Civil Proceedings and Family Proceedings Fees (Amendment) Order 2015

Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood Excerpts

Wednesday 4th March 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, one problem with a Bill that stretches to 186 clauses and 11 schedules and occupies 232 pages of the Queen’s printer’s copy is that, at least by the time that Clause 180 is reached, this House’s scrutiny powers begin to wane. Thus it was that, last year, by passing Section 180 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act, the Lord Chancellor was empowered to prescribe by statutory instrument, subject to affirmative resolution, court fees exceeding the cost of doing that for which the fee is charged—enhanced fees, as they are called. That Section 180 power must be reasonably, sensitively and fastidiously used. It is bad enough that the courts should be required to be self-financing at all. The justice system properly exists for the benefit of society and the economy as a whole. There has long been objection to the basic principle of full cost recovery.

To put that aside, the order for enhanced fees goes altogether further. In a real sense, it is selling justice—apparently contrary to Magna Carta, although now sanctioned by Section 180. Small wonder that it is characterised by some as a tax-like payment rather than a realistic charge for the use of the courts. Under Section 180(6), the enhanced fees,

“must be used to finance an efficient and effective system of courts and tribunals”.

That is small comfort to those who pay enhanced fees. Why, they will not unnaturally ask, should they be subsidising the family courts or whatever other proceedings are brought which do not attract the enhanced fee liability?

That is the first, fundamental, principled objection to the order. It is an objection not just in abstract constitutional terms, but because it must inevitably carry with it reputational consequences. Frankly, it sullies the overall image of British justice, no part of which should be open to criticism as a profit-making enterprise.

The second main objection is in two linked parts. First, to some extent at least, enhanced fees are bound to deter prospective claimants from litigating their claims. The second, necessarily linked, part of the objection is that, to the extent that claims are deterred, enhanced fees will fail in their central objective of raising money. The greater the number of claims deterred, the smaller the additional sum raised by the increases.

I add four footnotes to that objection. First, as explained in the Civil Justice Council’s response in December and the Lord Chief Justice’s letter written on behalf of all the heads of division, those dramatic increases, which, as we have heard, are in some instances over 600%, have to be paid up front and in full and are likely to impact disproportionately on SMEs and litigants in person. Of course, as the Minister observed in an answer at Question Time last week to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, the heads of division were indeed consulted, but even after modifications were made they continued to voice “deep concerns” about the proposals.

Secondly, as explained in a detailed briefing paper from the Law Society, the Bar Council and various other professional bodies, clinical negligence and personal injury cases, to which the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, referred, are likely to be adversely affected.

Thirdly, contrary to the Government’s bland statement that they are confident that the concerns expressed about the risk of damage to our legal services, and London’s reputation as the leading commercial dispute resolution centre, are misplaced—a bland assurance seen in their January 2015 response to the consultation and in Appendix 2 to the House of Lords Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee report—in fact 61% of the 158 people who responded on this issue to the BIICL research which was especially commissioned by the Ministry of Justice suggested that the proposed increase in fees could have a detrimental effect on the English litigation market, with 44 of those consulted considering this to be “highly likely”.

Wisely, following the consultation, the Government abandoned their initial proposal, which was to raise yet higher enhanced fees of up to £20,000 for the issue of the higher-value commercial claims in the Rolls Building, on the basis that this would be likely to kill or, at any rate, severely lame the golden goose that has paid the vast sums which this litigation has earned the nation—billions of pounds-worth, a lot of it foreign currency. It must surely follow from that abandonment that even £10,000 is likely at least to deter some foreign claimants from litigating their claims here or to drive people, if not actually to abandon their claims, at any rate to resort to arbitration or mediation, as the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, also suggested.

With regard to my fourth footnote—I say this in fairness to the Government—unlike certain others, I do not see the employment tribunal fees experience as a directly helpful analogy. No doubt the introduction of those fees, whereas before there were none, has discouraged a number of meritorious claims but I suspect that it has discouraged at least as many unmeritorious claims—speculative claims, which used regularly to be brought and then bought off or settled because, frankly, that was a cheaper option for the defendant employers than successfully resisting them and then being left to bear their own costs, which were quite likely to be very substantially more.

A third and final reason for objecting to these increases is that they are not only intrinsically unfair when levied at this level but, in addition, produce curious and unfair anomalies. An obvious one is that all claims not specifically limited are now to attract the maximum full fee of £10,000. It is true that the Civil Justice Council said that it could see no logical justification for distinguishing between specified and unspecified money claims, and as far as it goes that is right. However, as the Lord Chief Justice’s letter points out, in personal injury cases, for example, it may well be quite impossible to value the claim when it is issued. Similarly, in many of the Rolls Building commercial cases, damages may be a subsidiary consideration. The principal relief being sought may well be an injunction or some other remedy—perhaps an account or something of that character.

My final point is that the Government are now proposing yet further enhanced fees, with a view to raising a further £55 million annually. They propose to do this—it is the subject of the January 2015 consultation document—by raising fees in possession cases and upon applications of one sort or another being made in ordinary civil proceedings. Again, there are compelling arguments against those, summarised in the Civil Justice Council’s response in February to the latest consultation round, but it is not necessary to go into them today.

Today’s Motion is of course one of regret rather than a fatal Motion. For whatever reason, Labour has apparently not been prepared to go that far. However, it will, I hope, help at least to persuade the Government that enough is enough and that really there must be no more use of this enhanced fee power. I suggest that the order is not merely to be regretted but to be deplored.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I regret that I find it difficult to understand what has made the Ministry of Justice persist with these changes in the face of the well reasoned and overwhelmingly hostile reaction to them. The ministry’s impact assessment was based upon express assumptions, described as “key”, that,

“fee changes will not affect court case volumes”;

that,

“there are no detrimental impacts on court case outcomes nor on access to justice from any increase in court fees”;

and that,

“there are … no impacts on the legal services used to pursue or defend claims”.

It was those assumptions to which the senior judiciary referred in their letter dated 19 December 2014, to which reference has already been made, which led the Lord Chief Justice to describe the proposals as,

“very sweeping and, in our view, unduly complacent”.

For judges not inclined to overstatement, that is trenchant criticism indeed. The letter was based upon the draft impact statement, which the senior judiciary had seen. Notwithstanding that criticism, the assumptions nevertheless found their way into the final impact statement when it was made on 16 January this year.

When the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, asked a Question of the Minister last Thursday, my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay questioned why these measures had not been introduced with the consent of the heads of division. Cynics, and anyone who had read the letter of 19 December, could be forgiven for the view that the reason why such consent was not sought was that it clearly would have been withheld for the very reason that the assumptions made by the department were unsustainable.

It was not only the Law Society and the Bar Council that prepared a briefing on these proposals. Other professional bodies as disparate as the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers, the Forum of Insurance Lawyers —who, of course, are usually on the other side—the Association of Business Recovery Professionals, and COMBAR, the Commercial Bar Association, joined them in referring to the evidence from individual law firms, to which the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, referred, that:

“Over 200 individual examples provided by law firms show that the total value of cases brought by individuals would be likely to fall by around one-third (35 per cent) under higher court fees. For small and medium-sized companies it would halve (a 49 per cent decrease). This suggests that increased court fees could have a significant impact on access to justice for both individuals and businesses, as fewer could afford to pay the higher rates”—

a point eloquently made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood.

--- Later in debate ---

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, expressed himself with his usual clarity and economy and once again did not spare the Lord Chancellor from his criticisms. We are coming to the end of this Parliament. It was Frank Sinatra who, in his valedictory song, said that he had some regrets but too few to mention. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has had rather more regrets over the Government’s policies. Indeed, I have had to respond to many of his Motions of Regret. Before I had the privilege of standing at the Dispatch Box, my predecessor did as well. The noble Lord has certainly held the Government to account and has been a forceful critic of the Government. As far as these fees are concerned, I hope that my response has done something to mollify his regret, and I ask him, having considered the matter, to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood]

The Minister mentioned that Section 92(3) of the Courts Act 2003, which is the requirement that when making one of these orders, states that,

“the Lord Chancellor must have regard to the principle that access to the courts must not be denied”.

I thought the Minister said that that had found its way into the actual Order. I have been looking at this and of course I am sure I shall be corrected, but an awful lot of provisions are referred to there but rather oddly not Section 92(3). One might have thought that it would be, because the second paragraph in the recital says that he has had regard to matters referred to in Section 180(3) of the 2014 Act. That is actually where one would have hoped and expected it to appear. I do not know that he makes any reference to having had regard to that provision, which the earlier statute required him to have regard to. As I said, I am open to correction, and apologetic in raising this point today.

[Lord Faulks]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord. He is quite right: the recital refers to the fact that there is an exercise of the power conferred by Section 92(1) and (2) of the Courts Act and the consultation in accordance with Section 92(5) and (6). There is no explicit reference to Section 92(3). However, in purporting to exercise those powers, it would be said, although not specifically recited, that he was exercising them in accordance with the remainder of that section.