Equivalence Determinations for Financial Services and Miscellaneous Provisions (Amendment etc) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Bates
Main Page: Lord Bates (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Bates's debates with the Department for International Development
(5 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberThat the draft Regulations laid before the House on 17 January be approved.
My Lords, this SI is an important part of the Treasury’s programme of legislation under the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. It will address deficiencies related to the EU’s equivalence framework for financial services, and will make provisions for elements of the UK’s stand-alone equivalence framework for financial services, in a scenario where the UK leaves the EU without an agreement.
Many noble Lords will be familiar with the EU’s framework for equivalence. EU legislation allows the European Commission to determine that a country outside the EU—often termed a third country—has a regulatory and supervisory regime in a particular area of financial services that is equivalent to the corresponding EU regime. Granting equivalence is a key component of financial services regulation and supports cross-border activity. Equivalence decisions can reduce or eliminate overlaps in regulatory and supervisory requirements, thus decreasing regulatory burdens on firms. Some equivalence decisions provide improved prudential treatment, or facilitate the exchange of services. This can lead to increased competition, which benefits firms and consumers, while protecting financial stability.
Before making equivalence decisions, the Commission will undertake an assessment and may ask the European supervisory authorities for technical advice to support it. As an EU member state, any equivalence decisions made by the Commission currently have effect in the UK. In a no-deal scenario, the UK would be outside the EU’s equivalence framework. The Government place significant importance on having a functioning, stand-alone equivalence regime which will support our future relationship with the EU and other financial centres with which we want to build stronger partnerships.
Noble Lords will be aware that other Treasury statutory instruments which have completed their passage in Parliament have already transferred some equivalence responsibilities from the Commission to the Treasury, and functions from the ESAs to the UK financial regulators. Through these SIs, the Treasury has maintained the same substantive criteria that the EU uses to judge equivalence.
The SI does three main things to support a stand-alone UK equivalence framework in the event of a no-deal exit. First, it replaces the functions given to the ESAs with functions for the UK financial services regulators and creates an obligation for the Treasury and the UK regulators to enter into a memorandum of understanding that sets out how they will support equivalence assessments.
Secondly, the SI corrects deficiencies in existing equivalence decisions made by the Commission—for example, replacing references to the “Union” with references to the “United Kingdom”. Fixing these decisions is important to minimise disruption for some UK firms with businesses in equivalent third countries, and for some overseas firms which currently rely on these decisions.
Thirdly, the SI creates a temporary power for Ministers to make equivalence and exemption decisions for EU and EEA member states by direction for specified equivalence regimes listed in the SI. This is separate from the permanent arrangements for making equivalence decisions, which will become available only after exit and will require regulations subject to the negative resolution procedure. This temporary power is needed to prepare for the particular circumstances we would face if we left the EU without a deal.
As an EU member state, the UK has not previously needed powers to determine whether the EU is equivalent. However, in a no-deal scenario it will be important for the Treasury to have powers to make such decisions in time for exit day, to respond quickly and effectively to any risks to the financial system and to avoid disruption for firms and markets. To illustrate why these powers are required, I point the House to the European Commission, which has published several draft legal Acts granting certain technical exemptions to UK public bodies in a no-deal scenario. The Government would grant similar exemptions for relevant EU bodies in such a scenario, and this SI contains the powers to allow such exemptions to be put in place by exit day.
To ensure transparent use of the temporary power, this SI will oblige Ministers to lay directions before Parliament and to publish them. Noble Lords may have seen that the Treasury Select Committee wrote to the Economic Secretary to the Treasury on 7 February asking if 12 months was long enough for this power, given that other transitional regimes in financial services have been passed with longer periods. The Treasury’s response to the committee, published last week, emphasised that this power was needed only to mitigate the risks around exit. The Treasury expects that the permanent mechanism for taking equivalence decisions by regulations, subject to the negative resolution procedure, will be ready soon after exit day. As a result, the Treasury judges that 12 months is sufficient for this power.
The Treasury has worked closely with the Bank of England, the Prudential Regulation Authority and the Financial Conduct Authority in drafting this instrument. The Treasury and the regulators have also ensured that the resources are in place to take on these functions. The Treasury has engaged the financial services industry and will continue to do so. The regulators and key industry stakeholders have expressed support for the provisions in this SI as necessary to mitigate disruption and to provide legal certainty about the UK’s equivalence system.
This Government believe that the proposed legislation is needed to ensure that the UK has an operable equivalence framework in a no-deal scenario. The powers it contains are needed to ensure that the Treasury and UK regulators are properly equipped to respond if the UK leaves the EU without a deal or an implementation period. I hope noble Lords will join me in supporting these regulations and I commend them to the House.
My Lords, the equivalence SI shares the same consolidated impact assessment with the next three SIs. I am grateful that this was published in advance of today’s debate and was available in good time in the Printed Paper Office. That is a significant and welcome improvement on last week’s lamentable performance. I would have preferred individual impact assessments, rather than this consolidated one. However, consolidation has the merit of making absolutely clear the unsatisfactory vagueness about the costs and benefits of these SIs and that this arises chiefly from the lack of consultation.
The summary sheet in the IA for this package of SIs notes that the likely cost for all of them is “Unknown: likely significant” in all three defined categories. The benefits are also unquantified, but are said to be “significant”. This rather dramatically illustrates the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, in his later amendments. There has been no real consultation on any of these instruments. This is unsatisfactory and is entirely the Government’s fault. Had the Treasury started preparing these entirely predictable SIs earlier, consultation would have been possible. Why has the Treasury left things until the last moment? Although I sympathise strongly with the spirit of the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, I hope he will not press the fatal ones to a vote as we would not support him in a Division. It is critical to the functioning of our financial services that we make the changes—no matter how unhappily—set out in these SIs.
I turn to the detail of the consolidated impact assessment. The first 40 paragraphs are clear, but some questions arise in subsequent paragraphs and apply generally to all the SIs. Paragraph 44 explains that,
“it has not been possible to discuss the impact of the full package of changes with firms as this impact assessment was being produced, and has therefore not been possible to produce a monetised estimate of their full impact at this stage”.
This is more than a pity: it is tantamount to a dereliction of duty. It would not be the case if the Treasury had started the process earlier. It has had plenty of time to do this: the deadline can hardly have come as a surprise.
Paragraph 50 acknowledges explicitly that the impact assessment,
“is not able to fully quantify the potential impact of these SIs on industry”.
It undertakes, as a result of this self-generated inability, that if these no-deal SIs come into effect in March,
“it will at the appropriate time complete further analysis considering all of the relevant SIs as a package”.
The word “appropriate” is very vague; what does it really mean? Does it mean, for example, in less than three months after a no-deal Brexit?
I do realise that the promised analysis is shutting the stable door long after the horse has bolted, and even longer after the horse gave notice that it would bolt. Nevertheless, Parliament should still have a chance to review the real impact of these SIs on industry. Could the Minister help the House with an explanation of the limits implied by “appropriate” and confirm that Parliament will be given an opportunity to debate the subsequent analysis?
We could probably start with agreement across the House in saying that that is certainly something the Government do not want to happen. There is a very easy way for the noble Lord to ensure that that does not happen: to ensure that his colleagues support the deal before the House. This would then be unnecessary. This is not in any shape or form an objective this Government relish. It is a possibility that any prudent Government must prepare for. That is its status—nothing more, nothing less.
Given that we are going to be in for five substantial debates tonight, I will set one thing in context at the beginning. I will not cover some of the points, because I know they will come up in later debates, so I will try to not test the patience of the House by repeating answers five times to five different SIs. I will try to keep them as concise as possible so we can move through them at some pace.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, as the official spokesman for the Liberal Democrats and the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, as the official spokesman for the Opposition, for stating their intent to let this legislation go through, because they recognise that—whatever their concerns—there is a greater concern to ensure that there is a functional statute book in the unlikely event of no deal. I recognise that responsible approach, and I am sure it will be welcomed by the industry. The noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, and the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, spoke from that perspective.
I want to put this on record, because I think it is really important. In their presentations the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, set out brilliantly and the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, set out extremely well—and indeed the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey—the outstanding work that the Parliament and the Commission did in regulation. The UK has been a leader, an influencer and a shaper of regulation. It really has been a good process. Every single one of the SIs we are dealing with through this entire process has gone through that scrutiny. We are not dealing with something that has never been thought of before; this already exists and has been subject to scrutiny—not only in the Parliament but, let us not forget, in another important group that does incredible work in this House: the European Union Committee and its six sub-committees. They scrutinise all the regulations and directives that come out. Then we had the European Union (Withdrawal) Act, in which we said—because it included a revocation of the European Communities Act 1972—that we needed to bring a lot on to the statute book. That is what we are doing: bringing on SIs, directives and regulations from the EU that have been subject to scrutiny by a UK Minister, the European Parliament and your Lordships’ House in the sub-committees, at the instruction of Section 8 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act. Many of us recall the long and painful process of that working its way through the House. I looked it up: we spent 10 hours on Section 8, which gives us the powers and sets up the process we are now following.
The idea is sometimes presented that somehow what we are doing here is bringing onshore a whole load of stuff that we have never prepared for and that industry has not had any clue about dealing with. Industry is working with it, and we are now bringing it onshore. The process by which we deal with new regulations in future—the point made by the noble Lords, Lord Lilley and Lord Leigh—is something we need to look at. What we are doing at the moment is bringing across what is already in existence and has already been considered through a rigorous process, and putting it on the UK statute book.
Perhaps this is my misunderstanding, but as I read the SI I did not have the understanding that the Treasury, following exit day with no deal, would be able to act only in exact accordance with the pre-existing rules established under European directives but that it could make fresh and new decisions to revoke, effectively amend or make new decisions for a 12-month period; a process would appear at some point in that time that was not Treasury-only, but it would be structured around a negative SI. I thought that was part of this whole package.
The powers the Treasury will have are the powers the Commission currently has. The Commission cannot have them because we will have left the EU without a deal. Somebody therefore has to have them, and it goes to the Treasury because that is the equivalent body. Where the European markets authority was the regulator, that is transferred to the regulator here. We are simply doing all the things the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, has said at least two dozen times when we have discussed these points. He looks to see if we are actually following the rules as set down in Section 8 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act. That is what we are doing. We are not making substantial policy changes, just correcting deficiencies and making fixes. The noble Baroness is absolutely right; that is the process.
I accept what the Minister says. The Treasury in effect becomes the Commission, but without the checks and balances that normally exist on the Commission because we do not have the democratic process. That is the only point I am trying to make.
I know the noble Baroness is seeking to make a point, but the Treasury does have a representative in your Lordships’ House. I know the noble Lord, Lord Deben, thinks, with the Chief Whip present, that I will be here today, gone tomorrow. That may well be the case.
The only suggestion I made was that the noble Lord might not be here in 10 years’ time. That is a very different comment.
Perhaps the noble Lord was not aware that he and I served in the same Government 25 years ago. He was a personal hero of mine because he abolished the hated Cleveland County Council and returned it to the North Riding of Yorkshire, which was greeted with absolute acclamation. However, it was still not enough to get me past the 1997 general election, so I find myself here in your Lordships’ House. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Young, was there 40 years ago—so there is form.
My point is that the Treasury is accountable to Parliament. It is possible to question a Treasury Minister here in the House of Lords in the way that noble Lords could not question a Commissioner in the House of Lords, so I do not want us to run down that particular track. Nor do I want to overegg the situation and say that it is perfect. We are having to prudently prepare for a set of circumstances that nobody in this House wants but for which we need to prepare because the industry requires that assurance.
Let me try to deal with some of the specific points in this debate. The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, asked what third countries will do to declare the UK equivalent. The Treasury and the regulators have been in close contact with third-country authorities, including the United States regulators. We expect to replicate all arrangements with third countries which are based on equivalence. The UK will have grandfathered all existing Commission decisions through the EU withdrawal Act, and there will be retained EU law—the point I referred to.
The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, asked about a no-deal scenario, and I have dealt with that.
The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, asked why the negative resolution procedure is considered appropriate for equivalence. We went through this whole area. I will not repeat it, but, if the House will bear with me, it is good that the usual channels are here. As part of the EU withdrawal Act, there was intense discussion and debate about the correct process for considering the large body of regulation that would be coming onshore. A comprehensive system of scrutiny—involving sifting committees, the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments and the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee—was set out for your Lordships, and it has been working. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, will come back at a later stage to some of the debate we had, which was probably as interesting to me as it was to him as we listened to Sub-Committees A and B. But the reality is that that scrutiny work is going on through your Lordships’ House and is following exactly the process set out in the Act and agreed through the usual channels.
The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, said that the legislation is hard to follow. The Government are committed to ensuring that the law is transparent and accessible. That is why the National Archives will publish online a collection of documents capturing the full body of EU law as it stands on exit day. It will also gradually incorporate retained direct EU legislation into the Government’s official legislation website, legislation.gov.uk. She also asked whether decisions will be reviewed every three years because of the forthcoming SI. The future Treasury SI deals with making sure that equivalence directions fit into part of the existing FSMA framework. It does not mean decisions will be reviewed every three years.
Further, the noble Baroness asked why the SIs are being undertaken in such a piecemeal way and wondered why changes cannot be assessed holistically. A number of legislative changes will be necessary to ensure that there is a functioning statute book on exit day. HM Treasury has been as open as possible about this legislation and the potential impact, particularly by publishing draft legislation in advance of laying, alongside explanatory policy decisions.
The noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, asked whether we could provide examples of consultation on proposed rule changes. The regulators have undertaken extensive consultations on the proposed changes to their rules and technical standards. However, the powers in the EU withdrawal Act allow them to proceed without consultation, where necessary, to ensure that the necessary regulations are in place for exit day.
Does relying heavily on secondary legislation leave room for departments to push through unpopular or controversial legislation? These are powers granted under scrutiny by the EU withdrawal Act, as I have already explained.
Let me turn to another point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, and my noble friend Lord Deben. They asked why we have chosen a 10-year appraisal period. This is not about when we review the legislation; this is a technical issue about the period over which the costs are allocated. We have committed to further analysis and, if the SIs come into effect, we will need to consider what an appropriate time is, but it will be much less than 10 years.
The noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, asked about consulting and whether we would allow more than is quantified in the impact assessment. The limitations set out in the impact assessment would not be overcome by consultation at this stage. Firms need to consider all the changes made by these SIs, alongside the broader changes that occur at the point of exit, which cannot be known in advance.
The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, asked why we have not mentioned the public in the commentary. Consumers benefit from both competition and financial stability. This instrument will allow the Government to have due regard to both.
The noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, asked why no one has come forward to provide transparency around the costs of Brexit. The impact assessments for these SIs focus solely on their direct impacts; the wider costs of Brexit were covered in the cross-government analysis.
When we talk about the costs of these SIs, which just bring onshore regulations that already exist, has anybody thought for a moment to consider what the costs would be if we did not have them ready by exit day? What would that mean for the financial services industry? It would be cataclysmic. It is absolutely the reason that the noble Lords, Lord Sharkey and Lord Tunnicliffe, were right to say that, while they recognise the need for scrutiny, they also recognise how important it is for the industry that we get these measures through.
I will come back to some of the other issues in later debates on this evening’s SIs.
Will the noble Lord consider my point on paragraph 2.1 of the Explanatory Memorandum? It assures us that these powers will be used in a narrow way to manage the transition and not to introduce new policy. That is quite a strong statement, but it is nowhere on the record and there is nothing in the instrument to limit the use of the powers mentioned in paragraph 2.1.
The noble Lord did ask me to assure that that will apply, and I am happy to do so. With those assurances, and conscious that we will touch on many of these matters again later in the evening, I beg to move.