Lord Bates
Main Page: Lord Bates (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Bates's debates with the Home Office
Immigration Bill
Lord Bates Excerpts(8 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Hylton (CB)
Before the Minister replies, can he link the request from my noble friend with Amendment 113 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Roberts of Llandudno?
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Bates) (Con)
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for this short debate. As this is a fresh part of the Bill, perhaps I may put on record that my wife is a small-scale private sector landlord. I will structure my response first by speaking to the government amendments in this group which stand in my name and then seek to devote the rest of the time, which I think will be needed, to addressing the many points which have been raised.
It is important that we place this debate in some context. We had a significant debate on this issue at Second Reading. Following that, I wrote extensively to noble Lords seeking to provide some reassurances. We revisited the issue in Committee and further letters were sent. We also had what I thought was a very productive meeting on 11 February at the Home Office to which all interested Peers were invited, and we were delighted to have with us at that point the noble Lord, Lord Best, who cannot be with us today but who co-chairs the landlords consultative panel, to guide us through some of the working. A lot of reassurances were offered then but there were some outstanding issues of concern. In that context I will be referring to a letter I sent on 7 March to my noble friend Lord Howard of Rising, a copy of which is in the Library, which provides further reassurances on certain specific points that were made. Lastly, we are bringing forward today government amendments within this group. I have set this out as context to reassure all noble Lords that the Government are listening carefully to the concerns being raised and will continue to do so as the scheme is rolled out.
As I say, the Government have listened to the concerns about the effect that these provisions could have, which is a fear of prosecution on the part of genuine landlords. Government Amendment 62 provides a further defence for landlords who, once they know that they are renting to an illegal migrant or have reasonable cause to believe that that is the case, take steps to end a tenancy within a reasonable period. The amendment also provides that the courts must have regard to any statutory guidance issued by the Secretary of State in determining whether the landlord has proved that the defence applies on the balance of probabilities. This guidance must be laid before Parliament before being issued subject to the negative resolution procedure. The guidance will provide reassurance to landlords about the sorts of steps and periods of time which the Home Office considers reasonable and unreasonable in these circumstances. I understand that the Residential Landlords Association warmly welcomes the amendment, so I hope that it offers some reassurance.
Government Amendment 64 makes a minor change to the drafting, the effect of which will mean that, where an offence has been committed, it will not serve to render the terms of any tenancy agreement invalid or unenforceable on the grounds of illegality.
Government Amendment 72 seeks to remove a provision in Clause 40 that permits the Secretary of State to amend, repeal or revoke any enactment contained in this Bill. This follows a recommendation made by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, to which we wrote in response to its report, which of course the Government fully accept. I shall be moving the government amendments in due course.
I turn now to the points that were raised in the debate by my noble friends Lord Howard of Rising and Lord Cathcart. In my letter dated 7 March, I wrote as follows:
“The ‘reasonable cause to believe’ threshold is a very high one. Its inclusion in addition to the ‘knows’ threshold arguably makes it easier to successfully prosecute the landlord who is fully aware that there are illegal migrants in his or her property and deliberately turns a blind eye, or the landlord who has all the pieces at their disposal to know that he or she is renting to an illegal migrant. For a successful prosecution in such cases, the fact that the landlord is renting to a disqualified person would still have to be the only reasonable conclusion the landlord could draw from the information available to them. For example, a landlord who had undertaken all of the relevant right to rent checks in accordance with his obligations under the scheme”—
including Greek passports in the example given—
“but had no idea that he had been deceived by a good quality fraudulent document, or a landlord whose tenants had subsequently moved occupiers who were disqualified from renting into the property without his knowledge, would never satisfy the mens rea for commission of this offence”.
I hope that that offers some reassurance to my noble friends.
The noble Earl, Lord Listowel, asked about care leavers. If they have lawful status, they will have the right to rent. If not, but there are genuine obstacles to their return, permission to rent is likely to apply.
The noble Baroness, Lady Sheehan, raised a number of issues relating to prejudice. I was particularly concerned about prejudice against people with northern accents in this regard.
Baroness Sheehan
I just want to say that my good friend is now a judge, so it was not an insurmountable barrier.
Lord Bates
What a sweet prospect—a judge with a northern accent. That is a very fine example of social mobility under the modern government procedures that we have—I should quickly move on.
The noble Baroness asked how the scheme is working in terms of the detention of illegal migrants, and the serving of penalty notices. The scheme has now been in operation for over a year and has led to the detection of illegal migrants. The evaluation document that was produced, to which I draw the noble Baroness’s attention, pointed to 37 immigration enforcement visits which took place during that time. More than 100 individuals were identified who did not have the required legal documentation to be here. The scheme is now in operation. The extension of the scheme across England has worked smoothly, and further illegal migrants have been detected.
In terms of restrictions that are already in place to access social housing, it is reasonable to expect that migrants who remain here without permission should regularise their position or leave the UK. Successive Governments have sought to ensure that the immigration system is fair. In fact, we discussed this in Committee when the point was made that for some time—from about 1999—it has been a requirement on social landlords in the public sector to carry out checks that the person has the right to be here. We are now extending that into the private sector.
The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, asked about the evaluation and said that she did not feel that it demonstrated that the scheme had achieved its aim. The statement in the evaluation report that just “26 referrals” of irregular migrants were specifically related to the scheme is a partial and selective quotation of the research report. As the evaluation report makes clear, this number specifically related to referrals,
“formally recorded on the Home Office’s intelligence database within the first six months of the scheme. More intelligence referrals had been received but were not recorded in this database as they were sent directly to enforcement teams”.
As stated in the evaluation report, in the first six months of the scheme in phase one,
“109 individuals … were identified, of whom 63 were previously unknown to the Home Office”.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, raised the issue of the evaluation that was carried out by JCWI and the YouGov poll. These findings are at odds with the Home Office’s wide-ranging evaluation—specifically the mystery-shopping exercise carried out by independent contractors examining discrimination and documentation issues as one of the mystery-shopping scenarios involved a prospective tenant who did not hold a passport.
My noble friend Lord Howard asked what would happen if a person moves into a property without the landlord’s knowledge. I think I have dealt with this already, but the landlord will fall liable for the offence only if they have knowingly let the property to an illegal immigrant and have done so having reasonable cause to believe that the tenant or occupant is a disqualified person, or where they have subsequently become aware that someone disqualified is renting or occupying their property.
The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, asked a fair question about permission-to-rent guidelines and advised me to write to her on that. I am very happy to give an undertaking that I will do so and hope that that will be helpful. We do not accept the suggestion that the policy conflicts with the public sector equality duty. The Home Office prepared a policy equality statement and took into consideration the results of a thorough evaluation of the scheme in discharging this duty. Both the statement and the evaluation focused on the potential for discrimination; the findings of both are in the public domain. Having set out our criteria, we consider that it should, in most cases, be clear to migrants whether they have a right to rent or are likely to be given permission to rent. It is not something that we expect people to apply for, but it is open to any migrant to contact the Home Office about their case.
Lord Bates
It is absolutely right for the noble Earl to draw attention to that. I certainly give him that undertaking. We will bear in mind those particular points precisely when we construct the guidance which will be laid before Parliament.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I am grateful to everyone who piled in on this. Again, there is an awful lot that we are not going to agree on—but I will not repeat all the arguments I made in moving my amendment. However, I should make it clear that I was asking not about publication of the Home Office’s evaluation but about the work of the panel of the noble Lord, Lord Bates. I think that that is a separate issue.
Lord Bates
The noble Baroness raised that point in Committee. I went back to James Brokenshire and asked him whether the minutes could be published. That issue will be raised at the next meeting of the consultative panel. Because other private sector groups are involved there is, of course, a need to get their permission before any action of that kind could be taken. But that issue will be on the agenda for the next meeting of the consultative panel.
Baroness Hamwee
I am glad to hear that because it means that the last hour may not have been in vain. I still have concerns about mandatory conviction, discrimination—whether because or in spite of my intermittent Mancunian accent, I am not sure—and criminalisation. My amendment and that of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, cover very much the same ground and we have discussed this. He asked for sympathy from the Minister. He always gets sympathy from this Minister. Therefore, I assume that he will not lead the troops to support the continuing pilot, if you like, which is the subject of both our amendments. Therefore, very sadly, as I do not want to take up the time of the House, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Bates
“(5A) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (1) to prove that—
(a) the person has taken reasonable steps to terminate the residential tenancy agreement, and(b) the person has taken such steps within a reasonable period beginning with the time when the person first knew or had reasonable cause to believe that the premises were occupied by the adult mentioned in subsections (2) and (3).(5B) In determining whether subsection (5A)(a) or (b) applies to a person, the court must have regard to any guidance which, at the time in question, had been issued by the Secretary of State for the purposes of that subsection and was in force at that time.
(5C) Guidance issued for the purposes of subsection (5A)—
(a) must be laid before Parliament in draft before being issued, and (b) comes into force in accordance with regulations made by the Secretary of State.”
Lord Bates
Lord Bates
Lord McCluskey (CB)
My Lords, I support the amendment proposed by my noble and learned friend Lord Hope of Craighead and would like the Minister to explain the assumption behind this clause as drafted. Is the assumption that the Sewel convention, as it is called, would be in force and therefore there would be flexibility, or is the assumption that the Scotland Bill will be passed in its present form, where the word “normally” is used, which virtually abolishes the Sewel convention? If “normally” is to remain part of the Scotland Bill and so become part of the Scotland Act, will that then be justiciable in relation to this particular matter?
Lord Bates
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, for moving his amendment and leading this debate. I concur with the view that these are very important issues: they are not trivial issues but are very substantial. They were raised and commented on by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee in its 17th report, and were also raised by the Constitution Committee in its report. I will come back to those responses later, but I certainly accept that this is a welcome opportunity to get some reassurances and some comments on the record in relation to these matters.
This Bill is intended to apply to the whole of the UK, including Scotland and Wales. Where the law differs between different parts of the UK, the Bill makes special provision. The Government have sought to be open and clear on how the Bill applies to the rest of the UK. Making the Bill work effectively across the UK is complex, and we have consulted with lawyers and officials in the devolved Administrations to make sure that we get this right. That takes time. I should say at this point that there has been a substantial body of exchanges between the Scottish Government and the Home Office on this Bill—between James Brokenshire and Nicola Sturgeon—dating back to 13 August, with some 13 different iterations. I am happy to make the list available to the noble and learned Lord to show that that consultation has been going on.
In Committee, we amended the Bill in respect of illegal working in relation to private hire vehicles, so provision for the whole of the UK now appears in the Bill. In respect of illegal working in licensed premises, to which the noble and learned Lord referred, we have not had time to amend the Bill but have published draft regulations so that our method and intent are clear.
Amendment 73 concerns the mechanism to extend the residential tenancies provisions to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. As with the right-to-rent scheme in the 2014 Act, we believe that the extension of these provisions to the whole of the UK has only consequential impact on devolved legislation and remains for an immigration purpose.
We have not sought to put the residential tenancies provisions for Scotland or Wales in the Bill or to publish draft regulations. This is because both the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly have been legislating in this space. The Private Housing (Tenancies) (Scotland) Bill was introduced into the Scottish Parliament last October, three weeks after we brought the Immigration Bill to Parliament. Stage 3 proceedings are scheduled to take place in the Scottish Parliament on Thursday 17 March. In Wales, to respond to the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, the Assembly has been considering the Renting Homes (Wales) Bill, which finally became law on 18 January. With the law in flux in Wales and Scotland, we had to decide whether it was worth amending the law only to need to re-amend it a few months later, and we thought that once was better.
Amendments 140 and 140A relate to the provision in Part 5 which will make it easier to transfer unaccompanied migrant and asylum-seeking children from one local authority to another, and will enable the Secretary of State to require local authorities to co-operate in the transfer of unaccompanied migrant children from one local authority to another, should voluntary arrangements fail. Of course, as the noble Lord said, we all hope that the voluntary arrangements will succeed and that the power will therefore not need to be exercised.
However, the dispersal of migrant children is not an area in which Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland have competence to legislate, and their consent is therefore, in our opinion, not required for the UK Government to legislate in this area. Immigration legislation already provides a UK-wide framework for migrants’ access to local authority services. As I mentioned, the Government have been liaising with the devolved Administrations on participating in dispersal on a voluntary basis, and are grateful for the positive engagement which we have received to date. However, we must avoid a repetition of the situation that we saw in Kent last summer, so we will enforce the arrangements if necessary.
The regulations in Clause 68 are subject to the affirmative resolution procedure, so will be scrutinised in Parliament before they become law. In that context, I should say that the point about their affirmative or negative nature was precisely the one raised by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. In response, we said that we would make them subject to the affirmative procedure, which will give the House a greater degree of scrutiny.
On the point raised by the former Solicitor-General, the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, about the Sewel convention, I am happy to provide copies to the noble and learned Lords and the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, of my letter to my noble friend Lord Lang of Monkton on 1 March this year in response to the Constitution Committee’s concern about the use of the Sewel convention. Perhaps I may read into the record a small section of it from the third paragraph on page 1. I wrote:
“We note that you have drawn the attention of the House in particular to the powers for providing an extension of clauses 10, 11, 16 and 43 to Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland (now clauses 34, 35, 40 and 68 respectively). We are clear that these provisions relate to the reserved matter of immigration and so we believe that it is entirely appropriate that the Legislative Consent Motions are not needed. We are also clear that it can be appropriate for these matters to be addressed in secondary legislation, which will allow us to ensure that the legislation reflects the differing legislative frameworks across the United Kingdom, including forthcoming changes to those frameworks”.
On the particular point raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, on the assumption lying behind this point, I wonder if I might write to him. I willingly accept the invitation from the noble and learned Lord to write further to address the specific points that he raised—but I hope that what I have set out so far will provide him with some reassurance that, while accepting that this is not an ideal situation, it is a genuine factor that we are respecting the devolved institutions in the work going through in the areas in which they have competence and seeking to make the intention clear at a later date to avoid having to change it.
Lord McCluskey
Would the Minister be good enough to include me in the correspondence that he sends to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, because this is a live and important matter that we have to discuss on Monday when the Scotland Bill comes back to this House for Third Reading?
Lord Bates
I certainly give an undertaking. All the correspondence is there, in a trail to the noble and learned Lord, stretching back to August. I shall make sure that that is all with the noble and learned Lords by the end of the week, so they have time to consider that for next week.
Lord Hope of Craighead
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his reply, which has helped to clarify matters to some extent. Rather like the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, I emphasise that I do not seek in any way to criticise the intention behind the legislation, particularly in regard to children. It is a very important matter, and no criticism is intended on the intention to extend these provisions to Scotland and, no doubt, to the other devolved institutions so that the same protection for children is available. That is absolutely understood—and I understand the immigration policy impetus behind wanting to extend the legislation with regard to residential tenancies to the devolved areas as well. But it is a curious feature that the way in which this will be sought to be done, which is fairly plain from what is being done in England and Wales, is by amending Scottish legislation. It is all very well to say that this is a reserved matter because it deals with immigration, but you cannot get away from the fact that the areas in which legislation requires change are in devolved matters. That is why the relationship with the Sewel convention is very important.
I have always been a little puzzled as to how the Sewel convention extends to discussions between Ministers, and I was very glad to hear that that dialogue has been taking place. In a way that is just as effective—perhaps even more effective—than having a matter before the Scottish Parliament for its consent, because it is a far more constructive dialogue, which can be begun early and help to frame the legislation from an earlier stage. That is not the Sewel convention as expressed in the Scotland Bill, but it is a useful way in which to communicate, which I welcome very much, and I am glad to hear that it has been going on. But there is still the Sewel point, which requires attention, because of the fact that the Scottish legislation is in the target for the statutory instrument.
The noble Lord, Lord Wigley, mentioned the Henry VIII aspect of the provisions, which requires explanation, because it is very wide-ranging. The power is to,
“amend, repeal or revoke any enactment”—
that is, any
“enactment contained in, or in an instrument made under, an Act of the Scottish Parliament”.
There has been no attempt in this legislation to focus on the Scottish legislation, which is quite easily identified, which requires amendment. It would have been more helpful if the Bill had been framed in a way that made it clear which particular statutes required amendment, or at least the areas of law that we are dealing with, instead of having a wide-ranging Henry VIII power to, as it were, demolish all the legislation embraced in these very broad phrases.
I hope that when the Minister writes, he can explain a little more what is intended and what has taken place to reassure people about this. From what he has been saying, I take it that it is not intended that this Bill should go before the Scottish Parliament for a legislative consent Motion. Nor do I think he is suggesting that the instruments themselves should go before the Scottish Parliament; I do not see how they could. But no doubt there are people in Scotland who are listening very carefully to what is being discussed in relation to this matter, as there will be in Wales. It is therefore very important that the matter is fully clarified. I hope that we do not have to come back to discuss it more on Third Reading, so I look forward to what the Minister is going to tell us in writing. I see that the Minister would like to say something.
Lord Bates
Very briefly, I just want to clarify, to manage expectations here. What I have undertaken to provide by Monday for the convenience of the noble and learned Lords are copies of the correspondence, which are already in existence, to aid that part of the discussion. With the very hard-working constitutional lawyers and cross-government committees necessary to sign off on such communications, we might be able to generate that by Monday—certainly as soon as possible. But those letters to which I referred will be with the noble and learned Lord before the end of the week.
Lord Hope of Craighead
My Lords, I am most grateful to the Minister. I fully understand the problems due to a shortage of time and will look forward to what can best be achieved. For the time being, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Rosser (Lab)
We have an amendment in this group which provides that a person does not commit an offence of driving when unlawfully in the United Kingdom if at the time of driving the motor vehicles the person had a reasonable belief that they had a legal right to be in this country. Of course, the Government have tabled an amendment which provides that a person commits the offence of driving when unlawfully in the UK only if they knew or had reasonable cause to believe that they were disqualified from driving by reason of their immigration status. We welcome the move that the Government have made on this issue.
The argument has been made in this debate by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for deleting from the Bill this new offence and the powers to carry out searches related to driving issues. My noble friend Lady Lawrence of Clarendon has spoken powerfully on the potential consequences of this new offence and the associated search powers to increase discrimination and damage community relations, including relations with the police, and generally put the clock back.
The Government have said that guidance will be issued and that there will be public consultation but I, too, ask whether there will be any debate in Parliament on the guidance. What will be the Government’s reaction if the public consultation shows clear concern about the potential impact of the new offence? Will the Government then decide not to bring it into force? If the new offence does come into force, what regular checks and reviews will be put in place to ensure that the concerns that have been raised about its potential adverse impact on community relations and discrimination are not materialising? What ongoing liaison, consultation and discussion will there be between the Government, the police and those in our diverse community who feel strongly that this new offence could do more harm than good? They say that, among other reasons, in the light of the evidence, you are more likely to be stopped and searched if you are black or from a minority-ethnic group.
As has already been said, this is about what might happen in practice as opposed to what should happen, as set out in the letter to which reference has already been made of 1 March, which I accept also made reference to the pilot of the use of the search power in Clause 41 in one or two police areas before proceeding with a national rollout. I very much hope that the Minister will address the specific points that I have raised on what might be the outcome of the public consultation, and on the issue about the regular checks and reviews that will be put in place to ensure that if the offence does come into being what happens is what should happen, as opposed to the very real fears that have been voiced today that it will potentially cause damage to community relations and increase discrimination.
Lord Bates
My Lords, I will come to the points raised in this debate shortly but first I shall speak to the two government amendments in this group standing in my name.
Amendments 75 and 76 would introduce a mens rea to the offence of driving while being unlawfully present in the UK. As currently drafted, the driving offence contained in Clause 42 is one of strict liability, on which the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, raised some significant concerns in Committee. Following that exchange, we agreed to reflect further on the issue. I believe that we are of one mind in our intention to ensure that migrants are not prosecuted for this offence where they hold a genuine and reasonable belief that they are in the UK legally. The Government have been persuaded that it would be appropriate to place further safeguards on the face of the statute. These amendments introduce a mens rea element so that an illegal migrant will commit the offence of driving while illegally present only if they knew or had reasonable cause to believe they were in the UK illegally.
This will protect those who genuinely and reasonably believed they were here in the UK lawfully, while ensuring that other migrants cannot seek to avoid prosecution by avoiding contact with the Home Office and/or their legal representatives, in order to establish the necessary doubt as to whether they could reasonably be expected to have known they were required to leave the UK. I invite noble Lords to support these amendments.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for moving his amendment. I fully accept that he is very sincere, but he also has a professional track record as he has worked in these very complex areas of community cohesion here in the capital, and has done so with great distinction over a long career. Of course, the work of the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence, for victims and improving community cohesion is well recognised. For that reason, it was very important that we had that meeting on 22 February where we sat down with officials to discuss the implications and workings of this clause. I am sure that they will testify to the fact that it was not necessarily an easy or cosy gathering. There were some strong feelings and concerns on all sides which were expressed at that time. One of the things that your Lordships’ House does repeatedly in many areas that is immensely valuable—officials may not have appreciated it fully at the time, but they have come to—is to bring great understanding, background and perspective to these very complex areas to pose the key questions that need to be addressed.
That said, I turn to the amendments, because they stem directly from that meeting. We went back afterwards and asked how we do this. As the noble Lord rightly pointed out, the Home Secretary is acknowledged to have made significant steps in improving community cohesion, in particular in tackling abuse of stop-and-search powers. That is why numbers have fallen. Part of the reason why that happens is that the number of incidents is now recorded so we can see what is happening on the ground. I set out in my letter—more like an epistle, as the noble Lord, Lord Alton, might say—to noble Lords over some three or four pages on 1 March how that operated in practice and the effect it was having.
We have brought forward two things: to recognise that we are making significant progress to improve community relations, and to maintain the confidence of all communities in the police to act fairly and justly, as my noble friend Lord Deben and the noble Lord, Lord Green, said. Nothing must be done to put any of that at risk. That is why we are proceeding cautiously in this area by introducing a pilot scheme, as mentioned.
On the concerns that focused on police use of these powers with particular groups, these clauses are important and necessary. We do not issue driving licences to illegal migrants and we revoke driving licences held by them. So far we have revoked some 16,000 UK driving licences held by illegal migrants, but less than 1,000 have been returned, even though it is a criminal offence to retain them. As these licences hold a value as a form of identification that can help an illegal migrant settle in the UK, it is important that they are removed from circulation. Clause 41 provides the best opportunity for us to do this when a person is apprehended as an illegal migrant.
The Government cannot, however, revoke foreign-issued driving licences. Without Clause 42, illegal migrants would be able to drive on valid, foreign-issued licences without consequence. This, in turn, facilitates their ability to stay unlawfully in the UK, to look for work and to work illegally. Illegal immigrants should not be driving on our roads. They have shown a disregard for the laws of this country—that is the very point that my noble friend Lord Deben raised. Therefore, it is absolutely right that we legislate to ensure that they are unable to do so.
I re-emphasise the following points. First, these clauses do not create new powers to stop persons or vehicles. Secondly, we intend the police to use these powers reactively after they have already stopped a vehicle for an objective reason—I will come back to that particular use of words, as the noble Lord, Lord Alton, asked me to—such as a driving offence. I emphasise that these powers will not be used by the police to stop vehicles simply to check the immigration status of the driver. That is an important distinction between the roles and responsibilities of the police and of immigration enforcement. It is one that we recognise should be maintained. Thirdly, these powers must be used proportionately. To that end, we have put in place safeguards against misuse.
Finally, I reiterate that the Government are absolutely clear that no one should be stopped, under existing police powers, on the basis of their race or ethnicity. This would be unlawful. The Government also remain absolutely clear in their commitment to reform the use of police stop-and-search powers so that they are applied in a way that genuinely protects our communities. We would not bring forward any proposal that we believe might undermine this work.
We have listened carefully to the concerns raised about these clauses. In response, the Home Office will go further. We will issue guidance to police and immigration officers on the operation of these powers and we will consult publicly on that draft guidance. This consultation will take place before implementation. It will raise awareness and provide an important gateway through which communities will be able to consider and comment on, among other things, appropriate safeguards.
Lord Bates
Lord Bates
Noble Lords will be aware of the background to the immigration health surcharge, which I set out in the debate on these amendments in Committee.
There are significant practical difficulties in introducing the incremental payments, proposed by Amendment 79, which would place additional burdens on the Home Office and the NHS. It is not simply a question of changing Home Office IT, but of introducing a mechanism through which the Home Office could monitor payments, chase those who had missed them and take action against those who refused to pay. Around 560,000 migrants are expected to pay the surcharge each year, and many of these may take the opportunity to pay in instalments. The resource implications for the Home Office of administering an instalment system could, therefore, be significant. If we were unable to recover unpaid instalments from some migrants, the NHS would suffer a loss of income. An instalment system might also be open to abuse from those seeking to come to the UK in order to receive NHS care, as they could simply stop making their payments once treatment had been received.
Amendment 80 would exempt all children under the age of 18 from paying the charge, together with those who are victims of domestic violence. I do not think it unreasonable for parents or guardians of a migrant child to bear the responsibility of paying the charge for their child. Further, and as set out during our previous debate, exemptions are already in place, in certain circumstances, for children and victims of domestic violence.
I have also reflected carefully on the points raised in Committee. At the invitation of the noble Lord, Lord Alton, the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and I had a very productive morning at the Cardinal Hume Centre. I know that a number of noble Lords are involved there in different ways—I was talking to the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, today and he said that he was involved. The noble Lord, Lord Alton, does a huge amount of good work in connection with the centre. I was amazingly impressed by the quality of the staff who undertake the cases there.
When we were there, we talked with officials and wondered whether there was a way we could engage more structurally with organisations like the Cardinal Hume Centre. The centre gave us a list of cases relating to the visa waiver and made the point that it used to be possible to secure the waiver but that, following some change, it was now more difficult. We took those cases away but, for reasons which I totally understand, the Cardinal Hume Centre was not able to give us the individuals’ names and contact details, which made it difficult for us to check. However, we have been in contact with the centre again this morning to see if we can set up a meeting to explore how the relationship might work. There would be benefits for both parties—from the Home Office point of view we would have another external validation system. The centre staff are deeply caring but not overly sentimental about it: they just want to provide practical help to people. Partnering with organisations like that can be immensely helpful and I am grateful to noble Lords for setting that up.
To clarify the situation, applicants will qualify for a fee waiver if they provide evidence to show that they are destitute or would be rendered destitute by payment of the fee, or there are exceptional circumstances relating to their financial situation. Where an applicant is in receipt of local authority support and has their accommodation and other essential living needs met, they will not be destitute. To qualify for a fee waiver, they must show that they would be rendered destitute by payment of the fee or that there are exceptional circumstances. As they are unlikely to have additional disposable income and there may be no prospective change in their financial circumstances that would enable them to pay the fee, we need to ensure that they are required to provide evidence that they meet the fee waiver policy in as straightforward a manner as possible.
It is important that the Home Office is able correctly to establish whether an applicant qualifies for a fee waiver. It will not surprise the House to learn that some applicants seek not to pay the fee that is properly applicable in their case. From 6 April 2015 to 28 February 2016, there were around 11,130 applications for a fee waiver. Of the fee waiver applications considered in that period—around 11,140, including some predating that period—around 84% were refused. This underlines the importance of the work the Home Office is doing to protect an important revenue for the NHS of around £100 million per year. It also underlines the importance of ensuring that those applicants who are able to show that they qualify for a fee waiver are enabled to do so as effectively as possible.
If the applicant qualifies for a fee waiver, the health charge is also waived, so there is no need for an exemption or for payment by instalments. There are also exemptions in place, as I have described, for vulnerable children, such as asylum seekers or victims of trafficking, and for victims of domestic violence who apply for limited leave under the destitute domestic violence concession.
Amendment 81, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, on student support for care leavers, would give student loan access to care leavers with limited leave to enter or remain who have been ordinarily resident in the UK since they were granted that leave. It would also require that such cases, as well as care leavers with an outstanding asylum claim or immigration application, be charged home rather than international student fees.
The Government are currently considering their response to the public consultation by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills on the terms on which those without settled status and who are not otherwise able to access student support by virtue of our international obligations should be eligible for student support. The consultation followed the Supreme Court ruling in July 2015 in the case of Ms Tigere that the policy of refusing access to a student loan solely on the grounds that the person did not have settled status in the UK was not compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. The Supreme Court left it to the Government to consider the options for a revised policy. The Supreme Court judgment also upheld the Government’s policy of requiring all persons—with the exception of refugees, who are given immediate access to support—to be lawfully resident in the UK for at least three years immediately prior to starting their course.
We think it is appropriate that there should be some distinction between a person who is a British citizen or who has long residence here or an immigration status of the sort that means they now have a solid connection with the UK—for example, refugee leave, humanitarian protection status or indefinite leave to remain—and a migrant with limited immigration status, or none at all but with an outstanding asylum claim or immigration application, who has not yet established a solid connection of that sort with the UK.
Turning to the questions that were raised, the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, asked about domestic violence exemptions. Those who pay the charge will be eligible to use the NHS free of charge for the duration of their stay without any further treatment charges being imposed. However, a person who applies for limited leave under the Home Office destitute domestic violence concession is exempt from the charge and will receive free NHS care for the period of that leave, during which they will make an application for permanent status in the UK. Those are the circumstances in which a victim of domestic violence gets free healthcare. The noble Baroness asked whether it would be possible to simplify the process by exempting all children and victims of domestic violence. We think that sufficient safeguards are in place for ensuring that vulnerable children and victims of domestic violence are able to use the NHS without charge, and a blanket exception is therefore unnecessary.
I was asked whether the Home Office could not make an exception from collecting all the charges upfront. Any move to an instalment approach, including setting up separate systems for exceptional cases, would be costly and administratively difficult. But it is not just that. The Home Office would also need to ensure that payments were made when due and would need to chase payments if they were not made and take enforcement action which could involve curtailing the person’s leave.
I was asked how much had been collected. In the first six months since its introduction, the immigration health surcharge collected more than £100 million—I correct my previous comment that it had produced £100 million in a year. That was in the first six months so, annualised, it is going to be much more than that.
The noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Alton, asked how charge payers access the NHS. Those who pay the charge and are subsequently granted entry clearance or leave to remain receive NHS care in the same way as a permanent resident. I was asked why the charge cannot be paid in multiple payments. I have addressed that point.
The noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, said that the numbers of those requiring support by local authorities for tuition fees are very low. We disagree with that. Even one or two cases create a significant burden for local authorities. International fees range on average from £12,000 to £15,000 per year. These costs are also a significant disincentive to local authorities participating in the voluntary transfer of unaccompanied asylum-seeking children.
I was asked what the criteria were to qualify for the fee waiver. The qualification is that an applicant is destitute or would be rendered destitute by payment of the fee because they are unable to pay the fee now or to save the required amount within a reasonable period—which is 12 months, as determined by the rules—and they have no ability to borrow the required amount from friends or family, or that there is no basis for concluding that their financial circumstances are likely to change within that reasonable period, or there are exceptional circumstances relating to their finances.
In relation to the visa fees, I totally understand the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, about the very significant increases. We changed the policy here and introduced a policy based on the belief that the user should pay; in other words, that the resident taxpayer should not be picking up the bill for people who are getting the benefit of coming to this country to study, visit or secure their citizenship. Therefore, the view was that that should be self-financing and the increases in the fees reflect that imperative.
I was asked how migrant families could be expected to pay the upfront amount. Migrant families entering the UK will be aware that they need to pay the health charge if they are here for more than six months in a temporary capacity, and will therefore need to plan their finances accordingly.
There is another letter to add to the many, which is the letter I sent to the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, on 8 March. I notice that that was not shared with other Members. I can place a copy in the Library, but if other Members are interested in seeing a copy of that and the reasons set out for student support for care leavers, I am very happy to make that available. I have written to the noble Baroness on these issues and have asked if she would be willing to meet Ministers at the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills to discuss her concerns. It is important that we frame the eligibility criteria for student loan access in a way which takes proper account of immigration status and is fair across all categories, including to the resident population.
While I might not have gone all the way in addressing all the concerns raised by noble Lords, I hope that with these explanations we have at least moved a little further down the road to addressing some of them and explaining the reasons why we cannot move further in other areas.
Lord Bates
“( ) to whom a notice has been given in accordance with regulations under section 105 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (notice of decision) of a decision to make a deportation order against that person,”
Lord Bates
“Guidance on detention of vulnerable persons
(1) The Secretary of State must issue guidance specifying matters to be taken into account by a person to whom the guidance is addressed in determining—
(a) whether a person (“P”) would be particularly vulnerable to harm if P were to be detained or to remain in detention, and(b) if P is identified as being particularly vulnerable to harm in those circumstances, whether P should be detained or remain in detention.(2) In subsection (1) “detained” means detained under—
(a) the Immigration Act 1971,(b) section 62 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, or(c) section 36 of the UK Borders Act 2007,and “detention” is to be construed accordingly.(3) A person to whom guidance under this section is addressed must take the guidance into account.
(4) Before issuing guidance under this section the Secretary of State must lay a draft of the guidance before Parliament.
(5) Guidance under this section comes into force in accordance with regulations made by the Secretary of State.
(6) The Secretary of State may from time to time review guidance under this section and may revise and re-issue it.
(7) References in this section to guidance under this section include revised guidance.”
Lord Bates
Lord Bates
Lord Bates
“(2A) Sub-paragraph (1B)(a) does not apply to a person who is granted immigration bail by the Secretary of State if the Secretary of State considers that to impose an electronic monitoring condition on the person would be—
(a) impractical, or(b) contrary to the person’s Convention rights.(2B) Where sub-paragraph (2A) applies, the Secretary of State must not grant immigration bail to the person subject to an electronic monitoring condition.
(2C) Sub-paragraph (1B)(a) does not apply to a person who is granted immigration bail by the First-tier Tribunal if the Secretary of State informs the Tribunal that the Secretary of State considers that to impose an electronic monitoring condition on the person would be—
(a) impractical, or(b) contrary to the person’s Convention rights.(2D) Where sub-paragraph (2C) applies, the First-tier Tribunal must not grant immigration bail to the person subject to an electronic monitoring condition.
(2E) In considering for the purposes of this Schedule whether it would be impractical to impose an electronic monitoring condition on a person, or would be impractical for a person to continue to be subject to such a condition, the Secretary of State may in particular have regard to—
(a) any obstacles to making arrangements of the kind mentioned in paragraph 4 in relation to the person,(b) the resources that are available for imposing electronic monitoring conditions on persons to whom sub-paragraph (1A) applies and for managing the operation of such conditions in relation to such persons,(c) the need to give priority to the use of those resources in relation to particular categories of persons to whom that sub-paragraph applies, and(d) the matters listed in paragraph 3(2) as they apply to the person. (2F) In this Schedule “Convention rights” is to be construed in accordance with section 1 of the Human Rights Act 1998.”
Lord Bates
Lord Bates
“(2A) Regulations under section 86(1) may, in particular—
(a) make provision about the circumstances in which the power in paragraph 6(1) may or must be exercised so as to impose an electronic monitoring condition on a person to whom this sub-paragraph applies; (b) enable the Secretary of State to exercise a discretion in determining whether an electronic monitoring condition should be imposed on such a person,and may, in particular, do so by providing for paragraph 6A or 6B to have effect with modifications in relation to such a person.(2B) Sub-paragraph (2A) applies to a person who—
(a) by virtue of regulations under section 86(1) is treated as having been granted immigration bail as a result of falling within—(i) sub-paragraph (2)(c), (d) or (e), or(ii) sub-paragraph (2)(f) on the basis that the person had been released on bail from detention under paragraph 2 of Schedule 3 to the Immigration Act 1971,(b) is not treated as being subject to an electronic monitoring condition, and(c) is not otherwise subject to an electronic monitoring condition.(2C) Sub-paragraph (2A) applies to a person who—
(a) is on immigration bail pursuant to a grant before the coming into force of paragraph 2(1A) and (1B), or the coming into force of those provisions in relation to grants of that kind,(b) before the grant of immigration bail, was detained or liable to detention under a provision mentioned in paragraph 1(1)(b) or (d), and(c) is not subject to an electronic monitoring condition.”
Lord Bates