Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 2nd June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to support the Bill and to follow a characteristically comprehensive and persuasive opening speech by my noble friend the Minister, as well as the well-informed and forensic contribution of my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti, and the excellent speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton.

It would be impossible in six minutes for me to engage with any substantial amount of the issues that have been alluded to or discussed; everything that has been said thus far in today’s proceedings has been wide ranging and reflective of the broader debate on these questions. So, mindful of time and of the specificity of previous contributions, I plan to restrict myself to one or two observations about the Bill’s provisions, as well as the broader challenges that they seek to engage. Given the nature and tone of other contributions, I do not intend to belabour the point about the inheritance bequeathed to my noble friend the Minister and the Government by the party opposite, but it is worth emphasising that the measures we are debating today are necessitated by 14 years, or thereabouts, of largely ineffectual policy, with occasional performative harshness here and there in that period.

Here, I will depart from my script to congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Harper, on his excellent maiden speech. I look forward to debating with him and hearing him debate in future.

I welcome the commitment in the Bill to cross-agency working under the aegis of the new border security commander. It is unquestionably true that previous efforts to reduce illegal arrivals in the UK were hamstrung by a lack of co-ordination and a tendency for government departments and agencies to work in silos. Under the provisions of Clauses 3 and 5, partner authorities in their activities must only “have regard” for the strategic priorities document produced by the commander. Thinking over the strength of those provisions, I read the Second Reading proceedings in the other place, and while picking my way through the comments of the shadow Home Secretary, I realised, peering through a mist of disbelief and astonishment on some occasions, that I found myself responsive to one, but only one, element of his remarks. He suggested something supported by a briefing from the Law Society of Scotland, which other noble Lords may have received; that the title “border security commander” is something of a misnomer, given that these provisions presuppose a system based on co-operation rather than compliance. What precedent have the Government drawn upon in coming to the decision that the commander and partner authorities should have regard for, rather than comply with, the priorities in the strategic document?

Clause 37, repealing the entirety of the safety of Rwanda Act, is, of course, entirely welcome. I cannot help but be struck by the criticism levelled at the Government by the Benches opposite in this context. We have been told on a number of occasions already that we are removing a deterrent that could have a transformational effect on the inflow of illegal migration. In order to take this critique seriously—which, frankly, I do not—we have to accept that, having finally found a silver bullet for a problem that has bedevilled this country for years, the previous Government did not discharge it or receive a consequent wave of acclimation from a grateful nation, but called a general election before the first flight had taken off. This repeal only confirms what we already knew: that this scheme was performative rather than substantive in conception and intent.

In this context, I should also mention those voices who urge the UK to disregard elements of international law to ensure that we can take appropriately severe measures to discourage illegal migration. Apart from comments already made in this speech, although this is a national problem, it can be solved only with international co-operation. The new agreements that this Government have reached with Germany, Iraq, the Calais group and the G7 are testament to this. Displaying a disregard for international law before asking for co-operation with international partners, would, to say the least, represent a somewhat quixotic approach.

On the wider point of the international picture, I have a question for the Minister about the retention of Section 59 of the Illegal Migration Act. As noble Lords will be aware, Section 59 makes any asylum or human rights claim by a national of a safe state inadmissible, save in exceptional circumstances. I know that the Section 59 powers have not been commenced, but if they are not going to be used, why not use this Bill to remove them altogether? To take but one example of the commencement of these powers possibly posing a problem, which has already been alluded to, Georgia was added to the safe states list by the previous Government but is an increasingly hostile environment for LGBTQ people. Given that the Home Office recently granted asylum to people from Georgia, the purpose of Section 59, even in abeyance, is somewhat questionable.

Mindful of time, I limit myself to one final question. On 10 February, the Home Office published significant changes to the good character requirement guidance for British citizenship applications. The updated guidance stipulates that asylum seekers who previously entered the UK illegally will typically be refused citizenship regardless of the time elapsed since their entry. I accept that, where safe and legal routes exist, taking the alternative of illicit entry can legitimately be seen as evidence of an absence of good character. However, if someone has a legitimate claim to asylum but came from a country with no safe legal route in place at the time they entered, is this really evidence of want of good character? I would be grateful for the Minister’s reflections on that question.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 3rd September 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Browne of Ladyton]

104: Clause 38, page 31, line 13, leave out “58” and insert “59”

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 104 in my name and that of my friend the noble Lord, Lord Cashman. In so doing, I would like to take this opportunity to thank my noble friend Lord Dubs, who, in my absence, moved and spoke to amendments in my name. He did so with characteristic thoughtfulness, eloquence and rigour, and I am pleased to have this chance to record my gratitude. I am also pleased to have this chance to record my gratitude to the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, who was willing to move and speak to Amendment 104 on 10 July, had he not been defeated by time.

This amendment seeks to do something essentially very simple to the Bill that is before the Committee and the legislation it relates to. However, I hope that the Committee will bear with me as in some ways it requires a complicated explanation—I will do my best not to complicate it even more. Essentially, it seeks to repeal Section 59 of the Illegal Migration Act and, in so doing, remove certain anomalies, which I will come to.

Section 59 extends the current inadmissibility process for certain asylum claims and other human rights claims from what was, initially, broadly nationals or those who came from the EEA states, one or two other European states and other countries that are deemed safe. The mechanism for this in Section 59 is a list of safe states—countries from which an asylum or human rights claim must be declared inadmissible unless exceptional circumstances apply. That list can be added to, and the list that was originally drafted in the clause was increased to include India and Georgia by regulations that were laid on 8 November 2023.

I could detain the Committee for quite a time explaining the state these countries were in in respect of human rights on that date. I will read, in short, from the United States’s 2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Georgia—that is the source of the information and noble Lords can find it and read it for themselves. I will read only two of about seven lines:

“Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: torture or inhuman, cruel, or degrading treatment; arbitrary arrest or incarcerations; serious problems with the independence of the judiciary, along with investigations and prosecutions widely considered to be politically motivated; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media”.


The first three lines of the United States’s 2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: India included the following:

“Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: unlawful and arbitrary killings, including extrajudicial killings by the government or its agents; torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment by police and prison officials; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest and detention; political prisoners or detainees; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy”.


I will stop there—that is enough. There are many other lines that come with that.

Despite this and other information from other sources, the then Government thought that these two countries were candidates for a list of safe states, and therefore places from which certain asylum or human rights claims would be declared inadmissible.

I believe that this amendment to repeal this is in harmony with the animating spirit of this legislation. Repealing Section 59 would terminate the proposition in it that you can declare states to be safe in this way, despite the evidence, and would remove certain anomalies that I will come to. It presently extends the inadmissibility process for asylum claims and other human rights claims. The distinction between human rights claims and claims to asylum is critical, but Section 59 conflates them. Unlike asylum claims, many human rights claims are founded not on an assessment of a country’s safety but on an individual’s connection with this country: family ties and relationships. As it stands, we risk imposing what amounts, in an anomalous fashion, to a blanket ban on consideration of human rights claims from a country because it is deemed safe, when that is irrelevant to the nature of the claim.

Section 59 deprives individuals of a right to appeal, as these claims, because they are disregarded from the outset, go unconsidered rather than refused, and therefore there is no right of appeal unless there are exceptional circumstances. But what might be considered exceptional circumstances are defined in the legislation in a non-exhaustive way, with narrow examples, such as derogations from human rights obligations under the ECHR or suspension from the EU by the country itself. They are simply inapplicable to states such as India, leaving us with legal uncertainty, over and above all the other problems with this process.

Noble Lords will know that exceptional circumstances have been narrowly interpreted by the Court of Appeal in the past as requiring compelling reasons to believe that there is a clear risk that the individual will be liable to persecution in the country of origin. This test is clearly incorrect for private and family life claims—again a result of the conflation of human rights and asylum claims.

Returning to the list of safe countries, I believe that this involves the other place and your Lordships’ House being asked to do something that they are plainly ill-equipped to do. The list of safe states in Section 59 of the Illegal Migration Act may be altered by the Government and future Governments through affirmative regulations, but I for one would feel myself placed in an invidious situation if asked to vote on whether a member of a religious minority could be considered safe in parts of India; on whether a young Bohra girl is safe in India, given the very high incidence of FGM in that community; or on whether a gay man in Georgia can be considered as residing in a safe country. To reach an informed judgment in these cases would require an omniscience that I do not pretend to possess.

I am grateful to the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association, which, in the case of Georgia, drew my attention to the case of Noah, a man who, mere months before Georgia was declared safe, was granted refugee status in the UK. After coming out as gay, he was physically attacked by his own family members, he was forced to stay in a hospital for people with mental illnesses, and he had an exorcism performed on him at his local church. His partner was attacked too, but the police in Georgia did not protect either of them—but the United Kingdom did, despite this legislation being in power at the time.

Considering this case and others like it, the lack of an obligation to keep the list of safe countries under constant review is troubling, over and above all the criticism that I have. The Committee needs no reminder of the tortuous logic-chopping that accompanied the decision to legislate as to the absolute and perpetual safety of the country of Rwanda. I worry that the absence of a reviewing mechanism for this list threatens to put us in a similarly invidious position.

Of course, Section 59 has not been fully commenced, but, given that the Home Office has granted asylum or human rights protections to hundreds of people from the countries on the list in recent years, even the shadow of the Section 59 provision is damaging. If commenced, these individuals would have no way to challenge a decision wrongfully to deport them. So either the Home Office has, in granting asylum or human rights claims, been acting out of a superfluity of compassion, or the suggestion that these countries are in all circumstances safe is wrong.

It is my belief that Section 59 of the Illegal Migration Act is ill-conceived and that it ties the hands of the Home Secretary, who, under its provision, must declare asylum and human rights claims from these countries as an inadmissible, save where largely undefined exceptional circumstances are detected. If fully commenced, it risks involving us, going forward under a new Government, in multiple breaches of our obligations under international law. I urge the Committee to support Amendment 104. I beg to move.

[Lord Cashman (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 104 and I am proud to follow my noble friend after the passionate and eloquent way he introduced it. He spoke passionately and deeply about the young man, Noah, and the experience that he had in Georgia. Before I speak further in support of this amendment, to which I have added my name, I wish to pay tribute to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, who, as your Lordships know, died on 6 May this year. I had the privilege to work alongside him on immigration and asylum legislation in this House. He was always seeking to bring justice and fairness where there was none and to give a voice to the voiceless. His contributions will be greatly missed. It is clear to me, having listened to previous interventions on this Bill and from the media stigmatisation of migrants, that this vital work of bringing justice and fairness to the system must go on.

I support Amendment 104, which, as I said, has been put before your Lordships’ House so eloquently by my noble friend. I also welcome and support Amendment 203E. These amendments bring us back to addressing the primary reasons of those seeking asylum. It is vital that each case is processed solely on its merits and not on the presumption of the safety of the country from which the person has fled, despite the issue of exceptional circumstances to which my noble friend has already referred. I am pleased to say the noble Lord, Lord Browne, has put the case exhaustively and therefore there is very little for me to add.

I believe this amendment to be essential because Section 59, once fully commenced, will make far-reaching amendments to the general inadmissibility of asylum claims from EU nationals, introduced by the Nationalities and Borders Act 2022. This could result in violations of the UK’s international human rights obligations, and I am grateful for the briefings that I have received, particularly from the Refugee Council. Section 59 of the Illegal Migration Act extends the current general inadmissibility of asylum claims from nationals of EU member states to cover human rights claims and to cover nationals of other countries deemed to be safe, despite concerns expressed about the safety of three of those states: India, Albania and Georgia.

There can be no general safety presumption if there is a risk of persecution to even one recognisable section of a community. Concerns have been raised by numerous organisations on protection issues in India, Albania and Georgia, including those faced by women and girls, victims of trafficking, and minorities such as certain religious groups and LGBTQ+ people. In relation to the latter, we must recall and recognise the Supreme Court judgment of 2010, HG (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v the Home Secretary, particularly in relation to the lived experiences of such individuals seeking asylum.

Finally, there is a fundamental issue with legislating for so-called safe states. The list of safe states in Section 59 of the Illegal Migration Act 2023 may be altered by the Executive through affirmative regulations, but Members of this House have expressed concern time and time again, particularly throughout the passage of the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024, that we are institutionally ill-equipped to act decisively to determine the safety of a state.

We have also expressed in your Lordships’ House concerns that we have been repeatedly asked to rubber-stamp such decisions of the Government of the day. It is our contention that the safety of a state must be designated by a review on the basis of reliable and objective information from a range of sources and regularly updated and published. I urge the Government to consider and reflect widely on this sensible and notable amendment and to work with us and the noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton, to accept this amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I thought that was what I said. I hope we can agree, at the end of this group of amendments that was livelier than I initially anticipated, that the Committee can support the Government’s direction of travel. However, I hope the amendment before the Committee today will be withdrawn.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, I offer my final remarks with the traditional thanks to all those who have contributed to the debate on Amendment 104. When I saw that I had the overt support of my friend the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, the noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady Brinton—whose support was more implied than overt—and the noble Lord, Lord German, whose support was overt, I began to think the only group that is of similar value to this one are the players that Liverpool signed in the transfer window. I thought, “I cannot possibly lose this argument”, until my noble friend explained operational benefit. I do not know if I should be pleased about the noble Lord, Lord German, reminding him of the possibility of “operational benefit”, but he found it—I will come back to that in a moment.

I heard nine Conservative speeches. I was astonished that, until the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, not one defended it—not one—and I think at least one of them may well have been responsible for the drafting of the legislation that Section 59 was in. I was therefore surprised when the noble Lord found that there was a pretty straightforward principle for Section 59, which is not that much different in its outcome to the speech made by my noble friend Lord Hanson. However, in reply to the noble Lord, Lord Cameron—and I will spend some time expanding this argument—if one looks at Clause 38 of the Bill, Section 59 is going to be pretty much alone as something that was in the Illegal Migration Act 2023. It is going to find itself in a very lonely context. The noble Lord’s argument was that one had to see this in context, but that will disappear if this Bill is passed. I will spend some more time between now and Report looking at just what that means for the ambitions that people have for Section 59 as it is presently drafted.

Some of the most important points that were made in this debate are well worth repeating. I do not intend to repeat very many of them because it has been a very wide-ranging debate and there has been a lot of repetition. It is important to start as my friend the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, encourages us to do, not only in debates but in conversations: to remember that it is people’s lived experience that should decide whether they deserve asylum or human rights protection, not conclusions that Governments or officials have come to about the temporary safety of the environments in which they may be living. This is all about people, and if we start from there and take into account all the other complexities of this legislation, we get to a point where there should be no room for Section 59 in the legislation going forward. There may need to be something similar to provide a benefit to the management of an issue of this scale, but it will not be that particular section in my view. This is a matter that I will come to again.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 11th November 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Browne of Ladyton]

59: After Clause 48, insert the following new Clause—
“Amendment to Section 59 of the Illegal Migration Act 2023(1) Section 59 of the Illegal Migration Act 2023 is amended as follows.(2) In subsection (2), for paragraph (a) substitute—“(a) for subsection (1) substitute—“(1) The Secretary of State may declare an asylum or human rights claim made by a person who is a national of a State listed in section 80AA(1) inadmissible.”;”.(3) In subsection (2), after paragraph (c) insert—“(ca) in subsection (4) after “considered” insert “or if the failure to consider an asylum or human rights claim would contravene the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Human Rights Convention”.”. (4) In subsection (3), after subsection (4) of the inserted section 80AA of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 insert—“(4A) The Secretary of State must by regulations amend the list in subsection (1) so as to remove a State if the Secretary of State is satisfied that the statements in subsection (3)(a) or (b) are no longer true of a state or territory, or part of a state or territory, in relation to a description of person.(4B) In deciding whether the statements in subsection (3)(a) or (b) are no longer true of a state or territory, the Secretary of State must have regard to the circumstances and information listed in subsection (4)(a) and (b).(4C) A description for the purposes of subsection (4A) may refer to—(a) sex,(b) language,(c) race,(d) religion,(e) nationality,(f) membership of social or other group,(g) political opinion, or(h) any other attribute or circumstance that the Secretary of State thinks appropriate.”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment alters the amendments made by section 59 of the Illegal Migration Act 2023 to sections 80A and section 80AA of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. It turns the duty into a power, to declare as inadmissible a human rights or asylum claim, which may not be exercised if the failure to consider a claim would contravene the UK’s obligations under the ECHR. It also creates a duty to remove States from the Safe States list, if they are no longer safe.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendment 59 is in my name and those of the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, whom I thank for their support. I also thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, and the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, again for their support in Committee, during which I proposed a repeal of Section 59 of the Illegal Migration Act 2023.

I proposed that we bring to an end the proposition that states may be declared safe despite the objective evidence that they are not. I explained why there should be no blanket ban on considering human rights claims when such claims have nothing to do with a state’s safety and everything to do with family unity, ties of dependency and the best interests of children. I have no doubt that banning all family claims of European wives seeking to live with their British husbands and children—when American wives, for example, would face no such impediment—will make us no friends in Europe. However, Section 59 of the Illegal Migration Act 2023 does precisely that. It extends what was a minimal pre-existing duty to declare asylum claims from EU nationals inadmissible to also cover human rights claims from EU nationals and a much wider list of states that the former UK Government called safe.

Despite these anomalies, noble Lords will recollect that I did not push my amendment to repeal Section 59 to a vote. Instead, I promised to return to the issue. From my noble friend the Minister’s response, I understand the Government’s position to be that the retention of Section 59 is worthwhile, given the flexibility it offers in ensuring that unmeritorious claims do not unnecessarily absorb limited resources. However, in my noble friend the Minister’s response to the debate on this amendment he said, in particular to the noble Lords, Lord Cameron and Lord Davies, that the Government are wary of inadmissibility duties that could result in,

“a rapidly growing number of people whose claims would be inadmissible”,

who then

“would be in a holding position, unable to be removed, including those with genuine claims”. —[Official Report, 3/9/25; col. 825.]

For the reasons my noble friend set out, Section 59 inevitably will gather in its net fish we do not intend to catch, including those with meritorious human rights claims whom we cannot lawfully remove. Therefore, although I appreciate that there must be a mechanism to manage claims fairly and efficiently, that mechanism, given the Minister’s own words, is clearly not Section 59 in its current form.

Amendment 59—I assure noble Lords that the numbering is an unintentional coincidence—is an attempt to helpfully suggest to the Government how they might turn Section 59 of the Illegal Migration Act 2023 into something workable and operationally useful. It would alter rather than repeal Section 59. It would further the Government’s objective of keeping a mechanism on the statute book that might be used to increase efficiency while ensuring that it can be operated lawfully and in a manner that does not breach fundamental human rights should the Government ever wish to implement it.

To this end, the amendment would do three simple and minimal things. First, it would turn what would be an unworkable duty to declare claims inadmissible into a workable power so to do. Interestingly, by coincidence, such a change is in harmony with Clause 38, which scraps other unworkable duties in the Illegal Migration Act. In creating a workable power, our amendment would free the hands of the Secretary of State to give her true flexibility over when and in relation to whom the power is exercised. If the Minister disagrees with our amendment, I should be grateful if he would clarify when and why a statutory duty gives greater operational flexibility than a statutory power. If the Minister is able to give an example, that would be greatly helpful to noble Lords.

Secondly, our amendment would provide the simplest and most minimal of safeguards. By “inadmissibility”, the Government are saying, “We do not wish to even consider this claim”. All this amendment would do is say, “You need not consider it if to fail so to do would not result in the UK breaching its obligations under the human rights convention”, a convention to which our Government have committed to remaining a party. Undoubtedly, the courts will not presume that it is the Government’s intention to breach their international law obligations. Rather than leaving the murkiness of exceptional circumstances to save the Government from illegality, it would be much simpler if we—and by “we” I mean Parliament—were to write what we mean in the statute book, rather than hoping that what we mean will be read by the courts into the legal uncertainties of a non-exhaustive list of exceptional circumstances.

I appreciate that if Section 59 were ever fully commenced, the Government would have to issue guidance giving their interpretation of exceptional circumstances, but such guidance is not an aid to statutory interpretation. As this Government intend to comply with their human rights convention obligations, a proposed minimal safeguard should not pose any obstacle to them. However, it would provide guardrails should future Governments have different intentions—and that may be a possibility that is nearer than we would like to think.

If this Government do not intend to implement Section 59, they should amend it if they will not repeal it. If they intend to implement it, they must be prepared for litigation and to be tied up in the courts for the rest of this Parliament trying to explain whether it is compliant with human rights and what they mean by exceptional circumstances. Woolly exceptional circumstances should not be made to do all the hard work and be interpreted expansively to comply with human rights. That will only bring unnecessary criticism down upon our human rights framework and overcomplicate the matter for our courts. I suggest that a matter as important as this should not be left to guidance to be interpreted by the Government of the day. It is our job, it is Parliament’s job, to set the appropriate boundaries. If the Minister disagrees with me on this point, I should be grateful if he would clarify how the exceptional circumstances test would apply to EU nationals making private life claims or even seeking entry to live here with their families. Would they really be considered only exceptionally or would they be considered as a matter of course? How about Georgia? Would protection claims from Georgian nationals be considered only exceptionally? What further exceptional circumstances would the Government need simply to admit the two above claims?

Thirdly, and finally, the amendment would create a simple mechanism for a state to be removed from the safe state list. If the Secretary of State considers that it is no longer safe in general or safe for a recognisable section of the community, in this amendment we have listed the descriptions of persons who may be unsafe because of their sex, language, race, religion, nationality, membership of a social or other group, political opinion or any other appropriate attribute or circumstance. Only truly safe states should be on the list at all. This again would further operational efficiency as it would ensure that caseworkers need not make hard case-by-case decisions about whether to declare a claim inadmissible when the Government already consider that the state generally is unsafe or ordinarily unsafe for minorities. Fortuitously, the Government have already agreed to undertake a continuous review of the safety of the states on the list and to remove from the list states that are no longer safe. Therefore, this amendment is wholly in line with their commitment.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

I am grateful to my noble friends Lord Browne of Ladyton and Lord Cashman for the amendment today, and to the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, for his support. I was pleased to have the opportunity to meet my noble friend outside the House to hear his concerns at first hand. I again wish the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, all the best for a speedy recovery and return to this place.

Amendment 59 seeks to change the way in which Section 59—that is confusing, I know—of the Illegal Migration Act 2023 would, if fully commenced, amend the inadmissibility provisions of Sections 80A and 80AA(1) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. I am grateful to my noble friends for the consideration they have given to this matter and I acknowledge the importance of the issues raised.

As my noble friend has said, Section 59 of the Illegal Migration Act has not been fully commenced. The Government have been clear that we are retaining it to allow for flexibility—that goes to the point that the noble Lord, Lord German, made—in its future implementation in a way that best assists us to address the significant challenges brought by asylum and migration.

Section 59 itself will, if commenced, amend Section 80A of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, with the effect that the existing inadmissibility provisions in respect of asylum claims made by EU nationals will extend to human rights claims made by nationals from a wider list of countries set out in Section 80AA(1) of that Act. The first part of the amendment in my noble friend’s name seeks to change the duty at Section 80A to a power, and to add an explicit provision allowing the power to be exercised only where it would not result in a person’s human rights being breached. I understand why my noble friends Lord Cashman and Lord Browne of Ladyton put forward this amendment, but, as I hope to explain, it is not necessary and could prevent us implementing Section 59 in a different, more robust way.

Those bringing this amendment are aware of the provision currently set out in Section 80A of the 2002 Act which displaces the duty to declare an EU asylum claim inadmissible in the event that exceptional circumstances are identified. Although Section 80A(5) sets out some examples of when an exceptional circumstance will arise—currently in respect only to certain EU claims—these examples are not exhaustive or indeed rigid. Exceptional circumstances can already be applied more broadly, on a case-by-case basis, to ensure fairness and lawfulness in all EU asylum claims, and well-established case law already sets this out very clearly.

If Section 59 is commenced in its current form, updated policy guidance will be published to set out clearly how the exceptional circumstances safeguard should be applied for all claim types, taking account of the different considerations due in asylum and human rights claims. This will allow us to robustly and promptly process unmeritorious asylum and human rights claims at the earliest juncture, but—and this is the important point that goes to my noble friend Lord Cashman’s point—whenever necessary, it will allow us to divert claims from inadmissibility action and instead consider them substantively, ensuring that individuals’ rights under the refugee convention and the European Convention on Human Rights are maintained. It is not our objective to not have those rights upheld.

This amendment seeks to impose a duty for the Secretary of State to remove a country from the list at Section 80AA(1) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act if that country no longer satisfies the rules in that section. I say to my noble friend that the intent of this amendment is clear and commendable. It is well understood—this goes to the point made by the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu—that countries’ conditions may change, and that may mean that a country previously assessed as safe can no longer be regarded as such. It is for that reason—the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, was seeking further clarification on the power in Section 80AA(6)(b), under which regulations to remove countries from the list can be made—that if Section 59 of the Illegal Migration Act is commenced in its current form, and the list at Section 80AA(1) has effect, it is unquestionable that a country assessed to be unsafe would be removed from the list by the Secretary of State under regulation. In the short term, however, ahead of regulations being made in such cases, the exceptional circumstances safeguard would apply, displacing that inadmissibility duty and allowing the claim to be considered substantially.

Noble Lords have asked why we are keeping inadmissibility under Section 80A of the Nationality and Immigration Act as a duty, rather than a power. While the exceptional circumstance provision does admit a measure of discretion, allowing for individual risks or changes in circumstance to be taken into account, the overall duty provides for greater consistency and focus in processing such claims.

I hope that, following the meeting I have had with my noble friend on the issues that he has raised and the debate that we have had today, I have reassured him that although his points are valid, they are covered by the discretion in the legislation currently in place. I hope he will withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

I thank noble Lords who have participated in this short debate. I am particularly grateful to my noble friend Lord Cashman for his contribution to the debate and his continued support on these matters. I thank the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, for repeating the points he made when we debated this in Committee very powerfully. I thank the noble Lord, Lord German, on behalf of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. I would be grateful if he would wish her well in these circumstances and thank her for her unstinting support.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, for his personal comments. I am disappointed, as he expected I would be, but not surprised at his contribution to the debate. I recollect that, in Committee, although there were numerous contributions from the Conservative Benches behind him, not one speaker supported the provision in Section 59 of the IMA. Today, there are no speakers at all from his party on the Benches behind him even to support it by their presence, if not by their contribution to the debate.

Behind these amendments is not my legal brain—which has been relaxed for many years—but advice that I got from an expert in the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association. I thank them very much for their support.

I am disappointed by my noble friend’s response. I have no intention of dividing the House on this issue, but I reserve the right to keep it open for the next stage of deliberation. I ask my noble friend, who is generous with his time and support, whether he will reflect on—I think that is the phrase used—the implications of the provisions that I have put before the House and why they are a better resolution to the challenges of Section 59 than the view of those who support him.

I should have thanked my noble friend for his willingness to meet me and others to discuss this. We did our level best to find the time on a very busy day last Wednesday to have that meeting. It probably lasted for about three or four minutes, while I was out of the room—if I remember correctly, I was voting, but then I was voting almost every minute of every day last week. Would it be possible between now and the next stage of deliberation on this Bill to have a meeting at a time when those who have been advising me and those advising him can sit in the same room for a reasonable period of time to go through the implications of the differing approaches?

As I say, I do not intend to divide the House on this matter and therefore withdraw this amendment.

Amendment 59 withdrawn.