Lord Bassam of Brighton
Main Page: Lord Bassam of Brighton (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Bassam of Brighton's debates with the Scotland Office
(6 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this amendment and Amendment 29 set an alternative method for recommending a tariff, not via the Judicial College but via the Civil Justice Council, and it is suggested that this should be done on an annual basis. The Civil Justice Council is a body established by the Civil Procedure Act 1997, and it acts as an advisory body to the Lord Chancellor, who must then set out the recommended tariff under this amendment, in regulations. That is the substance of Amendment 12.
Amendment 29 makes the necessary changes to the Civil Procedure Act, which then empower the Civil Justice Council to include recommendations on the whiplash injuries damages tariff. In my submission, that is a better way of dealing with matters than either the Lord Chancellor doing it on a political basis or leaving it to the Judicial College. I understand the reservations about them. This is a better way of dealing with the situation, and I commend it to the House. I beg to move.
My Lords, I have Amendment 14 in this group. Much of this ground was covered in the earlier debate, and I anticipate the Minister’s response in that light. I take the point made by my noble friend Lord Beecham that we perhaps need to find another route on this issue, and in a sense that is what Amendment 14 does. It seeks to place a duty on the Lord Chancellor to consult the Lord Chief Justice and obtain the agreement of the Judicial College on the proposed amount for tariffs, before making regulations to set damages tariffs for whiplash.
The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee of your Lordships’ House recommended that it is the judiciary, with its experience of personal injury claims, that should determine the provisions for damages or, failing that, the responsibility should be undertaken by independent medical experts. Noble Lords have referred to medical experts in earlier debates and recognise their value. I know that many would prefer the Government to abandon their plan to discard the use of the Judicial College guidelines for general damages claims, but there is value in the current guidance. This is a probing amendment, along with others, to find a way of enabling consultation and constraining the absolute power currently set out for the Lord Chancellor.
One of the worries that feeds this is that genuine cases may be dealt with in a way that leads to undercompensation. We do not know what the scale of the problem is, because the Government have not produced statistics on what they believe to be the level of genuine or, for that matter, fraudulent claiming. While that remains the case, we must surely protect those who have genuinely suffered and need to make a claim for good reasons.
It is worth reminding ourselves that the Bar Council recommended that the Lord Chancellor should be required to have regard to decided cases. That seems a reasonable approach. If the Lord Chancellor is required to consult the Lord Chief Justice before making regulations on the uplift in exceptional circumstances, what justification can there be for him not to consult the Lord Chief Justice on the tariff amounts generally? It may be that, with its experience, the Judicial College guidelines would be an appropriate starting point and basis for consultation.
We recognise the power of the Government’s argument generally to change and make reforms, but it is also important to recognise the value of the judiciary’s knowledge in this field and the importance of consulting it in setting tariffs. After all, it has the experience.
I just wanted to say one thing. First, I am not sure whether I have declared during Committee that I was a Minister in the Ministry of Justice when the subject of whiplash reform was frequently discussed, although the precise shape of that reform did not manifest in the same way that it does in this Bill. I made that clear at Second Reading, but would like to make it clear now.
My Lords, I am much heartened by what the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, said because my Amendment 30 tries to take us to the same range of issues. It states:
“When making regulations under section 2(2), the Lord Chancellor must take account of the PI small claims limit”.
The rest of the amendment addresses the whiplash issue.
Why is the amendment here? It is here because there is no other way in which we can address the personal injury limit. It seems to us to bring in an element of manifest unfairness. This piece of legislation will impact on small claims made by employees. By raising the threshold to £2,000 for those personal injury cases the Government are creating a particular difficulty. Claimants in the small claims court, because they cannot reclaim the cost of legal support, will have to represent themselves as litigants in person—and that brings a number of difficulties.
These cases can be very complicated, and they impact adversely on those who have suffered an accident at work, or the early onset of an industrial disease. USDAW has produced a very good briefing on this, citing a vast array of cases in which it represented members and which would be caught by this uplift. Vulnerable employees can be quite seriously injured. They are often unable to work for weeks or months and suffer considerable financial detriment and loss. With no legal assistance available to them, they will be opposing an employer—who will invariably be represented at court—without the expert advice that their injury and its implications merit.
I do not understand, therefore, why the Government are so keen on this £2,000 limit. It seems both unfair and lacking in rationale. The Government have not set out any reasons for including employee injuries in what was billed as a reform of whiplash claims—which, as we have said, we have no argument with. There is no suggestion anywhere that there have been fraudulent claims by injured employees. Claimants in this process will be vulnerable. There should be, as the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, said, an equality of arms. That principle, which is fairly fundamental to the way our system of justice works, is undermined by this change, and the uplift to £2,000, when employers will be able to rely on full legal advice and support.
Cases are complex, injuries can be significant and victims can suffer considerable financial loss. Furthermore—an important point—the increase is far in excess of inflation. In 2009 Lord Justice Jackson suggested that there should be no increase to £1,500 until inflation justified it. Well, the figure of £2,000, to which the Government are wedded, cannot be justified on an inflationary basis: in terms of Lord Justice Jackson’s proposals, no increase is currently justified.
Small claims courts are not suitable for personal injury claims. We invite the Government to seriously reconsider the way they have set about this. We have already heard that cyclists will be swept up in the whiplash issue. Whether or not the Government seriously thought that they would be involving quite badly injured claimants by raising the limit to £2,000, that would be the effect of the proposed change. I have tried to find a way to bring an amendment to the Bill that would capture this issue, but have not so far succeeded. That worries me, because the Government seem to have found a way around a problem to the benefit of employers. I hope that that is not the case.
The Minister has a gap between Committee and Report, and I hope that he will meet me and others—particularly those who represent trade union members and are involved day in and day out with small claims personal injury issues—to benefit from our experience and knowledge of this field. I hope that he will then reconsider what is a very unfortunate policy, and one that will not be welcome in the workplace.
There are two other points here that are of value to consider. There will be an increase in the undersettlement of claims as a product of this; and I suspect that there will also be an increase in the number of claimants with highly unrealistic expectations of the value of their claim, thus removing the possibility of early settlement and placing increased pressure on the courts system. I hope that the Minister has some reassurance for us on this, because it is a very serious issue. It undermines some of the other, perhaps gentler, words that the Government have used in trying to understand the problems and complexities that people confront in the workplace, which was one of the Government’s earlier ambitions. That is the purpose behind our Amendment 30 and I hope that the Committee will see the strength of the case that has been put.
When the Minister considers in the round the comments made by other noble Lords, will he undertake to go away and look specifically at the way in which Scotland has approached this important question of asymmetry in the process? Will he look at whether there is a way of incorporating or dealing with claims in a similar way, without clearly undermining what he has identified as the Government’s policy principles in simply reducing tariffs?
Can the Minister assure me that there will be consultation with the trades unions? Given the case he is making, it is important that that should take place. Their experience here is highly relevant.
Trades unions’ experience is, essentially, filtered through claimant solicitors such as Thompsons, and those being consulted include representatives of both claimant and defendant groups—so that is being done. However, I would be perfectly happy to meet the noble Lord, and such representative groups as he may wish to bring to a meeting, to discuss the proposed increase in the limits on small claims. If he wishes to do that, I shall be perfectly content for him to contact my private office, and we can make suitable arrangements. At this time, however, I invite noble Lords not to press their amendments.
There are indeed, and that was why I wondered at the noble Lord’s reticence. If the noble Lord wishes to speak to them, I am not the person to stand between him and the remainder of the Committee.
I am extraordinarily grateful to the noble and learned Lord for his prompt rising, as it were, from a sedentary position. My Amendment 42A is in this group. On the Bill as a whole, in Clause 4 the Government seem to recognise the problem of what are called “pre-med offers”, yet fail to ensure that they are sufficiently discouraged. We are in the same territory here but perhaps not seeking to approach it in the same way. My understanding is that such offers are made to people sometimes at a point of vulnerability following injury and sometimes, it has to be said, in the most cynical of circumstances—when sick pay runs out and after putting in a denial, which, although clearly weak, sometimes worries people.
Lawyers for claimants have a professional duty to put an offer to their client. There are many circumstances in which desperate people ignore the advice to reject that comes with that offer and accept what is offered, however inappropriate the sum is to the injuries that they have suffered. Pre-med offers are not made to be fair or reasonable. The offers are often made by defending insurers to get rid of a case cheaply, and I quite accept that the Government are right to seek to prohibit them. The consequence of acceptance in the absence of a medical report is that if the injured person later develops conditions arising from the accident, they will of course fall back on the NHS to support them. They will have no compensation to get treatment and the cost will fall more widely on society and the taxpayer. Meanwhile, the insurer for the guilty party who caused the injury will have walked away having saved money.
I am obliged to noble Lords. The amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, would place the requirements for medical reports to be provided by an accredited medical expert selected via the MedCo portal or other experts specified by the Lord Chancellor in regulations. Currently, the Civil Procedure Rules require any initial medical report in support of a whiplash claim to be sought through the MedCo IT portal, which is established and proves, as the noble Lord indicated, the independence and quality of these medical reports. The Civil Procedure Rules also require that all MedCo medical reports must be provided by an accredited medical expert. I am therefore uncertain what additional benefit the amendments would add to that process, because we already have in place the requirement that it should be a MedCo report that is obtained.
Indeed, the amendments could have a negative impact on the success of MedCo as, on one view, it would widen the pool of medical experts to any person with medical qualifications rather than someone who has been accredited specifically for these types of report by MedCo. I may have misunderstood Amendment 41, but that appears to be what its result would be, although that may be unintended. I emphasise that we consider that the creation of MedCo, as adjusted recently, has been a success and will continue to be so. We require that parties should have to go through the MedCo portal for an appropriate independent expert report before these claims are settled.
So I ask the noble Lord to reconsider the terms of the amendment because we do not feel that it adds anything to the Bill. I believe we have a common intention here and it may be that I have misunderstood what lies behind Amendment 41, but at present we believe the present structure of MedCo reports and the portal is appropriate as it stands, and at this stage we would not be prepared to contemplate the amendments that have been moved. If the noble Lord wishes to discuss this matter further with me, I will be content to do so because it may be that I have somehow misunderstood the intent of Amendment 41 in that regard.
I turn to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Bassam. We looked at the whole question of how it would be most appropriate to deal with claims that were settled without a MedCo report. That would place the insurer or relevant party settling the claim in breach of their own regulatory requirements, and appropriate steps would be taken. In due course, as we know under the financial regulation Bill that is currently going through, that would be the FCA in respect of claims management companies.
I draw attention to Clause 5(6), which states:
“A breach of section 4 does not make an agreement to settle the whiplash claim in question void or unenforceable”.
We adopted that approach to ensure that the claimant should not suffer at all in circumstances where the person making the settlement did so without the report. In other words, the claimant would be entitled to retain all sums paid in those circumstances. If we make the agreement void, the sector would potentially seek recovery of the sums passed in respect of a void transaction. I appreciate that the noble Lord seeks to qualify that, but it raises complex issues over contract liability. We believe that we have taken the correct approach by ensuring that the person making the settlement, who is a regulated party, will be in breach of their regulatory regime if they do so without a MedCo report, while equally ensuring that the claimant should not suffer because of that misfeasance, and should be able to retain the settlement sum.
We do not believe that there is a major issue in this context with regard to those who are persuaded to settle early but, if that is an issue, it is more widely encountered across personal injury claims as a whole, and we do not see any basis for taking an exceptional route in regard to whiplash injury claims. I hope that that reassures the noble Lord that there is a mechanism to protect the claimant and enforce the requirements of Clause 4 against those who are settling claims.
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for his attempt at reassurance. I will reflect on his words, but I may come back with something on Report because I want to ensure that we have that protection there.
I quite understand the noble Lord’s concern, and I would be willing to consider any further amendment that he puts forward on this in due course. At this stage, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.