Ukraine

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Friday 26th January 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a privilege to follow so many thoughtful contributions informed by experience and expertise. It is a particular pleasure to have been present at the excellent maiden speech made by the noble Lord, Lord Camoys. He can go home later this evening, clear that it was a job well done, and come back in the confident knowledge that he has the ear of your Lordships’ House.

It is a truism to say that this debate is taking place at a critical time in the Ukrainian struggle to repel Russian aggression and safeguard its national integrity, an assessment that could have been made with equal truth on every day since the Russian invasion began on 22 February 2022. As both sides have now undertaken offensives and counteroffensives, we can see the emergence of broad strategic lineaments, which offer clues to the pattern of this conflict as it progresses into its third year.

Last week, President Zelensky reaffirmed the indispensability of western aid, money and materiel in repelling Russian aggression. He argued that providing the bare minimum of assistance in the hope that we may help produce a permanent frozen conflict is futile, given the scale of Putin’s expansionist ambitions—and that is the real reason behind the war itself. Equally, 10 days ago, we heard Putin rail against the prohibitive demands being made by Ukraine and the West to end the war and his warning that, if this continued, Ukraine’s statehood may suffer a very serious blow.

On manpower, we have seen waves of conscription from the Russian side. Although Putin ruled out further mass mobilisations in his end of year press conference, we must expect that further drafts will be instituted as necessity dictates. Equally, at the end of December, President Zelensky demanded half a million new troops, and we await the draft mobilisation Bill taking legislative shape and coming before the Ukrainian parliament.

We see parallels too in industrial capacity, which is a key limiting factor for both sides. Russia’s economy, admittedly affected by sanctions, is fully mobilised on to a war footing, with recent air strikes on Kyiv and Kharkiv showing that the Russians possess, for the moment at least, adequate arms and ammunition to continue their air campaign. Conversely, the Ukrainian economy and its western allies are struggling to meet the demands for ammunition for the Ukrainian ground campaign, with Ukrainian air defences still insufficient. In this respect, the UK and our NATO partners are serving as the arsenal of democracy. Leo Varadkar made this clear, rather starkly, at December’s meeting of the European Commission; without adequate support from the US and the EU, he said, Putin will win.

As well as providing critical arms to Ukraine, western powers are compelled by the febrile situation in the Middle East to look to their own security of supply of armaments. Can the Minister tell your Lordships’ House what, if any, multiyear assumptions have been made as to the viability of replenishing our own munitions stocks while continuing our essential support to Ukrainian forces? Major European armaments manufacturers, such as Norway’s Nammo, have spoken about the need to share risks with Governments, given the scale of investment that would be needed to increase production and meet current demands, as well as to mitigate the commercial risk of a sudden end to the conflict. A concerted long-term fiscal commitment is necessary by western Governments to ease the supply bottleneck, and to ease Ukrainian apprehensions about the effect that dwindling supplies will have on their strategic position.

The final parallel is in the sphere of strategic innovation. While Russia’s conventional forces have suffered heavy losses—a staggering 87% of its invasion force having been destroyed or irreparably degraded—they still present a multidomain threat. Its northern fleet and air force remain largely intact, it continues to raise the spectre of a tactical nuclear deployment, and supplies of Iranian drones and small arms and North Korean missiles, artillery and shells continue apace.

Ukraine too is seeking greater multidomain capacity. The commander of Ukraine’s forces, Valerii Zaluzhnyi, has made it clear that the stalemate on the ground indicates that this war can be won only by technological advantage. The provision and deployment of F-16s will, of course, be a significant boost to Ukraine forces, but they are old and expensive to run, and their arrival on the battlefield has been trailed for months, giving the Russians time to implement appropriate strategic defences. Given this, I fear that the arrival of F-16s, while welcome, may not substantially change the calculus of the conflict.

For all these parallels, there are crucial ways in which the two countries utterly diverge. Ukraine is a victim of unprovoked aggression and living under an existential threat, while Russia is prosecuting an expansionist conflict entirely of its own making. A stark moral difference dictates that we must do all that we can to help Ukraine survive this threat to its existence, and equally that we must do everything in our power to frustrate Putin’s aims.

Alongside present needs, this should also involve equipping ourselves to hold the perpetrators of war crimes to account in a post-conflict situation. This includes those responsible for the forcible transfer—or, in plain English, the abduction and compelled adoption —of Ukrainian children by Russians, the harrowing consequences of which were so graphically described by my noble friend Lady Kennedy of The Shaws. Over and above her suggestion as to how we should approach this, what consideration has been given to encouraging the expansion of the jurisdiction that we set out in Section 51 of the International Criminal Court Act, which allows us to pursue these crimes domestically, to ensure that those responsible can be apprehended, potentially for the rest of their lives, and punished wherever they choose to take shelter?

To return to the strategic picture, Ukraine has, for the moment, shifted into a policy of active defence, maintaining its lines and pursuing counterattacks where temporary tactical advantage can be found. While the lines may be static for the moment, is it not possible that Putin, as I suggested in your Lordships’ House last year, is measuring this war and the western electoral cycles and awaiting the possible arrival of President Trump in the White House?

This Government have been steadfast in their support for Ukraine, and they will continue to enjoy unanimous support in debates and analogous Questions in your Lordships’ House. The Minister, as he normally does, ended his remarks with the Ukrainian for “Glory to Ukraine”, the phrase popularised during the Ukrainian War of Independence between 1917 and 1921. It is in that spirit and with that objective that I speak today, trusting that our support, and that of NATO and the European allies, will continue to be effective in repelling Russian aggression.