Exchange of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information Agreement

Lord Boyce Excerpts

Monday 17th January 2022 Grand Committee

[Lord Boyce (CB)]

My Lords, I agree with and support in principle the agreement we are debating. It will strengthen our strategic position in the Indo-Pacific and help to bolster our relationship with the Five Power Defence Arrangements, which is, in my view, necessary in the light of China’s increasing assertiveness in the region. It will also bring us closer to the Quad, which has been mentioned two or three times this afternoon, and is an alliance with which we should become more closely associated.

En passant, this initiative is extraordinarily ambitious for Australia. One has to wonder whether it has truly assessed the huge cost of nuclear ownership, even if the submarines are not built in Australia. I worry that we are going to invest a massive amount of time and capital that we can ill afford only to find somewhere down the line that Australia has deemed the project unaffordable. However, I hope this will become apparent —or not—in the early stages of the studies that are under way.

Notwithstanding my broad support, none the less, I have some reservations about where this agreement might take us. I note that some commentators have said:

“AUKUS does not over-extend Britain”


as

“There is no military commitment involved in the agreement.”


Well, that all depends on how you define “military commitment”. Clearly we will not be in some sort of Article 5-type situation, but I am quite sure that there will be a drain on our military resources in terms of people and equipment as this project ramps up and thereafter as the Australian submarines achieve operationality.

This presents me with a major concern. I realise that this agreement does not provide for the transfer of naval nuclear propulsion equipment. As the Explanatory Memorandum explains, following the conclusions of the 18-month scoping programme,

“a follow-on agreement would be put in place to support such transfers as needed to then deliver the submarine capability to Australia.”

Our submarine-building programme is not in a strong place, and the need to get Dreadnought operational as soon as possible could not be more pressing given the state of the ageing Vanguard class it is due to replace.

The Explanatory Memorandum implies that we are just talking about the transfer of equipment in due course, but from where and at what cost to our own tautly stretched supply lines? No mention is made of the exchange or loan of nuclear propulsion SQEPs—suitably qualified and experienced personnel, which the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Houghton, mentioned —both uniformed and civilian. We are already in a parlous position in this area, but it is difficult to see how Australia, with no nuclear SQEPs, can manage without acquiring some of our people, which would be at significant detriment to ourselves. Australia may look to the United States but my understanding is that it, too, is stretched in its submarine-building programme from equipment, industrial and personnel aspects. I therefore agree very much with the thrust of the views of the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Houghton, on this matter. Although the agreement we are debating is not crafted to cover my concerns, can the Minister say whether the Government will lay down some markers to cover the points I have mentioned before the ratification of this agreement?

On another point, can the Minister give an assurance that we are fireproof so far as the 1958 agreement is concerned? Some may remember the mess we got ourselves into in this area when we tried to help the Canadians move forward on their aspiration for a nuclear submarine force following their 1987 defence review, which set out their vision for a three-ocean navy. The Americans were mightily upset with our offer to the Canadians to provide them with some nuclear propulsion technology, and it took a considerable time before we were able to re-establish our previously good working relationship with the United States Navy.

Paragraph 3.2 of the Explanatory Memorandum alludes to the 1958 agreement and implies that the agreement allows the United Kingdom to share nuclear naval propulsion information, but this is not covered in the agreement per se. Should we have a formal amendment to the 1958 agreement, or a codicil to it, to make sure that we are indeed fireproof?

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

We always keep a vigilant eye on wherever we can find friends and partners. As I have already indicated, we also find different ways of working with them.

AUKUS is not uncontested. As an emerging new partnership, it is open to being misunderstood. All three AUKUS partners are therefore committed to engaging positively and collaboratively with international partners on the regional and global benefits of AUKUS while pushing back on disinformation about arms races and nuclear proliferation.

In addition, we have committed trilaterally under the auspices of AUKUS to enhancing the development of joint capabilities and technology-sharing beyond the nuclear propulsion that we have discussed today. Our initial area of focus for this effort is cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, quantum computing and additional undersea capabilities. We have agreed to broaden this into other areas as our partnership develops.

The UK will use this element of AUKUS as a platform to leverage its world-leading science and technology sector, working with trilateral partners to identify and exploit opportunities for us to develop new defence capabilities from which we can all benefit. We will foster deeper integration of security and defence-related science, technology, industrial bases and supply chains. In conclusion, this is a significant partnership and a positive development for the United Kingdom, as it is for Australia, the United States and the broader region.

[Lord Boyce (CB)]

Thank you for allowing me to intervene. Can I return to the Nassau agreement for a moment? I am aware that we are talking about not nuclear weapons but nuclear propulsion, but I quote the Explanatory Memorandum:

“The US-UK Agreement for Co-operation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes of 1958 … also prevents the UK and US from disclosing restricted naval nuclear propulsion information to other countries unless specifically authorised.”


We fell foul of that with the Canadians in 1987; that is what I am talking about. It is not about nuclear weapons, but nuclear propulsion, which the Explanatory Memorandum itself admits. As I say, the agreement does not mention this per se. I come back to the point of my original speech: should we have some sort of codicil or amendment to the 1958 agreement to make sure that we do not fall foul of it in this transfer of nuclear propulsion information to Australia?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble and gallant Lord for that clarification; I apologise for misunderstanding his question. I shall need to look at that in detail and revert to him with such information as I am able to find.

In conclusion, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and her committee. I also thank your Lordships for a stimulating debate.