Iranian Nuclear Programme

Lord Austin of Dudley Excerpts

Thursday 2nd July 2015 Westminster Hall

[Ian Austin (Dudley North) (Lab)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered the Iranian nuclear programme.

It is a pleasure, as always, to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Amess; it is great to see you in the Chair this afternoon. I am grateful to the Chairman of Ways and Means for giving us this opportunity. I have been raising concerns about Iran’s nuclear ambitions ever since I became a Member of Parliament: I have raised this issue with four Foreign Secretaries over the past 10 years. I applied for the debate in the hope of getting it this week because of the negotiations currently taking place in Vienna.

It is worth recalling how we got here and why Iran’s claims that it does not want a bomb have no credibility whatever. Iran has been caught lying time and again. In 2002, Iranian opposition groups disclosed details of major secret nuclear sites that Iran had kept hidden. Those sites included a large underground uranium enrichment facility at Natanz and a heavy water production plant and reactor at Arak that could produce weapons-grade plutonium, neither of which are necessary for civilian power. In 2009, Britain, France and the US exposed another secret enrichment facility under a mountain at Fordow that is too small for civilian fuel but big enough to produce weapons-grade uranium.

The International Atomic Energy Agency issued a report in November 2011 with detailed evidence of Iran’s nuclear weapons programme, which included a structured programme until 2003 and suspected activities since. In defiance of binding UN Security Council resolutions, Iran has expanded its enrichment capacity over recent years, reducing the time needed to reach one bomb’s worth of enriched uranium to two to three months. Iran has repeatedly refused the IAEA access to the Parchin military base, which is suspected to have been working on nuclear triggers, and has been working to cleanse the site of all evidence. Iran already has missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, and our Prime Minister warned in 2012 that Iran is developing intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The Iranians say that they are enriching uranium for nuclear energy, despite not having the capacity to make nuclear fuel rods and not having a nuclear power station that can use the fuel. Iran has only one nuclear power plant, which was built by the Russians, and it is contractually bound to use only Russian fuel rods in that plant. Experts have likened the situation to someone buying a gallon of petrol from a petrol station every day for 12 years despite not having a car. All those activities have been in direct breach of Iran’s non-proliferation treaty commitments and numerous binding UN Security Council resolutions.

I will talk a little about the nature of the current proposed deal and the concerns that it raises. The framework announced in Lausanne in April 2015 has created much concern. Henry Kissinger and George Shultz put it well in their article for The Wall Street Journal:

“Nuclear talks with Iran began as an international effort, buttressed by six U.N. resolutions, to deny Iran the capability to develop a military nuclear option. They are now an essentially bilateral negotiation over the scope of that capability… The impact of this approach will be to move from preventing proliferation to managing it.”

It was welcome to hear President Obama say earlier this week that he will

“walk away…if it’s a bad deal”.

At times we have heard from the US that the only alternative to the deal would be war. The impression has therefore been given that the US is more concerned than the Iranians about the consequences of not reaching a deal. Yet it is surely the case in any negotiation that, unless we are willing to walk away and unless we have an alternative to an agreement, we are negotiating from a point of weakness, which will be exploited by the other side. Even at this late stage, and given what the P5+1 have already conceded, we need to get a deal on the best terms possible to meet our basic concerns. That means not accepting a deal at any price.

The red lines tweeted by Supreme Leader Khamenei last week are clearly not consistent with an acceptable deal for the UK and our P5+1 partners. What is our plan B if the Iranians do not budge from those red lines? Will our Government press our P5+1 partners to keep negotiating for an acceptable deal? Will the UK consider calling for a further extension of the current joint plan of action to allow more time, if needed? Meanwhile, this week the Iranian President threatened that, if there is no deal, Iran

“will go back to the old path, stronger than what they can imagine.”

Will the Minister confirm that we will not be moved by such threats? If Iran does not agree to our minimum terms, walks out on the talks and carries out its threat to resume its stockpiling of enriched uranium and centrifuges, will there be a robust and effective response to dissuade it from that path?

I will now turn to the details of the deal under discussion. I am waiting to see exactly what emerges from Vienna. If an agreement is reached, we already know from the framework that it will allow Iran to become a nuclear threshold state. The framework says that Iran will scale back its enrichment capabilities for 10 to 15 years, but most of the restrictions on the enrichment and stockpiling of uranium will then expire. President Obama has said that the

“fear would be that in Year 13, 14, 15, they have advanced centrifuges that enrich uranium fairly rapidly, and at that point, the breakout times would have shrunk almost down to zero.”

As the framework will ultimately allow Iran to be within touching distance of nuclear weapons, and as Iran cannot be trusted, there are two critical concerns. The first is about knowing exactly what is going on inside Iran’s nuclear programme, and I have some specific questions about that.

First, is it a condition of the deal, and of the lifting of sanctions, that Iran answers all the IAEA’s questions about its suspected nuclear weapons research? Will the Minister confirm that, as his colleague the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the hon. Member for Bournemouth East (Mr Ellwood), told the House last month, it is essential that the IAEA

“is able to verify all of Iran’s nuclear-related commitments, including through access to relevant locations”?

How will the Government ensure that the IAEA can conduct intrusive and robust short-notice inspections of any site, including military locations, when Khamenei declared just a few days ago, while negotiations were taking place in Vienna, that such inspections will be limited? On research and development, will he confirm that the development of advanced centrifuges will be strictly limited to prevent the rapid technical upgrade and expansion of enrichment after the initial 10 years? Can he confirm that the remaining enriched uranium in Iran that is above the limits agreed in the framework will be irreversibly converted into a harmless form?

My second concern is that real and credible deterrents are needed in case Iran attempts to break out for a bomb either in the next 10 to 15 years or beyond that. Again, I have some specific questions. First, what discussions have the Government had with our American and European allies about how we would respond to Iranian violations? What planning will take place with our allies to deter Iran from making a dash to a bomb when its breakout time is, in the words of President Obama, “almost down to zero”?

How can the Government prevent Iran from acquiring the capability to produce nuclear weapons when the agreement is over? How will they ensure that the breakout time does not reduce to zero? How will the Government ensure that Iran does not continue to develop military aspects of its nuclear programme given that it has not come clean on past activities, has violated protocols signed in the past and has failed to comply with its commitments to the IAEA to answer questions posed by the nuclear watchdog?

How will the Government and our international partners deal with violations of the agreement? Does the Minister believe that a joint committee mechanism of which Iran is a member will be reliable for dealing with such violations? What mechanisms will be in place to quickly reimpose, or snap back, biting sanctions if necessary? What would be the threshold for snapping back EU sanctions? Is there a threshold, or would one follow political negotiation? Will the Government reaffirm that all options ultimately remain on the table to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons, should it try to do so in the future? Finally on the deal itself, every nuclear arms control agreement has included measures to control the means of delivery, so why does the current proposal lack a clause that deals with the issue?

I now want to raise some points about what will happen after the deal. We appear set to enter an agreement that, within 10 to 15 years, will allow Iran to reduce its breakout time to almost zero, according to President Obama. As the sanctions fall away, Iran will receive a huge economic and political boost, greatly empowering it in its ambitions to dominate the region. It is not surprising that that has united Israel and some Arab states in deep concern.

[Mark Pritchard (The Wrekin) (Con)]

I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on securing the debate. Of course the question has to be seen in the American, as well as the Israeli, geopolitical context. Does he agree, however, that the supreme leader, along with President Rouhani, would be better served by looking at Iran’s history? Great leaders from Persian history, such as King Darius and King Cyrus, supported the return of Jews from Persia to Jerusalem and helped to pay for the building of the Temple. That is real leadership, and it shows how to live in peace with Israel, rather than threaten it.

[Ian Austin]

I think Iran’s leaders would be better served by doing lots of things differently. I hesitate to use the words “wishful thinking”, but I am not sure how much confidence we can have that Iran’s present leadership will embark on the course of action that the hon. Gentleman has set out.

There is real concern right across the region that others—first and foremost, Saudi Arabia—will use the next 10 to 15 years to catch up with Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Former Saudi intelligence chief Turki al-Faisal said recently:

“Whatever the Iranians have, we will have, too.”

What will the UK and its allies do to reassure states in the region that they will deter Iran from breaking out to a bomb and, therefore, dissuade others from trying to match Iranian capabilities, creating a cascade of proliferation across the region?

There is also real concern that Iran will use its strengthened economic and political position to expand its existing destabilising activities. The country is shipping rockets to Palestinian armed groups in the Gaza strip and paying them to fire those rockets at Israel. It is also shipping rockets to Hezbollah in Lebanon, which now has 100,000 rockets aimed at Israel. In addition, it is shipping weapons to Houthi rebels in Yemen, propping up Assad in Syria and expanding its attempt to dominate a Shi’a-controlled Iraq. It is worth recalling that Hezbollah, which answers to the Iranian regime, is also guilty of murderous attacks on European soil. Just this week, a Hezbollah operative was convicted in Cyprus and sentenced to six years’ imprisonment for planning an attack against Israeli targets there.

Will the Minister tell us what discussions the Government are having with our US and EU allies and with friends in the region, including the Gulf states, Egypt, Jordan and Israel, about how to contain an Iran that will be unbound by this deal? How does the UK plan to work with its allies to deter Iran from pursuing more destabilising behaviour? In the short term, the deal is likely to grant Iran an immediate bonus, which could amount to up to $50 billion, as a result of the lifting of sanctions. How will the Government ensure that that money is not used to increase Iranian insurgent activities in Syria, Iraq and Yemen or to continue supporting and arming Hezbollah and Hamas? What conditions will the agreement place on the use of those assets?

It is particularly disgraceful that Iranian leaders have repeated open calls for the destruction of Israel. That includes the supreme leader, in November last year, tweeting a nine-point plan for Israel’s elimination. Will the Minister assure us that the tone of relations between this country and Iran will reflect the deep distaste we have for such rhetoric and for Iran’s general approach to the region? Finally, will he give a commitment that the UK will continue to enhance its strategic co-operation with Israel against shared threats, including Iranian behaviour?

I have put lots of questions to the Minister, and I appreciate that the debate taking place in the main Chamber means that he is having to deal with a policy area for which he is not personally and directly responsible, but I would be grateful if he could answer my questions either in the debate or, subsequently, in writing. If he would prefer, I would also be happy to table them as written questions.

--- Later in debate ---

[Patrick Grady (Glasgow North) (SNP)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir David. I congratulate the hon. Member for Dudley North (Ian Austin) on securing this debate, which recognises the importance of the issue. This is the second time it has been debated in Westminster Hall in recent weeks.

I agree with a certain amount of what has been said. Of course we deplore the baiting of Israel by the Supreme Leader of Iran or any attempt to destabilise the region in whatever form, but I would strike a slightly less hawkish tone than we have heard so far. Developments, however small, are welcome. It is a live, ongoing negotiation process, and there is rhetoric on both sides while detailed negotiations go on. Some progress is probably better than no progress at all.

Diplomatic relations between Iran and the west have thawed in recent years, and this is a manifestation of it, starting most recently with the Lausanne agreement and the ongoing talks. We can see the election of President Rouhani, who spent considerable time in Glasgow, completing his doctorate there, as a demonstration of willingness to make at least some kind of progress. Iran has also indicated it might accept the additional protocol of the agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, which again suggests a certain willingness to engage.

The issue has important consequences for the wider region. If a peaceful agreement can be achieved between Iran and the western powers, that could well represent a model for future agreements elsewhere in the region. If Iran is respected and demonstrates that it can be trusted, where appropriate, we might see more peaceful and democratic negotiations and transitions in the region. The negotiation process represents an important opportunity to get things right, and perhaps to help not just the region but the whole world make progress on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament—issues close to the heart of the Scottish National party.

We must consider the wider context of getting our own house in order when it comes to the messages that we send out from the United Kingdom with the decisions we make. The SNP is not ashamed to oppose the renewal of Trident and the existence of weapons of mass destruction on the Clyde or anywhere else in these islands. We are rightly opposed on moral and ethical grounds, because the destructive power of nuclear weapons and their ability to cause devastation and loss of life on an unimaginable scale is reason enough to scrap them wherever they exist. We are also opposed on the grounds of the cost and investment at this time of austerity. There is a consensus in Scotland that nuclear weapons should not be possessed by any country in the world: 57, not 56, of Scotland’s MPs agree. We will see where the shadow Secretary of State for Scotland goes when his party whips him on that.

There is also the question of nuclear power. Most people suggest that countries have a right to develop a peaceful civilian programme. Perhaps that is true—we would not have air conditioning today if it were not for a base-load provided by nuclear power stations—but the trend in this part of the world has been away from nuclear generation and towards renewables and so on. If we do not want other countries to develop civilian nuclear programmes, maybe we need to provide them with support for alternatives. Solar power is certainly not lacking in the parts of the world that we are debating. Perhaps that is a small example, but it goes to my wider point: as is so often the case, we must get our own house in order. The United Kingdom must lead by example. What right, moral or political, do we have to dictate terms to other countries if we are not prepared to apply the same standards to ourselves?

In welcoming the progress made diplomatically, I look forward to an update on where the negotiations are, and I encourage the Government to lead by example—not just in the negotiations as part of the western grouping, but in considering the impact of their domestic decisions in the areas of nuclear power and nuclear weapons.

[Ian Austin]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Patrick Grady]

No, I am just finishing. I encourage the Government to work ultimately towards a world that is both peaceful and nuclear-free.

--- Later in debate ---

[Ian Austin]

I apologise to you, Sir David, for getting your title wrong at the beginning of the debate.

I am grateful to all the Members who have taken part today. The Minister was presented with a lot of questions and I am grateful to him for the answers he gave. I particularly welcome his assurances that we will not do a bad deal, that we will not make a deal at any price and that we will not turn a blind eye to Iran’s destabilising of the region. I am grateful for the contributions made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden), and by the hon. Members for Tiverton and Honiton, for Central Suffolk and North Ipswich (Dr Poulter) and for Glasgow North (Patrick Grady).

That said, I want to make one point, which was the reason why I tried to intervene on the hon. Member for Glasgow North right at the end of his speech. I do not accept at all the argument that there is some sort of moral equivalence between us in the west and the Iranian leadership, nor do I accept his argument about getting our own house in order before we can comment on what the Iranians are trying to do. The truth is that Britain’s nuclear stance has not changed for 50 years. We are not promoting a radical anti-western ideology. We are not threatening to destroy other states. The issue is Iran, which, uniquely, signed the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, broke all its provisions with a secret nuclear weapons programme, and was caught red-handed on two occasions.

I must also say that we are not an autocratic dictatorship—1,200 people have been executed under Rouhani’s supposedly moderate leadership. We do not arrest journalists, bloggers and political activists and lock them up for years on end and we do not threaten to wipe other countries off the face of the Earth. It is utterly ludicrous to compare the Iranian regime with western democracies and say that we have to get our house in order before we can comment.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That this House has considered the Iranian nuclear programme.