UK-Mauritius Agreement on the Chagos Archipelago

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Monday 30th June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, I am pleased to have the opportunity to contribute to the debate today on the Motion in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, and to take the opportunity it affords to examine, insofar as five minutes allows me so to do, the principles that underpin opposition to this treaty.

Before I do so, I congratulate, as others have, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Prentis of Banbury, on an excellent maiden speech. Having heard the response to her father’s valedictory speech, which was also an excellent speech, it seems that I must have missed out in the 13 years I was in the other place and the 15 years I have been in your Lordships’ House, because I have never had the opportunity to be as close to him in working in this House as many other noble Lords have. However, I know of his reputation and I take this opportunity to thank him for his distinguished service to both Houses and wish him a long and happy retirement.

The Opposition have left no stone unturned and certainly no thesaurus unconsulted in heaping execration on this agreement. It has been described as “shameful”, a “surrender treaty”, and a “sell-out”. All of this was built upon by the Leader of the Opposition, who went further, suggesting the terms of the agreement represented a series of

“snivelling capitulations to left-wing activists who hate Britain and are ashamed of our history”.

For someone purportedly animated by a detailed knowledge of our island story, she seems to have neglected some of the more recent chapters. It was of course a Conservative Government—one in which she served at Cabinet level—who conducted 11 rounds of negotiations with Mauritius to resolve the legal status of the Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia.

This whole process of course started with the Written Statement made on 3 November 2022. There has been toing and froing about what was actually in this Statement, so, with your Lordships’ permission, I will read it, because it reveals quite a lot. In its first paragraph, the Statement says:

“Following the meeting between the then Prime Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for South West Norfolk, and Prime Minister Jugnauth at the UN General Assembly, the UK and Mauritius have decided to begin negotiations on the exercise of sovereignty over the British Indian Ocean Territory … Chagos archipelago. Through negotiations, taking into account relevant legal proceedings, it is our intention to secure an agreement on the basis of international law to resolve all outstanding issues”.—[Official Report, Commons, 3/11/22; col. 27WS.]


If the issue of sovereignty was never on the table in these previous negotiations—something belied by the Statement from which I have just read—it is essential that the party opposite explains what its negotiating aims were. Of what did these negotiations consist if, as the Motion we are considering today implies, sovereignty and financial recompense were off the table? The question then arises, what was on the table beyond a union flag and a sheet of paper containing the single word “No”?

Your Lordships’ House is being asked to believe, in defiance of the negotiating parameters publicly announced by the Foreign Secretary at the time, from which I have already quoted, that these 11 rounds of negotiation had produced an embryonic deal utterly unlike that which the Government have now laid before Parliament. If the then Government were so wedded to the status quo and felt that the principle of British sovereignty over the Chagos Islands was inviolable, as most of the Opposition appeared to, why did they initiate negotiations at all, let alone go through 11 successive rounds?

As the report from the International Agreements Committee makes clear, a refusal to ratify this treaty and a further refusal to negotiate would represent a “greater risk” to the future of our base on Diego Garcia, given the vanishingly small possibility that an international court would find in our favour. I know that it has become fashionable in some quarters to see international law as an à la carte menu, but much of Britain’s influence and authority rests on our reputation—the damage of recent years notwithstanding—of adherence to these norms.

As we think about the future of the base and our role in the Indo-Pacific, I should like to engage the question of Chinese influence. Those opposed to a deal over Diego Garcia have suggested that Mauritian sovereignty over the islands may represent a huge security risk if the Chinese bring their influence to bear. While we will need to exercise constant vigilance in this respect—particularly as we move towards the end of the initial 99-year lease—precedent suggests this risk can be managed. Kenya, where since 1964 we have also had a permanent military presence—the British Army Training Unit Kenya—has a far deeper economic relationship with China, including significant indebtedness and, as of April this year, has agreed to a new agreement creating a China-Kenya community. There are many more examples I can give—including Somalia and Djibouti—where a far more explicit degree of Chinese influence has not precluded the UK maintaining a strategically significant military presence.

Mauritius is not a Chinese cat’s paw. According to the Rule of Law Project’s global ranking, its judiciary is the second most robust and independent in Africa. It has historically low levels of corruption and its principal trading partners include France, India and South Africa, as well as China. Try as I might, I can find no evidence that Mauritius and China are becoming best friends. What I can find are lots of places where it is asserted that this is being claimed—but there is no basis for it. Mauritius has strong diplomatic ties with several countries and my research supports the contention that its closest allies are the United Kingdom, France, India and South Africa.

In closing, I return to the issue of negotiation. In the other place, the shadow Defence Secretary stigmatised this deal as representing a

“complete and utter negotiating failure”.—[Official Report, Commons, 22/5/25; col. 1285.]

I believe that this Motion and the Opposition’s motive in moving it represent their failure to negotiate with reality. The treaty negotiated by this Government ensures British control of Diego Garcia for the next century and beyond, it has been welcomed by the US Government with whom we work closely in this area, and we have an effective veto on developments on the Chagos Archipelago, together with a 24-nautical mile buffer zone.

I will offer this agreement my full support in these and any other proceedings in your Lordships’ House.