Sanctions (EU Exit) (Miscellaneous Amendments) (No. 2) Regulations 2022

Lord Beith Excerpts

Monday 17th October 2022 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (Lord Goldsmith of Richmond Park) (Con)]

My Lords, the instrument before us was laid on Tuesday 19 July 2022, under the powers provided by the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, also known as the sanctions Act. The Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments published its 12th report of the 2022-23 Session on Friday 14 October. The committee reported the instrument for two reasons: one for defective drafting and another relating to one of the sanctions regimes to which the amendment applies—the Burundi (Sanctions) Regulations 2021. I will address each of these briefly in turn.

First, the JCSI raised concerns about the absence of definitions on sanctions in the new information provisions. It is not satisfied that the drafting of the new regulation clearly achieves the stated policy to limit the functions in question to those imposed under the relevant instrument. We are considering the most appropriate way to address the committee on that point.

The second aspect flagged to us by the committee relates to the Burundi (Sanctions) Regulations 2021, which was originally laid in December 2021 to replace the Burundi (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019. The replacement regulations were made to reflect the 2020 Burundi elections and the peaceful transfer of power. As noble Lords may recall, the 2021 regulations were debated but they were not approved by resolutions of both Houses within 28 days, and therefore ceased to have effect on 23 January 2022. This was in accordance with Section 55(3) of SAMLA. Having carefully considered the consequences, the FCDO concluded that the 2019 regulations have not been revoked by the 2021 regulations and therefore remain in force. The Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments accepted this conclusion.

The UK Government continue to monitor developments in Burundi and to keep the sanctions regime under review; we are currently considering a 2022 regulation. We thank the committee for its detailed feedback and continued engagement on the FCDO’s sanctions legislation, which we continue to bring forward at pace. I also take this opportunity to thank those across your Lordships’ House for the continued support for amendments brought forward by His Majesty’s Government to update the sanctions regime throughout this Session.

Sanctions form a key pillar of our foreign policy. It is essential that our sanctions regimes are maintained and updated appropriately, so that we can respond at pace to the activities of malign actors around the world. Indeed, we have recently shown the strength and utility of our sanctions in our response to Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and Russia’s crimes against the Ukrainian people.

The legislative instrument that we are debating today updates all our sanctions regimes, including those we are required to implement due to our UN obligations, as well as our autonomous UK regimes. These regulations ensure that crypto asset businesses fall within the scope of financial sanctions reporting requirements, strengthening our ability to respond to emerging threats and evolving global standards.

Specifically, the regulations require crypto asset exchanges and custodian wallet providers to report to the Treasury if they encounter any designated persons in the course of business or if they are holding any frozen assets on behalf of customers who are designated. Crypto asset businesses are also required to report any suspected breaches of financial sanctions.

The regulations also include new powers for public authorities to share financial sanctions information with the Treasury. This change ensures a wide range of persons and organisations, from regulators to local authorities, have a dedicated information-sharing gateway. They will no longer have to rely on gateways that are not sanctions-specific or on the Treasury’s powers to compel information from partners.

We hope that this will give organisations confidence to share information so that the Government can better pursue breaches and uphold the integrity of UK sanctions. These changes are possible thanks to the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022, which amended the sanctions Act in March this year.

The regulations also make changes to our various sanctions regimes to update definitions and clarify intentions. These amendments ensure that the definition of “designated person” is consistent across regulations. They include a correction of the reporting obligations relating to the transfer of funds to a ring-fenced account. They clarify that, within the Libya sanctions regime, it is not a breach of sanctions to credit a frozen account with interest and specify that Treasury licences would be available for the purpose of satisfying prior obligations. They also correct acronyms which were entered incorrectly into the initial regulations or were missing, and update the name of the African Union peacekeeping force in Somalia.

These regulations will ensure that our sanctions continue to hold to account corrupt officials, abusers of human rights, and malign actors across the world, and that our UN sanctions regimes remain accurate. To conclude, these amendments mean that our sanctions regimes take account of the most modern financial services and prevent loopholes being exploited in the future. I welcome this opportunity to hear views on these regulations. I beg to move.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to intervene in this debate on the point which the Minister helpfully set out in his opening remarks, one of the two issues raised by the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments. This instrument amends the Burundi (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 but, according to the legislation.gov.uk website—the definitive source—those regulations were revoked by the Burundi (Sanctions) Regulations 2021. Commercial websites on UK legislation also refer to the 2019 regulations having been revoked. That would make today’s proceedings a little odd, because we would be amending something that was no longer law.

However, this is not the case. As the department explained in its memorandum to the Joint Committee, although the revoking SI was debated in 2021, it was not approved by both Houses of Parliament within the required 28 days. Therefore, under the terms of the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, as a “made affirmative” instrument, it expired. The Joint Committee agrees with the department’s view that the original regulations have not been revoked and can therefore be amended tonight.

I raise this matter because it is important that affected citizens and businesses, and their lawyers, can establish with clarity what the law is or was at a relevant time. In this instance, the only sources to which you could have turned to find out—not only government but commercial sites—had got it wrong. I raise it as a warning of the pitfalls of complex legislation by statutory instrument—of which we have a lot coming down the track—and the need to be absolutely clear about what is and is not law in force. The committee has written to the hard-working team at the National Archives to ensure that the matter is put right there. The committee’s advisers should be commended for identifying it. It is important that we get these things right.

Not on behalf of the committee in any way, perhaps I could also raise the question that the Minister touched on: what is the Government’s current view of the relevance, purpose and desirability of sanctions against Burundi?

[Viscount Waverley (CB)]

My Lords, I apologise if this is Burundi-specific. I would like to address to the Minister a particular point that has been drawn to my attention. He spoke about the economic crime Act and loopholes. Some people from overseas register a company, open a bank account through lawyers and then, when everything is in place, there is a transfer of shares to a party, which rather defeats the object of the exercise. I am sure that the Minister does not wish to go into detail about this today. However, would he care to reflect and pass on to his officials that, in the spirit of the economic crime Act, they might wish to address that situation?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Goldsmith of Richmond Park (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords who have contributed to this debate today. I will do my best to address the issues that were raised by noble Lords.

Crypto asset exchange providers and custodian wallet providers have been added to the definition of relevant firms in all UK sanctions regulations, and relevant firms must report certain information to the Treasury when encountering a designated person in the course of their business or where they become aware of a breach of financial sanctions regulations. Reporting obligations themselves have not changed.

The instrument that we are debating today strengthens our sanctions in two ways: first, the measure further supports the UK’s technical implementation of recommendation 15 of the Financial Action Task Force standards. It is the international standard-setting body for all anti-money laundering, counterterrorist financing and counterproliferation financing. Recommendation 15 requires the Government to ensure that certain financial sanctions reporting obligations are applied not only to financial institutions and designated non-financial businesses and professions but to virtual assets service providers. These regulations bring crypto asset exchange providers and custodians wallet providers into the scope of those obligations.

The second area in which this strengthens our regime relates to enforcement. The instrument seeks to address the risk of crypto assets being used to breach or circumvent financial sanctions. The definition of “relevant firm” now covers firms that either record holdings of or enable the transfer of crypto assets and are therefore most likely to hold relevant information.

I will address some of the specific points raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer. I felt she made an interesting point about the possibility of the FCA and the NCA sharing the proceeds of fines to build up their capacity, and I will certainly convey that suggestion to my colleague in the other place. I believe the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation has doubled in capacity this year, and we have seen that mirrored through the infrastructure we have to counter these forms of crime in the UK.

The noble Baroness gave a very effective plug for her Private Member’s Bill to protect whistleblowers. I will not pretend that I know chapter and verse of her Bill, but it certainly sounds sensible and worthy of serious consideration. I will also pass that to colleagues and do my best to ensure that it is treated with the seriousness it no doubt deserves.

The noble Lord, Lord Beith, asked a couple of questions about Burundi. As he acknowledged, the view—I think it is a consensus—is that the 2019 Burundi sanctions regulations remain in place. On the second point, the issue about guidance online has been brought to the attention of the FCDO. Colleagues in the FCDO are now working with those websites to ensure that the right guidance is available, so I think the point he made has already been registered in the Foreign Office by the relevant department.

The noble Lord, Lord Collins, repeated the question put to colleagues in the other place by Stephen Doughty in relation to two firms in particular. Although I do not have the answer for him now, I know that a letter is winging its way across to Stephen Doughty—I am told it will reach him this evening—and addresses the points he raised. I hope that is satisfactory. I will make sure that the noble Lord receives a copy of the letter.

The noble Viscount, Lord Waverley, made a number of interesting points. I flag to him that a new combating kleptocracy cell has been set up this year in the National Crime Agency. I hope it will be able to fulfil some of the roles and functions he outlined in his contribution.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

I asked the Minister a general question about Burundi, to which the appropriate section of these regulations relates specifically. Bearing in mind that most countries reduced or ended their sanctions on Burundi earlier this year, what is the current Foreign Office position?

[Lord Goldsmith of Richmond Park (Con)]

My concern in answering this question is that I never know where the line is drawn. We are not supposed to talk about individual or upcoming sanctions. My understanding is that this has been largely an academic issue—I really hope I am not crossing any lines here—and that, regardless of whether the regulations had been revoked, and we understand that they have not, it would have had no material impact on any company or individual. It is unfortunate and an error, but it has not had any real-world impact. I hope that addresses his question.

Treaty Scrutiny: Working Practices (EUC Report)

Lord Beith Excerpts

Monday 7th September 2020 Grand Committee

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I speak as a member of the Constitution Committee. I welcome the fact that our report is being debated and that it is being debated alongside two excellent reports, which have been equally well presented.

The point made by both committees is that treaties now extend far more into the daily lives of people than many did in the past, particularly when their primary concern in the past was either tariffs or international boundaries of countries other than our own. People who do not know their Ponsonby rule from their CRaG will find their daily lives affected on issues that have been mentioned, such as standards and environmental rules of the kind that appear in many trade agreements.

That is one part of the background. Of course, there are lobby groups that know perfectly well what is involved and are very active when trade negotiations are going on. We are about to lose a much higher degree of systematic parliamentary engagement with and accountability for treaty-making in the areas for which the EU had responsibility, notably trade. The European Parliament carried out that scrutiny vigorously, with a degree of engagement and information not to be found in Westminster’s scrutiny of treaties. That will go, and when it has gone, we will not be able to control our laws in the sense of those other than the Executive controlling our laws. They will be subject to much less democratic control than they were before.

Clearly, treaty-making is a function of the Executive, but they must be an accountable Executive, subject to oversight continuously through the process. One thing that happens when Executives are subject to scrutiny is that the question is asked during the process: will Parliament wear this? Is this something that we can get through or will it be opposed? Will we have to rely on loyalty and the fact that people do not want a general election at the moment to ensure that we get it through? It is at that level that our treaty scrutiny has tended to be, I am afraid.

Governments worry that demanding effective parliamentary scrutiny prevents the Executive doing their job, but that clearly was not the case with the European Commission, which had to accept detailed scrutiny by the European Parliament. It comes strangely from those who thought that the Commission was too powerful to ignore the fact that when we want to create a system here, there is no reason we should not have that level of accountability.

We have argued in our report for a Westminster alternative. Indeed, the process has been going on because existing and newly created committees have started to assume that role. There are some things which a trade scrutiny committee can do itself; there are others which might be better done by a committee which specialises in a particular field. But the committee structure of the two Houses of Parliament really needs to engage with this task.

There is some government recognition in their response of the need for improvement, but the rejection of the presumption of transparency is a mistake. It is not that everything by law would have to be transparent; the working assumption would be that there was transparency, backed, where necessary, by confidential discussion with the committee—which, again, featured in the European Parliament, which must be just as likely to be subject to the pressures around leaking that we worry about here.

If noble Lords want to know what the Government really think, they should look at page 8 of their response, where they make this very generous offer:

“If a third country’s domestic procedures mean it will publish a draft treaty at an earlier stage, then the Government will also look to do similar to ensure that the UK Parliament is not receiving less information than the Parliaments of negotiating partners.


In other words, we might get some information if some other country decides to release it and we then have to. The pointer has to be shifted towards real transparency, with full recognition of the need, which any negotiating body has, for a degree of confidentiality. I think the system in Parliament is capable of accomplishing that and we should give it the opportunity to do so, when these things have such a profound effect on the lives of the people we serve.