Strategic Defence and Security Review Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Bishop of Wakefield
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(14 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I join others in offering condolences from these Benches on the tragic death of Senior Aircraftman Scott Hughes. At remembrancetide, as has been said, we are sharply reminded of the cost of the protection of our interests internationally and the sacrificial contribution made by Her Majesty’s Armed Forces.
Living in Lincoln, as we were in 1982, we saw the Vulcans take off from RAF Scampton and RAF Waddington for Ascension Island and Port Stanley. It was a bold and courageous move and a remarkable logistical achievement. Indeed it was the only ever use of the ageing V-bomber force in anger. Its strategic impact, however, was limited. The Stanley runways were pock-marked, but not put out of action. None of this was surprising, either then or in retrospect. The Vulcans were designed first for free-fall and, later, stand-off nuclear bombing in a European theatre of conflict. For fairly obvious reasons, rarely will forces designed for one strategic purpose with a clearly defined enemy be easily adapted to an utterly different target and theatre of war.
This tiny piece of historic narrative focuses sharply for us the key issues behind the present debate. The strategic defence review is clear that we no longer face one polarised ideological enemy. No longer is it a matter of mutually assured destruction or the mobilisation of the entire nation. Indeed, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet empire in late 1989 onwards led to jubilant cries about the world now being a far less dangerous place. Twenty years on, however, following two Gulf wars, Serbia, Kosovo and Afghanistan, it all looks very different. That is, of course, the conclusion, too, of the recent report of the National Security Council.
Doubtless that has contributed to the discrepancy in figures between the overall 19 per cent cuts of the comprehensive spending review and the specific conclusions of the strategic defence and security review, resulting in a more modest 8 per cent reduction in spending. Despite this, the impact on our different forces will still be sharp, as reactions to the SDR suggest.
At root, we face two decisive questions. In an increasingly insecure and uncertain world, how can greater stability be secured? How can we plan to meet both our present and future responsibilities and afford to do so? The answer to these questions must lie primarily with those nations with a sophisticated defence capability working together for world peace and security. That must be the key to our own foreign and defence policy. There is, then, a responsibility placed on the powerful nations to protect those who are weaker. This may begin with enlightened self-interest, but the imperatives on us all direct us toward a wider concern for human flourishing and well-being.
What is Britain’s part to be in this broader search for international peace and security? How can that be integrated into a broader vision and strategy—a strategy that ultimately presses us well beyond the principles of those worthy statesmen who fashioned the North Atlantic Treaty? How, then, does the present defence review measure up to those questions?
As we have heard from noble Lords who have spoken, the reviewers had the unenviable task of seeking a pathway that embraced one of three contrasting responses open to government at this time. Those responses are often labelled “committed”, “adaptable” or “vigilant”. A committed response would have required long-term overseas deployment, which is now unsustainable within our contemporary financial resources. Vigilance would simply imply a withdrawal from much of Britain’s previous international engagement.
As we heard from the Minister when he opened this debate, the review has attempted to embrace adaptability. Such an approach would inevitably lay policy based on such a premise open to the criticism of muddle or lack of clarity. “Adaptability” can mean anything, especially when we remember the constraints that apply at present. The review bears the marks of such uncertainties, but it has the merit of feeling like an interim review, leaving options open for a return to these issues later. The Government could help to avoid confusion on this point by not using vocabulary that sounds as if it belongs to the “committed” stance when the chosen path is that of adaptability. To do otherwise risks repeating the mistakes of other Governments.
The principles that I have outlined, relating to the responsibilities of the powerful nations with sophisticated defence capabilities and our part in that, will, I hope, play a paramount role in continuing planning and debate. The initial reports of the Prime Minister’s meeting with President Sarkozy and their discussions about shared defence facilities are encouraging as a sign of co-operation in international security. We hope that it will become a reality.
The publication of this review, initiated by the previous Government and enacted by the present coalition, is a beginning and not an end. There are still further issues to be brought into the discussion. For example, all this has crucial implications, too, for the military covenant and for our responsibility as a nation to those who serve in our Armed Forces. The tributes that we have heard this morning reinforce that fact.
Some weeks ago, as we awaited the review, I wrote to the Times, highlighting the significance of this whole process. My letter coincided with a flood of correspondence about Stephen Hawking’s book on the origins of the universe and the implications for theism. I was castigated by a later correspondent for failing to be on task. Surely my job was religion, so why did I not stick to rebutting atheism and prescind from intervening in debates on defence and security? Had I replied, my response would have been to remind my correspondent of the French statesman Georges Clemenceau’s eloquent maxim that war is too important to be left to generals. It is also, I suggest, too important to be left to politicians alone. International peace and security, and the human flourishing that they should nurture, are the responsibility of every one of us individually and all of us as a nation.