loans, you have these majority voting provisions so that a group of private investors cannot hold up the resolution of those debts. That is the right way forward. On Sri Lanka, we welcome the official creditor group deal that was reached on 29 November 2023; the bondholder committee is currently in negotiations with the Government of Sri Lanka. We do not comment on ongoing restructuring programmes, but we hope that a deal will be arranged soon.
My Lords, the 2010 Act was an excellent example of cross-party co-operation because it was passed by the Labour Government and implemented by the coalition. The United Kingdom and New York have a unique power to take leadership of this issue, which is important to a substantial part of the world, because 90% of the private lender contracts that are causing the problem are written under either English or New York law. Does the Foreign Secretary acknowledge and approve the efforts of New York to bring in legislation to make sure that private creditor terms are equivalent to those of other creditors, which they are not? If so, what steps are we taking, if any, to co-ordinate with New York to ensure that similar legislation can be enacted here?
I thank the noble Lord for his question. It is true that what was teed up by Gordon Brown was nodded into the net by the coalition Government, and rightly so. We do not think that the law in Albany, New York state, is actually likely to get through; it has been sitting around for a long time. It is good in its intentions because it is trying to sort out the issue. But the IMF advice and the Treasury advice is that if we legislate in this way, particularly unilaterally, it would affect the cost and availability of finance to other countries, and it may mean that more of these financial deals are written elsewhere in a less advantageous way than is currently the case.
(10 months, 4 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is a privilege to follow so many thoughtful contributions informed by experience and expertise. It is a particular pleasure to have been present at the excellent maiden speech made by the noble Lord, Lord Camoys. He can go home later this evening, clear that it was a job well done, and come back in the confident knowledge that he has the ear of your Lordships’ House.
It is a truism to say that this debate is taking place at a critical time in the Ukrainian struggle to repel Russian aggression and safeguard its national integrity, an assessment that could have been made with equal truth on every day since the Russian invasion began on 22 February 2022. As both sides have now undertaken offensives and counteroffensives, we can see the emergence of broad strategic lineaments, which offer clues to the pattern of this conflict as it progresses into its third year.
Last week, President Zelensky reaffirmed the indispensability of western aid, money and materiel in repelling Russian aggression. He argued that providing the bare minimum of assistance in the hope that we may help produce a permanent frozen conflict is futile, given the scale of Putin’s expansionist ambitions—and that is the real reason behind the war itself. Equally, 10 days ago, we heard Putin rail against the prohibitive demands being made by Ukraine and the West to end the war and his warning that, if this continued, Ukraine’s statehood may suffer a very serious blow.
On manpower, we have seen waves of conscription from the Russian side. Although Putin ruled out further mass mobilisations in his end of year press conference, we must expect that further drafts will be instituted as necessity dictates. Equally, at the end of December, President Zelensky demanded half a million new troops, and we await the draft mobilisation Bill taking legislative shape and coming before the Ukrainian parliament.
We see parallels too in industrial capacity, which is a key limiting factor for both sides. Russia’s economy, admittedly affected by sanctions, is fully mobilised on to a war footing, with recent air strikes on Kyiv and Kharkiv showing that the Russians possess, for the moment at least, adequate arms and ammunition to continue their air campaign. Conversely, the Ukrainian economy and its western allies are struggling to meet the demands for ammunition for the Ukrainian ground campaign, with Ukrainian air defences still insufficient. In this respect, the UK and our NATO partners are serving as the arsenal of democracy. Leo Varadkar made this clear, rather starkly, at December’s meeting of the European Commission; without adequate support from the US and the EU, he said, Putin will win.
As well as providing critical arms to Ukraine, western powers are compelled by the febrile situation in the Middle East to look to their own security of supply of armaments. Can the Minister tell your Lordships’ House what, if any, multiyear assumptions have been made as to the viability of replenishing our own munitions stocks while continuing our essential support to Ukrainian forces? Major European armaments manufacturers, such as Norway’s Nammo, have spoken about the need to share risks with Governments, given the scale of investment that would be needed to increase production and meet current demands, as well as to mitigate the commercial risk of a sudden end to the conflict. A concerted long-term fiscal commitment is necessary by western Governments to ease the supply bottleneck, and to ease Ukrainian apprehensions about the effect that dwindling supplies will have on their strategic position.
The final parallel is in the sphere of strategic innovation. While Russia’s conventional forces have suffered heavy losses—a staggering 87% of its invasion force having been destroyed or irreparably degraded—they still present a multidomain threat. Its northern fleet and air force remain largely intact, it continues to raise the spectre of a tactical nuclear deployment, and supplies of Iranian drones and small arms and North Korean missiles, artillery and shells continue apace.
Ukraine too is seeking greater multidomain capacity. The commander of Ukraine’s forces, Valerii Zaluzhnyi, has made it clear that the stalemate on the ground indicates that this war can be won only by technological advantage. The provision and deployment of F-16s will, of course, be a significant boost to Ukraine forces, but they are old and expensive to run, and their arrival on the battlefield has been trailed for months, giving the Russians time to implement appropriate strategic defences. Given this, I fear that the arrival of F-16s, while welcome, may not substantially change the calculus of the conflict.
For all these parallels, there are crucial ways in which the two countries utterly diverge. Ukraine is a victim of unprovoked aggression and living under an existential threat, while Russia is prosecuting an expansionist conflict entirely of its own making. A stark moral difference dictates that we must do all that we can to help Ukraine survive this threat to its existence, and equally that we must do everything in our power to frustrate Putin’s aims.
Alongside present needs, this should also involve equipping ourselves to hold the perpetrators of war crimes to account in a post-conflict situation. This includes those responsible for the forcible transfer—or, in plain English, the abduction and compelled adoption —of Ukrainian children by Russians, the harrowing consequences of which were so graphically described by my noble friend Lady Kennedy of The Shaws. Over and above her suggestion as to how we should approach this, what consideration has been given to encouraging the expansion of the jurisdiction that we set out in Section 51 of the International Criminal Court Act, which allows us to pursue these crimes domestically, to ensure that those responsible can be apprehended, potentially for the rest of their lives, and punished wherever they choose to take shelter?
To return to the strategic picture, Ukraine has, for the moment, shifted into a policy of active defence, maintaining its lines and pursuing counterattacks where temporary tactical advantage can be found. While the lines may be static for the moment, is it not possible that Putin, as I suggested in your Lordships’ House last year, is measuring this war and the western electoral cycles and awaiting the possible arrival of President Trump in the White House?
This Government have been steadfast in their support for Ukraine, and they will continue to enjoy unanimous support in debates and analogous Questions in your Lordships’ House. The Minister, as he normally does, ended his remarks with the Ukrainian for “Glory to Ukraine”, the phrase popularised during the Ukrainian War of Independence between 1917 and 1921. It is in that spirit and with that objective that I speak today, trusting that our support, and that of NATO and the European allies, will continue to be effective in repelling Russian aggression.
(1 year ago)
Lords ChamberI thank the noble Baroness for her Question and her deep interest in this subject. I think the reason the Pakistan Government are doing this is that they are concerned about the activities of the Pakistan Taliban within Afghanistan, and this is their way of trying to get the Taliban Government to address that. One of the points I made to them is that that might well be counter- productive and we think this is the wrong move. We will continue to raise this with the Pakistan authorities at every level and on every occasion. Obviously, we have a specific British interest to make sure that any Afghans who worked for our authorities in Afghanistan, and who have a right to come and settle here under either of the two schemes we have, are not inadvertently pushed back into Afghanistan. That is our number one concern.
On the issue of the regime and recognition, I am sure there will be other questions about this, but, fundamentally, as the House knows, the Foreign Office always says that we recognise states and not Governments, which I know is right. However, on this occasion, when you look at this regime and what it is responsible for, you see that it bans women from working for the United Nations; it is the only country in the world to ban girls from secondary school; it restricts women’s access to parks, playgrounds and other public spaces; and it has a complete ban on women attending university. We are some way off moving to recognise this regime. We need to keep the pressure on for it to change its approach.
My Lords, the Foreign Secretary may recall when he was Prime Minister meeting members of Afghanistan Commando Force 333, a counternarcotics unit that later became a counter- insurgency unit, which was created, trained, mentored and funded by His Majesty’s Government. He will be appalled to know that former and deserving members of CF 333, and the similarly created and funded ATF 444, were wrongly refused resettlement under the ARAP process. Abandoned, several have been killed and/or tortured. About 100 CF 333 and ATF 444 applicants were rejected and are in Pakistan, fearing imminent deportation and a death sentence. Will the Foreign Secretary agree to meet with me and a delegation of noble Lords and noble and gallant Lords and Baronesses so that we can explain the compelling case for an urgent review of the rejected or rescinded approvals of their settlement applications?
I thank the noble Lord for his question. Of course, he has great experience of this, having been the Defence Secretary for a prolonged period when we were in that fight in Afghanistan, and he knows exactly about the issues he raises. I am very happy to take away the point he makes about those two units and to look at them specifically. Under the Afghan relocations and assistance policy—the ARAP scheme—I think 12,200 people have been repatriated so far. Of course, the Foreign Office scheme, for which I am responsible—the Afghan citizens resettlement scheme—has the capacity for up to 20,000 people. I am very happy to take away the specific points that he makes and see what we can do to help.
(1 year, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, climate change is already having a material effect on malaria transmission. Forecasts suggest that owing to a rise in global temperatures, transmission seasons could be up to five months longer by 2070. Already, malaria rates in Mozambique are at their highest since the current reporting phase began in 2017. More than 70% of anti- malaria drugs used in Africa are imported, so what is the international community doing, and what are we doing, to stimulate local manufacture of drugs to ensure that weaknesses in the international supply chain do not result in preventable deaths?
The noble Lord is correct and I can assure him, from our experience of the Covid pandemic, that we are working in collaboration with India on global health generally but specifically on malaria. We welcome India in tackling global health threats and the whole issue of malaria is something we are looking at specifically, based on our research, in terms of collaboration with India on manufacturing. Indeed, two of the main vaccines currently being developed for malaria are actually UK research based.
(1 year, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the tragic events in Israel and Gaza, consequent on the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas’s unprecedented attack on Israel are, sadly, an appropriately sobering backdrop against which to debate this Question before your Lordships’ House.
Before getting into the substance of my remarks, I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Helic, whose commitment and depth of expertise both found expression in her characteristically forensic opening speech. I thank her for securing this important and timely—nay, urgent—debate.
I say that the events in the Middle East are an appropriate backdrop because the reaction in Bosnia and Herzegovina to those dreadful events has served to further exemplify the fragility of its own peace. In the city of Mostar, the Palestinian flag is raised above the Old Bridge in the predominantly Bosniak eastern section of the city, while support for Israel is increasingly vociferous in the western, predominantly Croatian, side. The chairwoman of the Council of Ministers, who unequivocally condemned Hamas violence, was publicly rebuked by the chairman of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s tripartite presidency for “carelessly” and “selfishly” failing to explain the historical suffering which, in his view, partially justified the actions of Hamas. These are senior members of a single, fragile polity.
The ease with which divisions on this question can be mapped on to the ethnic and civilisational division within Bosnia and Herzegovina is worrying. It should make us all consider how we can avoid ethnic conflicts in other geopolitical spheres being weaponised as proxies for regional frustrations. In the western Balkans, history—or, perhaps more correctly, historiography—is not an exercise in retrospection but the currency of the present. Russia uses that fact to inflame division, promote anti-western narratives, propagate disinformation and weaken those institutions upon which an often-fragile peace depends.
There are other important factors, too. Both China and Russia used vaccine diplomacy very effectively in the region, exploiting the rocky start to the EU’s vaccination programme. In this context, the fact that the 2022 Balkan Barometer indicated a 6% decline in support for EU membership across the region should cause us to ask ourselves how successful we have been in counteracting not just Russian disinformation but its more conventional deployment of soft power. Of course, enlargement fatigue does play a large part in this—not necessarily an ebbing of support for EU membership in principle, but a frustration that accession has begun to feel more like a distant mirage than an approaching geopolitical fact. Although we have rather diminished our influence over the EU accession process, I urge our Government, in this regard, to do what they can to narrow the gap between aspiration and reality.
While it is true that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine may weaken its capacity to foment division in the Balkans, it is equally true that it has much to gain by so doing. But a weakened Russia may also create problems in the region given the fragile equilibrium which allows peace to continue. The rapidity with which Nagorno-Karabakh receded into history last month was a direct consequence of Russia’s inability to project its power into areas where it had previously been decisive. Indeed, Armenia’s Prime Minister, just a few weeks before Azerbaijan moved to erase Nagorno-Karabakh, conceded that his country’s reliance on Russian military influence for its security was a “strategic mistake”. Although no one can expect Russian disengagement from the western Balkans, any change in its ability to project influence that results from the war in Ukraine will also reverberate throughout the region, with unpredictable consequences.
In terms of the long-term constitutional settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the actions of the Bosnian Serb Republic over the last 18 months have been deeply concerning. The Bosnian Republika Srpska has gravitated towards Russia to the extent that the relationship between President Dodik and President Putin now resembles that between a pilot fish and a shark. However, as the noble Baroness, Lady Helic, reminded us, more tangibly we have seen attempts by the Republika Srpska to de-legitimise the Dayton accords altogether; an attempt to formally annex all rivers, forests and agricultural land that fall within its territory; a refusal by the Republika Srpska to recognise the legitimacy of the high representative and any decisions made under the Bonn powers, as well as systematic attacks on press freedom. Given the gridlock that is an inevitable consequence of this hardening of attitudes by the Republika Srpska, it is perhaps no surprise that Freedom House ranks Bosnia and Herzegovina the lowest among all countries in the region in terms of the viability of its democratic institutions and democratic accountability more broadly.
When we think about the Dayton accords, it is worth recognising that while the peace they brought was, in human terms, beyond price, in political terms it has come at a heavy cost. As the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights acknowledges, the Dayton accords entrenched ethnic divisions and created a governing structure whose complexity renders it vulnerable to the aspirations of ethno-nationalists.
In the time available I have been able to touch on only one or two critical elements in the region. But we know there are tensions in several countries across the region—tensions that require constant attention if they are not to lead to violence. If we are to ensure that these frozen conflicts remain frozen and not kindled into flame by malicious external actors, the West will have to exert the same, or greater, commitment to the exercise of soft power—and to the projection of force when needed—as that exerted by our strategic adversaries. For the reasons set out by the noble Baroness in her excellent opening speech, if ever there was a time for the international community to rise to this challenge in the western Balkans, it is now.
(1 year, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in respect of the plant itself, it is important that the IAEA gets in to find out whether there are explosive devices on top of two of the reactors, why they would be put there and what likely damage they would do if they exploded. It is suggested that they are there for it to appear as though the Ukrainians have bombed the plant themselves. The most important thing here is not to get confused between perceived dangers and real dangers. This plant is of a particular design. My understanding is that the most dangerous nuclear fission that could come from it will have been depleted because it has not been working for months—I think it is iodine-113, though this is not from my expertise but from my reading. We need an authoritative explanation of the risks, from a nuclear engineer of repute, telling us what the potential consequences would be of further damage to this plant—not speculation by people from their recollections of previous incidents. This is a distinctive plant that was created in a particular way. My understanding is that we can be reassured that, while it would not be a good thing to happen and there would be significant local consequences, this is not a repeat of Chernobyl.
The noble Lord is well-informed by his reading, and his is very much an accurate assessment. This particular plant is much more modern and state-of-the-art. The fact is that most of its activities and energy generations have been turned down—indeed, most of the reactors are now not operational. Even without inspections, that assessment can be made. However, I add the necessary caveat that all of us, including Russia, will get reassurance when the IAEA can get access and, as the noble Lord said, there is an expert opinion on the table that we all recognise. This war will continue but it is in Russia’s interests, not just Ukraine’s and everyone else’s, to allow access. Russia itself has been a signatory to ensuring that this kind of access and assessments of facilities are done regularly, accurately and comprehensively.
(1 year, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberTo ask His Majesty’s Government what steps they are taking with international partners to facilitate the present round of peace talks between the Government of Colombia and the National Liberation Army.
My Lords, the ceasefire agreed between the Colombian Government and the National Liberation Army is a welcome step. We share the hope that it will contribute to improving security and alleviate the suffering of conflict-affected communities. As penholder on the Colombia peace process at the UN Security Council, the UK plays a key role in co-ordinating support for Colombia with international partners. Since 2015, the UK has committed £80 million through the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund to support the peace process and improve stability and security in Colombia.
My Lords, the recent visit of the Foreign Secretary to Colombia to discuss ongoing support for the implementation of the 2016 peace agreement, and the commitment of a further £3.6 million for that purpose, is to be welcomed and commended. The Minister will be aware of the importance of the Colombian Office of the High Commissioner for Peace to the implementation of President Petro’s policy of total peace. However, this department lacks sufficient resources to carry out the necessary work to promote negotiations with the wide range of armed groups that are still functioning in Colombia. Is it possible to hypothecate any of our ongoing financial support for the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace, and will His Majesty’s Government consider so doing?
I thank the noble Lord for raising the broader issue, and I will certainly take his suggestion back to the appropriate Minister. Although we are not directly supporting the Colombian Office of the High Commissioner for Peace, which he mentioned, we are supporting it indirectly through the trust funds that I mentioned earlier, to which we are, I believe, still the second-largest UN donor. This is a priority for us in our relationship with Colombia. Of course we want the process to succeed; it matters to the whole world that it does.