Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Bishop of Manchester Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 28th June 2023 Lords Chamber

Brevity is the order of the day. I do not intend to say anything further, but I commend these amendments to the House and urge the Government to think again.

[The Lord Bishop of Manchester]

My Lords, traffickers exercise control over their victims by convincing them that they will not receive help from the authorities if they seek it. The Bill will simply add credence to that claim.

I fully sympathise with the desire to deter people from using our modern slavery laws as a means to make a spurious claim for protection, but where is the evidence? The Government cannot point at any evidence of widespread abuse of our modern slavery system, yet they propose to remove basic protections for some of the most vulnerable people in our country. It is a basic principle of law—I can find it for you in the Book of Genesis if you want—that, in our desire to convict the guilty, we should not end up punishing the innocent. Amendment 12 is the very least we need in order to protect that vital principle.

Some 41% of referrals to the national referral mechanism relate to people exploited as children, which is why I also support Amendment 112 in the name of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. We must ensure that no child victim, whatever form of exploitation they have experienced or whatever crime they may have been coerced into committing, should be disqualified from accessing protection. We owe that to children. We have a moral responsibility at the very least to provide people with the opportunity to have their case heard through the national referral mechanism without fear of immediate detention or removal.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Griffiths, told us during the last vote about the views of all the members of the Council of Europe and specifically mentioned Hungary questioning what the UK is doing—Hungary.

My name is on the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, on behalf of everyone on these Benches. The survivors of modern slavery should be protected and supported, not just because it is the right thing to do and the UK was lauded for it but to help the prosecution of criminals, of which we hear very little. The Bill indicates the extent to which the Government fail to put themselves in the shoes of victims and survivors, including those who have been trafficked here—who therefore have not come under their own steam—and particularly regarding the need for survivors to be in the UK to assist prosecutions. I could go on, but I will not.

The noble Lord, Lord Alton, is right that we need an independent anti-slavery commissioner in post. How long has it been—a year and how many months? A considerable number of criteria should be assessed, but we are where we are. We maintain our opposition to how slavery and trafficking are dealt with. I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, on his filleting of the Bill. We will be with him.

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[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 37. I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, for a very clear exposition.

Broadly speaking, I support the amendment, although I shall not be voting for it for the reasons I will now give. I concur also with the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Alton, about Christian and Muslim persecution in Nigeria, which remains a constituent country in Schedule 1.

The amendment is doing a lot of heavy lifting. Notwithstanding my support, I have some significant questions as to whether it should appear in primary rather than secondary legislation, because it is very detailed and because there are other groups that are suffering persecution which could also be included. That does not take away the very real concerns articulated by many noble Lords about lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people who may face persecution when returned to some of these countries.

I have a very significant issue. I genuinely hope that when those who tabled the amendment respond to the Minister they will disabuse me of any misapprehension about it, particularly with regard to subsection (1)(c). It seems to me that it is constitutionally unprecedented to put in primary legislation an amendment which is largely dependent on the time-limited, opaque legal process of a foreign legal entity—in this case, Section 7 of the Treaty on European Union. We are relying on the procedures of the European Union and how it handles ongoing and potentially continuous infraction procedures under that part of the treaty as a determinant of whether we include it in the Bill. That is completely unprecedented.

I can understand the points that noble Lords have made about Poland and Hungary, but those legal processes have not yet run their course and are still ongoing. That is a matter for the European Union rather than the United Kingdom.

How wide and prescriptive would this amendment be? Would infraction procedures begin against Latvia, Bulgaria, Malta and Romania? This can be incorporated over a period in secondary legislation in a statutory instrument, rather than on the face of the Bill. I say very gently to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, that he was not as clear and emphatic in his explanation and rationale for that part of his amendment as he was in the earlier part, that it is of course axiomatic that a number of people, because of their sexuality or gender preferences, would face persecution.

For that reason, I feel uncomfortable about supporting the amendment and will support the Government if they oppose it. I would be extremely grateful if those who tabled the amendment would address the issues that I have.

[The Lord Bishop of Manchester]

My Lords, we cannot countenance a situation in which people who sought asylum here because of a well-founded fear of persecution in their country of origin are then removed to a third country where they may face a similar, or even greater, level of risk. For that reason, I join others in supporting Amendment 37.

It was my privilege earlier this year to be invited to attend a reception on the Parliamentary Estate, where I met a group of LGBTQI+ women who had sought and gained asylum in this country. Their stories were harrowing. By contrast, their efforts to rebuild their lives here in Britain were inspirational.

It seems to me beyond any doubt that the threshold of safety must be different and, indeed, higher for people like these women—people who are persecuted on the basis of their sexuality or their gender identity. Putting it bluntly, if His Majesty’s Government’s travel advice to British tourists is that they should not be open about their sexuality when visiting certain countries, two things surely follow. First, those same countries are not places to which we should remove LGBTQI+ people; secondly, the Bill must provide explicit protection to that end. The noble and learned Lord’s amendment achieves that aim, and unless the Minister can offer equally concrete protections, I hope that your Lordships’ House will support it at such time as the voting machines are resurrected from the dead.

[Lord Cashman (Lab)]

My Lords, I speak in support of the amendments in this group, particularly the amendment to which I have added my name and which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, so eloquently expounded, as did the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. We have of course addressed, and will continue to address, vulnerable people in all the categories affected by the Bill. We have done so consistently—for example, for pregnant women and vulnerable children, as we have done today, and for others. When it comes to protecting the vulnerable, that is arguably how a country is judged, so we make no omission when dealing with Schedule 1.

As was said earlier—I will be brief—there are 63 countries that currently criminalise people merely because of their sexual orientation or gender identity. In a country such as Uganda, for example, for you to know that somebody is in a SOGI minority, as the UN refers to it, and not to report it to the authorities is to face two years in prison. If in Uganda you rent a home to a homosexual person, you can face up to 20 years in prison. Some 63 countries criminalise; now seven have the death penalty. The reality of state discrimination, as has been said, is death, mutilation, persecution, blackmail and coercive rape. I remember David Kato, the Ugandan activist murdered some nine or 10 years ago; his murderer has still not been brought to justice. Lives are being denied, blighted and criminalised.

We raise this issue because within Schedule 1 the majority of those countries that criminalise and offer the death penalty are on the list and there are currently no protections. We have sought reassurances throughout—at Second Reading, in Committee and now—but reassurances there have come none.

Let me finish with the words of a young Ugandan, Arthur Kayima, who said this, yesterday, here in Parliament:

“Without a Mother I grew up as a very vulnerable child and as if that was not enough, as a child, signs of not being straight were just too visible”.


Growing up in a country like Uganda, he said, being considered gay is to be considered evil—

“a curse, an abomination and a dangerously unforgiven sin”.

He continued that the President of Uganda, Museveni,

“signed into law the world’s harshest anti-LGBT+ law, which allows the death penalty for homosexual acts, long serving in prison for promoting homosexuality or renting a room to a gay couple (20 years in prison)”.

Without any reassurances, Uganda is on the list in Schedule 1.

That is the reality of being in a country with homophobic laws: those words, spoken by a man seeking asylum in the United Kingdom. No LGBT person should be sent to such a country, and that is one of the many reasons why I support Amendment 37, in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton.

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Bishop of Manchester Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments
Wednesday 12th July 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, briefly, we on these Benches support all the Motions to amend the government Motions. The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, has well made the point that even if one could have argued that the original Amendment 1 was a backdoor incorporation—an argument I always found unpersuasive—that objection certainly cannot be made of the new text of Motion A1, which is clearly nothing of the sort. The Prime Minister has been at the NATO summit in Vilnius upholding international law against breaches through Russian aggression. Indeed, the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 cited the rule of law at one of the core principles. The Prime Minister was also recently at the Council of Europe summit. Again, the core values in the declaration were the threats to human rights, democracy and the rule of law.

On Report, the noble Baroness, Lady Helic, talked about how this amendment

“is firmly in the Conservative tradition of strengthening, not undermining, the international rule of law”.—[Official Report, 28/6/23; col. 704.]

She reminded noble Lords that

“Conservative Governments were instrumental in creating the first four conventions listed in the amendment”.

Finally, on Amendment 93, we still have concerns, as do doctors, about the proposals in the Bill for as yet unproven medical age assessments. Amendment 93 provides the most basic safety net for those undergoing age assessment: the right to appeal a judgment. Removing that right will not deter any smugglers, or child refugees in need of appropriate safety and protection. We urge support for the amendment Motions.

[The Lord Bishop of Manchester]

My Lords, I support Motion A1 but will speak more particularly to Motion U1 in my name, to which the noble Baroness just referred. It proposes that if an age-assessment judicial review is in progress, removal should be delayed until its completion. I welcome comments from Ministers that those subject to an age dispute will be accommodated in an age-appropriate setting here in the UK, but can the Minister confirm that will be the case in a third country? Will Rwanda, for example, be informed that a young person is subject to an age dispute, and will the Rwandan Government then be required by the UK to keep that person separate from other adult residents and to supervise them properly as a child until the courts have made a judgment?

The Secretary of State has a legal duty to have regard to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children. Can the Minister therefore say how the welfare of a child will be protected by not allowing judicial review to act as a temporary delay to their removal? The Government appear to be arguing that when a child legally challenges an age assessment, it is simply a spurious attempt to use legal methods to postpone removal. However, as we know, the majority of children are found to be children after local authority assessments, so it is more likely that what is happening is an attempt to protect their proper right to be treated as a child. Can the Minister therefore take the opportunity at least to confirm that when an individual’s age is disputed, they will not be subject to removal before having met with a social worker and a child protection team for a more comprehensive age-assessment process?

The determination that an individual may be a child and therefore could deserve all the rights a child is due should and must be reason enough to prevent their removal. When the implications for children are so grave and lifelong, it seems that to not delay a child’s removal from the UK until those questions are resolved is immoral. I plead with the Government to recognise this as a failure of safeguarding, which we are all trying to treat at the highest possible standard. However, in view of the lateness of the hour when we are likely to reach a vote on this matter, and the many other matters your Lordships’ House has to deal with tonight, I am not minded at present to press this Motion to a Division.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I do not know whether I should declare an interest as a pseudo-lawyer, or perhaps as Mickey Mouse. I am not entirely convinced that framing the debate in that way is appropriate.

I have a number of things to say. First, the fact that Motion A1, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, has been rephrased as it has been, shows that those of us who argued that the previous version was substantive, and not interpretative, were right. However, the Motion as redrafted is also improper because it does two things—here I again respectfully part company with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton. He read the Motion but omitted words in its second line. Let us have a look at what it actually says:

“In interpreting this Act, regard shall be given to the intention that its provisions”—


that refers to the provisions in the Bill—

“and any act and omissions made as a result, are intended to comply”.

Even now, it is not properly an interpretative provision, because it does not just apply to interpreting the words; it is also said to apply to any acts and omissions made under the Act, as it will become. That still has substantive consequences, and the effect is still—this time in an evening rather than in an afternoon—that we are effectively incorporating these treaties into our domestic law.

That is why the words

“and any acts and omissions made as a result”

are still objectionable, but the rest of it, while maybe not objectionable, is unnecessary. As I mentioned on Report, the law of this country has always been that, in the absence of express words to the contrary, all statutes are presumed to be in accordance with our international obligations. That was most recently set out by Lord Dyson, speaking for the Supreme Court in the Assange case, when he said that

“there is no doubt that there is a ‘strong presumption’ in favour of interpreting an English statute in a way which does not place the United Kingdom in breach of its international obligations”.

The fact that we now have to go through the contortions of trying to fit this reformulated amendment into interpretation when it still has substantive consequences shows that this is a road down which we should not be going at all. In so far as the intention is that legislation should be interpreted in line with our international commitments, that is already part of the law. In so far as it says that

“any acts and omissions made as a result”

of this Bill are to be so interpreted, that has substantive consequences.

I respectfully suggest that those points are not those of a pseudo-lawyer, nor are they Mickey Mouse points. If I may finish where I began, it is somewhat unfortunate that that is how they are being described.

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[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, as ever, the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, was ahead of me, and clearly I should address the amendments in this group. I have already moved Motion E, which is:

“That this House do not insist on its Amendment 8.”


With the leave of the House, I shall speak also to Motions J, K, L, M and N.

The Government have considered carefully the concerns raised in your Lordships’ House about the detention of unaccompanied children and pregnant women. We recognise the sensitivities around the detention of these cohorts and, accordingly, the Government have brought forward amendments in lieu, to which the Commons has agreed.

Regarding the detention of pregnant women, Amendments 38A to 38E are wholly in line with those tabled on Report by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, and my noble friend Lady Sugg. These amendments preserve the existing 72-hour time limit on the detention of pregnant women. As now, this 72-hour time limit would be extendable to an absolute maximum of one week, provided there is ministerial authorisation in place for the extension. It is important to note that, as per the existing Section 60 provision, this time limit will apply only where an immigration officer or the Secretary of State, as the case may be, is satisfied that the woman is pregnant. I trust that these amendments will be welcomed on all sides of the House.

On the detention of unaccompanied children, the challenge we received in the House of Commons was that in enabling a person to apply for First-tier Tribunal immigration bail after 28 days of detention, the Bill did not differentiate between adults and unaccompanied children, and there needed to be judicial oversight of the detention of unaccompanied children much earlier in the process. Amendments 36A and 36B, agreed by the Commons, do just that. They enable the First-tier Tribunal to review the detention of an unaccompanied child after eight days, where the detention is for the purposes of removal. The eight-day period aligns with the existing framework governing immigration bail for those detained at ports and the eight-day period for making a suspensive claim under the Bill.

I again assure my noble friend Lady Mobarik and other noble Lords that any period of detention for unaccompanied children will be the shortest possible. Where there is doubt that a person is indeed aged under 18, as they claim to be, they will be treated as a child while an age assessment is undertaken. Such a person will be detained in age-appropriate accommodation, as the law already provides. This is provided for by the Detention Centre Rules 2001, made under Section 153 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. Rule 11 provides:

“Detained persons aged under 18 and families will be provided with accommodation suitable to their needs”.


If no such accommodation is available, an unaccompanied child will not be detained and will be transferred to a local authority instead as soon as possible. I hope this provides the assurances that my noble friend has been seeking.

The Commons has proposed no change to the Bill in response to my noble friend’s Amendment 33, which relates to the detention of families. We believe this amendment would put children at risk, as well as significantly weakening our ability to remove people from the UK, in accordance with the duty provided for in Clause 2. Such a change would incentivise unscrupulous individuals to co-opt unaccompanied children into a bogus family unit to escape detention. This presents very real safeguarding risks for those children. I hope my noble friend, having secured an important change to the Bill in respect of the detention of unaccompanied children, will be content not to pursue her Amendment 33 any further.

I turn to Motion M and the amendments originally tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, which sought to reinstate the existing Hardial Singh principles. Here again the Commons has agreed with the Government that the changes should be made to the existing legislation and that Clause 11 should stand. The Hardial Singh principles provide, among other things, that a person may be detained only for a period that is reasonable in all the circumstances and that if, before the expiry of the reasonable period, it becomes apparent that the Home Secretary will not be able to examine, effect removal or grant leave within a reasonable period, that person’s detention should not continue. The Government continue to take the view that it is for the Home Secretary, not the courts, to decide such matters as she will be in full possession of the relevant facts and best placed to decide whether continued detention is reasonable in all the circumstances. As I say, the Commons has endorsed this approach, and I hope that the noble Lord, having achieved some significant changes to other aspects of the Bill, will be content to agree Motion M.

Motion N relates to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham’s Amendment 50 to Clause 16. This relates to the Secretary of State’s power to direct a local authority in England to cease accommodating an unaccompanied child and to transfer the child into Home Office-provided accommodation. The amendment would limit the power such that it can be exercised only where the transfer would be in the best interests of the child.

We all accept that the best interests of the child is a very important consideration. That is why the Secretary of State is already required, under Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009, to have regard to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children when exercising her immigration functions. In exercising the power in Clause 16, the Home Office will continue to comply with the Section 55 duty. I should also emphasise again that we expect to exercise the power in Clause 16 in only limited circumstances —for example, in advance of returning an unaccompanied child to a parent in their home country.

Finally, I can deal briefly with Motion E, given that this covers similar ground to Motion F, which we have already debated. As I said, it remains the Government’s contention that declaring such claims to be inadmissible is a core part of the scheme provided for in the Bill. The Motion from the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, would incentivise the people smugglers to prioritise young people, putting more lives at risk and splitting families. I am sure that the noble Lord would not wish to see this.

The Government have listened to the concerns raised by noble Lords about the Bill’s provisions relating to detention and the Commons has agreed significant changes. I hope, on this basis, that the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, my noble friend Lady Mobarik and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester would be content to agree Motions J, K and L. Where the Commons has disagreed with your Lordships’ amendments to Clauses 4, 11 and 16, I hope that the noble Lords, Lord Dubs and Lord Carlile, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester will be minded to accept that verdict and agree Motions E, M and N.

[The Lord Bishop of Manchester]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, for his support for my Motion K1, even though I suspect we would both prefer his stronger Motion. I also welcome the government amendments that would allow an unaccompanied child to seek bail after eight days if they have been detained for removal.

I struggle to see why similar rules should not apply to all children. Hence, Motion K1 seeks to rectify the unreasoned omission of children who are with their families. It proposes a 24-hour extension to the current statutory 72-hour time limit for detention of children with families. Hence, the detention of these children would not be indefinite but be for no more than 96 hours or, if a Minister personally approved it, for no more than seven days. This seems a fair and reasonable change and I urge the Government to seriously reflect on it. I really cannot see that it is morally justified not to have equal provisions for children with families and those who are alone; one child is not different from another.

It remains the fact that the institutional nature of detention affects both the physical and mental development of the child and leads to their significant emotional and psychological regression. These impacts, which were witnessed often in children prior to 2010, were not limited to unaccompanied children. All children suffered under a regime which this Government are now proposing to reintroduce without limit for unaccompanied children. I cannot accept that it is right to be prepared to lock up these children for an indefinite period, simply because they happen to arrive with families, when we know the grave consequences. The evidence has not changed. How can it now suddenly be tolerable?

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[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, I have already spoken to Motion K. I beg to move.

Motion K1 (as an amendment to Motion K)

[The Lord Bishop of Manchester]

Moved by

At end insert “, and do propose Amendment 33B to the words so restored to the Bill—

33B: Clause 10, page 15, line 29, leave out “for any period” and insert “for a period of not more than 96 hours, or for a period of not more than seven days in cases where the longer period of detention is authorised personally by a Minister of the Crown (within the meaning of the Ministers of the Crown Act 1975)””