Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Lord Armstrong of Ilminster Excerpts

Wednesday 4th February 2015 Lords Chamber

Universities, of course, in protecting themselves, will go for the position that makes them most secure. That will have a chilling effect, and will ultimately lead to a stifling of the very conversations that need to take place. There will be a chilling effect in the very communities that can, in the end, be the biggest answer to dealing with the issues of radicalisation and terrorism and those discussions will not be allowed to happen.

[Lord Armstrong of Ilminster (CB)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as a former Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Home Office and as a former chancellor of the University of Hull. I have therefore listened to this debate with great interest and concern. I find myself in a situation that was described in Committee by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I agreed with everything he said then, although I shall not repeat it.

The debate has swayed around the issue, and it seems very difficult for us to try to assign primacy between the duties under the Bill and the duties towards freedom of speech. The duty of preserving freedom of speech is, as so many speakers have said, of fundamental importance. However, we have seen that it is possible for people who wish to do so to be rather successful in radicalisation within the restrictions on freedom of speech within the law, so I have sympathy with what the Government are trying to achieve.

The merit of Amendment 14A proposed by the noble Lords, Lord Macdonald and Lord Pannick, and Amendment 15D proposed by the Government is that while the duties obviously conflict, the ultimate choice of what to do is left to the universities. No primacy on one or the other duty is expressed. The decision is left, presumably case by case, to the universities. That seems to be almost the only position possible if we are to retain some kind of inhibition on radicalisation in places of higher education.

[Lord Scott of Foscote (CB)]

My Lords, there have been some memorable speeches this evening. I want to add just a word or two. I have an interest: I have four children, two of whom are Muslims, and 12 grandchildren, seven of whom are Muslims. They are as indignant as anybody else about the outrages that are committed from time to time by members of their religion. They would be wholly supportive of everything that has been said in this debate.

Amendment 15D, as proposed by the Minister, seems to deal satisfactorily—with some exceptions which I propose to mention—with the main issue in this debate; that is, to reconcile the conflict between, on the one hand, the duty on universities to encourage and allow freedom of expression, and, on the other, the Clause 25(1) duty to protect people from being influenced into terrorism. Amendment 15D seems to deal with that, subject to some grammatical points on its second subsection where it refers to the two relevant duties.

One of the duties, imposed by Clause 25(1), is to protect people against terrorism; the other, under the Education Act (No. 2) 1986, is to allow and encourage freedom of speech. Those two duties are often in conflict, and the reconciliation between them is sought to be done with subsection (2) of the proposed new clause in Amendment 15D. It says:

“When carrying out the duty imposed by section 25(1)”—

which is the protection against terrorism, “a specified authority”, such as a university,

“to which this section applies must, if subject to the duty imposed by section 43(1) of”,

the Education Act,

“have particular regard to it”.

I read that several times as I was quite uncertain which of the two duties the “it” referred to. I hope it was referring to the freedom of speech duty but, as a reading of the subsection shows, it is grammatically perfectly capable of referring to the Clause 25(1) duty. That really ought to be sorted out before this amendment becomes final. It could be dealt with perfectly easily by ending subsection (2) with the words: “having particular regard to the freedom of speech duty”.

In subsection (3) of the proposed new clause, there is again this ambiguity as to what “that duty” refers to. There are two duties and it might be referring to either. I think that the duty being referred to in subsection (3) is probably the Clause 25(1) duty. These might be described as pedantic points, but they are the sorts of points that a chancery barrister, as I was when I began my legal career, would love to make in taking up the time of a judge in court. Goodness knows what answer the judge would give: different judges might give different answers, and that would mean that the legislation had a flaw in it. It is an ambiguity that needs to be corrected.