Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill

Debate between Lord Beith and Lord Carlile of Berriew

Committee stage
Thursday 2nd March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith (LD)]

Was it Tuesday? The dates of this Bill are becoming a blur in my mind.

The noble Lord, Lord Benyon, said:

“Defra’s default approach will be to retain EU law unless there is a good reason either to repeal it or to reform it”.—[Official Report, 28/2/23; col. 205.]


He repeated that later in the proceedings, and I think we were all pleased to hear it, particularly as it related to environmental legislation, public health and other important things. It was a very significant thing he said, but it is not how the Bill is constructed; the Bill is constructed to make it so easy to repeal the legislation that a Minister does not really have to do anything other than not put it in the box marked “reform” or “reintroduce”. I would like to feel that the attitude taken by one Defra Minister will not only be supported and reinforced by the Leader of the House and others on the Front Bench but might start to colour the attitude of other government departments as they see how undesirable it is for law to be removed or dispensed with at the whim of Ministers or simply because everything goes that way unless selected otherwise. This is not an acceptable way to proceed.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 44. I am grateful for the explicit support of the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope, who apologises for having had to leave for an engagement in the north.

About three weeks ago, I stepped from the golden sands of the Cross Benches into my first meeting of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord McLoughlin, for his objective and clear chairing of that committee, which I found very helpful as a newcomer. The first meeting that I attended took me straight into constitutional quicksand, rather than golden sands, in which I was looking at provisions which seemed to do the exact opposite of what we were told was the purpose of Brexit. The report of the Select Committee, which I recommend strongly to noble Lords, is clear that much of the Bill is nothing else than a dilution of parliamentary scrutiny and, therefore, a dilution of parliamentary democracy itself.

I hope that this debate will not develop into a discussion about whether we should have Brexited or whether we should remain, because that is not my intention at all. For me, this is a debate about what Brexit is intended to achieve and whether we are achieving it in a way that is consistent with parliamentary practice—a key part of our constitution. As I recall, the slogans of Brexit were undeniable. I overheard one about “bringing our democracy home”. However, the Bill actually sends our democracy from this building to the intellectual suburbs, where it will not be part of our law-making process. My Amendment 44, which is a probing amendment, is an attempt to show how easily a solution can be reached which does not dilute our democracy. To devise Amendment 44, I reached into my metaphorical bathroom cupboard and pulled from it the sharpest, but non-existent, instrument: what somebody else called Occam’s razor. That is the principle by which you look at a complicated problem and see if there is a series of simple solutions; you usually find that they are much the best way of solving that problem.

I respectfully suggest to your Lordships that we should set up an independent body led by a judicial figure, preferably a serving Court of Appeal judge—as leads, for example, the Law Commission, although this would be a different kind of commission from the Law Commission. With colleagues and staff, that body would consider the questioned laws in real time on the basis of the demands of time placed by this legislation. It would produce reports with recommendations, including for modification, and those recommendations would be placed before—yes—Parliament for the approval or otherwise of both Houses. Thus, we would sustain parliamentary democracy entirely by this simple process; it is Occam’s razor at work. Ministers would of course play their part; they would take part in the discussions with the commission, would be able to suggest changes and objections, and would be free to make representations to both the commission and Parliament—but Parliament would decide.

I have seen an opinion of Sir Jeffrey Jowell KCMG KC on the Bill, on the instructions of a number of respected NGOs. I do not simply use Sir Jeffrey as an argument ad maiorem; he is a most distinguished and authoritative figure of the law on constitutional matters. I will quote some of what he said in that opinion:

“The claim that the Bill promotes sovereignty is hollow, as it is an exceptional example of Parliament relinquishing its key responsibilities … Insofar as the Bill may be justified by some procedures being in place for the scrutiny of Statutory Instruments by Parliament, this rings equally hollow, since those procedures provide no opportunity to amend the secondary legislation and in practice have rarely been effective in halting its passage … The Bill also offends the rule of law which requires our law to be accessible, clear and predictable.”


Those citations, and there are many more in his opinion, really tell the story about the Bill and what is at its centre. My draft new clause may be the right or wrong template—I do not mind whether my amendment or some other amendment passes—but we have to try to agree something that sustains parliamentary sovereignty, which the Bill does not. Let us not sully Brexit by the criticism that is available at the moment that it has diluted and damaged our democracy at home.

National Security Bill

Debate between Lord Beith and Lord Carlile of Berriew

Committee stage
Wednesday 11th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, the provisions of this clause and its defects have been set out very well by my noble friend Lord Purvis of Tweed, and there has been some really helpful analysis from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson.

I will just make a preliminary point. The inclusion of the Armed Forces in this provision is wholly inappropriate, simply on the basis that it is the wrong place to deal with what is a much wider problem and raises many other issues—battlefield situations; civilian situations such as we experienced in Northern Ireland, where we have had difficult court cases to deal with; and issues around the proper defence that veterans might wish to advance when involved in contentious matters. To push this into a provision about intelligence services does not seem the right way to deal with it.

One qualification that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, made was that there may be a case for including actions of the Armed Forces in direct support of the intelligence services, but that is as far as I think it reasonable to go on an issue of wide importance that affects the international reputation of this country. I would rather we were simply dealing with the issue of how we provide the appropriate cover for intelligence services when they have reason to act outside the law. What an easier world it would be if we never asked intelligence services to act outside the law, but that is not possible. The range of things that intelligence organisations can become involved in if they are acting outside the law includes things that, on discussion and explanation, most people would find understandable and acceptable, right through to things that are utterly unacceptable—and which have happened. We think particularly of torture and rendition to torture, which has been our worst recent example. Many people would understand that, if you are dealing with a covert human intelligence source engaged with a terrorist group or some other group of people, at some point you will inevitably get into a situation in which both that source and the officer running that source have questions about what is permissible. You need a mechanism that can handle those things, and we thought we had one.

The provisions we have had until now have worked in a wide range of cases, and the ultimate recourse in difficulty is the decision of the Attorney-General on whether a prosecution is in the public interest. On the face of it, it perhaps looks too limited in some ways but, as I say, for the most part it has worked. There is a case being made now that in some situations it is not sufficient, but to move from that to a general immunity, not restricted in the kinds of illegality it can cover, is worrying and dangerous. To do so by way of a system that does not embody authorisation at its heart is a really serious mistake, and I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, touched on this.

It cannot be acceptable for an intelligence agency to be able to act in a way which goes outside the law, without having had to make reference to some democratic authority before doing it, whether by way of a class provision or because of the serious nature of the specific incident or action that is involved. Were we to allow that to happen, which will be the case if this provision goes through unamended, Ministers could then always say “I knew nothing about it—it’s not part of my job to know. I just tell them to get on with it and let me know when they’ve finished”. That situation is not acceptable for either Ministers or the agencies, which then of course take all the blame and have to make political decisions—for example, on whether taking such action is going to cause massive international complications. Should an intelligence agency decide that, or should it be decided at the highest political level? Of course, it leaves accountability out of the system altogether.

The accountability is inevitably limited by the nature of what we are talking about. It may depend almost entirely on the judicial forms of accountability which the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, helpfully described—the commissioners and the tribunal, supported also by the work of the Intelligence and Security Committee, which should be told more about the kinds of operation that have to take place. There are mechanisms to have that accountability, which will only rarely be able to be exercised on the Floor of this Chamber or that of the Commons because of the nature of what is being done, but there should be a process of authorisation.

What I fear out of all this is either Ministers being able to say, “This is all very regrettable, but I knew nothing about it”—when it is not something that Ministers would be consulted about—or a situation in which the service says, “We’d better not tell the Minister because it would be very difficult for him to authorise this”. These are great dangers, and we must not pass legislation which fails to address them.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, as is his wont, the noble Lord, Lord Beith, started with a very cogent and important point. The issue about the Armed Forces is both legally and politically distinct. It hardly needs explanation in this Committee as to what those distinctions are, for they are evident to us every time one of those cases is considered.

It is also a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, whose return to your Lordships’ House is very welcome to us. He brings a richness of experience on issues which include the quality of the jurisdiction within which we live. Great attention should be paid to the point he made about the way in which our jurisdiction should retain its fundamental values.

In the provisions suggested by the Government in the Bill, I am afraid that I see the words “double standards” above the mirror every time one looks at them. Immunity is inimical to our system of law—full stop. Take the Khashoggi case as an example. I am not suggesting for one moment that we in this country would do anything quite as bad as that murder, nevertheless there could be other outrages committed. If we look at the Khashoggi case and the way that the country that committed that outrage has brushed it under the carpet of immunity, we see how dangerous it is to go down this slippery slope. I will not say a great deal more, but it is a particular pleasure for me to be able to take, as it were, the role of junior counsel to my noble friend Lord Anderson. He opened these amendments with superb and supreme clarity, in my view, and I would only muddy the waters if I said too much more.

I want to make a couple of other points, though. It seems to me that the existing involvement of the Secretary of State in at least some of the decisions to which we are referring does much more than give cover or protection to the individuals who might commit the acts complained of. It shows that political responsibility is taken for those acts, and it is real political responsibility because that Secretary of State is almost always accountable to the other place and will have been elected to it. Misleading actions on the part of, heaven forfend, any Secretary of State could have very serious repercussions in our democratic polity.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Debate between Lord Beith and Lord Carlile of Berriew

Report stage & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords & Report: 1st sitting & Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords
Monday 11th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I add my thoughts for James Brokenshire, who was a member of the Justice Committee when I chaired it; I respect him and hold him in the highest regard, and I wish him well, as others have.

It is pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord West; I recall taking evidence from him when I was a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee. Now that he has gone from poacher to gamekeeper, I hope he is applying similar zeal to the scrutiny and examination of these very issues. I hope that the ISC will take a continuing interest in this legislation when it is on the statute book.

During my time on the Intelligence and Security Committee, I was concerned about the unspecific and broad nature of the “economic well-being” justification as a basis for approving various forms of action. Of course, that was in relation to intrusive surveillance powers, not the sanctioning of criminal acts, which we are discussing today; indeed, since that time, the economic well-being justification has been qualified in the same terms as those which Amendment 9 uses.

I raised my concerns in Committee on 3 December, and they echo the concerns expressed by the Constitution Committee, of which I am a member, in its report on the Bill. It was disappointing that, on 3 December, the Minister’s reply did not answer or even refer to the concerns I had raised. She had had a long day, and she has had an even longer one today, but I hope that I can provoke her to make some things clearer.

In that debate, I said that there are obviously threats to the economic well-being of the United Kingdom that are as serious as physical threats to that security. I included

“action by a hostile state or a terrorist ... group to destroy or disrupt key elements of our critical national infrastructure, energy supply, transport or banking and financial transaction systems”—[Official Report, 3/12/20; col. 870.]

as well as government communications and many forms of cyberattack.

I will suggest three other areas which might involve action by hostile states or extremists and might be candidates for authorisation. I do this simply to illustrate how broad the concept of economic well-being is. The current pandemic is, undoubtedly, a threat to the economic well-being of the United Kingdom. Could there be a future pandemic situation in which we believed that the reckless behaviour of other countries or deliberate action by extremists was making the spread of the pandemic significantly more dangerous? Would that qualify if some form of participation by an agent or human intelligence source seemed likely to help us fight the threat? I think it probably would.

I will give another example. The way the Brexit future relationship agreement is implemented could certainly affect the economic well-being of the United Kingdom. Could that justify deploying intelligence resources, including covert human intelligence, involving themselves in criminal acts? That is not quite so clear.

I offer a third example—that of a major overseas defence and civil engineering contract, affecting perhaps as many as 10,000 jobs in Britain, where there are fears of bribery, corruption and money-laundering, and of those distorting the outcome. What if a different British company is involved in the rival bid for this contract—these bids normally come from consortia involving companies from several countries—and that company considers that it would be very adversely affected by action which might have been begun by someone qualified through this legislation? The economic well-being justification is clearly not a simple matter in such a situation.

I am not asking the Minister to comment on those three hypothetical examples individually. What I want her to consider is, first, whether the economic well-being justification should be so broad. Secondly, if it is not to be qualified by reference to national security, as Amendment 9 in the name of my noble friend Lord Paddick requires, how else can we be confident that it is not inappropriately used? The use of this justification for serious criminal action has not really been the subject of much ministerial comment, and its scope will depend heavily on how future CCAs will be viewed in retrospect by the Investigatory Powers Tribunal and by the commissioners. This approach does not give us much confidence that applications to authorise criminal conduct in relation to economic well-being issues will be considered by authorising officers against a well-understood test of what is justifiable. We have to bear in mind that these authorising officers are in a wide variety of organisations, some of which have long experience of intelligence work and some a great deal less.

The Constitution Committee said in its report:

“While we recognise that threats to the ‘economic well-being of the United Kingdom’ may justify a security response, we are concerned about the use of such a broad concept to authorise serious criminal conduct. The House may wish to consider whether the authorisation of criminal conduct should require more specific justification than a general invocation of the need to protect economic well-being.”


That is what we are doing in this short debate tonight. I would like to hear a clear statement from the Minister on how we might establish clear principles against which to test whether authorising criminal action under so broad and vague a headline as “economic well-being” will, in any future instance, be proportionate and justifiable. Would it need to be a threat to economic well-being of a kind that would, in effect, be a threat to the security of the United Kingdom? That is really what the amendment suggests.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I join in the good wishes to James Brokenshire. He has been a superb Minister over many years and never appears to be partisan, whatever he feels inside. He is one of the best listeners among Ministers I have ever seen. He has played a very important part in some significant policy areas, so we hope that he will be much better soon and back in a very senior position.

It is always an enormous personal pleasure for me to follow the noble Lord, Lord Beith. I have admired him in politics for decades. He is one of the best parliamentary debaters that we have, as he has illustrated in the last few minutes.

I want to speak on Amendments 9 and 11. Like the noble Lord, Lord Beith, I was looking for examples and thought I would ask myself whether I had done any cases as a QC that involved serious economic crime that did not fall within the realms of national security, or clearly so. I was immediately able to think of two examples. One was a money-counterfeiting case in which a ring of forgers was forging very substantial quantities of notes, many of which passed into currency circulation. The other was a fraud relating to the activities of the London Metal Exchange in which over £1 billion-worth of fraud was committed by the simple task of forging bills of lading that referred to metals passing around the world, when the only ones that were really passing around the world were a few containers of pig iron—not the much more valuable metals referred to on the forged bills of lading.

Neither of those cases, obviously, would have any direct relevance to or interest in national security, but they are undoubtedly very serious crimes. I do not know, for I was the defence counsel in both those cases, whether any CHIS were involved in those cases, but it would not surprise me if they were, because there were obvious parts that they could have played. It seems to me that the use of CHIS in those circumstances of economic crime is entirely legitimate and that Amendment 9 is therefore inappropriate and too limiting.

Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Bill

Debate between Lord Beith and Lord Carlile of Berriew

Committee stage & Report stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords & Report stage (Hansard) & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 24th February 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I do not dissent at all from that assessment that a moral victory has been won, but that is only the beginning of the story. I simply want to address the Government’s distinctly lacking arguments against the amendment as advanced so far in a context where there was such widespread agreement on the efficacy of bringing the Parole Board into all cases but no very clear defence by the Government as to why the two-thirds provision has to be imposed on those who would otherwise have been released without the Parole Board’s involvement half way through their sentence.

The arguments produced by the Government have been very strange. One was that it would create greater confusion. It is in the essence—in the nature—of this provision that there will be confusion, because nobody can know what assessment the Parole Board is going to make of their case. The avoidance of confusion is not a primary objective of this: quite the contrary, we invite the Parole Board to make a very serious consideration of each case and only to allow release at either the halfway or two-thirds point if it is satisfied that there is not a danger to the public from doing so. The confusion argument does not really make any sense at all.

Then there is the argument that this will increase public confidence. Of all the things that might increase public confidence, I cannot see someone rushing into the pub saying, “Have you heard? Do you know that some of these offenders might spend up to another year in jail, but then they will be released?” That is not what public confidence is built on, and it is the wrong argument to use for something that involves issues of liberty.

Then I want to challenge the argument about the further period of incapacitation, because terrorists in prison are not incapacitated. They engage in grooming and recruitment activities and, as I said in the Second Reading debate, in some cases might be able to achieve more by their work among other prisoners—including prisoners who are not there for terrorist offences—than they might be able to achieve on the outside. They might recruit a larger number of people, so I do not accept the incapacitation argument.

The only argument that would be persuasive would be that it was impossible, with this amendment as drafted, to avoid the situation in which the Parole Board could not cope in a reasonable period of time with the cases at the half-time stage, but that probably could be overcome by alternative drafting if the drafting presented tonight has that problem. That would be the only argument that would persuade me: that we were letting people out without the Parole Board assessment, when the whole purpose of this is to make sure that they have that assessment.

Therefore, unless the Government produce a better argument, I do not think that they have made the case.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, my name is the fourth name on these amendments, and I am not going to add anything, save to say this: I wish it had not been necessary to table these amendments. They represent what I would have considered a reasonable Bill to tackle the difficult problems we are dealing with tonight. I support strongly my noble friend Lord Anderson and others who have signed these amendments.