Civil Legal Aid (Remuneration) (Amendment) (No. 3) Regulations 2014

Lord Bach Excerpts

Wednesday 7th May 2014 Lords Chamber

Therefore, as a non-lawyer, I support the lawyers who have spoken this evening. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for the manner in which he introduced the debate—briefly, concisely and extremely persuasively—and I was also glad to be personally present to witness the repentance of the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, and the noble and learned Baroness when they admitted that they had perhaps got it wrong. On this occasion, it is the Lord Chancellor who has got it wrong; let him put it right.

[Lord Bach (Lab)]

My Lords, even more than usual, thanks are owed to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for tabling this regret Motion, because these regulations are laid, as we have heard, under Section 2 of LASPO, which requires only a negative statutory instrument. This allows for the implementation of the regulation before Parliament has any opportunity to debate it. Indeed, Parliament would have had no such opportunity if not for the noble Lord himself. All those with an interest in the rule of law and access to justice—and that should be all of us—once again owe a debt of gratitude to the noble Lord.

Other experts argue with some force that the appropriate way for Her Majesty’s Government legitimately to bring forward such a major reform—with the likely consequence that in practice many poor citizens will not be able to exercise every citizen’s right to question executive power—is by primary legislation. If this, however, is asking too much, these experts argue that the regulations should have been laid under Section 9 of LASPO, which obliges the Government to get parliamentary approval before the regulation comes into place. Thankfully we are having a debate, and I make a few points in support of the Motion of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.

I perhaps ought to declare an interest. I am probably the only speaker to take part in this debate who has been on the wrong side of a judicial review. The court found against the decision I had taken. However, that encourages me even more to make the points I intend to make.

In his initial attack on judicial review, the Lord Chancellor implied in rather a general, throwaway manner that judicial review was somehow becoming the tool of left-wing pressure groups egged on by left-wing lawyers. This sort of talk may of course satisfy the Daily Telegraph on a bad day, or the Daily Mail on any day, but it does not accord with reality. Judicial review is supposed to be open to all citizens who want to challenge the decisions of the executive: it should be for all of us. Examples of citizens, rich and poor alike, taking this course are legion. For me, a current example is close to home, and I mention it briefly. The self-described descendants of King Richard III, who obtained a judicial review of the Lord Chancellor’s decision, cannot, I suggest, be described as left-wing activists whose purpose is to destroy civilisation as we know it.

Criticism can and must be made of the Lord Chancellor himself. He often gives the impression, I am afraid, that he does not always appreciate important principles that lie at the heart of our legal system, or that he does not have much understanding of how it works in practice. Both are important: the principles, and how they work in practice. It is unfair—on balance—to say that it is because he is not a lawyer. There are many non-lawyers who have a deep understanding of how precious and important our legal system is. However, I make the point that all four of the Lord Chancellor’s current crop of junior Ministers are distinguished lawyers. One in particular is distinguished—I will not embarrass him by naming him tonight but I think he knows who he is. I ask this question of that Minister: is it not time that he and his lawyer colleagues, who, just as much as the Lord Chancellor, must have the interests of justice as their prime obligation, girded up their loins, if I may use that expression, and together pointed out to their boss that many of the changes being made in his name seem to have scant concern for the concept of the rule of law, or access to justice, or how these important principles are put into practice in a system that I hope is still—but only just—the envy of the world?

The regulations we are debating are, I argue, a good example. Everyone who has looked at the regulations comes to the irresistible conclusion that for the LAA not to be allowed to pay any legal aid in a case where permission is refused and for the Lord Chancellor to have an unclear and uncertain discretion if a case never reaches the permission stage will have a chilling effect. It will mean that lawyers will not be able to take judicial review cases where the claimant cannot afford to pay. The result is that a system of law which is open to all will inevitably have become closed to many, and in particular to those who most need the protection of judicial review against the power of the Executive.

As the Bar Council put it in paragraph 9 of its very well argued briefing note:

“A fundamental concern is that a particular group only (namely, legally aided claimants) would be subject to these provisions. Public authorities would face no particular adverse consequences when they resisted applications for permission for no good reason. The position of privately funded claimants would remain unchanged. Treating legally aided claimants differently would be unfair. It does not happen in relation to other areas of law. It would create an unprecedented imbalance between the parties to litigation and will lead to inequality of arms”.

That is a powerful statement. When the Minister comes to reply, will he say whether he agrees with it?

Of course, the point has been made that there are already filters in place: a merits test before legal aid can be granted and, in every case, there is a permission stage. As the same note from the Bar Council says in paragraph 11,

“the existence of the filter amply serves its intended purpose. It is wrong in principle to impose additional, specific disincentives to accessing the permission stage itself. That does not ‘rebalance’ judicial review; rather, it risks fatally undermining it”.

If one looks back to the passage of the LASPO Act through Parliament, the Government promised two safeguards. One was that exceptional cases would be a safety net for the area of social welfare law that was being taken out of scope. In its first year of operation, the exceptional cases point has turned out to be a miserable failure. The second safeguard—the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, spoke of this—was of course to be the continuation of legal aid for judicial review. As the Government argued in their own original Proposals for the Reform of Legal Aid in England and Wales in November 2010, judicial review represents,

“a crucial way of ensuring that state power is exercised responsibly”.

Throughout the lengthy debates in this House and in the other place, Ministers would use the existence of legal aid judicial review as a reason why it was safe to remove legal aid from social welfare law. Yet barely one year after Part 1 of that Act has come into force, the Government are introducing a regulation that is bound to have the effect of making it very unlikely that a poor or disabled person, or a citizen who needs legal aid, will be able to get justice by way of judicial review. The risk of not getting permission, and thus not getting any costs, is so great that providers simply cannot or will not be able to do it.

To my mind, this represents a particularly low point for the Government. They have got controversial legislation through Parliament on a false basis and further demeaned our legal system. Where will it end?